

lic Health Service general hospitals. Thanks to the constructive work of shipping labor-management groups and the Congress itself, the Bureau of the Budget has not been permitted to carry out such a purpose to date. However, this year the Bureau, utilizing the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, is again making a strong attempt to further impair this essential service by closing hospitals and transferring the seamen to veterans' hospitals already overcrowded and not tuned to the needs of shipping. I am one of those in the Congress who will oppose this ill-conceived proposal. The most concerted action by labor and management will be required to save these hospitals. It is unthinkable to me that a hospital service which has contributed so much to the medical and hospital care of the Nation should be under such heavy attack by the Bureau of the Budget. We should do everything possible to obtain a direct Presidential pronouncement to strengthen and maintain this service as well as our Veterans' Administration hospitals for the future. Such an action would be in keeping with all of the President's proposals on health and a greater society.

CARGO PREFERENCE

I can't believe that anyone is serious in wanting to phase out any segments of our industry from cargo preference in carrying Government aid. Those who argue that it is giving assistance where assistance is already given apparently do not apply the same criteria to the foreign ships. They should remember the scores of bargain-priced ships sold foreign to rehabilitate foreign fleets; the use of counterpart funds to help shipping and shipyard interests; the sale of American grain below our cost to the taxpayers to make shipments possible; the acceptance of foreign currency of questionable future value to provide the cargo which these foreign ships carry. We sometimes seem to have a strange philosophy in our country where we are blind to everything except what we can bestow on someone else. I believe our cargo preference laws are only one way of assuring that U.S.-flag ships may share in the product of American enterprise while at the same time sharing with those who are hungry and in need.

The Congress looks to the industry, both labor and management, for counsel and recommendations on maritime policies requiring congressional action. Building a strong American merchant marine is the job of all

of us. In the industry, labor and management must close ranks and through deliberate cooperation, one with the other, come forward with recommended programs to lift our maritime posture to the high status it deserves. Aggressive action on your part in this regard is required.

In conclusion, may I say that the American merchant marine must always be alert and ready for change. We live in dynamic times. Let us always adopt the best of new methods and devices in the interest of progress. However, let us retain the stable and proven processes which time has tested, including those human standards which transcend all other considerations. There is no virtue in change merely for the sake of change. There is every virtue in modification required for true progress in a fast-moving world.

I am sure that you all now agree that I can be somewhat lengthy when the occasion calls for it. I hope my remarks may prove helpful in some manner to the American merchant marine. If they do, then my departure from short speeches in this instance will have been well worthwhile.

Secrecy in Government Should Be Eliminated

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. SAM GIBBONS

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 22, 1965

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I believe that we should take every step possible to reduce secrecy in Government, and I am pleased to join with many of my colleagues in urging the passage of legislation to assure that Government records are available to the public. Too long the records of Government agencies have been shrouded in mystery and secrecy, surrounding the operations of our Government in a paper wall, which sometimes even a Congressman cannot cut, and preventing citizens from access to

information to which they are rightfully entitled.

Under the provisions of the bill I am introducing today, every Government agency would be required to "make all its records promptly available to any persons." However, sensitive information areas would be exempt, such as security and personnel matters and information that private concerns must submit to the Government. To enforce the right of citizens to receive information to which they are entitled, my bill provides that if a person is denied access to public records, he can go into a Federal district court and obtain an order for the production of agency records or information improperly withheld from him. It would be up to the Government to prove its right to withhold the records, and the courts could punish agency officials for contempt if they refused to comply with a judge's order.

The eight categories of "sensitive information" exempt from my bill are: national security secrets specifically protected by executive order; documents solely related to personnel records and practices; information specifically protected by other laws; privileged private commercial information obtained from the public, such as trade secrets; agency memorandums dealing solely with matters of law or policy; personnel and medical files; files of law enforcement agencies dealing with investigations; and reports of financial institutions submitted to regulatory agencies.

Secrecy in Government should be eliminated. It is by having a citizenry, knowledgeable in all facets of Government, that we remain strong. Freedom of information belongs to citizens whose Government is by the people, of the people, and for the people.

Congress should enact freedom of information measures to assure the free access of information from Government agencies; it can also lead the way by opening many of its executive, or secret, hearings to which the public is barred.

SENATE

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1965

The Senate met at 12 o'clock meridian, and was called to order by the Vice President.

Rev. Edward B. Lewis, pastor, Capitol Hill Methodist Church, Washington, D.C., offered the following prayer:

O God of all ages, we bow before Thee in need for this day and age.

This is a day and age of unrest and anxiety. Remind us of the words of Jesus, "Come unto Me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest."

This is a day of hate, distrust, and little peace throughout the world. Remind us of the words of our Lord, "Peace I leave with you; My peace, I give unto you."

On the other hand, ours is a day and age of great discovery, thrilling living, and glowing hope. Surround these blessings of real life with Thy love. Through

the touch of God, may we have more faith, hope, and love—the greatest of these being love.

O God of all ages, visit us in this day and age, through our leaders, our good citizenship, and our daring hopes.

We pray in the name of Jesus Christ, our Lord. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

On request of Mr. MANSFIELD, and by unanimous consent, the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Monday, February 22, 1965, was dispensed with.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages in writing from the President of the United States submitting nominations were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Jones, one of his secretaries.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate messages from the President of

the United States submitting sundry nominations, which were referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

(For nominations this day received, see the end of Senate proceedings.)

LIMITATION OF STATEMENTS DURING MORNING HOUR

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that statements made during the morning hour be limited to 3 minutes.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING DURING SENATE SESSION

On request of Mr. MANSFIELD, and by unanimous consent, the Special Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Committee on Public Works was authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

RESOLUTION OF THE OKLAHOMA STATE LEGISLATURE IN RELATION TO THE ELIMINATION OF THE U.S. ARMY RESERVE AND THE REORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, for myself and Senator MONRONEY, I present, for appropriate reference, and ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD, a concurrent resolution from the Oklahoma State Legislature expressing the opposition of the Oklahoma State Legislature against the proposed elimination of the U.S. Army Reserve and the reorganization of the National Guard. I renew the protest that I previously made to the Secretary of Defense, and I trust and hope that the appropriate committee of the Senate will investigate the question in order to see that the proper defenses of our country are preserved.

I should like to associate myself with the statement to be made by the senior Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MONRONEY], my distinguished colleague, and I ask unanimous consent also that his remarks appear immediately following the resolution in the RECORD.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The concurrent resolution was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, as follows:

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 5

Concurrent resolution expressing opposition of the Oklahoma State Legislature to the proposed elimination of the U.S. Army Reserve and reorganization of the National Guard

Whereas during our Nation's history, it has been necessary to wage wars in order to destroy tyrannies which were dedicated to the destruction of our status as a free people, and such tyrannies continue to exist; and

Whereas the very history of our country attests to the wisdom of its traditional military concept that, as a democracy, it may best deter aggression by the effective implementation of relatively small but thoroughly trained professional armed forces, adequately supported, however, by civilian components of such armed forces; and

Whereas such civilian components have proven themselves equal to the tasks assigned to them both in peace and in war, and have provided our country with a reservoir of personnel dedicated to its defense in numbers which its economy could not support and which its citizens would not tolerate as a standing professional armed force; and

Whereas we adhere to the firm belief that although weapons have changed and no doubt will continue to change, as they have throughout the history of mankind, the successful defense of our country, and of its people, must, in the final analysis, depend upon the ability of the people of our Armed Forces to take and to hold ground; and

Whereas in such belief, we do not discount the effectiveness of any weapon or weapons, but rather deem it folly to rely solely on one instrument or on a few instruments of war to the exclusion of all others: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate of the 30th Oklahoma Legislature (the House of Representatives concurring therein):

SECTION 1. The Oklahoma State Legislature hereby records its complete opposition to the recent move of the Secretary of Defense of the United States, the effect of which, if implemented, will be the destruction of the

U.S. Army Reserve and the reduction of the National Guard to a status of ineffectiveness.

SEC. 2. That a duly attested copy of this resolution be immediately transmitted by the secretary of the Oklahoma State Senate to the Secretary of the Senate of the United States, the Clerk of the House of Representatives of the United States, to each Member of the Congress from Oklahoma, and to the presiding officer of each branch of each State legislature or assembly of the United States.

Adopted by the senate the 7th day of January 1965.

LEA WINTERS,
President of the Senate.

Adopted by the house of representatives the 13th day of January 1965.

J. D. MCCARTHY,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
BASIL R. WILSON,
Secretary of the Senate.

Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, the resolution passed by the Oklahoma Legislature, which my colleague [Mr. HARRIS] and I have brought to the attention of the Senate today, emphasizes the complete unacceptability of proposals which would destroy the identity of such highly regarded fighting units as the 45th Division and such experienced and skilled outfits as the 95th Reserve Division.

Ill-advised mergers or consolidations of well identified and close-knit military organizations, such as the 95th and the 45th, could do irreparable damage to our national defense posture.

This resolution is most emphatic. In it, the Oklahoma Legislature records its firm opposition to the proposals recently advanced by the Secretary of Defense to merge and consolidate Army Reserve and National Guard organizations. In the opinion of the Oklahoma Legislature, the plans advanced by the Secretary, and here I quote, "Will be the destruction of the U.S. Army Reserve and the reduction of the National Guard to a status of ineffectiveness."

This legislative enactment stems from an intimate understanding of the contributions made by Oklahoma Army Reservists and Oklahoma National Guardsmen. This is not blind or unreasoning opposition.

The leaders of these two Oklahoma-based divisions have made it clear during the past few weeks that they desire to cooperate fully with higher headquarters in working out reorganizations that will bring economies and improve the mobilization readiness of their units.

I repeat, none of the Oklahomans who have discussed this matter with me, and I have had hundreds of my constituents comment to me on the subject, have taken an unreasonable attitude. They are not arguing against all changes. They are not opposed to progressive modernization of our Reserve and Guard organizations.

In Oklahoma, a number of reasonable alternative plans that deserve careful study have been advanced. But I am concerned, and this resolution makes it obvious that the Oklahoma Legislature is concerned, that a ruling clique in the Pentagon will act without full appreciation of the role these military organizations have played in the past. With the best of intentions, a small, insulated and isolated group of decisionmakers in the Pentagon may do irrevocable damage to

military organizations whose future strength and effectiveness are due in no small way to their identification with a proud and honorable past.

A disturbing trend toward overcomputerization and dehumanization is apparent in top level defense planning these days. There are adequate reasons to fear that Pentagon planners are relying too much on the cold sciences and mathematics of weaponry, ignoring far too often the more difficult equations based on assessments of human elements.

It is one thing to design, test, and produce a reliable gun, and a completely different thing to recruit and induct a citizen, to indoctrinate him, to train him in the use of a gun or other weapon, and to equip him with an esprit de corps based on an organization identity and tradition, to make a soldier of him.

Much is being said these days at the Pentagon about cost effectiveness. Many brilliant, dedicated men are engaged in an effort to reduce the tremendous cost of our defense system. But last December, when they disclosed plans for drastic reorganization of the Army's Reserve and National Guard structure, they raised grave questions concerning their methods of calculation. Adding machines or electronic data processing machines have not yet been invented that will measure the fighting spirit of our soldiers. How anyone could calculate the destruction of tried and proven military organizations without grave misgivings concerning the validity of such calculations is very difficult to understand.

Probably no State in the Union has more pride in its citizen soldiers of the Guard and Reserve than does Oklahoma. The 45th Infantry Division participated in eight campaigns during World War II for a total of 511 days in combat. Hundreds upon hundreds of Oklahoma's finest young men sacrificed their lives in defense of their country under its banners. In Europe and in Korea the enemy bloodied the hills and the valleys in unsuccessful efforts to haul down those banners. What an irony it would be to strike those banners only in the interest of doubtful economy.

In the past few days the Oklahoma delegation has been advised by the Secretary of the Army, Mr. Alles, that steps are being taken to preserve the identity of the 45th Infantry Division as the 45th Infantry Brigade, a unit which would retain the history, honors, colors, lineage, and traditional designation of our historic fighting Guard division.

As Oklahomans, we have the same interest in retaining the identity of the 95th Reserve Division, one of the high priority training divisions which now functions independently of the Guard through a separate chain of command direct to the Pentagon. Many good and valid arguments have been advanced to keep the Reserve units under separate management from our Guard outfits. I am particularly impressed with the fact guardsmen must double in brass, performing such missions as State militiamen under control of the Governors of the States—duties which sometimes mean involvement in civil disorders and

disasters, requiring a diversion from military training activities. The considerations involved here are exceedingly complex, requiring the technical skill of the military scientists, but I would remind our Pentagon leaders the talent and genius for analyzing problems of this kind are not the sole monopoly of this city or that big building just across the Potomac.

The competition that has existed between our Guard and Reserve organizations has been of incalculable help to our defense posture. What kind of machine was used at the Pentagon to calculate the value of this competitive approach.

I suspect that one of the big risks we run in our current defense philosophies and concepts is over reliance on weaponry, on rockets, on our hardware, and under emphasis and neglect of those difficult arts that come into play in converting the average American boy into a tough, reliable fighting man.

I was pleased to learn recently that the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, under the always tough, reliable leadership of Senator STENNIS, has scheduled hearings in order to review the proposals that have been advanced by the Secretary of Defense.

I have brought to the attention of the Preparedness Subcommittee alternatives that have been advanced by the National Guard and Reserve officers of Oklahoma.

I am confident the subcommittee will give close scrutiny to the various proposals that have been advanced. This study by a qualified Senate subcommittee can make an immeasurable contribution to our future national defense.

I am sure that the members of the Oklahoma Legislature, who adopted the resolution submitted here today, will be deeply interested in the outcome of the hearings.

We were advised that the Pentagon planners have virtually completed the blueprint of this consolidation of Reserve and Guard units. We were told that troop lists for each of the States will be sent to the Governors in the early part of March, and the Governors will be asked to approve that portion which deals with their particular State.

Oklahomans who are alarmed by this merger and consolidation program have been assured that alternative proposals advanced by the senior commanders in the field have received the most careful consideration. It is equally important that Pentagon calculators and planners give fullest consideration to the reaction of the rank and file, both military and civilian, as reflected in the Oklahoma legislative resolution, which my colleague [Mr. HARRIS] and I bring to the attention of the Senate today.

BILLS INTRODUCED

Bills were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. JAVITS:

S. 1234. A bill to encourage the preservation and development of a modern and efficient passenger rail transportation service in the northeastern seaboard area by

granting the consent and approval of Congress to the States of New York and Connecticut to negotiate and enter into a compact to create their own New York-Connecticut Rail Authority, and by guaranteeing certain bonds of, and furnishing certain assistance to, such authority; to the Committee on Commerce.

S. 1235. A bill for the relief of Miss Agnese Goffredo; and

S. 1236. A bill for the relief of Elizabeth J. Padilla; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

(See the remarks of Mr. JAVITS when he introduced the first above-mentioned bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. TALMADGE (for himself and Mr. HART):

S. 1237. A bill to encourage the creation of original ornamental designs of useful articles by protecting the authors of such designs for a limited time against unauthorized copying; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HART:

S. 1238. A bill for the relief of Clifton M. Chippewa; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

S. 1239. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to allow an exemption for a dependent who has attained age 65 without regard to the amount of income of such dependent; to the Committee on Finance.

S. 1240. A bill to provide for exemption from the antitrust laws to assist in safeguarding the balance-of-payments position of the United States; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

(See the remarks of Mr. HART when he introduced the last two above mentioned bills which appear under separate headings.)

By Mr. HART (for himself, Mr. FONG, Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts, Mr. PELL, and Mr. SCOTT):

S. 1241. A bill to amend section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

(See the remarks of Mr. HART when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. McCARTHY:

S. 1242. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to treat income from property created by the taxpayer as earned income for certain purposes; to the Committee on Finance.

By Mr. JACKSON (by request):

S. 1243. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to employ aliens in a scientific or technical capacity; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

(See the remarks of Mr. JACKSON when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts:

S. 1244. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Maria Luisa D. Furtado;

S. 1245. A bill for the relief of Maria Manuela Sousa Carvalho;

S. 1246. A bill for the relief of Emmanouel Christos Stasinou; and

S. 1247. A bill for the relief of Pablo Cordero; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. FONG:

S. 1248. A bill to provide for the approval of a payment in lieu of taxes to be made for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1959, by the Hawaii Housing Authority to the city and county of Honolulu; to the Committee on Government Operations.

By Mr. McGEE:

S. 1249. A bill for the relief of Leo Weiss; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

S. 1250. A bill to amend Public Law 874, 81st Congress, relating to financial assistance for local educational agencies in federally impacted areas, in order to give the Commissioner of Education discretion to waive a minimum requirement for such assistance; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

By Mr. NELSON:

S. 1251. A bill to prescribe certain safety features for all motor vehicles manufactured for, sold or shipped in interstate commerce; to the Committee on Commerce.

(See the remarks of Mr. NELSON when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. MUNDT:

S. 1252. A bill to give farmers an additional month in which to meet the requirement of filing a declaration of estimated tax by filing an income tax return for the taxable year for which the declaration is required; to the Committee on Finance.

(See the remarks of Mr. MUNDT when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. TOWER:

S. 1253. A bill for the relief of Lolita G. Soriano; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HRUSKA:

S. 1254. A bill for the relief of Ljubica Dajcinovic; and

S. 1255. A bill for the relief of Lualro Torres Quiazon; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. TOWER (for himself and Mr. PEARSON):

S. 1256. A bill to amend Public Law 874, 81st Congress, providing assistance to schools in federally impacted areas, in order to provide for a more gradual reduction of payments pursuant thereto as a result of termination of activities of the Department of Defense; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

(See the remarks of Mr. TOWER when he introduced the above bills, which appear under separate headings.)

By Mr. TOWER:

S. 1257. A bill to extend for 5 years Public Laws 815 and 874, 81st Congress, relating to Federal assistance to education in federally impacted areas; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

By Mr. NELSON:

S. 1258. A bill for the relief of the widow and minor children of the Reverend Donald Aksel Olsen; to the Committee on Finance.

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

TO EXPRESS THE SENSE OF CONGRESS RELATIVE TO SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES OF LATVIA, LITHUANIA, AND ESTONIA

Mr. MILLER (for himself and Mr. HICKENLOOPER) submitted a concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 23) to express the sense of Congress relative to self-determination of peoples of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

(See the above concurrent resolution printed in full when submitted by Mr. MILLER, which appears under a separate heading.)

RESOLUTION

MEMORIAL SERVICES ON THE LIFE, CHARACTER, AND PUBLIC SERVICE OF THE LATE SENATOR CLAIR ENGLE

Mr. MANSFIELD (for himself and Mr. DIRKSEN) submitted a resolution (S. Res. 81) providing for memorial addresses on the life, character, and public service of Hon. Clair Engle, late a Senator from the State of California, to be held at 2 o'clock p.m., on Monday, March 1, 1965; which was considered and agreed to.

(See the above resolution printed in full when agreed to, which appears under a separate heading.)

CREATION OF A NEW YORK-CONNECTICUT RAIL AUTHORITY

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I send to the desk a bill to create a New York-Connecticut Rail Authority to deal with the critical problem of continued commuter services on the bankrupt New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad.

I ask unanimous consent that the bill may be referred to the Committee on Commerce. I wish to state for the RECORD that my office has checked with the staffs of the Committee on Commerce and the Committee on the Judiciary. I understand that such referral is acceptable to those committees, so that all hearings on the New Haven situation may occur in one committee. If the chairmen of either of the committees have any question about the request, I shall move to set aside the unanimous-consent agreement.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and the bill will be received and referred to the Committee on Commerce.

The bill (S. 1234) to encourage the preservation and development of a modern and efficient passenger rail transportation service in the northeastern seaboard area by granting the consent and approval of Congress to the States of New York and Connecticut to negotiate and enter into a compact to create their own New York-Connecticut Rail Authority, and by guaranteeing certain bonds of, and furnishing certain assistance to, such authority, introduced by Mr. JAVITS, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Commerce.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the critical nature of the New Haven's present situation demands emergency action by both the affected States and the Federal Government. We must face up to two basic facts—one, that the New Haven's cash situation is absolutely critical; and two, that it is possible that the U.S. Federal district court judge now presiding over the New Haven, under the Bankruptcy Act, could seek to take action on his own to curtail or discontinue passenger service on the ground of protection of the existing assets for creditors of the bankrupt railroad.

The operating cash funds of the New Haven were reduced from \$8.5 million at the end of 1963 to \$6.2 million at the end of 1964, a loss of \$2.3 million for the year. An additional \$1.7 million is owed by the railroad for a retroactive wage increase. The trustees of the New Haven estimate that the operating cash fund will have dwindled to \$4.4 million—less than 1 month's payroll—by July 1. An unexpected snowstorm or disruption of passenger and freight services of the type which cost the railroad \$3.9 million in February of 1961, would substantially reduce this estimate.

The time for discussion has almost run out. While a long-term solution should not be overlooked, it is essential that

financial aid be made available promptly to permit the New Haven to continue operations. The amount of financial aid needed is relatively modest, and in view of the sizable amounts which the States and the Federal Government have spent in sustaining highway construction, air service, helicopter travel, ship construction, and other means of transportation, financial assistance to sustain the New Haven which serves in excess of 30,000 commuters daily, is, we believe, fully justified. Failure to keep the New Haven operating would bring about not only intolerable restrictions on the flow of commuter traffic in heavily urbanized areas of New York and Connecticut, but would result in increasing the burdens of already crowded highways and the need for added Federal and State expenditures for highway construction under a 90-10 or 50-50 matching fund program. The loss of the four tracks of the New Haven would, according to a recent survey, require the construction of 80 highway lanes at prohibitive cost.

The two-State emergency compact is the most workable and immediately attainable alternative in this emergency situation. It can be approved by the participating States in a much shorter time than the four-State agency which we originally called for, and which we still feel is essential to meet long-term, regional transportation problems.

Under this measure, the authority could be expanded to include additional northeastern States, such as New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts, and transit systems within all the participating States, such as the New York City rapid transit system.

The bill we are proposing today would establish a New York-Connecticut Public Authority to operate commuter services of the New Haven and other rail systems in the two States needing Federal and State assistance. The authority could operate the New Haven's commuter services by itself or on a leasing basis and could administer Federal aid available under the Mass Transportation Act of 1964. The bill would authorize the Secretary of Commerce to pay for a 2-year period, one-third of any excess of operating costs over revenues which the authority incurred; with the participating States paying the remainder under a formula to be determined by the authority with the consent of both States.

The measure allows the authority to submit to the participating States a request for payment of their agreed upon share of such costs and provides for means of payment consistent with the States own constitutional and legal requirements for financing future obligations. The bill also permits the participating States, as well as the Federal Government, to guarantee tax-free bonds, publicly offered by the authority in an amount of up to \$500 million for capital expenditures, including purchase of new commuter cars. The authority could also lease cars from State and Interstate agencies, such as the Port of New York Authority, and make them available to needy railroads.

Positive steps have been taken both by the States and the Federal Government. On January 21, the Governors of New York and Connecticut announced an agreement to support contributions by each State of \$5 million and to seek \$10 million from the Federal Government under the Mass Transportation Act of 1964 for the purchase of 80 new multiple unit commuter cars and the rehabilitation of 50 others for the New Haven. At that time, the need to provide help to the New Haven to meet its operating deficits was expressly acknowledged. We believe such a need must be urgently dealt with, and urge the States of New York and Connecticut to set aside funds in the next month to meet the railroad's operating deficit.

On a Federal level, the Interstate Commerce Commission has guaranteed \$8 million of trust certificates sold by the trustees to provide operating cash and stands behind an additional \$4.5 million of unissued certificates. The ICC is also presently considering the inclusion of the New Haven Railroad in the pending Pennsylvania Railroad-New York Central merger. We have favored such a merger in the public interest. This merger may well provide a long-term solution to some of the New Haven's problems. We have also met with the Chairman of the ICC, Commerce Department officials and administrators of the mass transportation program to obtain up to date information on what action the Federal Government can take and we are continuing to seek aid for the New Haven Railroad under that program. We have also met with the trustees of the New Haven and have talked with the Attorney General and officers of the Pennsylvania and New York Central Railroads concerning this matter.

While a short-term solution has been sought, we have endeavored also to find a long-term answer to the New Haven's problems and the overall regional rail transportation needs of New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts. On January 8, Senator PELL, of Rhode Island, introduced legislation to establish a four-State Northeast authority. While we disagreed with some of the financing provisions of that bill which would have, in our belief, imposed open and long-term financial obligations upon the participating States which made acceptance difficult, we strongly endorsed the principle of a four-State agency to deal with the long-term problems of rail systems in the Northeast.

The legislation we introduce today, expressly provides authority for the inclusion of additional States as members of the authority. It is hoped that the States of Rhode Island and Massachusetts and New Jersey would be interested in entering this compact and that this expanded authority would deal with regional problems. A comprehensive planning authority for this region is necessary. A short-term solution for the New Haven's critical situation is essential now, but the machinery for a long-term solution must also be established without delay.

We have urged the States to act, and we shall continue to do so, especially in terms of the immediate contribution of cash. But the Federal Government must also play an essential role in the solution of the problem.

So I urge the immediate attention of Congress to this critically important matter. I would like to compliment the chairman of the Committee on Commerce, the distinguished Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] and the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE] on scheduling early hearings.

AMENDMENT OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE ACT OF 1954

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I introduce for appropriate reference a bill to amend the Internal Revenue Act of 1954 to allow an exemption for a dependent who has attained age 65 without regard to the amount of income of such dependent. This is similar to a bill I introduced at the close of the last session, too late for a departmental report. This I hope will shortly be forthcoming this year, so that action can be taken.

The bill seeks to respond to a very difficult problem, which is a burden borne by a great number of people in this country—the case of a child who assists materially in the support of a parent who has more—but often not much more—than \$600 a year income. Since the parent under present law cannot be claimed as a dependent, often the child has to pay very burdensome medical expenses for the parent without being able to claim the parent's medical exemptions. In my exploration of this matter with the Internal Revenue Service I got the impression that cases like this are more common than many of us realize, and I believe the Congress should take steps to lessen the burden borne so cheerfully, and willingly, but at great financial cost, by children of parents in this category. I hope the Finance Committee looks into this question with the appropriate department so that we may move forward during this Congress.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 1239) to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to allow an exemption for a dependent who has attained age 65 without regard to the amount of income of such dependent, introduced by Mr. HART, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Finance.

EXEMPTIONS FROM ANTITRUST LAWS, RELATING TO BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. HART. Mr. President, in his persuasive message to the Congress of February 10, the President made a number of recommendations to meet the balance-of-payments problem. Some of these recommendations would require legislative action. Such is the case if the banking community is to cooperate effectively in the overall efforts of the

administration on this most pressing problem. To cooperate will require certain exemptions from the antitrust laws.

Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce a bill which would carry out the suggestions on this point, and ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill, together with a letter from the Attorney General to the Vice President of the United States, be printed at this point in my remarks.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the bill and letter will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 1240) to provide for exemptions from the antitrust laws to assist in safeguarding the balance-of-payments position of the United States, introduced by Mr. HART, was received, read twice by its title, referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 1240

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That it is declared to be the policy of Congress to safeguard the position of the United States with respect to its international balance of payments. To effectuate this policy the President shall undertake continuous surveillance over the private flow of dollar funds from the United States to foreign countries, the solicitation of cooperation by banks, investment bankers and companies, insurance companies, finance companies, and pension funds to curtail expansion of such flow, and the authorization of such voluntary agreements or programs as may be necessary and appropriate to safeguard the position of the United States with respect to its international balance of payments.

SEC. 2. (a) The President is authorized to consult with representatives of banks, investment bankers and companies, insurance companies, finance companies, and pension funds to stimulate voluntary efforts to aid in the improvement of the balance of payments position of the United States.

(b) When the President finds it necessary and appropriate to safeguard the United States balance of payments position, he may request banks, investment bankers and companies, insurance companies, finance companies, and pension funds to discuss among themselves the formulation of voluntary agreements or programs to achieve such objective. If the President makes such a request, no such discussion nor the formulation of any voluntary agreement or program in the course of such discussion shall be construed to be within the prohibitions of the antitrust laws or the Federal Trade Commission Act of the United States, provided that no act or omission to act in effectuation of such voluntary agreement or program is taken until after such voluntary agreement or program is approved in accordance with the provisions of subsections (c) and (d) hereof.

(c) The President may approve any voluntary agreement or program among banks, investment bankers and companies, insurance companies, finance companies, and pension funds that he finds to be necessary and appropriate to safeguard the United States balance of payments position. No act or omission to act which occurs pursuant to any such approved voluntary agreement or program, shall be construed to be within the prohibitions of the antitrust laws or the Federal Trade Commission Act.

(d) No voluntary agreement or program shall be approved by a delegate of the President except after submission to the

Attorney General for his review as to its effect on competition and a finding by the Attorney General that the actual or potential detriment to competition is outweighed by the benefits of such agreement or program to the safeguarding of the United States balance of payments position.

(e) The Attorney General shall continuously review the operation of any agreement or program approved pursuant to this Act, and shall recommend to the President the withdrawal or suspension of such approval if in his judgment its actual or potential detriment to competition outweighs its benefit to the safeguarding of the United States balance-of-payments position.

(f) The Attorney General shall have the authority to require the production of such books, records, or other information from any participant in a voluntary agreement or program as he may determine reasonably necessary for the performance of his responsibilities under this Act.

(g) Upon withdrawal of any request or finding made hereunder or approval granted hereunder, or upon termination of this Act, the provisions of this section shall not apply to any subsequent act or omission to act.

SEC. 3. The President may require such reports as he deems necessary to carry out the policy of this Act from any person, firm, or corporation within the United States concerning any activities affecting the United States balance of payments position.

SEC. 4. The President may delegate the authority granted him by this Act, except that the authority granted in section 2(c) may be delegated to only officials appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, whether acting singly or jointly or as a committee or board.

SEC. 5. This Act and all authority conferred thereunder shall terminate on December 31, 1967, or on such date prior thereto as the President shall find that the authority conferred by this Act is no longer necessary as a means of safeguarding the balance of payments position and shall by proclamation so declare.

The letter presented by Mr. HART is as follows:

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Washington, D.C., February 17, 1965.

THE VICE PRESIDENT,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. VICE PRESIDENT: Transmitted herewith for consideration and appropriate reference is a draft bill entitled "An act to provide for exemptions from the antitrust laws to assist in safeguarding the balance-of-payments position of the United States."

This bill is submitted to implement recommendations contained in the President's message to Congress of February 10, 1965, on the balance of payments (H. Doc. 83, 89th Cong.). In that message the President indicated that he was requesting the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in cooperation with the Secretary of the Treasury to enroll the banking community in a major effort to limit lending abroad. The President also stated that to insure effective cooperation by the banking community he would request legislation which would authorize voluntary cooperation by American bankers under governmental auspices and provide such exemption from the antitrust laws as might be necessary to permit cooperative plans of action. The enclosed draft bill is designed to effectuate the President's objective. Adequate safeguards are provided in the bill to make certain that joint action does not exceed that which is necessary to deal effectively with the balance-of-payments situation.

It is contemplated that as part of the program representatives of the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve System may meet from time to time with the banks and

other institutions significantly engaged in foreign financing and consult with them individually and in groups concerning means of curtailing the outflow of funds through extension of credits. In this connection, we understand that the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has already requested banks to limit credits to foreigners. It could become necessary for the President or his delegates to request financial institutions to develop and undertake specific voluntary agreements or programs to restrict their lending activities. Under this proposed legislation the President would be authorized to approve voluntary agreements or programs formulated by the cooperating institutions.

To assure full cooperation, the bill would exempt from the prohibitions of the anti-trust laws and the Federal Trade Commission Act activities in connection with the development and implementation of voluntary agreements and programs undertaken at the request of the Government. The proposed legislation is similar in many respects to the provisions of the Defense Production Act of 1950 which were in effect during the Korean war period and continue in effect to a more limited extent today.

The exemptions provided in the enclosed bill are carefully limited. The authority of the President to approve voluntary agreements and programs may be delegated only to officers appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. It is contemplated that such agreements and programs would be approved only if found to be necessary and appropriate to safeguard the U.S. balance-of-payments position. Unless an exceptional situation arises requiring direct action by the President himself, they will be approved only after submission to the Attorney General for his review as to the effect on competition and a finding by him that the actual or potential detriment to competition is outweighed by the benefits in safeguarding the U.S. balance-of-payments position. The Attorney General is authorized to require the production of any books and records that he may need in order to keep a careful watch as to the effects of any agreement or program upon competition, and to recommend to the President the withdrawal or suspension of any approval given pursuant to the act if in his judgment the actual or potential detriment to competition outweighs its balance-of-payments benefits.

The bill also provides needed legal authority pursuant to which the President can require reports so that constant surveillance may be maintained over the trends in foreign lending and other significant aspects of the President's balance-of-payments program.

The proposed enactment would expire on December 31, 1967, or sooner if the President determines and by proclamation declares that the authority conferred by the act is no longer necessary as a means of safeguarding the balance-of-payments position.

This bill has been prepared in consultation with the Treasury Department and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Both agencies join in urging its prompt enactment.

The Bureau of the Budget has advised that enactment of this legislation is in accord with the program of the President.

Sincerely,

NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH,
Attorney General.

AMENDMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT OF 1952

Mr. HART. Mr. President, on behalf of myself, the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. FONG], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PELL], and the Sen-

ator from Pennsylvania [Mr. SCOTT], I introduce for appropriate reference, a bill to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 to permit the adjustment of status of refugees resident in the United States, who are natives of countries contiguous to the United States or of any adjacent islands, including Cuba.

The bill eliminates the technical requirement of our immigration laws which requires such aliens to leave this country and reenter, in order to become eligible for permanent residence. I do not question this requirement for aliens who have come here through normal procedure and in casual circumstances, and then elect to apply for permanent residence. The requirement, however, would seem to have little justification in the case of refugees from the Communist regime in Cuba. Certainly, their entry into this country was anything but normal and casual—they were under duress and fleeing oppression.

Moreover, the requirement inhibits the rather substantial Federal program of assistance administered by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. As Senators know, the purpose of this program is to render effective asylum by providing our Cuban guests with opportunities for self-support, chiefly through resettlement. The program is carried out in cooperation with several voluntary agencies, religious bodies, and civic organizations.

Mr. President, the talents of many Cuban refugees are going to waste because State professional licensing laws keep those without permanent status from practicing their skills or professions. This situation, and the expensive and laborious procedure to obtain this status under present law, is keeping refugees on relief rolls in various difficult circumstances. I am thinking of examples in Michigan, where, because of their immigration status, qualified Cubans have been unable to teach Spanish in the local public schools. It is obvious, however, that such refugees could fill an urgent need if given the opportunity for adjustment of status.

Examples in Michigan are multiplied throughout the country; in every State and on the public assistance rolls of the Cuban Refugee Center in Miami.

The bulk of the refugees are highly skilled and educated persons: qualified teachers of Spanish; professional, technical, and managerial workers; office personnel; and skilled workers. In my book, this reservoir of talent should be tapped to the fullest extent in the interest of the individual Cuban, for the development of our society.

Legislation to permit an adjustment of status for Cuban refugees would help accomplish this objective, and also assist in phasing out the Cuban refugee program.

Legislative action should also encourage the resettlement of Cubans to other countries in this hemisphere, where refugee talent would contribute to economic, social, and political development. And certainly, there are no more effective spokesmen to describe the destruction of

freedom under Castro's brand of communism than the Cubans who have fled their homeland.

Today, however, refugees are hesitant to leave the United States. Under their present immigration status they are not assured of reentry, if for valid reasons they choose to return. The proposed bill would help remedy the situation.

The Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees, which I have had the honor to serve as chairman, conducted extensive hearings on the Cuban refugee problem. On the basis of its findings, I believe that passage of the bill I offer today would have beneficial effects for all concerned.

It should be noted that the bill is permissive rather than mandatory. It does not automatically blanket all Cuban refugees with an adjustment of status. The bill is a limited measure, which will afford an opportunity for adjustment of status to those refugees who need or desire it to ply their skills and talents. The usual screening process, of course, would apply in all cases.

Public Law 85-559, enacted in 1958 for Hungarian refugees, is somewhat of a precedent for the bill I offer today.

Mr. President, I hope, sincerely, the Senate will act promptly on the bill.

I ask unanimous consent that the bill I offer today lay on the desk for 1 week for additional cosponsors.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, will lie on the desk as requested.

The bill (S. 1241) to amend section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, introduced by Mr. HART (for himself and other Senators), was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

EMPLOYMENT OF ALIENS IN A SCIENTIFIC OR TECHNICAL CAPACITY BY DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, by request, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to employ aliens in a scientific or technical capacity.

This measure was drafted by the Department of the Interior, and was transmitted to the Congress with a request for introduction and reference. It would extend to the Interior Department the same authority now possessed by a number of other agencies of the Federal Government to recruit and compensate qualified scientists and technicians who are not U.S. citizens for special projects and studies.

The measure would provide for adequate security and other appropriate investigations of any aliens so engaged. It is made necessary by a provision in the Public Works Appropriations Act which precludes use of appropriated funds to compensate aliens for employment in the United States except under certain restrictive conditions.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill and the accompanying letter from the Interior

Department be printed at this point in the RECORD.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the bill and letter will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 1243) to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to employ aliens in a scientific or technical capacity, introduced by Mr. JACKSON, by request, was received, read twice by its title, referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 1243

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Interior to the extent he determines to be necessary, and subject to adequate security investigations, and such other investigations as he may determine to be appropriate, and subject further to a prior determination by him that no qualified United States citizen is available for the particular position involved, is authorized to employ and compensate aliens in a scientific or technical capacity at authorized rates of compensation without regard to statutory provisions prohibiting payment of compensation to aliens.

The letter presented by Mr. JACKSON is as follows:

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Washington, D.C., February 8, 1965.

Hon. HUBERT H. HUMPHREY,
President of the Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Enclosed is a draft of a proposed bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to employ aliens in a scientific or technical capacity.

We recommend that the bill be referred to the appropriate committee for consideration, and we recommend that it be enacted.

The bill extends to this Department authority to employ aliens of any country in a scientific or technical capacity. The Secretary of the Interior is precluded by the Public Works Appropriation Act from using appropriations to compensate aliens whose post of duty is in the continental United States unless certain statutory requirements are met. Section 502 of the Public Works Appropriation Act, 1964, approved December 31, 1963, Public Law 88-257, provides in part:

"Unless otherwise specified and during the current fiscal year, no part of any appropriation contained in this or any other Act shall be used to pay the compensation of any officer or employee of the Government of the United States (including any agency the majority of the stock of which is owned by the Government of the United States) whose post of duty is in continental United States unless such person (1) is a citizen of the United States, (2) is a person in the service of the United States on the date of enactment of this Act, who, being eligible for citizenship, had filed a declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States prior to such date, (3) is a person who owes allegiance to the United States, or (4) is an alien from Poland or the Baltic countries lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence. * * * That any payment made to any officer or employee contrary to the provisions of this section shall be recoverable in action by the Federal Government. This section shall not apply to citizens of the Republic of the Philippines or to nationals of those countries allied with the United States in the current defense effort, or to temporary employment of translators, or to temporary employment in the field service (not to exceed sixty days) as a result of emergencies."

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A provision similar to that quoted above has been carried in one of the appropriation acts for several years, and it is assumed that it will be repeated in the future.

Authority similar to our proposed bill was recently granted by the Congress to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and to the Smithsonian Institution. Congress has exempted the Department of Defense from the prohibitions against employment of noncitizens. The Departments of State and Agriculture, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Public Health Service have also been given authority by Congress to employ noncitizens for certain necessary purposes.

The proposed legislation enables this Department, in the absence of qualified U.S. citizens, to broaden its area of recruitment in searching for talented personnel with unique technical and scientific skills, regardless of the country of origin of an individual being considered. It removes the anomalous situation whereby individual scientists of outstanding ability and experience, who are citizens of neutral countries, may not be offered employment unless they are employed on projects for which funds can be transferred from agencies that do have authority to hire such specialists.

The authority will be used to fill vacancies in current research and investigations programs that require qualified scientists and engineers with a depth of training and experience or a special combination of unusual abilities not commonly available in a single person. Lack of qualified applicants to fill present vacancies may result in postponement of needed research programs.

Examples of the kinds of specialists currently being sought include nuclear scientists skilled in mass spectrometer techniques and experienced in the absolute dating of rock specimens for geochronological studies (most of whom are Swiss nationals); scientists experienced in Arctic or Antarctic exploration with sufficiently broad training to extract maximum information from field work performed at high cost under the most severe working conditions, including work performed on limited time schedules at points of observation where access is difficult, as in certain areas of Alaska (such specialists are few in number and are principally Scandinavian or Canadian nationals, of which Swedish and Finnish scientists cannot currently be employed). Other examples include scientists with technical training and linguistic ability in the central European, Asiatic, and other less well-known languages, and with geographic familiarity with areas not currently accessible to travel, who would act not as translators as such, but provide scientific interpretations of materials produced in the geographic areas they know.

These specialists would be employed "subject to adequate security investigations, and such other investigations as he (the Secretary of the Interior) may determine to be appropriate" and "at authorized rates of compensation." These investigative provisions are not intended to permit lower investigative standards for aliens than for citizens. Rather, the above provisions are intended to insure that no security risks will be employed and that aliens will not be employed in scientific or technical capacities at rates which exceed those of citizens in identical or similar positions within the Department. Additionally, the bill provides that these specialists would be hired only after a determination by the Secretary of the Interior that no qualified U.S. citizen was available for the particular position involved.

The Bureau of the Budget has advised that there is no objection to the presentation of this draft bill from the standpoint of the administration's program.

Sincerely yours,

D. OTIS BEASLEY,
Assistant Secretary of the Interior.

S. 1243

A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to employ aliens in a scientific or technical capacity

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Interior to the extent he determines to be necessary, and subject to adequate security investigations, and such other investigations as he may determine to be appropriate, and subject further to a prior determination by him that no qualified United States citizen is available for the particular position involved, is authorized to employ and compensate aliens in a scientific or technical capacity at authorized rates of compensation without regard to statutory provisions prohibiting payment of compensation to aliens.

PROVISION OF SAFETY FEATURES FOR ALL MOTOR VEHICLES USED IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, today automobile accidents are a major and increasingly serious hazard to the public. The automobile ranks as one of the four leading causes of death in the United States. While millions of dollars are spent on cancer and heart research, two other major killers, we continue to ignore these dramatic statistics:

Over 47,000 people were killed on our Nation's highways last year.

Approximately 4.8 million people were injured in automobile accidents last year.

In the critical age group of 5 to 29, the automobile is the No. 1 killer.

An American's chances of escaping injury in a car crash during the whole of his lifetime is no better than 50-50, as estimated by one expert in the January issue of American Trial Lawyers.

Approximately 50 times as many people died in auto accidents as died in airplane accidents last year.

The U.S. Air Force loses more of its men in auto accidents each year than in aircraft accidents.

The figures are appalling, yet the slaughter goes on. What is being done to protect the millions of Americans whose lives are directly affected by the automobile?

Progress has been slow, but there is at last some indication of possible action. The Senator from Connecticut [Mr. RIBICOFF] deserves our congratulations for the traffic safety statement he made last week. His proposal to review the Federal Government's role in accident prevention should receive universal support. The problems of poor highway construction, confusing signs and traffic markings, inadequate driver licensing programs and mechanical failure of the automobile all deserve attention. They certainly contribute to the high death rate on our highways. I have introduced legislation to protect the consumer from faulty tires by requiring minimum safety standards and a system of quality grading and labeling.

These approaches to traffic safety problems attempt to get at part of the problem. They deserve consideration. But there is more to be done. We must direct our attention to another fundamental matter: the unsafe construction of cars themselves.

Forty-three percent of the people who die in auto accidents die under survivable conditions, according to the estimate of Elmer Paul, of the U.S. Public Health Service Accident Prevention Bureau. Their accidents have many causes, but their deaths have one: the unsafe nature of the car itself.

This means that almost one-half of our total highway fatality rate is unnecessary and could be eliminated by simple reconstruction of the vehicle.

It is only realistic to acknowledge that as long as the human being is in control of the vehicle, accidents will occur. Our attention must therefore be focused on reducing injury after the original impact has occurred. This concept is often referred to as safety during the "second collision"—the collision not only of the car in the accident, but of the occupant of the car with the interior of his own vehicle.

Dr. James Malfetti of the safety project at Columbia University recently stated:

We design cars and roads and then tell the driver to adapt himself to them as best he can. We should start the other way around. Let us first find out what the driver's capacities are and then build cars and roads to fit them.

How to achieve safety in the "second collision" is a concept which has been studied by the experts. Serious research has been going on for over a decade. There is agreement that the present construction of most cars hamper the driver's ability to avoid accidents. This results in the actual causation of accidents. Beyond this, there is a consensus that the construction of cars contributes to unnecessary injuries and deaths after the original impact.

The findings of such groups as the crash injury research project at Cornell University, the Institute of Transportation and Traffic Engineering of the University of California, the University of Minnesota, the University of Michigan Medical School, Harvard University, Wayne State University, the American Association for Automotive Medicine, and the U.S. Public Health Service are important contributions to the field of safety research. These expert groups have shown that:

If cars were built so that protection could be provided for the head alone, at least one out of five people who are now dying in auto accidents would be saved.

If cars were built with seat and shoulder belts which would hold people in the car in an accident, thousands of lives would be saved: If a person is thrown from the car, the chance of death is five times as great.

If cars were built with only three basic changes, occupants could probably survive any crash up to 35 miles per hour—and statistics show that 87 percent of all accidents occur at impact speed of 35 miles per hour or below. The three basic changes are: shoulder harnesses; doors which will stay closed in a crash; and collapsible steering shafts.

What do these statistics mean in practical language? Simply, that if we take action now to make cars themselves

safer, the frightening number of deaths and injuries occurring on our highways can be dramatically reduced.

The need for changes is obvious. But one factor impedes progress in this area. That factor is the conviction in Detroit that "safety doesn't sell." It is the stylist who reigns supreme in the automobile industry, not the safety and engineering experts.

The slightest mention of safety standards seems to cause panic in the automobile industry and I can understand their concern about ill-considered regulation. But, there is no intent to propose impractical or unreasonable standards. The industry will be consulted at each step of the way. This is a matter of great public concern. The purpose of the proposed legislation is to find a way to reduce the death toll on the highways.

Last year a very important step toward safety regulation of the automobile industry was taken when the Congress passed legislation authorizing the drafting of minimum safety standards for federally purchased automobiles.

The proposal being made today would extend the new Federal safety standards for Government automobiles to all cars manufactured for, sold or shipped in interstate commerce. We now know how to write safe standards for 60,000 publicly owned cars. The purpose of this measure is to give the benefit of such safety standards to the public as a whole.

This proposal will establish a number of required safety features. Among these are: collapsible steering wheels, shoulder harness safety belt anchors, specific types of safety glass, smog removing exhaust systems, standardized transmission controls to avoid confusion, and uniform bumper heights.

These new features have been tested, proven effective and will be available in Government-purchased cars by 1967. Installation of these features will be of great benefit. And, there are other steps which will increase our ability to deal with this problem.

A second proposal would authorize and provide funds to the Federal Government to develop and test a prototype safety car.

Both the Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. and the Engineering Department of the University of Minnesota have developed safety cars with encouraging results. Some who have studied such designs contend that the adoption of special safety features could save as many as 640,000 lives over the next 15 years. I intend to introduce a bill to authorize safety car research in the near future.

These proposals could do much to save lives. We have the opportunity, the technological know-how, and the manpower to eliminate one of the greatest hazards to the motorist and the public as a whole. It is the responsibility of the Congress to seize this opportunity and eliminate unnecessary injuries and deaths on the highway.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill, together with a list of the General Service Administration's

safety standards applicable to the 60,000 automobiles purchased by the Government annually, be printed in the RECORD and that the bill be held at the desk through March 5 for additional co-sponsors.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the bill and list will be printed in the RECORD and the bill will lie on the desk, as requested by the Senator from Wisconsin.

The bill (S. 1251) to prescribe certain safety features for all motor vehicles manufactured for, sold or shipped in interstate commerce, introduced by Mr. NELSON, was received, read twice by its title, referred to the Committee on Commerce, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the manufacture for sale, the sale, or the offering for sale in interstate commerce, or the importation into the United States, or the introduction, delivery for introduction, transportation or causing to be transported in, interstate commerce or for the purpose of sale, or delivery after sale in interstate commerce, or the use in interstate commerce, of any motor vehicle manufactured after the date of this Act, shall be unlawful unless such motor vehicle is equipped with passenger safety devices prescribed in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

Sec. 2. The Secretary of Commerce shall prescribe and publish in the Federal Register standards for passenger safety devices required under authority of the first section of this Act, which standards shall to the extent deemed desirable be consistent with standards prescribed by the Administrator of General Services pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 88-515. The standards first established under this section shall be prescribed and published not later than one year from the date of enactment of this Act.

Sec. 3. The Secretary of Commerce shall cooperate with other Federal departments and agencies and with other public and private agencies, institutions, organizations, and companies, and with any industries involved, in the establishment of safety standards under this Act. Where other Federal instrumentalities have prescribed standards in the field of automotive safety, standards issued hereunder shall be fully coordinated with those of such instrumentalities.

Sec. 4. Any person violating the provisions of section 1 of this Act shall be fined not more than \$1,000. Such violation with respect to each motor vehicle shall constitute a separate offense.

Sec. 5. As used in this Act the term "motor vehicle" means any vehicle, self-propelled or drawn by mechanical power, designed for use on the highways principally for the transportation of passengers, and light trucks up to a gross vehicle weight of 10,000 pounds, but will not include any vehicle designed or used for military field training, combat, or tactical purposes, and motor vehicles subject to standards prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Sec. 6. This Act shall take effect on the date of its enactment except that section 1 of this Act shall take effect one year and ninety days after the publication of standards for passenger safety first established under section 2 of this Act. If additional standards are established, or if the standards first established hereunder are later changed, such standards, as so later established or changed, shall take effect one year and ninety days after the date of their publication.

The list presented by Mr. NELSON is as follows:

Standards for passenger safety devices

RATING OF DEVICES FOR PASSENGER SAFETY ACCORDING TO VEHICLE APPLICATION

	Sedans	Buses	Carry-alls	Station wagons	Light trucks up to 10,000 pounds g.v.w.
Anchorage; seat-belt assemblies, passenger types.....	34	48	34	35	34
Outside rear view mirror.....					
Safety door latches, locks, and hinges.....	36	79	39	34	37
Safety glass.....	42	42	42	42	42
Impact absorbing steering wheel and column displacement.....	43	71	43	42	47
Dual operation of braking system.....	47	42	43	43	43
Anchorage of seats.....	47	50	49	45	57
Padded dash and visors.....	47	90	52	34	44
4-way flasher.....	47	54	45	54	52
Tire and safety rim.....	50	38	43	47	40
Backup lights.....	52	48	43	48	47
Sweep design of windshield wipers and washers.....	53	49	52	49	52
Standard gear quadrant (P R N D L)—Automatic transmission.....	58	86	62	55	59
Recessed dash instruments and knobs.....	60	78	53	57	57
Glare reduction surfaces—Dash and wipers.....	63	80	52	61	54
Exhaust emission control system.....	65	49	66	66	66
Standard bumper heights.....	79	87	77	76	85

FEDERAL STANDARD NO. 515/1

Anchorage; Seat belt assemblies

Requires anchorages for lap and shoulder belts on all front seats.

Requires anchorages for lap belts only on rear seats.

Each lap belt anchorage to sustain 2,500 pounds.

Each shoulder belt anchorage to sustain a pull of 1,500 pounds.

FEDERAL STANDARD NO. 515/2

Padded dash and visors

Requires installation of energy absorbing material over dash and visors.

Requires visor mounting location to minimize head injury.

FEDERAL STANDARD NO. 515/3

Recessed dash instrument and control devices

Requires breakaway or receding controls if they project from dash.

Requires instrument bezels recede to level of panel surface under impact.

FEDERAL STANDARD NO. 515/4

Impact absorbing steering wheel and column displacement

Steering wheel assembly to develop to more than 2,500 pounds force when impact by object weighing 75 pounds at 22 feet per second.

Steering column shall not be displaced rearward more than 8 inches on collision with barrier at 30 miles per hour.

FEDERAL STANDARD NO. 515/5

Safety door latches and hinges

Must withstand 2,500 pounds of longitudinal loading.

Must withstand 1,700 pounds of transverse loading when fully latched.

Must withstand 500 pounds of transverse loading in latch position.

FEDERAL STANDARD NO. 515/6

Anchorage of seats

Requires anchorage of seats and backs against forward and rearward loads.

SAE Standard applies only to front seats but this covers all.

FEDERAL STANDARD NO. 515/7

Four-way flasher

Provides warning by simultaneously flashing all turn signals.

Based upon new standards being developed by SAE.

FEDERAL STANDARD NO. 515/8

Safety glass

Applies the requirements of ASA Standards, ICC Regulations and National Education Association Standards to Government vehicles.

FEDERAL STANDARD NO. 515/9

Dual operation of brakes system

Under failure of hydraulic system requires that unaffected brakes stop vehicle in reasonably straight line.

FEDERAL STANDARD NO. 515/10

Standard bumper heights

Sets static height to better insure bumper contact between vehicles.

FEDERAL STANDARD NO. 515/11

Standard gear quadrant (PRNDL)

Requires single quadrant arrangement for all automatic transmission reducing human error.

FEDERAL STANDARD NO. 515/12

Sweep design of windshield wipers—washers

Requires multispeed electric wipers. Other requirements in accordance with SAE recommended practice.

Provides for windshield washer system.

FEDERAL STANDARD NO. 515/13

Glare reduction surface—instrument panel and windshield wipers

Provides for reduction of glare from all surfaces in operator's field of view.

FEDERAL STANDARD NO. 515/14

Exhaust emission control system

Incorporates the California test procedure and criteria.

In accordance with clean air act.

FEDERAL STANDARD NO. 515/15

Tires and safety rims

Requires that tires conform to Federal specification ZZ-T-381.

Requires that rims conform to the tire and rim association regulations.

In event of tire failure the rim will retain the tire.

FEDERAL STANDARD NO. 515/16

Backup lights

Requires rear white lights to be illuminated automatically when the vehicle is in reverse gear day or night.

FEDERAL STANDARD NO. 515/17

Outside rear view mirrors

Requires left outside rear view mirror for all vehicles.

Requires right outside rear view mirror for buses, station wagons, carryalls, and trucks.

Establishes certain limits on a location.

CHANGE OF DATE ON WHICH FARMERS MUST FILE INCOME TAX RETURNS

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, when I was back in South Dakota during the Lincoln Day recess a number of farmers, lawyers, and accountants in our South Dakota small towns inquired of me as to whether it would be possible to change the date on which farmers must file their income tax return. All advised me that because of the need established for exacting accounting procedures in their operations and the intricate tax forms which farmers must file with the Internal Revenue Service it takes an increasingly long time to prepare the return. Because of these accounting procedures and intricate forms most farmers must rely on expert tax accountants or lawyers to help them prepare their tax returns so that they are in compliance with all IRS laws and regulations. There are only a very few tax experts in the small towns and rural areas of America and these experts are finding it more and more difficult to prepare all of the returns of their farmer clients so they can meet the February 15 filing date.

All advised me that if the filing date was set back to March 15—or 1 month—it would give them the additional time needed to prepare and file the returns of farmers.

It should also be pointed out, Mr. President, that March 1 of each year is moving time for tenant farmers. It is the date that most of them establish for their accounting period and a March 15 filing date would be most helpful to them.

Many farmers rely on their canceled checks for much of their record substantiation. Many canceled checks for year-end debts and transactions are not cleared through the bank by February 1 and are not available soon enough to permit as much as 15 days for preparation of the tax return. By giving the farmer another 30 days it insures that all records are available so a complete return can be made and filed in an orderly and unhurried manner.

Because of these reasons indicating the need for more time for permitting farmers to prepare and file their income tax returns I am introducing legislation which establishes March 15 of each year as the final date for farmers to file their income tax returns. I hope this bill will receive early consideration by the Finance Committee so that it can be acted on this year and become effective for the filing of tax returns in 1966. I ask that my proposal be printed in full at this point in the RECORD.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the bill will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 1252) to give farmers an additional month in which to meet the requirement of filing a declaration of estimated tax by filing an income tax

return for the taxable year for which the declaration is required, introduced by Mr. MUNDT, was received, read twice by its title, referred to the Committee on Finance, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) section 6015(f) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to return considered as declaration or amendment) is amended by striking out "February 15" and inserting in lieu thereof "March 15."

(b) The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply with respect to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1964.

ASSISTANCE TO SCHOOLS IN FED- ERALLY IMPACTED AREAS

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, on behalf of myself and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON], I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill that I hope will assist school districts in areas where defense installations are being closed down.

My State has been affected, Mr. President, as have virtually all other States by the closing of Army, Navy, and Air Force installations which the Department of Defense feels are no longer necessary for the national security. I have been pleased with the efforts of the Department of Defense and the individual communities involved to lessen the economic impact of such closings.

However, it appears to me that an additional step can be taken in the vital area of education. As every Senator knows, the so-called impacted areas laws provide Federal financial assistance to school districts that educate children from federally connected families. This is a most worthwhile and necessary program.

As now constituted, Public Law 874 provides a system of cutting off funds for those school districts that fall below certain levels of enrollment of federally connected children.

Public Law 874 now applies to those school districts that have an enrollment containing 3 percent or more federally connected children. The law provides that when districts fall below that rate—as many will because of the recent defense base closings—such districts are eligible in the first year to receive payment for the actual number of federally connected children remaining enrolled. The next year, such districts receive one-half of the first-year amount. After the second year, they receive nothing.

I propose that this tapering-off period be liberalized so as to stretch out the economic impact caused by the curtailment of such funds. I have discussed this matter with many school superintendents, and you have only to chat with them a few moments to realize the importance of impacted areas funds in their budget planning. Since school budget planning must necessarily be plotted several years ahead so that sufficient classrooms, teachers, and programs are available, I believe a longer tapering-off period for impacted areas aid would be of vital benefit to the affected school districts.

I wish to point out that this Government already has recognized its obligation to assist communities in realignment of their economies to make up for loss of income from defense bases. This Congress also has graphically recognized its responsibility to see that education is not denied to the Nation's children.

Therefore, I introduce this bill to deal with the Federal obligation to those school districts who have in good faith participated in the impacted areas program while defense installations swelled their enrollments.

My bill would apply only to those school districts affected by defense installation closings. It would provide that such districts continue to receive impacted areas aid as long as they have 1-percent enrollment of federally connected children. When the 1-percent level is reached, such districts would receive in the first year one-half of the 1-percent level payment; in the second year, one-third of that payment; and in the third year, one-fourth.

I believe such a liberalized stretching out of the impacted areas payment curtailment will measurably assist such districts and will meet the Federal obligation not only to assist in education, but also to help in economic readjustment of cities where defense bases are closed.

Mr. President, may I take just a moment more to illustrate the scope of this problem in my own State?

You will recall that four major defense installations are being phased out or curtailed in Texas under the most recent Department of Defense announcement. There will be a total of 6,498 children now counted as federally connected who will not be so counted when the curtailment is complete. Some of these will move away with their families. Most families will not move. The total amount paid for these children in fiscal year 1964 was \$873,115.

In the Dyess Air Force Base area near Abilene 2 school districts now claim 554 federally connected children for which the payment in 1964 was \$73,381.

In the area of the Eagle Mountain Station near Fort Worth there were 178 children claimed by 17 school districts with a total payment of \$18,816.

When James Connally Air Force Base is closed at Waco, there will be a loss of Federal assistance in the amount of \$219,585 affecting 40 different school districts and 1,607 children.

At Amarillo, where the airbase is to be closed, there are 4,158 affected children in 19 affected school districts which have been receiving a Federal assistance payment of \$476,180.

I know, Mr. President, that such figures are duplicated in dozens of other States represented in this Senate, and I hope that we can provide good-faith relief to these school districts that have served our Nation's Defense Establishment in good faith.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 1256) to amend Public Law 874, 81st Congress, providing assistance to schools in federally impacted areas, in order to provide for a more gradual reduction of payments pursuant

thereto as a result of termination of activities of the Department of Defense, introduced by Mr. TOWER (for himself and Mr. PEARSON), was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, I express my support of the impacted areas-military base closing bill introduced today by the Senator from Texas, and I am pleased to join in cosponsoring the bill.

This is a matter of great urgency to many States—in particular, to my State of Kansas. We are required to close Schilling Air Force Base, at Salina, Kans., within the next 135 days and to uproot more than 13,000 officers, enlisted men, and their families. This loss of residents represents a 25-percent reduction in the entire population of Saline County.

The closure of Schilling will take more than \$34 million in effective purchasing power from the \$109 million annual buying income of Salina—a loss of nearly 35 percent.

The community leadership of Salina, although staggered by the deactivation of the air base, is working with resoluteness and enthusiasm to offset the loss. Civic and business leaders have organized a countywide committee to offset the slack by finding new uses for the base facilities.

Regardless of the positive efforts of local leaders and the fine cooperation of the Office of Economic Adjustment of the Department of Defense, Salina is left with a host of problems due directly to the closing of the base, and especially the brief period of adjustment involved. This bill would cushion some of the impact by relieving a heavy burden of educational costs incurred directly as a result of the presence of the Air Force.

We had been advised 1 year ago that B-47 bombers presently stationed at Schilling would be phased out in March of this year and would be replaced by B-52 bombers in June of this year. With the announcement that the base is to be closed in June, the Air Force will not move these bombers onto the base and undoubtedly will continue its B-47 phase-out next month.

Funds to aid the operation of school systems in federally impacted areas are based on two programs under Public Law 874: 3a students are those whose parents live and work on a Federal installation and 3b students are those who live in communities adjacent to Federal installations and whose parents work at the installations. During the 1963-64 school year, Salina received \$552,059 for students under Public Law 874. In 1965, on the basis of enrollment in the fall, Salina would receive \$688,217 because of a greater number of students enrolled.

The number of students eligible under this measure has been determined in Salina by taking a census in October, and again in April, and then dividing by two. For 12 years, this system has proven satisfactory to the Federal Government, for purposes of determining the amount of Public Law 874 funds.

After the B-47's leave Schilling in March, the number of dependents re-

maining on the base in April could be negligible. Thus, Salina's public-school system faces reductions of at least \$500,000 in Public Law 874 payments, if the present applicability is permitted to remain in effect.

This completely unanticipated chain of events leaves the Salina Board of Education with a deficit of 2,266 students classified under sections 3a and 3b of Public Law 874. Even though students may be taken from their classes and transferred to other schools, the Salina area still must honor its contracts to the many teachers who have been hired to educate students in the community and at the Air Force base.

Salina residents now are faced with paying off \$3½ million in school-construction bonds—which were issued prior to the announcement last November that Schilling Air Force Base would close. Through Public Law 815 funding, Federal money financed 14.8 percent of the total cost, even though 22.9 percent of the students in the Salina school system were federally connected.

Under the terms of the bill which today I join in sponsoring, the original cut-off point at which 3 percent of the total number of students enrolled are required to be connected with a Federal installation—established as a phaseout point for funds, would be reduced, so that only 1 percent of the total number of students would be required to be in the federally impacted classification. Furthermore, in the case of Salina, the percentage reduction in funds would be graduated over a 3-year period, with the funds being cut off at the end of the fourth year. Existing legislation specifies the payment of only one-half of the cost in the second year, and no payment in the third year. The bill introduced today would liberalize the phaseout portion of Public Law 874, and would give a community the benefit of funds for a longer period of time, even though the number of students identified with the federally impacted program was diminishing.

Today, I have stated the Salina story in considerable detail, because this Kansas community is undergoing a tremendous economic shock, due to the closing of the Air Force base. It is my belief that we must help all communities which experience a cutback in defense installations until they are able to reestablish their economies with new industries or by means of expansion of existing businesses. The relaxation of the phase-out schedule for Public Law 874 funds would be a significant step toward the achievement of this goal.

EXTENSION FOR 5 YEARS OF PUBLIC LAWS 815 AND 874, 81ST CONGRESS

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a second bill designed to extend the entire impacted areas program for 5 years. It is now scheduled to expire in 1966. My bill extends that date to 1971.

I believe this extension is necessary, Mr. President, in order that school districts can continue to make long-range budget plans. In addition, I believe this

longer extension will remove this vital program from the arena of partisan politics in which it has unfortunately found itself in recent election years.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 1257) to extend for 5 years Public Laws 815 and 874, 81st Congress, relating to Federal assistance to education in federally impacted areas, introduced by Mr. TOWER, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware subsequently said: Mr. President, earlier this afternoon, the Senator from Texas [Mr. TOWER] introduced two bills (S. 1256 and S. 1257) dealing with education.

On his behalf, I ask unanimous consent that these bills remain at the desk for 3 days so that other Senators who may wish to do so may cosponsor them.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SOVIET FORCES STATIONED IN LATVIA, LITHUANIA, AND ESTONIA

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I send to the desk a concurrent resolution and ask that it be printed in the RECORD, that it be printed, and appropriately referred.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The concurrent resolution will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, it will be printed in the RECORD, and printed.

The concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 23) was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, as follows:

S. CON. RES. 23

Whereas the United States has consistently recognized and upheld the right of the Baltic peoples to national independence and to the enjoyment of all independent rights and freedoms; and

Whereas the Charter of the United Nations declares as one of its purposes the development of friendly relations among nations based "on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples"; and

Whereas the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics has by force suppressed the freedom of the peoples of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia and continues to deny them the right of self-determination by free elections: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the President of the United States should seek through diplomatic and economic action to bring about the withdrawal of Soviet forces stationed in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia and the holding of free elections in those nations to the end that they may once again live as free, independent, and sovereign members of the community of nations.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, this concurrent resolution, which I present on behalf of myself and my colleague [Mr. HICKENLOOPER], would resolve that—

The President of the United States should seek through diplomatic and economic action to bring about the withdrawal of Soviet forces stationed in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, and the holding of free elections in those nations to the end that they may once again live as free, independent and sovereign members of the community of nations.

I would point out that, while included in the idea of diplomatic and economic

action is possible action in the United Nations, it is not the intention of the sponsors of the concurrent resolution that the activities of the President be confined to such action as may be indicated in the United Nations. However, I would point out that the Charter of the United Nations make it very clear that the United Nations stands for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, which, the evidence is clear, has been denied the particular nations to which I have referred.

I invite attention to the fact that the anniversary of Lithuanian independence was observed on February 18. I believe it would be helpful to the morale of the captive nations if they were to understand that the concurrent resolution not only had been agreed to by Congress but that the United States was actively engaged in implementing it.

I hope that the concurrent resolution will receive a favorable response by the Committee on Foreign Relations and by the State Department. I understand that the State Department heretofore has been concerned that action in the United Nations might not be indicated at this time. I repeat: Action in the United Nations is only one of the areas of possibility that are envisioned by the sponsors of the concurrent resolution.

AMENDMENT OF INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK ACT, RELATING TO AN INCREASE IN THE RESOURCES OF THE FUND FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK—AMENDMENTS

AMENDMENTS NOS. 36, 37, AND 38

Mr. GRUENING submitted three amendments, intended to be proposed by him, to the bill (H.R. 45) to amend the Inter-American Development Bank Act to authorize the United States to participate in an increase in the resources of the Fund for Special Operations of the Inter-American Development Bank, which were ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

AMENDMENT NO. 39

Mr. MORSE submitted amendments, intended to be proposed by him, to House bill 45, supra, which were ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

AMENDMENTS NOS. 40, 41 AND 42

Mr. LAUSCHE submitted two amendments (Nos. 40 and 41), intended to be proposed by him, to House bill 45, supra, which were ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

Mr. LAUSCHE also proposed an amendment (No. 42) to House bill 45, supra, which is pending.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSOR OF BILL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the next printing of S. 1035, a bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the name of the senior Senator from Indiana [Mr. HARTKE] be added as a cosponsor.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, at its next printing, I ask unanimous consent that the name of the senior Senator from Texas [Mr. YARBOROUGH] be added as a cosponsor of the bill (S. 1160) to amend section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 324, of the act of June 11, 1946 (60 Stat. 238), to clarify and protect the right of the public to information, and for other purposes.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, there are two measures which were introduced recently with which I desire to associate myself. These are S. 709 introduced by Senator BURDICK, and others, to amend the Consolidated Farmers Home Administration Act of 1961 to increase the limitation on the amount of loans which may be insured under subtitle A; and S. 1034, introduced by Senator MONTOYA, to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to grant loans to improve and extend waste disposal and fuel distribution systems serving rural areas.

I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that at the next printing of these bills my name be added as a cosponsor.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTICLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE RECORD

On request, and by unanimous consent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

By Mr. RANDOLPH:

Certain portions of the program at the Governor's prayer breakfast, Charleston, W. Va., Monday, February 22, 1965, including: Introduction of U.S. Senator J. CALES BOGGS by Senator JENNINGS RANDOLPH; address by Senator BOGGS; remarks by Gov. Hulet C. Smith, of West Virginia; and benediction by Dr. Stewart H. Smith, president of Marshall University, Huntington, W. Va.

KENNETH BELIEU, UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, I add my words of appreciation for the appointment of Kenneth Belieu as Under Secretary of the Navy. Mr. Belieu was an officer of the highest type in the Armed Forces, and at the same time he is a firm believer in the ultimate principle of civilian supremacy. He had a most distinguished record as a brave combat soldier in both World War II and the Korean conflict. He was decorated for bravery in the Normandy campaign with both the Bronze Star and the Silver Star; and in the Korean conflict he was severely wounded, and lost a leg.

He has served both in the Pentagon and on the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee; and in both capacities he has shown himself to be a hard worker, fairminded, and one who always puts the interests of the Nation first. As Assistant Secretary of the Navy for some years, he mastered the peculiar problems of that branch of the armed services. He is indeed a man of the

highest character; and the President has chosen well. Mr. Belieu's intimate knowledge of the problems of the armed services, his keen mind, and his resolute devotion to the fundamental principles of a democracy make him an ideal choice.

DEATH OF SEMINOLE INDIAN CHIEF BILLY BOWLEGS

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, last Wednesday, February 17, I placed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the account of the death of Seminole Indian Chief Billy Bowlegs.

I have now received a copy of the Clewiston News, one of the closest newspapers to his last dwelling place, and I think it is appropriate to complete my reference to this famous Indian chief by quoting the news article and the editorial from the pages of the Clewiston News for February 18, 1965. The news article is, in part, as follows:

SEMINOLE CHIEF DIES AT 103—FUNERAL SERVICES HELD FOR BILLY BOWLEGS III, MONDAY

Several hundred friends and relatives gathered at the Ortona Cemetery Monday afternoon to pay final respects to Florida's oldest and most colorful Seminole Indian Chief, Billy Bowlegs III, who would have observed his 103d birthday Wednesday, February 17.

The son and grandson of two of the Seminole's fiercest warriors passed on to his happy hunting ground in his two-room Government-built house on the Brighton Indian Reservation in northern Glades County Friday night or early Saturday morning. It was only in his final days that Billy moved into the house, preferring to live his life in his palmetto thatched hut until his doctor urged the move.

Services were conducted by Rev. Edward Leader, of Brighton, and Rev. Billy Osceola, of Dania. In paying his final tribute to Billy Bowlegs, Osceola, in both native tongue and English said that in his lifetime he had never heard the deceased say a harsh or untrue word about anyone and that he always conducted himself in a manner that was a credit to his people.

In true native custom, he was buried wearing his colorful ceremonial clothes as worn at fairs, celebrations, and special events through the years. All of his personal belongings were buried with him.

Billy was exceptionally well known in Glades and Hendry Counties, having attended the fairs, festivals, and special occasions through the many years of his life.

He was on hand to welcome former President Herbert Hoover when he visited Clewiston at the Hoover Dike dedication. He has been present at all 16 Chalo Nitka Festivals in Moore Haven, competing in various animal calling contests until recent years. He had made plans to attend the 1965 festival.

Albert DeVane of Lake Placid, Indian historian and 30-year friend of Billy, often tells of Billy Bowlegs' integrity and honesty, citing a 125-mile walk from a camp of Okeechobee Marsh to Kissimmee when he heard a white man had accused him of telling a lie.

Until recent years, Billy had been content to bank his money in hollow trees, cans, and various places about his camp, yielding only in the past year to placing his life savings in a white man's bank for safekeeping.

Billy was born on Arbuckle Creek, 3 miles from Lake Istokpoga, while his family was on a bear hunt, in February 1862. Astronomers figured back and designated the night of February 17 as the night of the little moon, on which he reportedly was born.

Mr. President, the editorial from the Clewiston News reads in full, as follows:

FAREWELL TO BILLY BOWLEGS III

In a tender but curious mixture of Christian and Seminole rites, graveside services were conducted for 103-year-old Billy Bowlegs III, patriarch of the Florida Indians, in Ortona Cemetery Monday.

Billy's life had spanned the age of transition; he had seen his people emerge from the fastness of the Everglades where they existed for generations on their skill as hunters and fishermen. He saw them accept society's opportunities for better health, better education and better job opportunities.

Billy became a legend many years ago for his prowess as a hunter. His reputation as the greatest hunter in Florida was never challenged; the great men of the State in all walks of life came to the 'Glades area to hunt with Billy. They never went home emptyhanded.

But to those who knew him, Seminole and white American alike, Billy will be enshrined in their hearts for the attributes of his noble character. Those who knew him best testify to his complete and absolute honesty and truthfulness. He was never known to cheat or tell a lie.

Without benefit of Christian teaching in his youth Billy believed that man has a noble spirit, which lives after the body is dead; and that the spirit of those who have lived the right life will go, after death, to the Happy Hunting Ground.

His kindly expression, his poise and his serene dignity have added grace to many gatherings, and we shall miss him.

DEATH OF JUSTICE FRANKFURTER

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, Mr. Justice Frankfurter will be missed by those who knew him and those who did not know but who respected him for his views on many different facets of our life. We are saddened by his death. He was a man of many unusually diversified interests. The principle one was the law and the interpretation of the law under our Constitution. He had undying faith in our Constitution and his decisions on the problems that came to the Supreme Court in recent years always reflected faith and confidence in our fundamental law.

But his interests were not confined to legal problems alone. He read the key newspapers and the Manchester Guardian each morning, I always felt before 7:30. Then, while his health was good, he walked part way to his office and discussed vital issues with the then Secretary of State Dean Acheson. On more than one occasion he saw me on the sidewalk, jumped out of his car and walked up the Hill with me to inquire concerning affairs in the Senate. During my time here in Washington, he and I lunched together in each other's office several times each year and I last visited him several weeks ago when, while he was weak physically, his mind and his interest in affairs was just as active as ever.

He came to the Harvard Law School as a professor in 1914. I was in his first class on criminal law and later in one of his other classes. So I grew at an early date to have respect for his keen mind and clear exposition of his thoughts and questions. Certainly his opinions, many of which I understand were given

without notes from the bench, will always stand as fine examples of judicial exposition.

Many people of all faiths and walks of life will be saddened by his death. I join with them in missing one whom we may almost call unique in the modern-day history of our country and its Government.

I send to Mrs. Frankfurter the deep sympathy of Mrs. Saltonstall and myself. I feel I have lost a true friend and shall miss his wise words of counsel.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the people of the Nation deeply mourn the death of one of the most brilliant of our Supreme Court Justices, Associate Justice Felix Frankfurter. Justice Frankfurter has made an outstanding contribution to the jurisprudence of the Nation and, indeed, to the structure of Anglo-Saxon law, so critically important to the history of all mankind. His incisive, articulate Court opinions have left a permanent imprint upon the framework of our country. His craftsmanship as a lawyer and a judge has been recognized and acclaimed far and wide.

It is significant that the span of Justice Frankfurter's creative and energetic career ranges from the Sacco-Vanzetti case to the Tennessee apportionment case. It is pertinent to the history of our country and a source of great inspiration of our youth that Felix Frankfurter was a Jewish immigrant who sailed from Europe to this country in steerage at the age of 12. He worked his way through Harvard Law School and had a distinguished career in the Federal service and in 25 years on the faculty of Harvard Law School prior to his appointment to the Court in 1939.

Justice Frankfurter's deep concern with the doctrine of judicial restraint was etched throughout his many articulate opinions. He had a passion for fundamental fairness in criminal proceedings and civil liberties, a deep belief in the protection of individual freedoms.

The life of Felix Frankfurter is not only a monument to the great tradition of justice which we have inherited from the Christian-Hebrew civilizations, of which we are so much a part, but, more than that, is an eloquent tribute to the fact that there is still plentiful opportunity for the poor, the immigrant, and the lowly born in this Nation. If Felix Frankfurter could speak to us today, I know his parting words would be: "May it ever be so."

I extend my condolences to his family and my deep thanks on the part of the people of my State for the important contributions Felix Frankfurter has made in the interests of our Nation, the world, and all mankind.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, a great man has left us—one of the Nation's alltime greats—and while the country is infinitely poorer because of the departure of Felix Frankfurter, it is infinitely richer because he lived and served with his rare ability, devotion, enthusiasm, perspicacity.

His one-fourth-of-a-century tenure on the Supreme Court, rich in the memorable contributions he made to law and

thought, may have caused many to forget his earlier, long, effective service to government, first before he became a professor at Harvard Law School, and then through the following academic years when he guided hundreds of able young men into public service.

Excepting President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, it may be ventured that no one did more to make the New Deal effective than did Felix Frankfurter although holding then no public office.

His record is all the more remarkable in that when he arrived in this country as an immigrant youngster at the age of 11, he had never heard a word of English spoken. His was another example of the miracle of America which makes it possible for people coming from the Old World, fleeing from its restrictions and persecutions, to achieve happiness and greatness in this land of freedom, promise, and opportunity. For, with only a public school education in New York City and City College, Felix Frankfurter became, for 3 years, the top-ranking student in his Harvard Law School class—in the fastest company in the academic world.

What is his great legacy? What he said of Dean James Barr Ames, of the Harvard Law School, during his student days there is fully applicable to himself:

What he left behind him is that which Pericles says in his funeral oration is the most important thing. His deposit is in the minds of men. He excited and touched more first-rate minds in the profession of the law than any man who ever had pupils.

Felix Frankfurter was brilliant, joyfully combative in the intellectual field, spritely, witty, stimulating, compassionate. Volumes will be written about him, his great contributions to the law, his indefatigable concern for the democratic process; for few men in our history have served so productively, so constructively, and whose influence was so widely projected through his multiple personal contacts, and the breadth of his and their varied interests.

But perhaps his life will best—or at least not less—be memorialized in the consciousness of hundreds of living men whom he counseled, guided, stimulated, helped; and it is probably true of Felix Frankfurter—to adapt the words of Robert G. Ingersoll at his brother's funeral—that:

If everyone for whom he had done a deed of loving kindness were to lay a blossom on his grave, he would sleep tonight beneath a wilderness of flowers.

BROTHERHOOD WEEK

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, this week the National Conference of Christians and Jews is again sponsoring national observance of Brotherhood Week. For more than 30 years this organization has worked hard to further human understanding and cooperation and has served as a constructive force in removing prejudices. Our Nation is the better for its efforts.

The complexity and inevitable conflicts of private and public affairs, as well as our preoccupation with our own prob-

lems and undertakings result in our neglect of our fellow man. Too often we are unaware of his need and his accomplishments, and fail to give him a pat on the back when he deserves it, or to lend a helping hand when that is required. A nation which places great emphasis on the dignity of the individual cannot afford to withhold good will and proper consideration from one person or a section of our population. We have become a great nation because we respect our fellow men and because we believe everyone should have the opportunity to develop to his fullest capacity. The true spirit of brotherhood extends far beyond toleration of others. It involves a positive effort and attitude and a commitment to man that reaches far beyond artificial political, economic and social barriers. It dictates the elimination of prejudice, selfishness, and discrimination.

I congratulate the national conference for once again drawing attention to the value, both for ourselves and for our Nation, which comes about when a spirit of brotherly love and concern for others governs our thoughts and our actions.

AWARD OF GEORGE WASHINGTON HONOR MEDAL TO CLARENCE N. SHOEMAKER, JR.

Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. Mr. President, Idaho is very proud of Clarence N. Shoemaker, Jr., elementary school principal of Nampa, Idaho. We are proud also of Nampa public schools where Mr. Shoemaker teaches. Both have been selected to receive the George Washington Honor Medal Award from the Freedoms Foundation of Valley Forge.

I congratulate Mr. Shoemaker and Nampa public schools for this splendid recognition which they have received. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a statement by Superintendent Harry C. Mills and the winning essay by Principal Clarence N. Shoemaker, Jr., be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement and essay were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

NEWS RELEASE

Clarence N. Shoemaker, Jr., a local elementary school principal, and the Nampa public schools have both been selected to receive the George Washington Honor Medal Award from the Freedoms Foundation at Valley Forge, Valley Forge, Pa.

This was revealed at a special news conference held at Kenwood School early this morning. Making the announcement of the 16th annual national awards was Harry C. Mills, superintendent of the Nampa public schools.

Shoemaker, Kenwood and Greenhurst school principal, has been selected by the trustees and officers of the Freedoms Foundation at Valley Forge to receive an award of \$100 and the George Washington Honor Medal Award. He was selected to receive these awards for an essay, "I Am America," which he wrote last fall.

His honor medal will be engraved with the following citation: "An outstanding accomplishment in helping to achieve a better understanding of the American way of life."

Shoemaker will be notified at a later date of the time and place of a special regional

awards presentation in this area. He is expected to attend this special presentation.

Superintendent Mills noted that the Nampa public schools were selected to receive the George Washington Honor Medal Award for their 1963-64 school program.

He went on to say that "we have been selected to receive this award mainly on the basis of Mr. Shoemaker's Staff Bulletin which he writes and distributes to his teachers, school board members and fellow administrators once a week."

"The contents of which," Mills added, "include a wide variety of teaching materials and aids on the subjects of Americanism and patriotism."

"He has also carefully studied many of the successful programs of Americanism and patriotism in other school systems throughout the country and shared this information with his colleagues."

"All employees of the Nampa public schools," Mills noted, "are to be congratulated on the part they had in helping us win this national award from the Freedoms Foundation. This is something which we can all be proud of."

All award selections are determined by a distinguished, independent national and school awards jury of 30 or more State supreme court jurists and national executive officers of patriotic, service club and veterans' organizations.

The Freedoms Foundation at Valley Forge is dedicated to the fundamental principle that freedom belongs to all the people, and only by thoughts and acts in their everyday lives can the American people preserve and extend their liberty under law.

Freedoms Foundation was established in March 1949. It is nonprofit, nonsectarian, and nonpolitical. Under its charter Freedoms Foundation exists: "To create and build an understanding of the spirit and philosophy of the Constitution and Bill of Rights and of our 'bundle' of indivisible, political and economic freedoms inherent in them."

"To inspire love of freedom and to support the spiritual unity born of the belief that man is a dignified human being, created in the image of his Maker, and by that fact, possessor of certain inalienable rights."

To this end, Freedoms Foundation acts to encourage all citizens to "speak up for America" through its annual national and school awards program.

I AM AMERICA

(By Clarence Newell Shoemaker, Jr.)

My birth certificate is the Declaration of Independence and I was born on July 4, 1776. I am a fabulous country of many things and many people. I am the United States of America.

I am over 180 million living souls and the ghost of millions who have courageously lived and died for me.

I am William Penn and Paul Revere. I stood on the Lexington green and fired the shot heard around the world. I am Washington, Jefferson, Hale, and Patrick Henry. Bunker Hill, Valley Forge, and Yorktown are a part of my heritage. I am John Paul Jones, Daniel Boone, the Green Mountain Boys, and Davy Crockett. I am Generals Lee, Grant, and MacArthur. I am Abraham Lincoln and the Gettysburg Address.

I remember the Alamo, the Lusitania, Pearl Harbor, and Iwo Jima. Whenever freedom called, I answered that call. I have left my heroic dead in the Argonne Forest, Flanders Field, on the rock of Corregidor, and on the cold bleak slopes of Korea.

I am the Golden Gate Bridge, the wheat lands of Kansas, the farm lands of Idaho and the fabulous forests of the Northwest. I am the Grand Canyon and Old Faithful. I am a small village in the hills of New England, an open-pit copper mine in Montana, and a farm in South Dakota.

My Capital, Washington, D.C., is like no other American city. It is completely free from any State government and there are no factories or commerce here. It has but one business and that is government.

From the top of the Washington Monument you can look north to the White House and to the east you see the Capitol. To the west is the long reflecting pool and the memorial to Lincoln. Inside is the famous statue of him by Daniel Chester French. His face is compassionate, sad and strong.

Looking south, you see the Tidal Basin, the famous cherry trees, and the memorial to Jefferson, author of the Declaration of Independence and our third President.

Across the Potomac River in Arlington, Va., in the huge national cemetery, is the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. All during the day and night, back and forth, paces an armed sentry in honor of those men who are known "but to God." There is no other memorial in my Capital which is quite so symbolic of our Republic as this one. There have always been the unknown Americans who have played a fundamental part in my progress, in addition to the famous men whose names have been known to all.

I am a Christian nation founded upon Christian principles. My people recognize God's power and authority and their responsibility to Him.

I am a nation that believes in the worth and dignity of the individual and his inability to solve his own problems without the help of God.

A sense of responsibility to God carries my people beyond the short-range view of what they can get for the moment. They consider the future benefits or damages as a result of their actions and conduct.

I am a government that is responsible to God and the people. Most of my organic documents of government—the Mayflower Compact of 1620, the Declaration of Independence of 1776, the Constitution of 1789—give recognition to God.

I am a nation of freedom loving people. God created my citizens as free moral agents with the power to choose between right and wrong. Freedom is possible for those citizens who choose the right. Tyranny, suppression, and slavery is the lot for those who choose the wrong. William Penn, one of my great statesmen and patriots, summed it up accurately when he said: "If men will not be governed by God, then they must be ruled by tyrants."

I am the front porch of a farmhouse in the Midwest. The front porch is associated with no other country. It is a place to sit and relax for a few moments before you finish the day's chores. It is a place to sit and read the paper or visit with your neighbors.

Political posters tacked on the country store near the crossroads down by the creek are a part of my heritage. The tiny country churches, roaring snows, howling winds, endless fields, and crystal clear lakes are all a part of me.

I am big. I sprawl from the Atlantic to the Pacific, more than 3½ million square miles of throbbing private enterprise. Within my boundaries lies a wondrous country. I am a land of fertile fields, country mailboxes and winding country lanes. I am remote, quiet villages and large metropolitan cities that never sleep.

I am a republican form of government with the Constitution as my cornerstone. It is the best plan ever devised by man to assure freedom and to release the creative powers of everyone. Its guarantees of life, liberty, and property have made possible the great "American way of life."

You can look at me and see Patrick Henry ending his fiery speech before the Virginia Convention with these defiant words: "I know not what course others may take; but as for me, give me liberty or give me death."

You can see the colonists discussing their problems at a town meeting, the building of the Wilderness Road and Lewis and Clark crossing the Continental Divide. You can see the multicolored lights of Christmas and hear the strains of "Auld Lang Syne" as the old year passes.

Yes, I am the United States of America and these are the things that I am. I was conceived in freedom and, God willing, in freedom I will spend the rest of my days.

May I always possess the integrity, moral courage, and strength to keep myself unshackled, to remain a stronghold of freedom and a beacon of hope to all the oppressed throughout the world.

This is my prayer—my goal—my wish.

May God be with me, always.

CLOSING OF VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION FACILITIES—RESOLUTION

Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, the 102d Legislature of the State of Maine, has passed a joint resolution protesting the ordered closing of Veterans' Administration hospitals, domiciliarys, and regional offices.

On behalf of my colleague [Mr. MUSKIE] and myself, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of that resolution be placed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Joint resolution protesting the ordered closing of VA hospitals, domiciliarys, and regional offices

Whereas the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, Veterans' Administration has summarily and publicly announced the intention of closing permanently 31 Veterans' Administration facilities throughout the Nation, including 11 hospitals and 4 soldiers' homes; and

Whereas the Veterans' Administration plans to transfer these veterans who are patients to other facilities, presumably including the Togus, Maine, Veterans' Administration hospital which is already filled to capacity, thereby creating hardships on Maine veterans; and

Whereas the ordered closings of the Veterans' Administration regional offices in New Hampshire and Vermont and the merging of their functions with the Boston Veterans' Administration office raises grave doubts as to the future of the Togus regional office; and

Whereas it was clearly the intent of the Congress of the United States, the veterans organizations and a grateful Nation that our disabled veterans be cared for and that they and their dependents be rendered every possible assistance in applying for the other benefits to which they are rightly entitled; and

Whereas the ordered closings of the Veterans' Administration facilities will render undue hardship to our Maine veterans and their families, as well as those in New England and the entire Nation, in seeking care and benefits: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the 102d Legislature of the State of Maine does hereby protest the said closings, and requests the Veterans' Administration to cease and desist in its efforts to close the said facilities; be it further

Resolved, That the Members of the U.S. Congress from the State of Maine are hereby urgently requested to use every possible means to cause the decision to close said facilities to be reversed; and be it further

Resolved, That a copy of this resolution, duly authenticated by the secretary of state, be transmitted by the secretary of state to the Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States; to the Honorable RALPH

W. YARBOROUGH, chairman of the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs; to the Honorable OLIN E. TEAGUE, chairman of the Veterans' Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives; to Hon. William J. Driver, Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, Veterans' Administration; and to the Members of the U.S. Congress from the State of Maine.

USE OF CEMENT INSTEAD OF MARBLE, LIMESTONE, AND GRANITE IN NEW PUBLIC BUILDINGS IN WASHINGTON

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may speak for 10 minutes to discuss a matter of great importance to my State and, I think, to the rest of the country, as well.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Vermont? The Chair hears none, and the request is granted.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, some weeks ago it was reported to me that a radical change in construction of public buildings in Washington is underway.

Whereas the present architecture of Washington is famous the world over for its beauty, durability, and designs, I was informed, to my amazement and chagrin, that a new era has arrived and that new public buildings in Washington instead of being constructed of classic marble, limestone, and granite will henceforth be built of cement.

Before I say any more, I wish to state that in a sense I am provincial.

I have long held that any person who does not take pride in his community or his State and who does not sponsor and promote the welfare and the economy of his own community and his own State will be unlikely to contribute maximum values to his country or the world.

In other words, civic pride and loyalty begin at home.

Since the production of marble and granite is one of Vermont's major industries, I naturally felt quite concerned at the report that the Nation's Capital, famed for its dignity and beauty, is to become a cement city.

I was quite incredulous when advised that word was being passed in architectural circles that any designs for new public buildings in Washington must not provide for stone facing if the approval of the Fine Arts Commission is to be received.

Not only is this condition seemingly applied to public buildings, but also to private buildings constructed in the District over which the Fine Arts Commission exercises censorship.

When I expressed doubt as to this attitude on the part of the Commission members, my attention was called to an article published on page B1 of the Washington Star of March 19, 1964, in which it was reported that three reputable Washington architects were criticized by members of the Commission for submitting designs for two private buildings in Washington, one at 700 17th Street, and the other on the old Raleigh Hotel site, for not having any great conviction, not having any excitement, or because the architect did not come in here fighting mad for his convictions.

The designs so severely frowned upon by the Commission members, incidentally, called for limestone construction in keeping with the historic style of the buildings now on Pennsylvania and Constitution Avenues.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD the well-written article published in the Washington Star.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THEY'RE LOOKING FOR SOME EXCITING ARCHITECTURE

(By Robert J. Lewis)

Members of the new Fine Arts Commission are gaining more confidence with each new meeting. Yesterday they gave a demonstration that left three architects in what appeared to be a mild state of shock.

To picture what happened, it is well to understand that Commission members play a censor's role over architecture in certain areas of Washington. Designs they don't like can seldom reach the construction stage. So it's understandable that architects are glad to have clues on how to please the Commission.

As it turned out yesterday, the members did not want to be pleased.

What they're really looking for is to make architects fighting mad "for their convictions," according to one member, Gordon Bunshaft.

All this came out when Edwin A. Weihe, a Washington architect, presented a design for a 10-story office building to replace the present Mills Building at 700 17th Street N.W.

Mr. Weihe told the Commission that the building would be of limestone, the windows would appear vertical to onlookers and his client "wishes to get as much for his money as possible."

At this point, Mr. Bunshaft said the building's design was "harmless" but that he didn't "sense any structural concept or any great conviction" in the design.

What's more, said Mr. Bunshaft, an architect himself, "the proportions are unpleasant."

"It's just bits and pieces—just decoration. What we're saying is that architecture should come from the total building."

Mrs. Aline B. Saarinen, another member, commented:

"I don't think this building is unto itself." Burnham Kelly, a third member who had reservations of his own, interjected:

"I think the way the columns are handled at street level denies the bulk of the building."

Mr. Weihe said he didn't want to ask any "dirty questions" but did the Commission have any "limitations, one way or another" in mind, such as about the use of limestone?

But none of the members was inclined to be specific on details.

"Our concern is with real architecture," said Mr. Bunshaft, enunciating the policy, "and to have an architect come in here fighting mad for his convictions."

Chairman William Walton, who was silent during most of the meeting, told Mr. Weihe as he was about to leave: "Now you have a sample of our thinking."

Earlier, Edmund Dreyfuss, Washington architect, explained to the members that a building he designed to replace the Raleigh Hotel, at 12th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue N.W., would have a limestone facade and a three-level underground garage with an entrance in a wing facing 11th Street.

The building will occupy a prominent site on Pennsylvania Avenue, which is proposed for redevelopment in a plan not yet announced.

The building's design left Mr. Bunshaft unimpressed.

"We think it's a very dull design, very flat, with no relief. The whole design doesn't have any excitement to it," he said.

Mr. Dreyfuss replied, in apparent perplexity:

"It's very hard to know when to excite and when not to excite. I came in here 5 months ago and tried to get a lead but got nothing except it be made a detached building."

Mr. Bunshaft hadn't been aware of that. "Five months ago, I wasn't here," he told Mr. Dreyfuss.

Still seeking a clue, the architect noted that his building could be "designed in a number of fashions."

"That's just it—fashions," Mr. Bunshaft said. "A good piece of architecture is more than that."

Then Mrs. Saarinen said:

"I think we're looking for architecture in which structure, facade, and site are welded into one thing, inevitably one coherent, forceful expression."

Mr. Bunshaft put it differently. "We're looking for a building that looks like a piece of architecture," he said.

Bravely, as it turned out, Mr. Dreyfuss persisted by saying that "being in this location, we didn't want to design a building that was too exciting."

But Mrs. Saarinen, an art critic, told him: "I feel that people who come in here with convictions about what they want to do fare better with us."

The third architect confronting the Commission yesterday was David Dimon, who started to explain the Smithsonian Institution's Zoo redevelopment project.

Members said they felt Mr. Dimon's architectural firm should use materials of fewer varieties.

"I think what we're thinking is that you get more character, intimacy, and warmth with more unity of materials," said Mr. Bunshaft.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, traces of my incredulity remained until Thursday of February 18, 1965, when the Washington Post, on page B1, reported that the Fine Arts Commission had enthusiastically approved designs for the building on the old Raleigh Hotel site presented by an architect who had been criticized only the year before.

This time, however, instead of recommending limestone the architect's plans called for an expressive concrete structure.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article entitled "Grand Plan Moves a Step Closer," published in the Washington Post of February 18, 1965, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

GRAND PLAN MOVES A STEP CLOSER: NEW OFFICE BUILDING APPROVED FOR AVENUE

(By Wolf Von Eckardt)

The grand plan for Pennsylvania Avenue moved a step closer to realization when the Fine Arts Commission yesterday enthusiastically approved the design for the first private office building that is to help give it its hoped-for splendor.

The building, at the corner of 12th Street, replaces the demolished Raleigh Hotel. It will be constructed within a year by a syndicate headed by Jerry Wolman.

An expressive concrete structure with a rhythmic, sculptured facade, the building design was lavishly praised by Fine Arts

Commission members as marvelous and distinctive.

It sits firmly on recessed columns from which it cantilevers at the third-floor level to provide a shopping arcade along both Pennsylvania Avenue and 12th Street. Harmonizing with, though in no way aping the Renaissance style Federal Triangle buildings across the avenue, its chaste brawniness contrasts sharply with the flat chested modern glassboxes we find in such abundance hereabouts.

The proposed building is, in fact, exactly what the Fine Arts Commission and the Pennsylvania Avenue Council visualized for this visually strategic corner. And no wonder.

The Council's staff architect, John Woodbridge, who did most of the Pennsylvania Avenue plan's visualizations, worked closely with the building's architect, Edmund Dreyfuss.

The collaboration was arranged by the Council which also quietly persuaded Wolman last October to conform his building to the grand plan even though there wasn't and still isn't any legal requirement for the proposed setback and height limitation.

Mr. Woodbridge is a member of the San Francisco office of the famous architectural firm Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, whose head, Nathaniel A. Owings, is chairman of the Council.

Technically the Council, appointed by President Kennedy in the summer of 1962, went out of business after it submitted its proposal to President Johnson last year. Actually it is quietly and voluntarily helping to put its much praised plan into effect.

This effort is shortly expected to get another boost when President Johnson recreates a new Pennsylvania Avenue Council with broader powers and a working staff. An order to this effect is reportedly on the President's desk.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, it was also reported, from what the news media would call "a reliable source," that several buildings proposed or currently under construction have been approved by the Fine Arts Commission—all to be constructed with exposed concrete exteriors.

These buildings are the new National Air Museum, the new FBI building, the new FOB No. 5 "Little Pentagon" building, new Housing and Home Finance Agency building, the new Hawthorne School and the proposed new Labor Department building.

Further inquiry on my part brought out the information that the Housing and Home Finance Agency building will have a base of granite with upper floors of precast concrete. The columns will be entirely of concrete with the customary stone sheathing being omitted.

I have as yet been unable to learn if any stone will be used in any way in the other buildings other than quoting from a letter which I shall shortly submit—"some bits of natural stone for effect"—but it appears that the exterior of all these buildings—the part which the public sees will be of cement.

Since all my information up to this point had been given me orally, I wrote on February 4, 1965, to Mr. William Walton, Chairman of the Commission of Fine Arts, seeking further information in writing. Under date of February 17, 1965, Mr. Walton considerably replied to my request.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that both my letter to Mr. Walton,

of February 4, 1965, and Mr. Walton's letter to me of February 17, 1965, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FEBRUARY 4, 1965.

MR. WILLIAM WALTON,
Chairman, Commission of Fine Arts,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. WALTON: I am gravely disturbed by repeated reports that the Commission of Fine Arts has laid down a policy decreeing that stone must not appear on any building winning its approval.

This is said to be common knowledge in construction circles. I have also been told on highly reliable authority that architects have learned that to win acceptance of their designs they must use some form of exposed concrete.

I should like to know specifically what policy, if any, has been adopted by the Commission to govern the selection of concrete or a natural stone. I should also like to know if it is true that, since the appointment of the present Commission in 1961, more than half a dozen major buildings which have been approved are being built or are to be built of poured or precast concrete. In this connection it would be helpful to have a list of all buildings constructed since 1961 with the Commission's approval, and to what extent concrete in any form and/or natural stone is used for exteriors.

I should like to know why it is, if true, that in planning these new buildings only contemporary design is used instead of the monumental structures of classic design that have made Washington one of the great architectural centers of the world.

Finally, it is only fair to ask if it is true that the policy of former Commissions, which held that marble should be used for buildings on the Mall and limestone for those on avenues adjoining the Mall, was changed within 2 years after the present Commission took office.

I emphasize that this is not intended as criticism of the talented persons who comprise the Commission. My concern is that the architectural beauties of our Capital be preserved and expanded by the continued use of those natural stones of lasting quality that have made Washington buildings truly outstanding.

It also seems to me that if concrete rather than stone is to be used in our new Federal buildings, such decision would be inconsistent with Mrs. Lyndon Johnson's campaign to make our Capital City still more beautiful.

Sincerely yours,

GEORGE D. AIKEN,
U. S. Senate.

THE COMMISSION OF FINE ARTS,
February 17, 1965.

HON. GEORGE D. AIKEN,
U. S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR AIKEN: At the outset of this letter I wish to make a flat statement that the Commission of Fine Arts has at no time laid down any policy forbidding the use of stone in buildings that come to us for review. The Commission does not choose materials for buildings: it either accepts or rejects the designs that are presented by General Services Administration and private architects. I start out with these statements because I want them clearly emphasized.

Your letter suggests that at some time in 1961 the members of this Commission adopted a new policy. May I point out to you that six of the seven members of this Commission took office in the summer of 1963. The seventh took office in 1962. Therefore, I think you will see that it was impossible for us to

have laid down some new policy in 1961, and to the best of my knowledge no such policy has been adopted, nor do I think it ever will.

I would like to emphasize to you that the members of this Commission are entirely openminded in their approach to architecture, both as to style and to content, which includes materials. Our aim is the same that has guided the Commission since its inception in 1910. We wish to contribute to the development of a harmonious city, which I would interpret to mean that new buildings had to fit with their neighbors. For instance, if I were expressing a personal prejudice, I would say that I thought that the Mall area was an unsuitable site for any building that was largely glass, like many of the tall buildings along Park Avenue in New York. Glass buildings have their place, but I don't feel that it is here.

I have asked my staff to prepare a list of all buildings that have been reviewed by the present members of this Commission, a period that really covers only about 18 months. I will forward that list to you as soon as it has been compiled. In the meantime let me say that the two major designs that have come before us were for Federal Office Building No. 5 and for the National Air and Space Museum. The architects specifications called for construction of both of those buildings in some kind of concrete aggregate which, as I understand it, includes small bits of natural stone and gives an effect far different than the kind of raw concrete we associate with factories and other commercial buildings. In neither of these cases did the Commission choose the material. We approved the designs and in so doing approved the material. When handsome natural stone buildings are proposed to us, I dare say we will approve them too.

I have tried to answer your questions, but if I have left any corners unlit please let me know. I would be happy to discuss it with you at any time and will send along the list of buildings in the near future.

With best wishes.

WILLIAM WALTON,
Chairman.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, it will be noted that Mr. Walton states at the start of his letter that the Commission "has at no time laid down any policy forbidding the use of stone in buildings that come to us for review" but simply passes on the designs that are presented.

I accept this statement at face value. It is apparent that the Commission has adopted no fixed policy for future buildings, but does accept or reject the design for each building as it is presented.

It is becoming increasingly apparent, however, that only those buildings with concrete exteriors are likely to be found satisfactorily designed.

One point which has been raised during my quest for information has been the suggestion that buildings constructed of poured and precast concrete might cost less than buildings based and faced with stone.

Not being an expert in this field, I wondered if the durability or life of the building should not be taken into consideration. There seemed to be no better place to start looking for comparisons than right here in the Capitol.

Except for certain recent extensions, the Capitol with marble and sandstone exteriors was built from 100 to 170 years ago. The excellent condition of the stone today is apparent to everyone.

The Senate Office Building, with marble walls facing the streets and limestone facing on the court, was built in

1909. These stone exteriors are in superb condition today, 56 years later.

Now, what about the concrete buildings? Four were built in 1918 under wartime conditions. All these are reported to show cracks, shrinkage, and discoloration. Patching and painting is said to be a continuing process.

However, we do not have to go back 47 years to find an unfavorable comparison for the cement construction. The General Services Administration building, built in 1934, is said to be in the worst condition of all.

The National Airport building, of 1940, is reported cracking.

The District of Columbia Stadium, built in 1962, shows considerable interior cracking and some signs of exterior cracking.

The Dulles Airport building, also built in 1962, is causing worry because of fine cracks appearing at the base of the pylons.

It seems to me that durability should be given a substantial weighting in determining the structure of a new building.

I am well aware that the guidelines of the executive branch place full emphasis on contemporary design of new buildings.

I am also aware of the fact that some contemporary-minded people may regard many of the Government buildings on Pennsylvania and Constitution Avenues as ugly or even hideous. To me, however, these dignified buildings of marble, sandstone, and granite mean something. They represent an era—an era in American history which saw 13 struggling colonies develop into the greatest nation on earth.

I am not ashamed of that era, and I want its meaning impressed upon the minds of every young American and the millions of people who come every year to stand in awe before the simple, dignified, durable, and inspiring buildings of Washington.

I sometimes wonder why it is that some people will give of their time and money to unearth the history of the Nile, or to reconstruct the pyramids of the Toltecs, and then ignore or look down upon those very traditions which made it possible to have that time and money to spend.

In speaking as I have today, I want it understood that I am not criticizing the estimable and intellectual members of the Commission of Fine Arts. I am glad that they do look ahead to continuing improvement of our art and culture.

There is, however, a time and place for everything, particularly historic values.

I make no charges against the cement industry. It is a very important industry. Its product has improved over the years. Yes, the cement industry is industrially potent and politically persuasive. It knows how to outwit competitors and get new business. It should not be blamed for that.

It has every reason to rejoice over the apparent plans to make the Nation's Capital a cement city, from which it may be expected that cement construction of public buildings will radiate.

I am speaking now for the purpose of alerting the public, so far as that is possible, in the hope that the people them-

selves will make the final determination as to whether we shall unconditionally give way to contemporariness or whether some part of our presently inspiring Capital City may be dedicated to dignity, simplicity, and tradition—a continuing memorial to those who brought democracy and freedom to America.

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I wish to join the distinguished Senator from Vermont in expressing concern over any action that has been taken or that might be taken by the Washington District of Columbia Commission of Fine Arts which would tend to mar or depreciate the natural and lasting architectural beauty of the National Capital.

The questions that have been raised by the Senator from Vermont and all others who are equally concerned about this situation, including the Representatives from the Ninth District of Georgia, are certainly valid ones, and they deserve to be answered.

The Capital City of the United States belongs to all of the people of this country and not to any special interests. Washington, with its wide boulevards and the dignity of its magnificent edifices, is recognized as one of the most beautiful cities in the world. The people take great pride in their capital, and they desire to assure the preservation of its beauty for generations yet unborn.

Legitimate questions have been raised as to whether or not the Commission of Fine Arts has decreed that natural stone cannot appear on any Federal building subject to its approval, and that the exterior design must be of some form of concrete instead of time-tested stone. I do not know if any such policy has been adopted by the Commission but certainly the substitution of concrete for stone exteriors of four new buildings to be built here indicates to me that some attempt apparently is being made to establish a new trend of architecture.

I understand that plans approved by the Commission call for the substitution of concrete for stone in four new buildings currently authorized to be built at a cost of more than \$120 million; namely, the Federal Office Building No. 5; the National Air and Space Museum of the Smithsonian Institution; the new FBI building; and the new headquarters for the Housing and Home Finance Agency.

In view of the actions taken with regard to these structures, the Congress and the people have every right to ask if more are to follow.

I earnestly hope not. It is inconceivable to me that the Fine Arts Commission would by its actions rule out the use of natural stone, whose permanence and beauty has weathered every test, in the exterior design of Federal buildings in Washington.

If the Commission has any such plans or intentions, I hope it will reconsider them.

INVITATION TO DEMONSTRATION OF EDUCATIONAL FILMS, LANGUAGE LABORATORIES AND OTHER MODERN TEACHING EQUIPMENT IN EDUCATION

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I have today, as chairman of the Education

Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, issued a cordial invitation to all Senators and their staffs to attend a demonstration of educational films, language laboratories, and other modern teaching equipment in education which will be held in the auditorium of the New Senate Office Building at 1:30 and 3:30 p.m. tomorrow, Wednesday, February 24.

Of particular interest, in my judgment, will be the presentation by a master teacher of a demonstration class using these techniques. We are privileged to have with us for that afternoon a fifth-grade class from Scott Montgomery School here in the District. The class will take two lessons in public from a master teacher whom they have met only once previously. I urge all Senators and members of their staff whose schedules permit to take this opportunity to see for themselves what can be done by a skilled teacher who has adequate equipment to do his work. In addition, in the foyer of the auditorium competent teachers will demonstrate the actual operation of different types of equipment used in our better schools.

As an added inducement—if one were necessary and I am sure it is not—I am advised that there may be coffee available.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my full invitation be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the invitation was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE,

February 22, 1965.

Hon. _____,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR _____: The Education Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare has, as you know, completed its hearings on S. 370, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.

During the course of our hearings we were privileged to receive much testimony upon new teaching methods and techniques using modern equipment which illustrated some of the ways in which educationally handicapped children can be helped in our elementary and secondary schools through programs financed by the provisions of the bill.

In order that you and your staff associates may have an opportunity to see for yourselves what can be done, I have arranged for two special demonstrations of the use of modern and audiovisual tools in education. These will be held in the auditorium of the New Senate Office Building on Wednesday afternoon, February 24, at 1:30 and 3:30 p.m. I cordially invite you to attend the demonstration if your schedule will permit.

The subcommittee has arranged this demonstration because we believe it is important for the Senators to have the opportunity to learn of the increasingly important role which films, TV, language laboratories and similar modern tools are assuming in the improvement of classroom instruction. These devices and materials have been shown to our subcommittee in its hearings on the Elementary and Secondary Education Improvement Act.

Of particular interest, I believe, will be the 45-minute presentation by a master teacher working for the first time with a fifth-grade class from the District of Columbia school system using a variety of the new

materials and equipment to strengthen the effectiveness of his own teaching.

Cordially,

WAYNE MORSE,
Chairman, Education Subcommittee.

CONSERVATION RESOLUTIONS

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, on February 18 I called the attention of my colleagues to the fact that a conservation battle is underway in our land. The soil and water conservation districts of America have organized a nationwide effort through their national association to counteract the administration's proposal that Congress enact legislation to authorize a revolving fund through which soil conservation districts, farmers, ranchers, and other landowners would pay the Federal Government \$20 million in 1966 to help finance a part of the cost of technical assistance from the Soil Conservation Service.

I announced then that I have joined the soil conservation districts in opposition to the proposed revolving fund, because it would not be in the public interest. Some of my colleagues have asked me for more details regarding this proposition.

Such details were set forth in resolutions adopted by the National Association of Soil and Water Conservation Districts at their annual convention in Portland, Oreg., on February 9. I think my colleagues will find them of great interest. I ask for unanimous consent to have the NACD resolutions printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the resolutions were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RESOLUTION 1

PROPOSED REVOLVING FUND

The Bureau of the Budget has proposed that Congress enact legislation to authorize a revolving fund through which soil conservation districts, farmers, ranchers, and other landowners would pay the Federal Government a part of the cost of technical assistance from the Soil Conservation Service of the Department of Agriculture used in planning and applying soil and water conservation practices on the land.

If adopted, this proposal would seriously slow down the soil and water conservation effort on the privately owned lands of the Nation. We believe it would result in an estimated decrease of 40 to 50 percent in the annual application of conservation practices and would reduce the quality of the practices applied.

This proposal, if adopted, would reverse a policy of 30 years standing. In 1935, Congress began a policy of providing technical assistance from the Soil Conservation Service without charge to farmers, ranchers, and other private landowners willing to cooperate in scientific, farmwide conservation programs on their properties.

We believe adoption of this proposal would serve to undermine landowners' confidence in the Federal Government's conservation purpose and its desire for an effective conservation partnership with landowners.

We believe it would weaken the exercise of local leadership and the functioning of self-government in resource conservation and development. Further, the proposal creates the prospect that soil and water conservation district governing bodies may be asked to function as collection agents for the Federal Government.

If adopted, this proposal would, in our judgment, break faith with State and local governments. State legislatures and county governments over a quarter of a century have been steadily building up their financial contributions to the total soil and water conservation effort on privately owned lands, with the understanding that the local-State-Federal team effort would be maintained as a team effort for the universal good of the Nation and all its people.

Adoption of the revolving fund proposal would treat American landowners unfairly. It would charge American landowners for technical assistance which the Federal Government now provides free of charge to the people of many foreign nations.

Under this proposal, farmers would assume still more of the town and city responsibility for soil and water conservation. Soil conservation, flood control, and water development contribute to the well-being of all the people because they depend on our limited supplies of soil and water for their daily requirements of food, water, and a productive countryside.

We believe adoption of this proposal would severely retard water conservation and development work in America. Problems of water shortage, floods, pollution, and sedimentation must be met first within the confines of each local watershed. Water comes from rain and snow which falls primarily on land surfaces. The farmers and ranchers who control our farms, range, and woodlands also are in a position to control the movement and protect the quality of the water falling on their lands.

If adopted, the revolving fund proposal would slow down the effort to reduce water pollution. The conservation needs inventory of the Department of Agriculture showed that erosion is still the dominant soil problem on two-thirds of the Nation's land area. Soil eroded from watershed areas pollutes rivers and streams, and clogs harbors and bay areas with sediment.

Moreover, adoption of this proposal would slow down work that is contributing to the good appearance and beauty of the American countryside. Green valleys, clear waters, contoured fields, well-managed forest, lush pastures, and developed watersheds are basic to the beauty of the countryside. Gullied fields and muddy streams detract from the beauty of America as much as auto graveyards.

If this proposal were to be adopted, we believe it would act as a major drag on the development of recreational facilities on private lands. The Soil Conservation Service type of technical assistance for recreational development on rural lands is not available anywhere else, even for hire.

Without question, establishment of the revolving fund would slow down needed adjustments in land use. In 1964, technical assistance guided more than 1 million soil and water conservation district cooperators in converting 2,500,000 acres from crop use to less intensive uses such as grass and tree production.

In addition, we should recognize clearly that adoption of this proposal would hit hardest in economically depressed areas. Much of what can be done to alleviate poverty in rural areas is bound up in the improved use of soil and water resources. Soil and water conservation is basic to economic development and family farm stability in rural areas.

We believe adoption of this proposal would penalize most the small farmer and the poor farmer who can least afford to pay. Family-owned farms are the very backbone of rural America. They operate most of the land and are the first custodians of most of our water.

The proposal also invites serious questions about certain commitments of the Secretary of Agriculture. In long-term contracts

with farmers and ranchers in special programs, such as the Great Plains conservation program the pilot cropland conversion program, the Secretary has contract commitments under long-term agreements to furnish technical assistance for applying conservation practices set forth in the agreed plan of operations.

Adoption of the Budget Bureau proposal would jeopardize the morale of Soil Conservation Service employees. It would constitute a vote of diminishing belief in the importance and purpose of the agency. The Soil Conservation Service today is recognized as the finest scientific agency of its kind in the world for supplying technical assistance for complete natural resource planning and development, acre by acre, farm by farm, property by property on individual landholdings, watersheds, and whole communities. This standard of excellence could be lost.

A revolving fund would increase total conservation costs. A collection system outside the accepted tax collection structure would have to be devised. Thousands of farmers would need more financial assistance to pay for technical aid—or else give up the opportunity of taking part in soundly developed conservation programs.

We believe future generations would suffer most if the soil and water conservation effort of the Nation is slowed down and dissipated. To recover from a slowdown begun in our time, another generation would be forced to take 11th-hour extreme actions which would be costly in terms of money, damaging in terms of our basic institutions, and unsatisfactory in terms of the resources themselves.

Further, we resist the prospect that the leadership of the Nation in the 1960's should be marked as the one which turned its back on the national soil conservation program so constructively undertaken by Franklin D. Roosevelt and the leaders of the 1930's.

For these several preceding reasons, the National Association of Soil and Water Conservation Districts will:

1. Lead a nationwide effort, and assist the Nation's 3,000 local soil and water conservation districts, to defeat the proposed revolving fund; and

2. Request the Administrator of the Soil Conservation Service to undertake promptly a nationwide study—district-by-district and State-by-State—to evaluate the impact of the Budget Bureau proposal on the conservation and resource development work on the privately owned lands of the Nation, and the ensuing effect on the well-being of the American people.

RESOLUTION 2

SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE APPROPRIATIONS

The workload in soil and water conservation districts involving the planning and applying of soil and water conservation practices continues to increase each year. Districts are being requested to supply increased soil survey information to farmers, agricultural workers, land appraisers, planning commissions, credit agencies, educators, economists, and other public officials. Districts are also assuming new responsibilities in programs for conservation, resource development, land-use adjustments, and economic development in rural America.

These new district responsibilities are based to a very large extent on farm conservation plans which farmers develop in cooperation with local soil and water conservation districts, or on plans developed by organized groups of landowners.

Meanwhile, the cost of technical assistance has continued to increase as the national economy has grown. Federal funds appropriated to the Soil Conservation Service have been inadequate to furnish sufficient technical assistance to meet the growing obligations in districts.

The National Association of Soil and Water Conservation Districts therefore requests the Congress to appropriate additional funds to the Soil Conservation Service to provide needed technical assistance, watershed planning, watershed protection, and service to the Great Plains conservation program during fiscal year 1966.

More specifically, we ask the Congress of the United States to appropriate \$115,040,000 for the conservation operations in fiscal year 1966.

We urge the Congress to kill the proposed revolving fund through which soil conservation districts and farmers and ranchers would make \$20 million of payments to the Soil Conservation Service for technical assistance.

We ask that \$750,000 of new funds be appropriated to provide technical assistance staff to 25 new soil and water conservation districts expected to be organized during fiscal year 1966.

We further ask that an additional \$10,187,000 of conservation operations funds be appropriated to meet the current backlog in staffing needs of 1,518 man-years of technical assistance in soil conservation districts.

Watershed planning:

We ask the Congress of the United States to appropriate \$10 million for watershed planning in fiscal year 1966.

This \$4¼ million increase over the budget estimate is needed to permit a step-up in the rate of watershed planning because nearly 1,200 communities are on the waiting list for planning assistance.

Watershed protection:

We ask the Congress of the United States to appropriate \$85 million for watershed protection in fiscal year 1966.

This would permit beginning construction on approximately 100 new watershed project starts instead of only 70 new starts as proposed in the budget estimates.

Flood prevention:

We ask the Congress to appropriate at the budget estimate level of \$25,417,000 for flood prevention in fiscal year 1966.

This has been a current and adequate level of flood prevention operations for several years.

Great Plains conservation program:

We ask the Congress of the United States to appropriate \$20 million for the Great Plains conservation program in fiscal year 1966.

The increase over the budget estimate is needed to help meet the backlog of nearly 5,000 farmers who have made application for help but are still waiting for assistance.

Resource conservation and development:

We ask the Congress of the United States to appropriate at the budget estimate level of \$4,303,000 for resource conservation and development in fiscal year 1966.

This would permit the continuation of operations in the 10 pilot R.C. & D. projects now underway and would permit the authorization of planning on 10 more pilot R.C. & D. projects in 1966.

We urge soil and water conservation district supervisors and watershed directors to inform their Senators and Representatives of these needs and request support for such appropriations.

RESOLUTION 3

AGRICULTURAL CONSERVATION PROGRAM FUNDS

All citizens of the Nation benefit from actions taken to conserve and develop natural resources, including the basic resources of soil and water.

We recognize that the economy of agriculture is such that farmers cannot finance, wholly, all the costs of planning and applying the conservation practices that are needed.

The agricultural conservation program of the USDA encourages, assists, and gives individual farmers an incentive, through shar-

ing the cost of applying conservation measures, to proceed with the work of conserving natural resources.

The NACD, therefore, opposes the proposed \$100 million budget reduction in the advance authorization for the agricultural conservation program in 1966. We ask the Congress to maintain the authorization at the 1965 level in order to maintain progress toward the conservation of natural resources.

RESOLUTION 4

CONTRACT ARRANGEMENTS IN WATERSHED PROJECTS

Under provisions of the Great Plains conservation program, landowners may enter into long-term contracts with USDA whereby they adopt a conservation plan for their entire unit and agree to make land-use changes, apply conservation practices, and establish desirable cropping and use systems, all according to an agreed upon time schedule. The USDA, for its part, agrees to provide technical assistance and cost-sharing to further adoption of this farmwide conservation plan according to the time schedule.

We urge an amendment to the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act authorizing the use of similar contract arrangements within approved watersheds. We recommend a time schedule of from 3 to 10 years for completion of essential conservation measures on whole farms covered by such watershed contracts.

PETITIONS BY CORNELL UNIVERSITY STUDENTS ON U.S. POLICY ON VIETNAM

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, last night I lectured at Cornell University. At the conclusion of the lecture, a group of students handed me some petitions in opposition to U.S. policy in South Vietnam.

I ask unanimous consent to have them printed in the RECORD at this point with the names.

There being no objection, the petition and names were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

We, the undersigned members of the Cornell University community, strongly protest the bombing and strafing attacks on North Vietnam by the U.S. Government on February 7 and 8, 1965. In spite of official statements to the contrary, we believe that such actions can lead only to the escalation of a war that the United States should not be fighting in the first place; especially since we are supporting regimes disliked by and detrimental to the Vietnamese people.

We hereby join with the growing number of citizens who have voiced their opposition to the United States presence in Vietnam.

We demand that the U.S. Government withdraw from Vietnam now.

Larry Faulkner, Fred Rosen, Mark Sommer, Douglas Hainline, Lincoln Bergman, Daniel Morrison, Charles F. Nagel, Janet A. Schleicher, Stephen R. Kellert, Bruce Bridgman, Martha Grinnell, Mr. and Mrs. Christopher S. Kinder, William E. Schleicher, Joyce Stark, Jill Ann Borkey, Michael Astor, Mark Leider, Carol Newman, Tim Hall, Dan Segrim, Steve Fankuchen, George M. Alexis, Richard Englestein, Thomas D. Hill, Ralph Schwartz, Abby Canfield, Ronald A. Schneider, James P. Snyder, Bruce E. Kaplin, Sue J. Estey, Murray Cohen, Les Jacobs, Serena Weaver, Fred Weaver, Brenda Milder, Eugene C. Holman III, Mary Dolores

Nichols, John Canfield, George R. Price, Sander Helhsby, David Kirkwood, Stanley Perlo.

Gary H. Deissman, Helen Chuckrow, Michael Dossily, Ruth Goldwarren, R. Stewart Jonas, Kenneth G. Rhuess, H. Carol Woodcock, Philip L. Gilman, Martha E. Trae, Nancy Sorkin, Adam J. Sorkin, Richard Peiser, Richard Brenblatt, Hal S. Kibley, Joe H. Griffith, Nypar Feldner, Peter Long, Stephen LeRoy, Doreen Brenner, Robert Gschfeld, Eric Lee Geytman, Katherine Porter, David Leseohier, William Schecter, Dainoz Fineman, Lawrence Jones, Jonathan Sabin, Robye Cooper, Henry Balsen, Judith S. Kessel, Richard Unger, James W. Boghosian.

Ann Suitow, Richard Epond, Helene Brosuis, Natalie Kent, Steven Gelber, Marie Gould, Peter Salwen, Steven Faigelman, Walter J. Wille, James R. Willcox, Mike Smith, Susan Higgins, Jo Hallperin, N. E. Dukin, G. Epoty, Claire Eisenhandler, Gail Boesel, Thomas C. Barnt, Tatman Walter, Jerry Sobel, Paul Epstein, William Duell, Bruce Bennett.

Michael Rudetsky, Peter L. Gale, Nathaniel W. Pierce, Mark L. Klein, Paul Seidel, David Rader, Steve M. Handschu, Christy Reppert, Helen Jones, Peter Dormont, Malcolm Campbell, Judy Russell, Martha N. Simon, Joe H. Griffith, John N. Vournakis, Karen Vournakis, Jeanne Duell, Carol V. Kaske, and Henry Daniel.

PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY'S STATEMENTS FOR GI BILLS

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, this year the cold war GI bill, S. 9, is receiving the greatest support that it has ever had from the Members of this body. In addition to having 40 cosponsors, the high caliber and earnestness of testimony by several Senators before the Subcommittee on Veterans' Affairs demonstrates that opposing forces will have a harder time blocking the consideration of this bill than they have ever had before.

I would like to remind my colleagues that the late President John F. Kennedy was an earnest supporter of readjustment assistance for our veterans. In Senate Document No. 79 of the 88th Congress, a compendium of speeches and statements made by John F. Kennedy during his service in Congress, there are two statements concerning readjustment assistance. The first of these is in support of the Korean GI bill, and the second recommends raising the allowances paid under the then existing GI bill. I ask unanimous consent that these two statements be inserted at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statements were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE KOREAN GI BILL, H.R. 7656, JUNE 5, 1952

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Speaker, I want to take this opportunity to be recorded as supporting fully and vigorously the Korean GI bill, H.R. 7656, now under consideration.

Close to a million Americans have participated in the Korean struggle. They are justly deserving of the same consideration that the veterans of World War II were accorded.

The assistance in obtaining educational training which the Korean veterans will receive under this bill will benefit not only the young men and women themselves. It will help insure for the future of America

an informed citizenry, which will be capable of guarding well the priceless American heritage of freedom.

Had I not been necessarily absent because of an injury, I would have voted for this bill providing for veterans' education and training.

INCREASED EDUCATION AND TRAINING ALLOWANCES UNDER VETERANS' READJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1952, JULY 21, 1955

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill to increase the education and training allowances under the Veterans' Readjustment Act of 1952. Specifically, this proposal would increase veterans' educational benefits by approximately 14 percent over the 1952 level.

In view of the continuing rise in educational costs, it seems to me that such increase as mentioned above is clearly warranted. One can easily see, by viewing at approximately the same level since 1952, the cost of education has, in the same period, increased by more than 10 percent and is expected to rise to over 14 percent of its 1952 level in the next school year.

It has been argued by some that inasmuch as the basic philosophy of the 1952 act was one of assistance and not complete subsidy, any increase would not be in harmony with this underlying philosophy. This argument is irrelevant to this bill, which would only increase veterans' allowances in proportion to increases in the cost of education since 1952. On the contrary, I feel that my bill if enacted, will erase many of the inequities presently existing under the 1952 GI bill of rights. Korean veterans presently enrolled in institutions of higher learning should not be rewarded for their services to a lesser extent than veterans who enrolled during the early days of the act.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. In addition, Mr. President, I should like to point out that when this bill passed the Senate on July 21, 1959, during the 1st session of the 86th Congress, both the late President Kennedy and our present President, Lyndon B. Johnson, were among those who voted for its enactment.

I suggest that a bill which has had the support of 2 Presidents, 1 past and 1 present, and 40 Senators in the present, should be given early consideration by this body. The fate of 5 million cold war veterans is worthy of immediate consideration.

THE FAMILY FARMER HAS EARNED THE THANKS OF THE NATION

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, no segment of our society has done a better job of production than the American family farmer. He has produced abundantly, and at a very reasonable cost to the consumer.

In 1964, we Americans spent only 18.6 percent of our income dollar to feed ourselves; yet we eat better than any other country in the world. In return for this efficient production, the family farmer is not now, nor has he in the past, received a fair return for his labor or a fair return on his investment. I rise to express again my extreme alarm over the continually worsening economic plight of the farmer and rancher. Worse than the farmers' economic plight are the unjustified attacks being made upon the family farmer by large and powerful interests in this country, aided and abetted by certain Government bureaucrats.

The farmers of this Nation have earned the thanks of the Nation. They should be thanked, not condemned.

In the February 18, 1965, *Tulia Herald*, Mr. H. M. Baggarly, winner of numerous journalism awards State and National, correctly states the dilemma faced by the American family farmer. I ask unanimous consent that this column from the *Tulia Herald*, of *Tulia, Tex.*, be inserted in the *RECORD* at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the *RECORD*, as follows:

[From the *Tulia (Tex.) Herald*, Feb. 18, 1965]

THE COUNTRY EDITOR

(By H. M. Baggarly)

There are many reasons why we became a newspaper publisher instead of a farmer. Topping the list is the fact that we were conditioned against farming from the time we started to school.

In our day, the teachers and especially the school principals did a lot of moralizing. They seldom let a school assembly pass without an attempt to inspire their charges to "get an education," "to study hard," and "to strive for success."

The alternative was to become a failure—and the penalty for failure was to become a farmer.

Even the parents of our friends who happened to be farmers joined with the teachers in urging their offspring to go on to school and get an education so they could live a better life than the parents.

We were impressed by this moralizing. We had no desire to become a farmer which, in our reasoning was the equivalent of failure.

Strangely enough, all this took place not during a general depression but during what was then considered an era of prosperity—the late 1920's. Business was enjoying great prosperity. Labor was prospering—yet the farmer was on the bottom rung of the economic ladder.

Business was in a position to demand its share of the economic pie, and so was labor. Only the farmer had to accept what was offered him for what he produced. Even though he constituted a highly important and necessary part of the economy, he simply had to accept what was left after business and labor were satisfied. He had no bargaining power.

Of course he was free to plant what he wanted in any amount. He had that "freedom" which some farm leaders long for today. Strangely enough, from many sources we hear the cry of farmers to be unshackled, the cry to be free from Government controls of production, a cry to be governed only by the law of supply and demand.

The fact is, agriculture had never even approached parity with other segments of the economy until Government controls were instituted in the early days of the New Deal. Business can look backward to a time of prosperity before the depression. Even labor earned a respectable wage before Roosevelt—but not agriculture.

It was not until the day of the farm program that the farmer emerged from the clover stage, the day when farm youth wore homemade haircuts and unstylish clothing, were made the brunt of unkind jokes, enjoyed none of the cultural opportunities now available to city and farm folks alike.

It was not until the day of the farm program that agriculture became attractive even to college graduates.

Yet, there are those people who imagine they can have their cake and eat it too. They imagine they could be freed to plant fence to fence, anything they desired—and

keep right on living like they do today—perhaps better, because they could grow more wheat and cotton.

We'd like to see the looks on some faces if these people were turned loose and were offered 10 cents a pound for their cotton and 50 cents a bushel for their wheat, and their overhead remained at the present level as it would.

Of course such a catastrophe would be the dream of a few millionaire corporate farmers who would delight at the opportunity to pick up a lot of cheap land.

Segments of the economy tend to seek advantage. Each wants not just its fair share but more. The British aristocrats who founded our Nation sought to favor the aristocracy, the merchants, the big plantation owners. They would even have denied the no-landowner the right to vote. In politics of the time, it was the aristocracy versus the laborer, farmer, frontiersman, and planter. This pattern continued until the industrial revolution and the rise of big business.

As big corporations were formed to build railroads, steel factories, manufacturing concerns, a tremendous economic imbalance developed. The rich merchants lived in vulgar luxury. At a party held in the old Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York, these heads of industry on one occasion lighted their cigars with \$10 bills. Meanwhile, their employees labored long hours in sweatshops for low wages. Often their lives were endangered as they toiled in multistory frame buildings with inadequate fire escapes. Coal miners died like flies because mining companies refused to take safety precautions.

The inevitable result was the rise of the trade union movement. Gradually labor came into its own with the result that both labor and business benefited. As labor achieved a higher standard of living it became a better customer of business which had things to sell.

Although business and labor had come to terms, the farmer continued in his old pattern. Even in the late 1920's when business and labor were enjoying their best years up to that time, the farmer was in what we would now call depression. He was on the bottom rung of the economic ladder, accepting what was offered him for what he produced.

Not until the great depression was a farm program initiated. Government loans spoiled the favored position of the grain speculators in Chicago and Kansas City who took control of the farmer's grain when the market was low and the farmer had to sell, then sold it when the market was high. It was the speculator who reaped the reward for the farmer's labor.

An effort was made to bring production out of chaos which uncontrolled production inevitably leads to.

For the first time, the farmer was able to produce in an orderly manner and be assured of a reasonable reward for his efforts.

Not only did his financial status improve but his children were able to compete culturally with their town cousins, his wife was able to take her rightful place in society, and he became something much more than "a country hick."

It's amazing what a few dollars can do for underprivileged people.

Neither the farmer nor the laborer achieved his new status by being turned loose to run his affairs without outside interference.

This is a luxury that even the multimillionaire merchant cannot afford. We are all a part of the whole. Controls, which is the only thing that prevents chaos in our complex society, is not an evil word.

The oil industry gladly submits to production controls for the good of the industry.

Professional groups all submit to controls by their associations.

Controls are imposed on the teaching profession, particularly in the field of certification.

Labor is regulated by the unions. Business is controlled by antitrust laws, health laws, and by the Federal Trade Commission.

Communications media are controlled by the FCC.

And so must agriculture be subject to controls for its own good.

The source of control varies. In some instances, good control is all that is necessary. In other instances, good judgment brings groups together informally for voluntary controls.

Due to the nature of agriculture, only the Government is able to exercise control. The automobile industry is able to control its production within the industry. It would never permit itself to manufacture more cars than it could sell just because it has the facilities.

But the farmer is different. He will plant fence to fence on the theory that "the little extra I produce won't affect the overall picture."

Agricultural regulation is morally just and economically sound.

With all segments of our economy gladly accepting controls, it would be chaotic for the farmer to buck the tide.

Some farmers, however, openly demand the "right to go broke" on the theory that that is their business.

But in our society, we don't even permit this right if it affects others. We are too closely allied. We cannot live unto ourselves.

We tell a man he can't even leave his key in his car which on the surface seems to be an unreasonable regulation. But the fact is, if he leaves the key in his car, and the car is stolen, the police must come to his rescue, we all pay the police, then we all become involved over his carelessness.

So it is that the farmer cannot go broke without dragging the rest of the economy down with him. He will take with him the small town, manufacturers of farm implements, and finally a huge part of the economy.

Some farmers seem to have troubled consciences over so-called handouts from Uncle Sam. They have the martyr complex. They don't want to take that which, they say, does not belong to them.

To be a martyr may be noble, but it isn't practical unless one wants to go all the way. An economic martyr owes it to himself to go all the way and shoot himself.

Society has developed an economy in which all its segments are subsidized one way or another. Manufacturers are subsidized by tariffs on imported goods. Shipbuilders and the airlines are subsidized by direct grants from the Government. Labor, in fact, is subsidized by minimum wage and other laws.

Since 1951, business and labor have enjoyed a hike in real income of 48 percent. During that same period, farm income dipped 23 percent. Farm families now have about 50 percent income parity with other groups. Yet cost of farm products to the consumer has dipped 15 percent.

So the farmer need shed no tears for his so-called handouts. Rather he should tell business and labor, "we'll end the farm subsidy on the same day that we end business and labor subsidy."

There are other reasons why we must have a strong, sound farm economy.

We cannot afford to have our farm plant eroded by income deflation. The farm plant must be ready to feed and clothe all our people.

We have noted many fallacies in our public thinking concerning agriculture.

One is that organized protection of farm prices is responsible for over production. Not so.

Another is that the removal of controls with prices guided only by a free market would automatically bring supply and de-

mand in line and everybody would be prosperous and happy. Not so.

Still another is that we can solve farm problem by asking agriculture to return to laissez faire economics of the 19th century. Absurd.

All the thinking world abandoned this theory after the great depression. Why don't we?

Letting the farmer take what he can get while producing what he would is suicide.

STATE LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT

Mr. HART. Mr. President, as the Senate again moves toward committee consideration of proposed constitutional amendments on State legislative apportionment, there are many critical questions which should be completely and thoroughly aired.

One such question was raised in a telling editorial last month in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

It asks the question: "What Other Factors?" Some of the proposed amendments suggest that one house of a State legislature may be apportioned on factors "other than population," and the editorial rightly makes the point that the question of "what other factors" must be raised again and again until we can make clear the hazards of such an amendment.

The editorial suggests that this language would permit "other factors" to be the number of automobiles in a given legislative district. That is a novel idea which a Senator from Michigan might well support.

I commend the editorial to all who are concerned that once again the Congress is about to consider an amendment to the Constitution which could well have far-reaching implications in its every word. I ask unanimous consent that the Post-Dispatch editorial of January 29, 1965, be printed at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WHAT OTHER FACTORS?

The basis for most proposals, by the Missouri House and in Congress, to defeat the Supreme Court's one man, one vote apportionment ruling is the idea that States should be able to create one legislative house on the basis of "factors other than population." What other factors?

This was the searching question raised before the Missouri House Federal-State Relations Committee by Jules Gerard, associate professor of law at Washington University. Speaking for the American Civil Liberties Union Chapter here, Mr. Gerard said that while those "other factors" supposedly referred to geographical representation, the proposal to amend the Constitution did not say so.

"Others factors" is a sweeping term, encompassing everything but representation based on population, which is the only fair kind. Suppose the Nation were to adopt the constitutional amendment, as House Speaker Graham recommends in Missouri and Senator DIRKSEN and SYMINGTON suggest in Washington: Could not Mississippi then base representation on race? Could not some other State base it on religion? Those are possible "other factors."

In colonial times and later, representation was sometimes attempted on the basis of

property holding. In Fascist countries, including Spain today, representation is provided for corporations. And if people are to be excluded as a direct factor in representation, why not provide for representation for trees, cornstalks, cows or automobiles? Those are certainly "other factors."

No doubt proponents of the amendment will say that they do not have such factors in mind at all—but their legislation does not say so. What they do have in mind is to protect legislators' jobs, and to defend a misrepresentative system that has meant rural domination of the States and all too frequently a stand-pat, conservative rule. Naturally, their legislation does not say this, either.

Yet, in seeking their selfish and antidemocratic ends, the champions of "other factors" want to write into the U.S. Constitution an unlimited grant of special privilege to the States and to those who presently govern them. They want to wipe out a portion of judicial review, cancel out basic constitutional protections of equal rights under the law and, for the first time, diminish the constitutional meaning of liberty.

The Missouri House and its committee, of course, had their minds made up in advance. The amendment resolution was rushed through by the outstate majority without much thought for the grave questions involved, or any other factors. In Washington, some Congressmen are equally intent on a collision course with the existing Constitution.

The American people ought to rise against these attempts to substitute other factors for freedom.

OPPOSITION TO MEDICARE UNDER SOCIAL SECURITY BY COLORADO CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, recently I received from a friend and constituent of mine, Mr. Howard Yates, a statement prepared by the board of directors of the Colorado Chamber of Commerce on the medicare issue. It takes up the problems which the medicare issue will create with respect to our social security system. Since the subject is important and is going to be one of the issues before us in this session of Congress, I ask unanimous consent that the statement be included in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MEDICARE REMAINS PRIME ISSUE

The recently adjourned 88th Congress rejected a program of medical care for the aged under the OASDI payroll-tax financed structure. Some congressional leaders and others now are suggesting that the fall election results amount to a mandate to pass the administration's medicare program.

The addition of such a costly and unnecessary mandatory program to an already financially insecure social security program has no more merit today than it had yesterday. The State chamber is opposed to a program of medical care under the OASDI tax structure because it would inevitably lead to:

Government control of health and medical care which would both increase costs and lower quality of medical services for everyone;

Unpredictable costs, which, as program expanded, could eventually threaten solvency of the present social security cash benefits program;

The use of a social security program of hospital care for elderly as the opening wedge in the establishment of compulsory

Government medicine for all, with its attendant bureaucracy, redtape, and tendency to promote mass-production, assembly-line procedures in which quantity takes precedence over quality and both suffer.

The State chamber believes in a realistic, practical social security system, enlarged and strengthened as the Nation can afford it. There should be continuing study of the many still-unsolved problems involved so that any further legislation in this field may be based upon careful appraisal of experience with the actual operation of the program.

Prominent among these unsolved problems are that (1) no consistent relationship exists between amounts of tax contributions of individuals and the amounts of benefits they ultimately may receive; (2) the program is one of sharply rising costs for the next several decades and a major portion of costs of pension rights being earned now is being postponed for future generations to bear, and (3) the cost-deferment characteristic hides from public consciousness the future cost impact of obligations being incurred currently.

There is need for basic decisions correcting OASI financing weaknesses. In any event, future law changes increasing OASI costs should be accompanied by commensurate tax increases in order to create a clear public understanding of the cost impact.

Every effort needs to be made to find and put into effect the best possible solutions of these problems.

VIETNAM

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I have recently had the pleasure of reading the February 22 issue of the Washington Report issued by the American Security Council, containing an article entitled "Why We Can't Negotiate Now."

This article deals very clearly with the situation facing us in South Vietnam, and refutes one argument after another suggesting negotiation in Vietnam. It points out very logically and clearly the reason why we must stand firm in that area. The article is of real value because it answers some points which have been made. One of the cries we hear constantly, in Congress and outside, is that we cannot win militarily.

One of the points made in the article is that every guerrilla war engaged in between World War II and now has been either lost or won, not just stalemated. Dependent on the issue of whether it has been won or lost has been the whole course of freedom in those areas.

The writers of the article come to the conclusion that this war can be won, that the President's policy should be firmly supported, and they go further with respect to possible support from Red China and the Vietcong.

I do not want to indicate that I am necessarily in favor of or in opposition to the last paragraph of the report, but the entire article points out so many factors with which we have been dealing that I ask unanimous consent that the entire report—which is only four pages—be included at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WHY WE CAN'T NEGOTIATE NOW

A great swirl of climactic events has followed President Johnson's order to give concrete effect to his repeated warnings to the Communists to cease their aggression against

South Vietnam. The difficult but extremely necessary decisions have at last been taken. Inevitably in such cases, an atmosphere of crisis is created by the outraged cries and threats of international communism. Just as inevitably, the calls for a negotiated settlement are redoubled on the free world side of the line. Many well meaning people find it difficult to understand why President Johnson does not at least accompany his military action by an offer to enter into immediate negotiations to end the Vietnam war.

Undoubtedly, the President would like nothing better—nor would any other person of good will—if negotiation presently offered a reasonable prospect of fulfilling our pledge to defend the people of Vietnam; it is this pledge which we must honor if there is ever to be any hope of lasting peace in the world. But in considering negotiation the Administration is faced with a series of very unpleasant facts, which are either unknown or forgotten by the general public.

One set of facts concerns the inherent nature of guerrilla wars. The military tactics and political purposes of such wars are not subject to stalemate or compromise. For example, much of the current argument for negotiation rests on the hypothesis that a military victory for either side is impossible. This is begging the question. Since World War II, when the guerrilla war came into vogue, they have invariably been won or lost. Either the guerrillas win in the sense of achieving a take-over of the country or government in question, or else they are militarily defeated, at least to the point where they are reduced to a harmless remnant. There have been no exceptions to this rule.

The guerrillas triumphed completely against the Dutch in Indonesia, against the French in Algeria and Indochina (except here they settled for North Vietnam in 1954 rather than risk U.S. intervention), against the British in Palestine and Cyprus, and against Batista in Cuba. They were decisively defeated in Greece, the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, and—apparently—Venezuela. Whenever negotiations were held it was only for the purpose of ratifying the guerrilla victory. In the majority of cases this was not of a decisive military nature. The French were never beaten in Algeria and even after Dien Bien Phu they could have held on at least in Hanoi and Saigon. The Dutch could have held Indonesia for some time as could the British in Palestine and Cyprus. But either the will to resist was broken or else a reevaluation of national interests caused them to consider the area no longer vital.

CEASE FIRE MEANINGLESS

On the basis of all past experience, therefore, a negotiated settlement in Vietnam can only have the purpose either of confirming a Communist decision to abandon the drive for control of Vietnam, or else an American decision to admit defeat and withdraw. A cease fire would be meaningless. It would only leave the guerrillas in place and free to use the interval to run in more reinforcements and arms until they were ready for the next push. Withdrawal of all Communist guerrillas behind the 17th parallel, as is sometimes suggested, would be fine, but would of course be tantamount to a total Communist defeat in Vietnam. President Johnson has no intelligence as yet to lead him to suppose that the Communists are ready for anything of the sort.

On the contrary—and this is the second set of facts prevailing in the Vietnam situation—the Communist world remains unanimous in its declarations that the only basis for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam is the complete withdrawal of American forces, which is tantamount to a complete American defeat.

These statements might be written off as mere propaganda bargaining were they not

backed up by a great deal of background information coming out of Communist China, which indicate that she believes time and events are very much on her side. Since the second hypothesis for negotiations is that they must include Communist China, her attitude is obviously decisive to the outcome. Here are some of the more public facts which the President must consider:

1. Between December 21, 1964, and January 4, 1965, the first session of the Third National People's Congress was convened in Peiping. Nearly 3,000 deputies met behind closed doors to hear speeches by the leaders of Communist China. In addition to statements by Marshal Ho Lung boasting that the Chinese people's army has been considerably enlarged, supplied with up-to-date equipment, and is now supported by powerful naval and air force units, the Chinese published on December 30 an abbreviated version of Premier Chou En-lai's report on Chinese domestic and foreign policy.

The speech reflected great pride and self-confidence resulting from the explosion of the atomic bomb, the surmounting of the very serious difficulties between 1959 and 1961, resulting from the failure of the great leap forward, and the intention of transforming China into a world power with the most modern industry, agriculture, technology, and defense within the shortest possible time. Reviewing foreign policy, Chou pledged support to all—and he listed each one—revolutionary movements and centers of unrest. He declared that Peiping would consider negotiation with the United States only after it had given up Taiwan and would deal with the United Nations only when it had thrown out Nationalist China.

Chou further asserted that the east wind would prevail over the west wind, and that favorable conditions for such an outcome are the storm centers of world revolution in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The speech forces the conclusion that the Chinese Communists are not only conscious of their power, but are also prepared to use it to support wars of liberation wherever possible in a continuing struggle against imperialism.

2. As a concrete example that Chou meant what he said and that the "falling domino" theory in southeast Asia was not a figment of John Foster Dulles' overstimulated imagination, Peiping formally announced on February 5, 1965, the formation of a patriotic front to overthrow the pro-Western Government of Thailand and eradicate American influence there. For some time now, Communist agents have been infiltrating into Thailand in order to form the nucleus for subverting that country. The Thais have instituted energetic countermeasures which have so far kept them under control, but it is foolish to believe that Thailand would or could resist a Communist takeover backed by China if South Vietnam is lost. The Chinese do not even wait until one victim is gobbled up before proclaiming their plans to take over the next one.

3. Mao Tse-tung stated in a January interview with American journalist Edgar Snow that the crisis in Vietnam will not lead to war between China and the United States so long as China is not invaded. He also said that the war in Vietnam would last only another year or two because the South Vietnamese are deserting in large numbers and the Americans will lose interest. While this statement greatly reduces the likelihood of any Chinese retaliation against our raids on North Vietnam, it gives no comfort to those urging negotiation. If Mao really believes that the war will be won by the Communists in another year or two, then it is obvious that he looks on negotiation only to confirm this fact, which is another point he actually made in the interview. Unless he can be shaken in this conviction there is no possible basis for negotiation with China.

MUST STOP REDS

It is easy for those without responsibility to call for negotiation, as though this were the automatic panacea for all the world's ills. But the U.S. Government is faced with the kinds of facts mentioned above, as well as much more grim data of a secret nature, which cannot be shrugged off. This is why it has consistently rejected calls for a new Geneva Conference and why even the British have supported this stand. It is accepted as axiomatic by most policymakers that under present circumstances negotiation could lead only to an American defeat.

Such a defeat cannot be accepted, not simply for reasons of foolish national pride, but because the Chinese have made it so very plain that Vietnam is only part of a much wider plan for aggrandizement and trouble making. We are helping Vietnam because it is in the interest of freemen everywhere that the Communist challenge be halted at this point.

The President is trying to create a new psychological situation in Asia. His decision to retaliate against North Vietnam is the only one which offers any hope of success. It has been long overdue and is all the more difficult for that reason, but it is still not too late. Mr. Johnson should be warmly congratulated for his action. If we carry through our policy with resolution there is still an excellent chance that we can win the Vietnam war at least in the sense that the Communists are induced to call off the war as a bad business and either withdraw the guerrillas into North Vietnam or else cease outside aid completely and leave them to their fate. Only then can there be a genuine basis for a negotiation which will ratify this decision.

The Communists will not come willingly or easily to such a disagreeable choice. Previous U.S. vacillation has led them to count the Vietnam war as already won. It will probably take time and a great deal of punishment before they call off the war. But they are practical men and eventually bow to reality. What is essential now is that the President be given the time to make the full effect of his new policy felt in Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow without being continually badgered to negotiate. The calls for negotiation only make the task harder and bloodier because it encourages the Communists to think that we may still falter in our purpose. It is still a Chinese article of faith that world and domestic pressures can be mobilized to thwart any resolute action by the U.S. Government. Many past follies have confirmed them in this viewpoint.

TURNING POINT IN HISTORY

A great experiment is underway—the experiment to see whether we can successfully contain Communist China on the mainland of Asia. If we cannot, the consequences to our children are hideous to contemplate. The Chinese have the numbers, the drive, the ambition, and the eventual potential to rule the world. The days through which we are now passing will mark one of the great turning points of world history.

The United States has very strong trumps to play in this contest. If North Vietnam is willing, or is forced by China to sacrifice herself in a continuing effort to win South Vietnam, there is yet one final arrow in our quiver. We can threaten China with the one punishment she would most fear: The destruction of her nuclear plants by aerial bombardment. If forced to carry out this threat, we would at least prevent or delay the looming menace of a nuclear-armed China.

FRANK J. JOHNSON,
Foreign Editor.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MONROVA in the chair). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION DOMICILIARY AT THOMASVILLE, GA.

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, there was published in the February 7 edition of the Jacksonville, Fla., Times-Union an excellent article concerning the operation of the Veterans' Administration domiciliary at Thomasville, Ga., one of the facilities which it was announced is scheduled to be closed.

This article clearly shows the domiciliary's value, both to the veterans it serves and to the community in which it is located. It is my hope that the operation of this facility will not be discontinued, and that the Veterans' Administration will reconsider its plans.

It is indeed regrettable to me that our veterans should suffer because of a purported economy move by the administration, although it must be kept in mind that our disabled veterans must be domiciled and provided home and medical care, and that if this facility is closed, they will have to be moved and cared for at some other location. I fail to see any economy in such a move.

As pointed out in the article, there are both human and economic factors to be considered, and I hope they will not be disregarded by the Veterans' Administration.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have this article printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

HUMAN, ECONOMIC ELEMENTS HINGE ON VETERANS' UNIT

(By Carey Cameron)

THOMASVILLE, Ga., February 6.—Both the human and the economic elements are of concern to those who will be affected if the Veterans' Administration domiciliary here is closed.

Thomasville and Thomas County residents and businessmen are concerned about the economic element. Counting payroll, other expenditures and non-VA jobs affected by the VA payroll, the area may lose about \$6 million annually, says chamber of commerce Executive Vice President Lloyd Eckberg.

The members who live at domiciliary (they are called members, not patients, stresses J. W. Legg, assistant domiciliary director), their few relatives and the American Legion are concerned with the human element—the displacement of 765 residents of the home, 25 percent of which are indigent.

It is possible that everything will turn up roses on both accounts. Lockheed of Georgia, a corporation that does 98 percent of its business with the Government, will submit a bid February 15 for the right to operate an Urban Job Corps Training Center under the Office of Economic Opportunity programs.

W. A. Pulver, president of the corporation, has told the Thomasville-Thomas Chamber of Commerce that the school will be located

at the domiciliary site if Lockheed gets the contract. Revenue here from the school could reach \$7 million annually, Lockheed estimates.

Plans are being worked out to transfer domiciliary members to various combination hospital-domiciliary centers in other locations. But Lockheed may not get the training center contract and Donald E. Johnson, national American Legion commander, has charged that there is no assurance new homes will be found for the veterans.

On January 12 the VA announced plans to close 11 hospitals, 16 regional offices, and 4 domiciliaries. This plan would eliminate 3,201 domiciliary beds. Although medical care is offered in clinic and infirmary-type departments, domiciliaries are not hospitals.

"They are domiciles (homes) for veterans who have disabilities preventing them from earning a livelihood," Legg explained. When a domiciliary member needs hospital care he is taken to a veterans hospital. Veterans at the Thomasville facility are usually sent to Lake City, Fla.

In return, patients recovered enough to no longer need hospital care are sent back to domiciliaries to make way for new patients. The other three domiciliaries to be closed are at Clinton, Iowa, in Commander Johnson's home State; White City, Oreg., and Bath, N.Y. The Bath home is a VA center, offering both hospital and domiciliary care, Legg explained.

At Thomasville, the domiciliary has an annual budget of \$1,800,000. Members' income from social security, pensions and other compensation totals \$1.5 million. The capital assets are about \$3.5 million, Legg said.

An evacuation plan, subject to approval by the central VA office in Washington, calls for all members to be moved out by March 31. The staff of 161 employees would be gone and the operation closed by June 30.

Members not discharged or transferred to hospitals by March 31 would be moved to centers at Biloxi, Miss., Bay Pines, Fla., Dublin, Ga., and Mountain Home, Tenn.

On January 13 admissions to all receiving domiciliaries were frozen. The Thomasville facility has 800 beds but operates on a planned average member load of 750, leaving a margin of up to 50 beds. On January 14 it had 765 members of which 193 were Florida residents and 263 were Georgia residents.

World War II veterans, a group whose need for domiciliary care is growing now that their average age has reached 45, comprised 56.84 percent of the residents while World War I veterans made up 33.28 percent. There were lesser numbers of Korean and peacetime veterans. Six residents are Spanish-American War veterans.

Other facilities also have a margin between total beds and caseload and it is figured that this margin plus natural turnover will make room for those being moved from the closing facilities, Legg explained.

The Thomasville domiciliary was built during World War II as Finney General Hospital. Like most military facilities of that day its exterior appearance is crude but interiors are comfortable.

About 50 percent of the rooms are private or semiprivate and a main dining room accommodates 408 men who are fed in 2 shifts. Light recreation, such as shuffleboard, is available for those able to take part. Some can play the game but others are in wheelchairs.

After the war, the old general hospital was used for 1 year as a VA hospital before the domiciliary was opened officially December 1, 1948. Legg, who works under Administrator E. C. McDaniel, has been here since 1948.

When news of the closing was announced, Thomasville Mayor Roy Lilly and Frank Neel, immediate past chamber president, went to Washington to see what could be done but were given assurance the order would not be revoked.

Therefore, the chamber has endorsed the Lockheed proposal which involves a Government aid program which Neel believes has practical use in that it would train high school dropouts. From 2,000 to 2,500 boys, aged 16 to 21, would be enrolled to learn six types of skills. It is hoped that satellite industries which could take advantage of the skilled labor will follow the school to Thomasville.

AMERICA'S FORGOTTEN ARMAMENTS

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, Dr. Walter R. Courtenay, minister of the First Presbyterian Church in Nashville, Tenn., and twice the winner of the Freedoms Foundation Award, has delivered another timely and thought-provoking sermon to his congregation.

Dr. Courtenay will be remembered for his splendid messages of 1963 and 1964, when he discussed "The Problems of Equality" and "The Problem of Equilibrium" in the context of the controversial issues of the day.

Dr. Courtenay is, without a doubt, one of the Nation's most forthright spokesmen for religion and morality, in every walk of life.

In his sermon of Sunday, February 14, Dr. Courtenay talked of the moral and military strength, or lack of strength, of the United States at a time when we are faced as never before with the threat of global communism and nuclear disaster. He eloquently describes how the American people can best arm themselves against this threat.

I would not attempt to expand upon his advice and counsel, but I strongly recommend his message to Members of the Senate and, indeed, to the people of the United States.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have Dr. Courtenay's sermon printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the sermon was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DR. COURTENAY WARNS OF U.S. FORGOTTEN ARMAMENTS

Honesty, faith in God and patriotism are the forgotten armaments of America's national defense. Dr. Walter Rowe Courtenay, minister of First Presbyterian Church and two time Freedoms Foundation Award winner, told his congregation this week.

Speaking Sunday morning on "The Forgotten Side of National Defense," Dr. Courtenay declared that Vietnam is now a brush fire which threatens to become a forest fire, then a prairie fire, "a fire swept on by the high winds of Red China, and thus endangering the entire world with searing flame.

"Now, in Vietnam," he said, "a little nation tests our patience and our positiveness, and why not? Did we not wage a Korean war and fail to win it? Did not our failure there encourage Asian communism to try again? Is not the present unpleasantness part of the tooth-marked aftermath of our Korean vacillatory actions?"

As in the case of Dr. Courtenay's second award-winning sermon, the Banner herewith reproduces in full Sunday's message.

THE FORGOTTEN SIDE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

Three times in my life war has come to the United States of America. These wars have always begun in a similar manner, namely, with events abroad creating strife, with someone somewhere pushing people around and exerting military pressures, the

affair always beginning with a smallness that in time became a bigness. Thus World War I, World War II, and the Korean war began, and all three are sharply etched upon my consciousness. Millions of our men have been involved. Unaccountable billions of our wealth have been invested, and we have given the strength of this Nation to make the world safe for democracy, to end war, to defeat dictators, and to establish peace. And with what results?

Today the Communists number in their ranks about 40 percent of the people of the world. Their hunger for world domination and world control diminishes not at all with the passing of time. Through their satellites, pressures are exerted on us in particular, harassing us, taunting us, teasing us, bullying us, and daring us to act with positiveness and power. The other free nations of the world seem almost totally exempt, but not us. The United States and the U.S.S.R. are the poles of modernity, one West and one East. As they turn so turns the rest of the world, for we are the giants of this topsyturvy age. The giants of yesterday are almost schizophrenic because of it. Britain and France, who once were giants, find it difficult to live as nations diminished in size and importance. The golden age they knew haunts them, and the modern age they know taunts them, and they do not know what role they ought to play in a world where new giants walk.

WHAT OF OTHERS?

The other nations, the pigmy and the larger ones, many of whom act like children released for vacation—what of them? The ones on our side talk big because we are big. Those against us talk big because Russia is big. Some gravitate to us because of what we are, and others gravitate to Russia because of what she is. Thus is the modern world divided, and in this world there are no neutrals, for how can any nation be neutral in a nuclear age?

Now, in Vietnam, a little nation tests our patience and our positiveness, and why not? Did we not wage a Korean war and fail to win it? Did not our failure there encourage Asian communism to try again? Is not the present unpleasantness part of the tooth-marked aftermath of our Korean vacillatory actions? What is now a brush fire in Vietnam may become a forest fire, then a prairie fire, a fire swept on by the high winds of Red China, and thus endangering the entire world with searing flame.

I have asked myself many times this week: Are we ready? Are we ready in case the brush fire becomes a large conflagration?

Two things need to be said here and said today:

1. We live in a world where aggression is still a profitable business. Russia understands this, and so do all the satellites. In my lifetime a handful of Bolsheviks in Russia have parlayed their winnings into a rich jackpot. Aggression still pays. Russia knows this and so do Red China, Tito, Ulbricht, Castro, Sukarno, and all the rest. We still live in a world where aggression can be a profitable business.

2. We live in a world where military power is still positive power, and where only strong nations succeed and survive. The world is still controlled by the militarily strong, for it is strength that creates nations and it is strength that sustains them. Russia, strong in weapons and plans, offers the peoples of the earth the security of enslavement and regimentation. We, strong in weapons, but weak in plans, offer the peoples of the earth security with what?

Twice in my lifetime this Nation has saved the British. Twice in my lifetime this Nation has saved France. Twice in my lifetime this Nation has saved the free world. Not only have we been the decisive element in winning the wars, but we are the ones who

have financed the rebuilding of the world, and the freeing of the world. Now, you would think that in the light of all that we have done in the last 50 years the world would love us as it loves no other, and would trust us as it trusts no other. Having given the free people of the earth a chance to remain free, our place of leadership should be unquestioned. After all, it is our strength that has created whatever freedom still remains, and on our strength the free world rests.

This is an awesome responsibility for us to face, and I ask myself again and again, "Are we strong enough? Are we worthy enough? Are we ready enough?"

We are told that we are the strongest military force on the face of the earth today. We are also told that we are the strongest Nation in the history of mankind. (May God prevent us from ever having to prove it.) It is amazing, therefore, that the Vietcong do not believe this. It is amazing that this handful of guerrillas in Vietnam is unimpressed. If we were Russia she would be impressed, and this whole business would have been settled at least 2 years ago. Russia would not have put up with this nonsense 2 weeks. The difference between us is that we fear world opinion and Russia has no such fear. We are afraid to act lest somebody shake a finger at us, and call us names. Not Russia—if you do not believe it look back at what happened in East Berlin and in Hungary when people asked for relief from Communist repression.

In nuclear power, in air power, in sea power, and in productive power, we are the strongest Nation on the face of the earth—we think—but are we strong enough? When is a nation strong enough? When is a nation adequately prepared?

1. I would say that a nation is strong and adequately prepared when her weapons are modern, and her personnel well organized and superbly disciplined. We are moving so fast in the modern world that what was good enough in 1960 may not be good enough for 1965, and what is good enough for 1965 may be of little value by 1970. Our weapons are modern at the moment, our weapons are impressive, and we are well organized—on paper. In terms of discipline—who knows? You can never know how well disciplined you are until war conditions exist. Based on past performances, however, if we are not ready, given a little time, we will get ready.

May I add that wars are never won by armies by themselves. They may be well equipped, and well trained, but a nation's strength is the strength of her people as a whole. It is the homefront that, in the end, determines the power of a nation.

2. That brings me to my second answer. While we are strong in weapons and well disciplined in manpower, there is a forgotten side of national defense; namely, the spirit of our people. A failure in human nature is always a failure in an ultimate sense. Well-trained men can throw away weapons that are still operational. They can desert planes and tanks and command posts. At the front they can frustrate the plans of a whole nation. On the homefront they can refuse to work and to sacrifice in behalf of those at the fighting front. They can leave supply lines empty, and also leave the heart of fighting men devoid of purpose. That is why I say that a nation's future depends on her people's attitudes, upon their general philosophy of life. Everything depends on the spirit of a people, their faith in themselves, their cause, their goals.

Here I read a statement that is now 15 years old but remains truthful and forceful, "The political leaders of the so-called democratic nations, who depend on popular choice, seldom try to develop moral power and a sacrificial spirit until war is upon them." In other words, as a Nation we never get around

to building strong moral fiber into our Nation until the chips are down and the crisis of destiny is upon us. Mr. Kennedy, I think, sensed this, and it was this sensitivity that moved him to say, "Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country." I say to you that this is a sentence that shines, and is a timely one, but what did it produce in the life of our Nation? How many people were changed? How many people suddenly became devoutly patriotic and self-sacrificing as a result of it? How many became bigger, better Americans?

BASIC HONESTY NEEDED

I am saying to you this morning that we need additional armaments, and the first basic armament that we need is basic honesty. Judging by all signs we have hit an all-time low in the realm of basic honesty—in government, in industry, in the labor movement, in education, and in your life and in my own. Basic honesty means the ability to be aboveboard, to be fair, to deal justly, to be true to the trust of others. When we have it, it adds other qualities to our lives and works wonders in a nation. Nothing endangers the strength of a nation more than dishonesty among its people. Dishonesty strikes at the very roots of selfhood and a good society. On the other hand, when we are honest, we have self-respect, inner strength, fearlessness, courage, dependability, punctuality, honest work, productive work, stable homes, and serious political views and loyalties. Once we build basic honesty into our lives all the other fruits of the spirit take root, and grow, and flourish.

2. The second armament we need to add to that which we already have is faith in God. Faith in God means faith in something big, Someone big, Someone who is not temporal, or transient, Someone who is permanent, and permanently earth related. When you believe in such a One you begin to understand what we talk about when we talk about sin; namely, this crude, cruel self-centeredness, and selfishness that is a part of every human life. Our faith also teaches us to appreciate the fact that we are responsible for our choices, and our conduct, and must face a judgment. Men shall be rewarded for their virtues. Men shall be punished for their wickedness.

Across the face of this Nation we have written, "In God We Trust." This ought to mean that as a nation we are on God's side. We are for righteousness, we are for justice, we are for truth, we are for morality. But are we? Where are we when a single atheist in the United States can silence the voice of prayer throughout the educational life of a nation? Where are we when a single atheist can determine the religious customs of the majority of our people?

Ours is a nation "under God," and such a nation must live by moral standards. This must mean temperance in all things, purity of life, fair dealings with other people, concern for other people, and right human relationships. Too often we Americans forget that it was the religious aspirations of our founders that laid the foundation for our materialistic success. All too easily today we forget the original source of our greatness and become as materialistically oriented as Russia herself.

3. The third armament that we need to add to that which we now have is patriotism. By patriotism I do not mean crowds, parades, flag waving, and nationalistic chest-thumping speeches. To me patriotism means a well-rounded knowledge of our history—undebunked, to know the roots out of which we have come, to understand the source of the greatness of our people and our system. Patriotism to me means a knowledge of our system of government and economics, of faith in the dreams of our fathers, faith in our system, and a willingness to live by it, a willingness to live for it, and a willingness to die for its perpetuation.

Honesty, faith in God, and patriotism. These are armaments that are essential on all fronts of our national life today.

The situation that actually exists in the United States today does not speak well of our public schools and the type of education we now support. The crime rate is too high for us to feel that all is well in public education. Our loose philosophy of life, the increase of disobedience, disregard for law and sexual irresponsibility, our inadequate understanding of our political system, and our profit-motive economy, does not warrant a complacent attitude toward the fruitage of our current educational endeavor.

Neither does the situation speak well for our homes, the basis of all else in American life, since it is our first school, church, court of law, and community. The looseness that characterizes them, the lack of integrity within, can only mean a further weakening of our wills and our ways at a time when we need increased strength.

The current situation does not speak well for our general philosophy of life, nor for the future that must grow out of our current points of emphasis.

WHAT CAN WE DO?

I ask myself, therefore, "What can we do?"

First, we must keep America strong militarily regardless of cost. If we do not, we are sitting ducks in a world where the Communists have not for a moment diminished their determination to control all nations.

Second, we must keep America strong in her faith in God, which means moral stability at the very center of our lives.

Third, we must keep America strong intellectually, so that our people really know this system of ours, and why we should live for it, and if necessary, die for it.

Fourth, we must keep America strong religiously.

Fifth, we must keep America strong patriotically.

We have written across the face of this Nation, "This Nation Under God," and something must be done soon about the new sentence that now threatens us, "This Nation Under Godlessness."

It was Dr. Henry C. Link who years ago observed that while Moses was up on the mountain receiving the divine law from God, the nation was down in the valley worshipping the golden calf. If that is not where we are today, where are we?

I believe in a free people, and a free society, but I wonder sometimes if we are not too free with our freedom. In this country we are free to be significant and we are free to be insignificant; free to be worthy and free to be worthless; free to be successful and free to be failures; free to work and free to be lazy; free to share and free to sponge; free to worship and free to tell God to seek a warmer climate; free to learn and free to remain ignorant; free to be Americans and free to be Communists and traitors to our history. I wonder sometimes how much adverse freedom a free nation can afford before she destroys herself.

Two clichés of modernity worry me:

1. One is that in this Nation there must be no second-class citizens. But you cannot avoid having second-class citizens, and even third- and fourth-class citizens, not because the Nation by law makes it so, but because the people themselves make it so. How can you make first-class citizens out of those who by nature, desire, and effort classify themselves as second class, third class, and fourth class? When citizens refuse to be first class how can you avoid their slipping down into other classes?

2. The other cliché says that we must treat all persons as persons; that we must never treat persons as things. But what if certain persons live like things? What if they lack the main ingredients of persons, such as love, appreciation, thoughtfulness, forgiveness, unselfishness, and a great loyalty to the best

life shares? Many persons become things as a result of what they think and how they live, and when a person is a thing how can you deal with him as a person?

Our Nation may be standing on the verge of another Korea. If she is, then this time no Yalu River will stop us. We will go beyond the Yalu River regardless of the price we are called upon to pay. But if our situation is worsening—are we strong enough militarily, and are we strong enough where it really counts, in you and me, in terms of our basic honesty and all that it produces, in terms of our faith in God, in terms of our love of country, in terms of our being first-class citizens and persons of worth?

It has been written, "Blessed is the Nation whose God is the Lord." Ah, but if our God ceases to be the Lord, what then?

PROXMIERE REPLY TO BUDGET DIRECTOR GORDON ON FARM INCOME

Mr. PROXMIERE. Mr. President, after Budget Director Kermit Gordon's widely discussed and controversial article was published in the Saturday Review of Literature, relating to economy in Government and also to our farm program, I wrote him a letter challenging some of his conclusions regarding our farmers.

He replied to me recently, and in closing sent me a speech delivered by Under Secretary of Agriculture Charles Murphy, on which Mr. Gordon had based much of his analysis of the farm problem.

Mr. President, I intend to have these three documents printed in the RECORD but before doing so, let me make these points:

First, a sharp diminution in the farm population, which Mr. Gordon sees as the principal basis for the solution to the farm program, is taking place right now, as it has taken place for many years.

Since 1952 the farm population has dropped from 21.7 million to 12.9 million. I submit that this is the sharpest, most decisive, and startling drop in population this growing country has ever suffered in its history in any large, important, and productive group.

But, has there been a significant improvement in the income of the remaining more efficient farmers?

The answer is an emphatic "No."

Per capita farm income remains a dismal 60 percent of off-farm income, although farm efficiency has increased three times as fast as off-farm efficiency, and although farmers work harder, invest more heavily, and risk more greatly than any other segment of the economy.

Second, Budget Director Gordon cannot deny the unfairness of comparing the income of the 40 percent most prosperous farmers with the income of the entire off-farm population. Obviously, the only fair comparison is to compare the 40 percent most prosperous farmers with the 40 percent most prosperous off-farm population.

Mr. Gordon concedes that if we do that, there is the same disparity, the same unfair disadvantages against the farmer that we have when we compare farm income with off-farm income and find the farmer's income is only a pitiful 60 percent of off-farm income.

The assumption that the removal of the 60 percent least prosperous farmers

from the farm will leave the 40 percent who now on the average earn near-income-parity returns with 100 percent of off-farm persons in the same relative income position they now enjoy, is demonstrably false. The experience of past years should show that as farm population diminishes, as the least prosperous farmers leave the farm the income of the remaining farmers does not improve relative to the rest of the population. Indeed, so long as farmers continue to produce so efficiently and so productively, and we fail to find any way in which they can limit their production to what they can sell at a fair price, this situation will continue.

What has happened is that we have enjoyed this immense growth and improvement in our national prosperity because of farm efficiency. The average American who 10 years ago spent 26 percent of his income for food, today spends something like 17 percent, \$1 out of \$6 of his income on food. No citizen of any country in the world has ever enjoyed anything like this bargain. In prosperous European countries the best any nation can do is one-third of income for food, in Russia one-half. By freeing five-sixths of income to buy everything else, American farm efficiency has made a mighty contribution to prosperity. But the farmer's reward is an insultingly low income.

He will diminish in numbers in the future but this will worsen, not strengthen, his economic position unless he organizes like every other economic group in America to limit his production to what he can sell at a fair price.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the letter which I wrote to Director of the Budget Kermit Gordon, the Budget Director's reply, and the speech made by Under Secretary of Agriculture Charles Murphy on which Budget Director Gordon based his reply.

There being no objection, the letters and speech were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JANUARY 11, 1965.

HON. KERMIT GORDON,
Director of the Budget, Bureau of the Budget,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR KERMIT: Although the bulk of this letter is directed at some points of sharp disagreement with your recent article in the Saturday Review, I must concur in your refreshing and persuasive analysis of "economy" as: the efficient allocation of resources.

I also agree that our farm program has failed to solve the cruel problem of low farm income for the vast majority of our farmers. And I applaud your questioning of the value of enormous Federal investment in reclamation projects which have the consequence of increasing our agricultural surplus.

But, unfortunately, your article is sure to be widely interpreted as giving the authority of your office and your excellent reputation to the wholly fallacious thesis that the heart of our farm problem is that 60 percent of American farmers are unproductive and inefficient, while the other 40 percent operate prosperous, thriving businesses.

This notion is just as wrong as it can be. American farming has already gone through one of the cruelest economic wringers in American history. In a country that prides itself on its efficiency, farming is by almost any standard the most efficient of all. You

and other economists have agreed with this with virtual unanimity.

The "wringer" has eliminated literally millions of so-called marginal, in some cases, inefficient farmers. And the process of leaving the farm is going on right now and will continue. But the American farmer who can make a living and support his family in farming today is perforce efficient. That living is not a good living by current American standards. For virtually no American farmer is it an adequate living in the light of the efficiency, the investment, the labor and the risk the farmer puts into his business.

I will be more specific: I vigorously disagree with the concluding sentence in the following paragraph, excerpted in part from your article:

"The 1 million farms with cash receipts of over \$10,000 accounted for only 27 percent of the number of farms but for almost 80 percent of the sales of farm products. These 1 million farmers could produce all of the Nation's farm needs, including our large commercial exports. Taking into account earnings from off-farm work, the 1963 average income of these 1 million relatively successful farmers was over \$9,500 up 13 percent from 4 years ago. These 1 million farmers earn average rates of return on their capital investments and labor almost equal to the corresponding averages in the nonfarm economy."

Will you document as fully as you can your assertion that "these 1 million farmers earn average rates of return on their capital investments and labor almost equal to the corresponding averages in the nonfarm economy?" This statement drastically conflicts with all the statistical information that I have seen. A year or so ago I made a study of both "rate of return" and "hourly earnings" for farmers in various sections of the country, and with respect to various commodities.

I found that farm rate of return was consistently far below—less than half—the rate of return in manufacturing, for example.

In making the comparison of the 40 percent most efficient farmers with manufacturing, for instance, for rate of return on investment, would it in your judgment be fair to exclude the least efficient 60 percent of manufacturing enterprises? In such a case you would be comparing the rate of return on the 40 percent most efficient manufacturers with the rate of return on the 40 percent most efficient farmers. Is there any reason to suspect in this case that the sharp disparity, the heavy advantage in favor of return on manufacturing would not still be 2 to 1 or better?

In terms of distributive justice, isn't it also true that in comparing rates of return you are ignoring the big fact that farmers have increased their efficiency at least twice as much in the past 10 years as manufacturers or any other sector of the American economy? Isn't it also true that the reward of farmers for this increased efficiency has been approximately zero, while increased return on investment for manufacturing enterprises has outpaced increases in efficiency?

Isn't it also true that in the sector of our economy that accounts for most of the Nation's earnings and expenditures—labor—that wages have increased at least as rapidly as productivity?

As a result of this, isn't it true that factory wages today are two, three, or four times higher than hourly earnings of farmers, if you allow farmers say a 4-percent return on their invested capital? The most recent statistics I have seen, for example, show factory wages last year averaged \$2.53 an hour. Agricultural statistics show that farm hourly earnings vary, depending on the commodity and the section of the country, usually with-

in a range from 60 cents to \$1—far less than the current legal minimum wage off the farm.

It is true that such a comparison includes all farmers, marginal as well as prosperous. But on what possible assumptions can one argue that if we ruled out the 60 percent least efficient, low-earning wage earners, the 40 percent factory workers with top earnings would not have a similar advantage over the 40 percent farmers whose labor return is the highest?

Indeed almost any comparison of farm earnings and nonfarm earnings in terms of efficiency is very likely to show a sharp disadvantage for farmers also because the number of farmers has already diminished so rapidly and continues to fall very rapidly.

It is certainly a logical presumption that marginal farmers with low incomes and low efficiency are more likely to have left the farm than efficient farmers. In the past 20 years American farming has endured one of the heaviest emigrations of low-income, low-efficiency operators that any economic group has suffered in our economic history.

On the contrary, our nonfarm labor market has been expanding apace, it is logical to assume that with new entry into the labor market, with less efficient workers able to find new employment—the efficiency of the nonfarm labor market would tend to improve much less rapidly than farm labor.

What all this comes down to is that in spite of the immense efficiency increases of the American farmer, his heavy investment, the long hours he works, the big risk he takes with his investment, it is clear that low farm income is the number one economic injustice, the shame of America.

Any fair, just, and practical solution of our farm problem must begin with the big fact that farm income for virtually all farmers is too low, and I mean much too low. The farmer must be given an opportunity, in the marketplace, to increase that income.

Any proposal that would divide the already pitifully divided farmers further; i.e., "the most efficient" 40 percent versus the rest overlooks the fact that farming as a whole as well as in part is the most efficient industry in America, and suffers by all odds the most unjust and inadequate return.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM PROXMIRE,
U.S. Senator.

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET,
Washington, D.C., February 19, 1965.

HON. WILLIAM PROXMIRE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PROXMIRE: As I explained in our telephone conversation, I very much regret the delay in replying to your thoughtful and penetrating letter of January 11, relating to my recent speech which was printed in the Saturday Review.

First, you have asked me to document the statement that "these 1 million farmers earn average rates of return on their capital investments and labor almost equal to the corresponding averages in the nonfarm economy."

This statement is based on recent studies made by the Economic Research Service of the Department of Agriculture. Some of the findings of these studies were summarized by Charles S. Murphy, Under Secretary of Agriculture, in a speech of November 16, 1964.

In this speech, Under Secretary Murphy said:

"There are somewhat less than a million farms in the United States that sell more than \$10,000 worth of products annually. These efficient farms make up only 27 percent of the total number of farms, but market nearly four-fifths of the total product. They have the capacity to produce all of the Nation's needs for agricultural products in the foreseeable future.

"There is good reason to be optimistic about the longrun future for the efficient commercial family farms. They have sufficient resources, present and potential, to provide their operators with satisfactory returns.

"Analyses made in the Department indicate that a substantial part of the efficient family farms are now receiving returns roughly near 'income parity.' In fact, average returns for the top 1 million farms would have been at parity in 1963 if gross farm income had been increased about 5 percent, either by higher prices or larger Government payments. The increase in net income would have had to be larger in percentage terms—perhaps 10 to 15 percent above 1963—for returns to this group of farm operators to have been at parity."

A copy of Under Secretary Murphy's speech is enclosed. I am sure that the Economic Research Service of USDA would be happy to provide you with a detailed explanation of the methods and criteria employed in developing these findings.

Second, you point out quite correctly that the average income of the 3½ million farms in America, taken as a single group, is very substantially below parity with average non-farm earnings of labor and capital. I am sure you are also correct in maintaining that the average income of the 1 million relatively successful farmers (27 percent of the total, not 40 percent) would be very substantially below the average income of the top 27 percent of nonfarm income recipients.

While I agree with both of these statements, I do not believe that either invalidates the points I was trying to convey. I sought to call attention to the fact that our farm commodity programs have helped to achieve near-parity incomes for the 1 million farmers who market nearly four-fifths of the total product; but since our commodity programs provide assistance to farmers roughly in proportion to their cash receipts, they have done little to help solve the problems of the other 2½ million—many of whom are desperately poor.

In distinguishing the 1 million relatively successful farmers from the others, it was not my intention—as you suggest—to "divide the farmers," but rather to divide the problem. Once it is seen that the commodity programs do not come to grips with the problems of the low-income farmers, the need becomes clear for expanded public efforts to improve the earning power of this group.

With help, some of these low-income farmers can move up to successful commercial farming. Most, however, can aspire to decent incomes only in nonfarm jobs. This does not mean, of course, that they must abandon farming; there are today some 900,000 small part-time farmers who earn, on the average, nearly five times as much from non-farm sources as they earn from farming. Others will choose to shift to full-time non-farm jobs, either in rural or urban areas.

Helping small farmers to improve their lot in these various ways requires, as I am sure you will agree, better education and skill training in rural areas; intensified efforts to assist small farmers by such organizations as the Farmers Home Administration and the Extension Service; organization of community action programs in low-income rural areas, and a strengthened program to spur industrial development in the countryside. Most of all, of course, it requires expanding job opportunities such as only sustained national prosperity can yield.

Third, you very properly call attention to the remarkable record of productivity improvement in agriculture in recent years. The great improvements in physical output per man and in yields per acre are at the source both of our unparalleled agriculture abundance and of our persistent farm income problem. With output per man increasing more rapidly than the total demand for farm

products, the pressures thereby created have exerted a persistent depressing effect on farm incomes. This, of course, lies at the heart of the anomaly to which you refer—productivity improvement so rapid that despite heavy migration out of agriculture, the low income problem persists.

I appreciate this opportunity to elaborate my views, and I am very pleased to learn that you share my opinions on the meaning of economy as a goal of public policy.

Sincerely yours,

KERMIT GORDON,
Director.

FARM POLICY ISSUES FOR THE YEARS AHEAD
(Talk by Charles S. Murphy, Under Secretary of Agriculture, at the 42d Annual Agricultural Outlook Conference, Washington, D.C., November 16, 1964)

I am glad to be here again this year. At the last Outlook Conference, I talked to you some about how outlook information is used in the process of making decisions in carrying on our farm programs.

The outlook affects those decisions significantly, and at the same time there is a feedback—the decisions on farm programs can and do change the outlook. This past year was a classic case.

Last fall, at this time, this conference looked for a drop in farm income in 1964 as a result of the defeat of the wheat referendum. But then a new wheat program was enacted earlier this year—and realized net farm income this year is running just about the same as last year.

In fact, we have had an unusually long period of 4 years of stable, fairly high incomes as compared with past experience. In a real sense, this is an index of effective response of farm programs to an unfavorable outlook.

Although this conference is focused primarily on the outlook for 1965, I want to take a longer look at the major policy issues. By and large, the commodity programs that we have now will be in effect next year and the outlook is clarified to that extent. But by 1966, a number of farm program decisions will have to be made by the Congress—at least with respect to feed grains, cotton, wheat, and wool, and perhaps for other commodities as well. The dialog will start early in the next session of the Congress.

Probably the discussions will hold within a narrower range than in previous years—well within the outer limits of pervasive mandatory controls on the one hand and the "free market" on the other. A consensus appears to have developed toward the broad middle ground—and I do not rest this conclusion only on the results of the first Tuesday following the first Monday in November. It is apparent also in the report of the National Agricultural Advisory Commission "Farm Policy in the Years Ahead" published last week. I should add that the Commission, which is appointed by the President, is made up of distinguished farm leaders of both major parties, and their report will provide a bipartisan base for consideration. You will find this document very helpful to understanding our present problems and the direction of future policy.

The broad middle ground—the course we are now pursuing—has been effective in raising the level of farm income and maintaining that higher level during the past 4 years. We hope for and expect further progress in improving farm income. But we must recognize that our ability to achieve such improvement is limited by the kinds of programs farmers find acceptable and by the levels of cost to the Government.

President Johnson has established a goal of parity of income and parity of opportunity for farm families and for other rural people as well. It is important to remem-

ber that, in terms of people, the nonfarm part of this goal is far larger than the farm part. Even today, fewer than one-fourth of our rural people live on farms. In the years ahead, it will be still less. And over half of those who do live on farms will be on part-time or retirement farms, or other farms with resources inadequate to provide a decent living from farming operations.

In the farm sector of the rural economy, we should certainly seek to make it possible for the efficient family farmers who account for most farm production to reach parity of income from farming operations. By parity of income, I mean returns to the efficient farm operator for his capital, labor, and management comparable to returns received in other pursuits.

There are somewhat less than a million farms in the United States that sell more than \$10,000 worth of products annually. These efficient farms make up only 27 percent of the total number of farms, but market nearly four-fifths of the total product. They have the capacity to produce all of the Nation's needs for agricultural products in the foreseeable future.

There is good reason to be optimistic about the long-run future for the efficient commercial family farms. They have sufficient resources, present and potential, to provide their operators with satisfactory returns.

Analyses made in the Department indicate that a substantial part of the efficient family farms are now receiving returns roughly near "income parity." In fact, average returns for the top 1 million farms would have been at parity in 1963 if gross farm income had been increased about 5 percent, either by higher prices or larger Government payments. The increase in net income would have had to be larger in percentage terms—perhaps 10 to 15 percent above 1963—for returns to this group of farm operators to have been at parity.

We must emphasize this point: The income position of these farmers is as favorable as it is only because of our price and income support programs. Their outlook will continue this favorable only so long as effective Government farm programs continue.

The price and income programs now in effect have been evolving over three decades. They are working reasonably well. There appears to be little prospect for drastic or radical changes at the present time.

Few any longer seriously propose junking our programs. Studies made here in the Department, at Iowa State University and Cornell University, and just last month by Dr. Walter Wilcox for the Congress, have documented the catastrophe that would result from such a course.

Dr. Wilcox finds that if price support and acreage diversion programs had not been in effect in the 1961-63 period, net farm income would have averaged only about \$6 billion a year. This is less than half the average of \$12.6 billion actually received. Economists like to talk about multipliers. In this case, each \$100 of Commodity Credit Corporation expenditures on price support and acreage diversion programs increased farm income by \$236.

Net income would have been even lower, if, in addition, there had been no marketing orders, Public Law 480 exports, or agricultural conservation payments.

If a return to a mythical free market for agriculture is not a realistic alternative, neither are we likely to take the road to further mandatory restrictions on production. Neither the farmers nor the Congress appear ready to accept such a course, even though it might provide price and income support at less cost to the Government than other kinds of programs.

To say that drastic changes in our price and income programs are not in prospect

does not rule out the need of making any changes. We must continually reappraise our programs to maintain farm income, to hold down costs to the taxpayer, and to keep them responsive to the needs of our rapidly changing agriculture. Program changes could be of major significance, although not drastic or radical.

I am not going to offer you a blueprint for future program changes this morning, but let me suggest a couple of examples that might well be in the general interest.

First, we need to develop a larger, more effective long-run land retirement program. Our problems of overcapacity are going to be with us for a long time. We are now paying to withhold about 57 million acres in the feed grain, wheat and conservation reserve programs. We will continue to have somewhere between 50 to 80 million acres more cropland available than we need for farm production. As a minimum, such a program should provide for the retirement, more or less permanently, of submarginal land not needed for farming. It also should provide a better way to divert land not needed in the short run because of excess capacity.

Second, the National Advisory Commission has proposed—and I agree—that producers ought to take a look at quantity limitations rather than acreage limitations for some crops such as tobacco where mandatory production controls are in effect. Tobacco producers as well as the rest of the tobacco industry have been seriously discussing poundage quotas for several years. Emphasis on high yields under acreage limitations has created a serious quality problem. Under poundage quotas, growers would have a greater incentive to produce high quality tobacco in order to receive more dollars for the quantity allowed. This would improve the competitive position of American tobacco in the export market. Tobacco producers should consider this suggestion carefully. Primarily, it will be up to them.

Now I want to turn to another outlook—away from "commodity outlook" to "people outlook." I have noted that this conference will consider the problems of rural people as well. Commodity programs may be the proper route for the 1 million or so farm families of efficient commercial agriculture. But they cannot provide adequate income for the 2½ million families on the smaller farms or for the 12 million other families of rural America.

A prosperous commercial agriculture is a necessary foundation for the economy of rural America. But programs for commercial agriculture cannot alone create the parity of opportunity that rural people must have if they are to achieve a standard of living comparable to that of city people. Only 1 out of 10 boys now growing up on farms can expect to make a decent living as farm operators.

In rural America, there are massive problems of a chronic nature—problems of surplus manpower, of inadequate education, of substandard income and substandard living conditions. This is really the great challenge for the years ahead.

Rural America has half of the Nation's poverty, although it contains less than a third of the total population.

The percentage of dilapidated and substandard houses in rural areas is three times that of the cities. A fourth of all farm homes and a fifth of rural nonfarm homes do not have running water.

Rural children get a third less medical care than those in nearby cities. Their mortality rate is 50-percent higher. They get less schooling and less money is spent on their education than for children in cities.

This is the classic vicious circle. Lack of resources has kept rural America from providing the educational, health, and other public services necessary to develop the skills and talents of its citizens. And because the

lack of skills has kept earning power low, rural America has been unable to accumulate the resources it needs.

Breaking this circle is our most important job in the years ahead.

One figure illustrates what we have to do. The increase in jobs needed between 1960 and 1970 to absorb the increase in the rural labor force, and to alleviate rural unemployment and rural underemployment, is over 6 million. This is an increase of 40 percent over the total number of rural employment opportunities existing in 1960.

Not all of these new jobs must be found in rural America. The increasing efficiency of agriculture will release additional manpower, and migration from farms to cities will continue.

But experience proves we cannot look to migration to solve the ills of rural America. The flow of rural population into the cities has left serious problems in its wake.

Many rural areas have been stripped of their younger, best educated and most productive citizens. This loss of human resources and potential leadership has seriously weakened rural institutions.

For many other farm people uprooted by technological change, particularly the poorly educated, migration has meant exchanging poverty in the country for poverty in the city.

Our first step in coping with the problem of poverty in rural America is to give our rural youth a chance to compete successfully for a decent income, either in the city or in the country. Many of us believe that the No. 1 "farm problem" now and for the future is the widespread deficiency in rural education.

The humanitarian reasons for providing equality of opportunity for our rural youth are obvious. The economic justification is just as compelling. Various studies have demonstrated that the returns for public investment in human resources provide greater returns than investment in physical or natural resources. For example, returns on investment in primary education appear to be about 35 percent for the Nation as a whole, and it probably is much greater for some of the disadvantaged groups. Returns on a typical water or land resource investment, on the other hand, seldom reach 10 percent.

Our public policies for rural America have been too heavily weighted in favor of investment in real estate, or plants and animals, as compared with investment in human development. We must shift the emphasis toward greater investment in people.

One of our major objectives is to give rural people a fair chance to choose whether they stay in their home communities or move to the city. For many, it is a very poor choice under present conditions, considering the disadvantages of education, jobs and incomes, housing and public facilities, in rural areas.

How to move all of rural America and its people into the mainstream of national economic progress may well occupy the center stage of policy issues with which this conference will be concerned in the years ahead.

REVISION OF RULE XXII—STATEMENT BY SENATOR ROBERTSON BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, it was my privilege this morning to attend a hearing conducted by a subcommittee of the Committee on Rules and Administration, where I heard the Senator from Virginia [Mr. ROBERTSON] testify in a very fine way in opposition to Senate Resolution 6, Senate Resolution 8, and Senate Resolution 16, now pending before the subcommittee, which propose amendments to rule XXII of the Senate.

As always, the remarks of the Senator from Virginia were learned and based on a fine understanding of our form of government, particularly the operations and functions of the Senate and the privileges and responsibilities of Senators.

His remarks are worthy of the attention of every Senator and of every citizen, and entitled to wide circulation. I therefore commend their reading to everyone. I ask unanimous consent that his remarks at that sitting of the subcommittee be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the remarks were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR ROBERTSON

I always have been opposed to restricting Senate debate because the Senate is the one forum in our Government where minorities may appeal to the people against hasty and ill-advised legislation which at any given time may happen to muster the support of a majority.

My opposition is stronger than ever this year, because recent events have demonstrated how unnecessary it is to place any new restrictions on debate.

For many years the chief argument of those who advocated a tighter cloture rule was that they could not get action on civil rights bills under the existing rule XXII, which requires two-thirds of those present and voting to limit debate.

But since 1957 three civil rights laws have been put through the Senate without a tougher cloture rule, and the last one—in 1964—was so all-inclusive that I cannot imagine what further legislation in this field could be justified.

Less than a year ago, on June 10, 1964, the Senate voted 71 to 29 to invoke cloture, which brought a final vote 1 week later on the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

Less than 3 years ago, on August 14, 1962, the Senate invoked cloture by a vote of 63 to 27 to pass the Communications Satellite Act.

In the face of these recent developments, how can it be argued now that important legislation will be blocked unless the Senate reduces the two-thirds requirement for limiting debate?

Your committee now has before it three proposals all designed to make it easier to curtail debate.

1. Senators ANDERSON, Democrat, of New Mexico, and MORTON, Republican, of Kentucky, are sponsoring Senate Resolution 6, to permit three-fifths of those present and voting to apply cloture. Assuming a full attendance of 100 Senators, this would reduce from 67 to 60 the number required to limit debate.

2. A bipartisan group led by Senator DOUGLAS, Democrat, of Illinois, is sponsoring Senate Resolution 8, which would permit a majority of all Senators "duly chosen and sworn" to invoke cloture. This would reduce the number required from 67 to 51.

3. Senator MORSE, Democrat, of Oregon, has offered Senate Resolution 16, which provides that after the unfinished business has been pending before the Senate for not less than 7 calendar days, a simple majority of those voting could invoke cloture. Since 51 Senators constitute a quorum, adoption of the Morse plan would make it possible for 26 Senators to gag all of their colleagues.

In view of the fact that, even with the two-thirds requirement, cloture has been imposed twice in less than 3 years, this committee would be fully justified in reporting back to the Senate on March 9 that no change in rule XXII is necessary or desirable at this time.

It is true that the Senate went for a period of 35 years—from 1927 to 1962—without invoking cloture under the two-thirds require-

ment, and that during that period it rejected 16 cloture petitions. But these statistics only serve to point up the fact that the Senate traditionally has been reluctant to curb freedom of debate.

I would remind the advocates of rule changes that they will find it difficult now to convince anyone that the opposition is merely a southern effort to block civil rights legislation, when every major facet of civil rights has already been brought under Federal control.

There is some talk about the possibility that this session of Congress may be asked to pass another civil rights bill to protect voting rights.

I can see no necessity for further action, in view of the voting safeguards written into the civil rights laws of 1957, 1960, and 1964. During that period we also have amended the Constitution to abolish the poll tax in Federal elections.

The 1957 Civil Rights Act extended the jurisdiction of the district courts to include any civil action designed to recover damages or secure relief in voting rights cases. This act also empowered the Attorney General to seek injunctions to prevent an individual from being deprived of voting rights.

The 1960 law allows the Attorney General to follow up civil suits brought under the 1957 act by asking the courts to make a separate finding that a pattern of discrimination in voting rights exists in certain areas. If a court found that such a pattern exists, any Negro in that area could apply to the court for an order making him eligible to vote, if qualified under State law.

In 1964 voting was the first issue dealt with in the comprehensive 11-part civil rights law. That law curbs literacy tests, protects registrants from being turned down because of immaterial errors on application forms, and requires election officials to apply the same standards for qualification to all applicants for voting rights.

I would also remind advocates of a new rule that in the years ahead many other issues will arise on which Senators who now clamor for a tighter rule may want to speak at length to prevent passage of some measure they do not like. If they find themselves in the minority, they will want time in which to try to win the public over to their viewpoint.

But if these advocates of a new rule succeed now in reducing the number of votes required for cloture, they may be the first to suffer from their own newly forged weapon.

I recall that only last year a handful of Senators who did not want the Senate to interfere with the Supreme Court decision on reapportionment of both houses of State legislatures, exercised the right of unlimited Senate debate to prevent passage of a motion, seeking to give the States more time in which to comply.

I mention this to show that when Senators find themselves in the minority they welcome the protection afforded them by freedom of debate, regardless of whether they fall into the category of liberal or conservative Senators.

Only a decade ago, in 1954, the Senate went through a gruelling filibuster over an atomic energy authorization bill because some liberal Senators were disturbed over some of its features.

The original two-thirds cloture rule was placed on the books back in 1917, not because of civil rights, but as a result of a filibuster against arming American merchant ships, which were being exposed to German submarine attacks before the United States was drawn into World War I.

It must also be remembered that when the cloture rule was drafted in 1917, and for many years thereafter, we still had the "lame duck" sessions of Congress every other year, which were tallormade to aid filibustering.

These "lame duck" sessions convened in December, following the biennial election, and ended automatically at noon on March 4. Members who had been defeated for reelection in November continued to serve through the short session, and since it was necessary to jam all of the annual appropriation bills through both Houses in a 3-month period, Members could use the threat of a filibuster to get concessions from the leaders as the March 4 deadline approached.

But, thanks to a constitutional amendment, the "lame duck" sessions have been done away with. A new Congress, with its newly elected Members, convenes in January, and Congress may stay in session for the entire 12 months of each year, if the leaders so desire.

In practice, the sessions have been getting longer with the passing years, and this in itself has made it more difficult to defeat worthy legislation by filibuster. It has also lessened the need for a more stringent cloture rule.

In the early days of our Nation the first set of Senate rules included the right to move the previous question, which is the most drastic weapon for ending debate. But over a period of 17 years only four attempts were made to use that weapon, and only three succeeded.

This shows that from the start the Senate recognized that its function was to act as a balance wheel and a check upon hasty action on legislation coming over from the House, where the larger membership makes limitation of debate necessary.

After the Founding Fathers agreed upon a House, to be elected by the people every 2 years, on the basis of population, the smaller States began to wonder how their rights could be protected from the whims of a majority in the House.

After long debate, at times acrimonious, the wise and venerable Benjamin Franklin came up with the solution of equal representation for all States. In a further attempt to protect the Senate from passing waves of majority sentiment, the original Constitution provided for selection of Senators by the State legislatures.

Some of that protection for minorities in the original setup of the Senate was withdrawn when the Constitution was amended to provide for the direct election of Senators. This left freedom of Senate debate as the main protection for minorities.

When Senate rules were rewritten in 1806 the previous question motion was dropped. In 1807 debate on an amendment at the third reading of a bill was forbidden. For nearly 40 years thereafter no further limitations were placed on Senate debate.

In 1841 Henry Clay sought to revive the previous question, but had to abandon it in the face of strong opposition. He also proposed the "hour rule" to accomplish the same result, but this also was abandoned.

In 1848 the Senate inaugurated the practice of limiting debate by unanimous-consent agreements, which are still used today. The unanimous-consent agreement has proved an effective method of preventing debate from dragging on needlessly when there is no serious opposition to passage. This device, however, has enabled Senators who want changes made in a bill to win concessions from the leaders by blocking unanimous-consent agreements until their amendments are adopted.

A distinguished Virginian, Senator Thomas F. Martin, played a leading part in the adoption of the two-thirds cloture rule in 1917. The rule has been modified twice, but without departing from the two-thirds principle.

In its original form the rule permitted two-thirds of those present and voting to limit debate on a "measure." This was held to mean that cloture could not be applied to "motions" to take up a bill.

In 1949 rule XXII was broadened to permit cloture to be invoked on any measure, motion or other pending matter. At the same time, it was amended to require two-thirds of the entire membership instead of two-thirds of those present and voting to limit debate.

In 1959, when President Johnson was majority leader, the rule was liberalized by going back to the original yardstick, allowing two-thirds of those present and voting to invoke cloture.

In the 1959 resolution the Senate made another important change. It added to rule XXXII a flat declaration that the rules of the Senate continue from one Congress to another unless changed in accordance with existing rules.

This change was intended to fortify and strengthen the doctrine that the Senate is a continuing body. This doctrine has become a major issue in recent years, because some Senators who want to revamp long-standing rules have advanced the argument that the Senate, like the House, has a right to adopt new rules at the start of each Congress.

At the start of each Congress for a decade or more, the advocates of a new cloture rule have attempted to present new rules on the floor on the opening day of the session and have them acted upon without delay.

This maneuver has had the dual objective of bypassing the Rules Committee and also avoiding the necessity of mustering the two-thirds required by the existing rules to limit debate on a proposed new rule.

Some of the advocates of this novel doctrine seek to rely on the constitutional provision that each branch of Congress shall make its own rules as the basis for their contention that in any given Congress the Senate should not be bound by the rules of a previous Senate, any more than the House, which readopts its rules for each Congress.

This argument glosses over the fact that when a new Congress convenes, there are no Members of the House until the entire membership is given the oath on opening day, whereas the Senate is never without two-thirds of its Members.

The Founding Fathers left no doubt that they wanted the Senate to be a continuing body by providing that only one-third of the membership should be elected every 2 years.

Even prior to 1959 there was an abundance of evidence to sustain the contention that the Senate is a continuing body, and the rule adopted that year merely confirmed the doctrine.

The passage in 1913 of the law creating the Federal Reserve System is one of the historical events which proves that the Senate is a continuing body. My distinguished predecessor, Carter Glass, who was then a Member of the House, had secured House passage of his bill, setting up the Federal Reserve System. After passing the bill, the House adjourned sine die. The Senate Finance Committee failed to report it out, and the Senate adjourned sine die.

But President Woodrow Wilson then called the Senate into special session, and the Democrats, being in control, created the Committee on Banking and Currency and placed at its head Senator Robert Owen, of Oklahoma, an authority on fiscal matters and banking.

Senator Owen put the Federal Reserve bill through the Senate at that special session, at a time when the House was not in session, and it has proved a valuable and effective agency for the management of monetary policy. Senator Owen was able to accomplish what he did in 1913 because the Senate was a continuing body.

Another incident in 1947 also served to demonstrate that the Senate is a going concern from the moment a new Congress convenes, because two-thirds of its members are

fully qualified to act as soon as the convening gavel falls.

On January 3, 1947, there were 36 Senators-elect waiting to be sworn in (4 more than usual because of vacancies). A controversy had developed over the seating of Senator Bilbo of Mississippi which delayed the usual routine administering of the oath to new Senators.

Senator Bilbo's name was second on the alphabetical list, and, after swearing in one new Member—Senator Baldwin of Connecticut—the Senate spent 2 days debating the procedure to be followed with regard to Senator Bilbo. During that debate there were several rollcall votes on procedural questions, while one-third of the Senators sat on the sidelines, ineligible to vote. The Senate was functioning as a continuing body, with its holdover Members.

Every man who has served in both the House and Senate knows that, with a membership of 435, the House cannot let all of its Members air their views thoroughly in floor debate, or even ask all of the questions they would like to hear answered before a bill passes.

That is why it is important to preserve freedom of debate in the Senate, so that important and highly controversial issues may be thoroughly considered before they reach the final stage of conference between the two Houses.

President Johnson has presented an imposing workload to this Congress, including medicare for the aged, new Federal aids to health and education facilities, revision of excise taxes and measures to reduce the deficit in our balance of international payments. On top of these legislative proposals, we have all of the 12 or more annual appropriation bills to consider.

If the Senate becomes involved in a long controversy over its rules in mid-March, we will find ourselves laboring through the summer and fall on a backlog of administration measures.

UNITED NATIONS HELP FOR INDIA'S POPULATION PROBLEM

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, a United Nations Planning Advisory Mission is in India, at the request of its Government, to help India solve its exploding population problem. This is encouraging news.

India's economic progress is imperiled by its present high birth rate of 42 per thousand of inhabitants, as opposed to its death rate of 19 per thousand. The natural increase of 23 births per thousand adds 11 million new citizens yearly to India's present 460 million.

Poverty and exploding population walk hand in hand. We cannot expect to see much development or solution of India's problems until this fact is recognized.

India's request to the United Nations is a welcome augury of some progress. The cost of the United Nations Family Planning Advisory Mission will be about \$22,000. It is hoped that this modest investment forecasts a turning point in international teamwork on the population problem. The United Nations mission has members from Britain, Chile, the United States, Korea, and from the U.N.'s Office of Social Affairs. Let us hope this first mission will open wide the door for similar requests. Time is running out, even as our population problem grows.

I ask unanimous consent that a newspaper article about the Mission, as pub-

lished in the Washington Post of February 21, 1965, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.N. TO ASSIST INDIA'S BIRTH CONTROL EFFORTS (By Louis B. Fleming)

UNITED NATIONS.—The United Nations is sending a team to India in the organization's first comprehensive birth-control project.

A six-member team will spend 2 months seeking to speed up family planning efforts in India. The survey probably will lead to a more ambitious international assistance program to begin later this year.

It is the first comprehensive and major effort by the United Nations in the area of birth control, which has stirred some sharp controversies in the United Nations in the past.

JOINT EFFORTS

The new plan will be linked to governmental and private efforts, including the work of planned parenthood, signaling a change of policy in the United Nations toward direct efforts in the use of mechanical or medical techniques to prevent fertilization.

The subject is still so delicate and controversial, however, that the project was developed under careful secrecy until it was completed, and other requests for aid along these lines are not being publicized pending final action.

Impetus for the new move by the United Nations came from the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, which approved last year a demand of one of its own population conferences for technical assistance in all aspects of family planning. This, in turn, inspired the Economic and Social Council last summer to give indirect endorsement by drawing the attention of the General Assembly to the proposal.

WHO ENCOURAGED

These new moves also have encouraged the World Health Organization, which has avoided direct action on birth control, to give some indications that it may assume a different position.

The original mission to India will cost about \$22,000. This will come from contingency funds of the U.N. expanded program of technical assistance. The technical assistance money comes from voluntary contributions of member governments. The United States has put up 40 percent of the total in the past but has not yet made its pledge for this year.

Among the problems to be considered by the team of experts are organization of family planning programs, communication of new planning ideas, winning popular acceptance for family planning approaches, and training field workers.

AN ALASKAN VIEW OF THE VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the Alaska Legionnaire, in its excellent editorial entitled "VA Turns Back on Alaskan Veterans," published in its January 1965 issue, has expressed admirably what all the members of the Alaska delegation feel—a view which is shared widely, and almost without exception, I believe, by all Members of Congress.

It is to be hoped that the administration will fully reconsider the unwise alleged economies proposed in this field, and will remember that we owe our veterans a debt which can never be adequately repaid.

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial from the Alaska Legionnaire be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

VA TURNS BACK ON ALASKAN VETERANS

Along with 30 other VA facilities around the Nation, the Veterans' Administration in Washington has announced that Alaska's only VA office is to be closed, as a "sound business move to realize a savings to the Government."

Assistant VA Field Director Henry Peck said: "The fear of retarded service to veterans under the consolidation move is unfounded. Most of the VA business here is handled by mail anyway, and can be continued easily from Seattle." To borrow General McAudle's famous reply when the Germans demanded his surrender in World War II: "Nuts." Mr. Peck's simple dismissal of this closure of VA services to which Alaskan veterans are entitled is a slight to any veteran whose right it is to present his case in person without having to make an outlay of a roundtrip plane fare from either Juneau, Anchorage, or Fairbanks, to a distant office in Seattle. Increased efficiency and economy in Government is always welcome, but Alaska's location in relation to the south 48 is such that it becomes an entirely different situation than the mere combining of one or more offices within a given State. We wonder, would Mr. Peck consider this a form of taxation without representation? It's a dangerous precedent, and an inconsiderate affront to Alaska's veterans who are entitled to at least one VA office in their State without having to resort to Mr. Peck's ridiculous dismissal of the closure by in effect telling Alaskan veterans that the mail service is good enough for your problems. Mail service at best is an impersonal way of doing business, and we wonder whether Mr. Peck would like to offer an easy solution to weather delays when flights are canceled, particularly in the winter months. How, Mr. Peck, can such VA business emanating from Alaska, be easily handled by your Seattle office? Would Alaska's veterans be penalized by VA business transacted by mail that was delayed due to airports being socked-in by bad weather, or would a note from the airline, post office, or weather bureau explaining the delay, be sufficient—or accepted?

This wrong to Alaska's veterans should be righted. Every American Legion post in the State should send a petition signed by every member to Washington demanding that Alaska have their own regional office for the convenience of even a single Alaskan who doesn't wish to discuss his problems by mail, or who doesn't wish to spend the money, or worse yet—can't afford to, for a trip to Mr. Peck's haloed Seattle office.

THE 47TH ANNIVERSARY OF LITHUANIAN INDEPENDENCE

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, on February 16, Americans of Lithuanian descent commemorated the founding of the Lithuanian Kingdom and the 47th anniversary of the declaration of independence by the Republic of Lithuania following World War I.

In 1918, after a century of revolts, the Republic of Lithuania was reestablished; and in the 22 years which followed, the Lithuanian people made great advances in their economic, social, and political development.

Although Lithuanian independence was later lost, the people of Lithuania

and their friends in all parts of the world still deeply desire the benefits of a free and independent life, as men of good will do in all places in the world.

The Lithuanians' love of freedom, their rich sense of culture, their spirit of self-reliance, and their abiding respect for spiritual values are widely known and understood in our State of Minnesota.

Our State and our Nation have been enriched, and all of us have benefited by these values and characteristics.

On this 47th anniversary of Lithuanian independence, we look forward to the day when all nations and all peoples will have an opportunity to plan their own future and to determine for themselves the system of government under which they will live.

This event reminds us of the rich and full meaning of liberty and the need for a world in which the rights of all men are honored.

THE PRESIDENCY AND COMMUNISM

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, on the heels of the recent election campaign, James G. Patton, president of the National Farmers Union, had occasion to respond to a worried citizen's fears that the Communist conspiracy was so pervasive in this Nation that it could, in fact, gain control of the Presidency.

The exchange of letters reveals that Mr. Patton's correspondent was really groping for an answer to the extreme charges bandied about during the recent campaign.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of Mr. Patton's thoughtful reply be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JANUARY 25, 1965.

Mr. JOHN L. WILTSEY,
Spud Center Local No. 1442,
Hemingford, Nebr.

DEAR MR. WILTSEY: Normally I do not bother to answer the rare letters I receive which question whether or not Communists control the President of the United States, but your letter is different in tone and I am going to try to give you a detailed answer.

First, it seems to me that the central issue involves our basic aims: that men shall have freedom of speech and of worship; that they shall be free to choose the type of government they want and to choose the leaders of their government in open, free elections; that they shall have an equal opportunity in the economic and social life of the Nation and equal treatment before the law; and, finally that they shall have freedom of action and movement consistent with the rights of others. Extremists of the right and of the left oppose many of these aims of our democracy. That is why we must oppose these extremists—but we must oppose them without adopting their methods.

Jesus Christ was crucified by extremists. Martin Luther, when he nailed his 15 points on the church at Wittenberg was rebelling against the extremist cruelty of the church. The Nazis, who were not only against Jesus, but were militaristic and opposed to freedom of speech, of thought and of action, were a modern variety of extremism.

Certainly, actions of Russia, her satellites and the Peoples Republic of China, commonly referred to as Red China, have been extreme ones to which people like myself are wholeheartedly opposed.

Similarly, I am opposed to the racists and John Birchers who would deny people of a different color or people of a different opinion their right to work, to speak, and to enjoy the fruits of American life. I stand squarely behind the U.S. Constitution, its Bill of Rights, and the Declaration of Independence. There is not the slightest doubt in my mind that President Lyndon B. Johnson and HUBERT HUMPHREY hold the same basic beliefs that I do. After his San Francisco speech followed by his unwillingness to disengage himself from the racists, from the John Birch Society and other extremists, I could not say the same for Senator Goldwater.

Man's basic struggle for freedom and peace has gone on throughout human history. I suspect that even after all of the guns are silenced and all of the bombs destroyed, some human beings will still be trying to deny other human beings their personal rights and their freedom. It would not be called the Christian Crusades or nazism or communism or the John Birch Society or the Ku Klux Klan. It will have another name but it will be basically the same thing—man's inhumanity to his fellow man.

There are many ways to fight communism, fascism, and other extremism, but the poorest way in the world is to "label" everyone with whom you disagree as a Communist or a Fascist or a John Bircher. These are the very tactics which were employed by Hitler, by Mussolini, and by Stalin.

In my opinion, the United States is in much more danger of being dominated and taken over internally by huge monopoly groups or militarists or Madison Avenue hucksters than it is by Communists.

Although there are many ways to fight communism, first one must understand communism, and the varying forms of communism. Marxist communism is different than democratic socialism where everybody has a right to vote for or against what the government is doing. In Russia the right to vote is specious because no choice is offered the voter. In Sweden and England and Holland a greater percentage of the people vote than in America, yet these countries practice what is commonly known as democratic socialism and they are completely opposed to communism. "Communism," as practiced and preached by the Chinese and by the Russians and their satellites is a derivative of Marxism but not the Marxism which Marx envisaged 100 years ago.

The philosophy being preached in Communist circles is not a single philosophy but several. Hence, the increasingly apparent differences between Russia and China.

The real point is how should we fight communism. With both sides having enough bombs to destroy the world, we are not going to get anywhere by destroying civilization. Suicide is not victory.

The best way to fight present day communism is to do what the National Farmers Union is doing in Latin America, Africa, and elsewhere. In Latin America we are working with the Catholic church and in the AID program. We are training young leaders. We are teaching them cooperation and the principles of democracy, the rights of free men and how they can produce more food and develop a better environment and opportunity for themselves. For generations dictators, mostly from the right and mostly men in uniform, have held them down and shot them down. These people provide a readymade seedbed to receive the untruths, the half-truths and the false promises of the Communists even though they have lost their fear of guns and wouldn't understand the potential of an atom bomb no matter how hard you tried to explain it to them.

Our struggle against communism will, in my opinion, continue for at least several more generations. Basically, it is a struggle between two fundamental ideas—man's free-

dom, and the denial of man's freedom, either by organized force or by the power of an individual dictator in control of economic and military power.

Again, may I say that I am completely convinced that President Johnson and Vice President HUMPHREY, like myself, are willing to use force if that is the final alternative but, in the meantime, we are dedicated to the concept that ideas cannot be contained in a vacuum and that they must be met head on with better ideas. The rich—American and Western Europe—must lend a helping hand to the poor—the underdeveloped countries. We must help the poor to help themselves so that they will have a genuine stake in freedom—a piece of land, a home and a life of comfort and dignity.

This has been a long letter but I think you deserve a thoughtful answer and this I have tried to give you.

Sincerely,

JAMES G. PATTON.

A WORD FOR HOME

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, the reports we receive daily from South Vietnam are devoted for the most part to the actual battles which are taking place, the difficulties we have in attempting to achieve a stabilized government there, and the impact this struggle has on the future of both peace and liberty in this area of the world, so distant from our shores.

I doubt that any member of this body needs to be told of the personal involvement and sacrifices of young Americans in this struggle to preserve freedom for the people of South Vietnam from the aggressive designs of communism. Each of us is fully aware of the commitment that has been made in behalf of liberty.

However, I do feel that an occasional reminder of what is involved is not out of order, particularly when such comes from this remote area of the world.

Such a reminder of our stake in this difficult war comes from one of our Army chaplains, serving with our forces in South Vietnam. He is Capt. James L. Jones, of Memphis, Tenn.; and in a recent interview over the National Broadcasting Co.'s Monitor radio program, Chaplain Jones was asked if he had any particular message for the folks back home in America.

This is what Chaplain Jones had to say:

I would like to say, above all to mothers and fathers, and very specially to wives, that there is nothing so important in our mission here as the individual feeling that his family back home loves him, is concerned about him, and sends him as frequently as possible letters that are spirited—that the words are of encouragement.

The greatest problem, as I have indicated before, of morale, is lack of mail, or letters that come reading of depression, despondency, of problems or difficulties in the home that tend to lower morale more than any other factor. Then, too, especially I would say a word as chaplain here: I have seen many men—friends of mine that I closely felt a deep affection for—I have seen them go down; I have conducted memorial services for them. Many times a question comes, "Is this vain or is this waste?" I have over and over evidence that relatives often write and wonder if this isn't a ridiculous world we're in.

And I would say to you at home, as I have said to our men here, and as I believe they

feel deeply, the men who have given their lives here have not given their lives in vain. The real price of life is always the price death to fine dedication.

Our nation was built by men who loved their principles—the truth for which they lived by much more than they loved life itself. Our nation was built and shall only exist by our standing for the truth that we hold dear, and as we are here in this land, we are not only working and laboring and dying here for Vietnam but for America, for the world.

Our world is a very small tiny village today, and we cannot have our neighborhood wars. We can only have a peace that can be a peace for all of us. I would say, let us dedicate ourselves, and you, to the task of liberty, and freedom, and human dignity for all people, and let us be proud of the men here, whether they are special forces out in the field; whether they be pilots-navigators in the sky; whoever, they might be.

Most will come home—some will not—but let us be proud of them and let us remember them and dedicate ourselves to this task of bringing freedom and peace to our world.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

INCREASE OF FUND FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which is S. 805.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 805) to amend the Inter-American Development Bank Act to authorize the United States to participate in an increase in the resources of the Fund for Special Operations of the Inter-American Development Bank.

VIETNAM AND THE NEW ISOLATIONISM

THE NEW ISOLATIONISM

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, there has been developing in this country in recent years a brand of thinking about foreign affairs which, I believe, can aptly be described as "the new isolationism." This internal phenomenon is, in my opinion, potentially more disastrous in terms of its consequence than the major external problems that confront us.

Its background is a growing national weariness with cold war burdens we have been so long carrying, a rising frustration with situations that are going against us in many places, a long-simmering indignation over the fact that our generosity and sacrifice have too often been met abroad, not just with indifference and ingratitude, but even with hostility and contempt.

Its political base seems to be to the left of center, although it forms as yet a distinct minority there.

Its scareword is "escalation"; its cure-all is "neutralization."

Its prophets include some of my colleagues in the Congress, influential spokesmen in the press, and leading figures in the academic world. Some are new volunteers in this cause of retrenchment; they regard themselves as pragmatists. Others are old hands at Pollyanna-ism, those unshakable romantics

who were disillusioned by Moscow at the time of the Hitler-Stalin pact, disillusioned by Mao when they discovered that he was not really an agrarian reformer, disillusioned by Castro when they learned that he was not a cross between Thomas Jefferson and Robin Hood—and who, having again dusted themselves off, now look for new vistas of adventure.

If I may digress, let me say that I have always admired their durability. The manner in which they have survived, unchastened, a whole series of intellectual Dunkirks is, if nothing else, a tribute to man's invincible confidence in himself; and their adeptness in avoiding discredit, in the face of repeated catastrophes and evacuations, must be acknowledged as one of the marvels of modern history—a triumph of self-rectitude over reason.

The basic premise of the new isolationism is that the United States is overextended in its attempt to resist Communist aggression around the world, overcommitted to the defense of distant outposts, and overinvolved in the murky and unintelligible affairs of remote areas.

The corollaries of the new isolationism are many. It is contended that we should deemphasize the cold war and reverse our national priorities in favor of domestic improvements; that we should withdraw from South Vietnam; that we should cease involvement in the Congo; that we should relax the so-called rigidity of our Berlin policy; that foreign aid has outlived its usefulness and should be severely cut back; that our Military Establishment and our CIA, organizations that seem particularly suspect because they are symbols of worldwide involvement, should be humbled and "cut down to size" and stripped of their influence in foreign policy questions.

In my judgment all of these propositions have one thing in common. Each of them would strike at the heart of our national effort to preserve our freedom and our security; and collectively they add up to a policy which I can describe by no other name than "appeasement," subtle appeasement, unintentional appeasement, to be sure, but appeasement nonetheless.

My purpose, this afternoon then, is to oppose these propositions and to enlist Senators' opposition against them—for the new isolationism is as bankrupt as the old.

First of all—to tackle the main premise—I reject the assumption that the United States is overextended, or overcommitted, or overinvolved.

We are enjoying a spectacular growth in every index of national strength. Our population, our wealth, our industrial capacity, our scientific potential, our agricultural output, all are enjoying great upward surges. We were informed that our gross national product was again up in January, and the trend seems ever upward.

Far from overextending ourselves in the cold war, we are actually in a period of declining defense budgets, of steadily lowered draft calls, of sharply reduced foreign aid, of one tax cut after another.

Let me emphasize this: In every basic resource, we have greater capacity today

than during the past 5 years; by every military or economic standard, we are stronger; and by every physical measurement, the percentage of our resources going into the cold war is lower. Why then should we talk of weariness or overcommitment?

We are not even straining ourselves. We are actually pursuing today a policy not only of both guns and butter, but of less guns and more butter.

So far as our resources go, we are capable of indefinite continuation and even intensification of our present efforts, if need be. It is only our mental, and perhaps our moral, resources which seem to be feeling the strain.

We would, of course, prefer to live in a world in which it were possible for us to have no commitments, a world in which we could devote all of our energies to the task of perfecting our society at home and enriching the lives of our people.

But we must face the world as it is. And the basic fact of our world is that Western civilization, itself terribly rent and divided, both politically and philosophically, has been forced into a twilight war of survival by a relentless and remorseless enemy.

It is incontestable, in terms of peoples enslaved and nations gobbled up over the past 20 years, that we have not been holding our own. And each year, the world Communist movement is committing more and more of its resources to the task of subjugating our allies, all around the perimeter of freedom.

Against this background it is preposterous to maintain that we should reduce our effort and lessen our commitment to the great struggle of our century.

Yet, according to Time magazine, it is the widespread sentiment of the academic world that we have overreached ourselves and ought to pull back. Walter Lippmann, the well-known columnist, for whom I have great respect, says that "the American tide will have to recede."

It has been argued that we would be in a "precarious situation" if we were attacked on several fronts. Of course we would, but does anyone believe that we can solve the problem by abandoning our commitments and defensive alliances? Would the loss of these countries be any the less disastrous because they were given up undefended?

On the contrary, if we are not strong enough to honor our commitments today, then we should solve the problem, not by reducing our commitments, but by becoming stronger, and by aiding our allies to become stronger.

The defense of the free world rests on a very delicate balance. The key elements in that balance are American power and American determination. If we lack the power to maintain that balance then certainly all is lost. If we reveal that we lack the determination, if we, for instance, allow ourselves to be pushed out of Vietnam, such a humiliation may indeed be the second shot heard around the world; and a dozen nations might soon throw in the sponge and make whatever accommodation they could with an enemy that would then seem assured of victory.

Fortunately, at the present time we do not lack the power to carry on the defense of freedom. Our power is at its peak and we have the capacity to increase it vastly if necessary. It is our spirit, apparently, that needs shoring up.

Four years ago, after a visit to southeast Asia, I said on the floor of the Senate:

If the United States, with its unrivaled might, with its unparalleled wealth, with its dominion over sea and air, with its heritage as the champion of freedom—if this United States and its free world allies have so diminished in spirit that they can be laid in the dust by a few thousand primitive guerrillas, then we are far down the road from which there is no return.

In right and in might, we are able to work our will on this question. Southeast Asia cannot be lost unless we will it to be lost; it cannot be saved unless we will it to be saved.

This problem, seemingly so remote and distant, will in fact be resolved here in the United States, in the Congress, in the administration, and in the minds and hearts of the American people.

The passage of 4 years has not diminished my belief in this course.

If the main premise of the new isolationism is erroneous, then surely the lesser premises are fraught with terrible danger.

It is argued that we should de-emphasize the cold war and turn more of our resources to domestic welfare.

The annual congressional revolt against the foreign aid bill grows more violent and successful each year, and the administration, forced to yield, now sends foreign aid requests 40 percent below what it solemnly declared 2 years ago to be the minimum figure tolerable for free world survival.

And a small but growing band of Senators have begun offering each year amendments making across-the-board percentage cuts in our defense budget, cuts not directed to any specific economy, but rather to a principle—the principle that we should be spending less on defense and more on welfare.

Here, in my judgment, are sure-fire formulas for defeat.

Where are the victories in the cold war that would justify such a reversal of priorities? In what global trouble spots are there lessened tensions or improved postures that would make this plausible? I can see a lot of cold war areas where things are looking worse—but very few where things are getting better.

More effort, more sacrifice—not less—is the need of our time. And I speak as one who does not disparage the need or the importance of domestic improvements. As a credential of this I recommend to Senators my scorecard, compiled last year by the ultraconservative Americans for Constitutional Action, which asserts that I voted right only 13 percent of the time—one of the worst records, alas, in the Congress.

But I say to you that if our foreign affairs are going badly, no aspect of internal welfare is secure or stable. And if we cope successfully with the great problem, the cold war, no internal problem can long defy solution.

Our first national priority is and must ever be the survival of our country and our freedom—and if the 20th century has taught men anything, it is that survival and freedom cannot be purchased on the cheap, in a discount store or a bargain basement.

But our situation is such that we can meet our needs both at home and abroad—not as handsomely as we would prefer, but well enough. This I take to be the objective of the Johnson administration. The war on poverty and the struggle against tyranny can go hand in hand, if our vision be broad.

Twenty-five years ago, our country, comparatively new and untried among the great nations of the earth, through passage of the Lend-Lease Act, described by Winston Churchill as "the most unsordid act of recorded history," embarked irrevocably upon the path that has brought us to our present posture in history. Through that act, we affirmed the preservation and expansion of liberty as our highest goal; we acknowledged that freedom was insecure everywhere so long as tyranny existed anywhere; and we assumed the burden, and the glory, of being the champion and defender of man's highest aspirations.

Since that embattled hour, when the light of freedom was but a flicker in the dark, our journey across the pages of history has been fantastic and unprecedented: tragic, to be sure, in its mistakes and naiveties, but heroic in its innovations and commitments, prodigious in its energy and power, gigantic in its generosity and good will, noble in its restraint and patience, and sublime in its purpose and in its historic role.

We have not realized the high goals we set for ourselves in World War II.

But we have preserved freedom and national independence in more than half the earth; we have prevented the nuclear holocaust; we have restored Western Europe; we have helped friend and foe to achieve prosperity, freedom and stability; we have launched a world peace organization and have kept it alive; we have offered the hand of friendship and help to the impoverished and backward peoples of the world if they will but take it.

It may be said of our country today, as of no other in history, that wherever people are willing to stand up in defense of their liberty, Americans stand with them.

We cannot know at this hour whether our journey has just begun or is nearing its climax; whether the task ahead is the work of a generation, or of a century. President Kennedy said, in his inaugural address, that the conflict would not be resolved in our lifetime.

The Chief of Staff of the Army recently told the Congress that it might well take 10 years to decide the issue in Vietnam alone. And Vietnam is only one symptom of the disease, the epidemic, we are resisting.

Against this somber background, how foolish it is to talk of deemphasizing the cold war, of pulling out of Vietnam, of abandoning the Congo to Communist intrigue, of slashing the defense budget

by 10 percent, or of any of the other irresponsibilities of the new isolationism.

Vietnam

It is against this background that I take up today the question of Vietnam, which has been the favorite target of those who urge withdrawal and retrenchment.

Over the past several months, a number of my most respected colleagues have taken the floor to urge that we get out of Vietnam or that we enter into negotiations over Vietnam.

The propriety of our presence in Vietnam and the validity of our position has been challenged. It has even been suggested that we are the real aggressors in Vietnam. The war has been called "McNamara's War." It has been suggested that we more or less ignore Asia and Africa and concentrate on Europe and the Americas.

I have listened with growing dismay to these presentations—and with all the more dismay because of the respect and affection I have for the Senators who made them.

If I have not risen to reply to my colleagues before now, it was not because Vietnam was a new subject to me, but because I felt that their arguments required the most carefully considered and most painstakingly prepared reply.

I had visited most of the countries of southeast Asia in early 1961, and I have spoken a number of times on the floor of the Senate on the subject of Vietnam and Laos and Indonesia since my return. I have endeavored to keep up with the situation in that part of the world as best one can do by reading the press and official publications. But I realized that there were important gaps in my information because the press coverage of Vietnam was, with a few outstanding exceptions, weak and in some cases completely misleading. I have, therefore, sought to fill these gaps by correspondence with friends in Vietnam, both Vietnamese and American, and by conversations with Americans who have served in Vietnam in various capacities—some of them for long periods of time.

The senior Senator from Wyoming [Mr. McCHEE] and the senior Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MONRONEY] on the one side, and the distinguished minority leader, the junior Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN] and the senior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] have already spoken eloquently on the need for standing fast in Vietnam.

A debate has been joined which is worthy of the best traditions of the Senate.

I hope that the remarks I make today will contribute at least in some measure, to the further unfolding of this debate. Out of this debate, let us hope, will ultimately emerge the kind of assistance and guidance that every President must have in dealing with vital issues of our foreign policy.

What we say here may help to guide the President. But in the final analysis the terrible responsibility of decision is his and his alone. He must listen to the exchanges which take place in this Chamber. He must endure a hundred

conflicting pressures from public sources, seeking to push him in this direction or that. He must also endure the impatience of those who demand answers to complex questions today, and who accuse him of not having made the American position clear when he has in fact made our position abundantly clear on repeated occasions.

And finally, when all the voices have been heard, when he has examined all the facts, when he has discussed all aspects of the situation with his most trusted advisers, the President must alone decide—for all Americans and for the entire free world—what to do about Vietnam.

No President has ever inherited a more difficult situation on coming to office. No President has ever been called upon to make a decision of greater moment. At stake may be the survival of freedom. At stake may be the peace of the world.

I believe the United States can count itself fortunate that it has found a President of the stature of Lyndon B. Johnson to meet this crisis in its history. I also believe that, whatever differences we in this Chamber may have on the question of Vietnam, our feelings to a man are with the President in the ordeal of decision through which he is now passing.

I have said that I have been dismayed by the rising clamor for a negotiated settlement. In the type of war which the Communists are now waging against us, I fear that, although those who urge negotiation would be among the first to oppose an outright capitulation, their attitude may not be construed in this way by the Communists.

The Vietnamese war, in the Communist lexicon, is described as a "war of national liberation." Its strategy is based on the concept of what the Communists call "the long war." This strategy is premised upon the belief that the free world lacks the patience, the stamina, the fanatical determination to persist, which inspires the adherents of communism. It is based on the conviction that if the Communists keep on attacking and attacking and attacking in any given situation, they will ultimately be able to destroy the morale and the will to resist of those who oppose them in the name of freedom.

China affords the classic example of the long war. It took 20 years for Mao Tse-tung to prevail. There were several times during this period when his entire movement seemed on the verge of collapse. But, even in his blackest days, Mao Tse-tung remained confident that, if he persevered, ultimately his enemies would crack and he would emerge as China's undisputed ruler.

There is no more cruel test of courage and staying power than "the long war" as it is waged by the Communists. Five years, 10 years, 20 years, means nothing to them. And if they detect any sign that those opposed to them are flagging, that their patience is growing thin or that their will to resist has weakened, the Communists can be relied upon to redouble their efforts, in the belief that victory is within their grasp.

I disagree strongly with my colleagues who have spoken up to urge negotiations.

But if there is any way in which my voice could reach to Peiping and to Moscow, I would warn the Communist leaders that they should not construe the debate that is now taking place in this Chamber as a sign of weakness; it is, on the contrary, a testimony to our strength.

Nor should they believe that those who speak up in favor of negotiations are the forerunners of a larger host of Americans who are prepared to accept surrender because there is no one here who believes in surrender or believes in capitulation. I believe the senior Senator from Idaho made this abundantly clear in his own presentation, in which he underscored his complete support for the retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam.

WHY ARE WE IN VIETNAM?

I have been amazed by a number of letters I have received asking the question, "Why are we in Vietnam?" or "What is our policy in Vietnam?" I have been even more amazed to have the same questions put to me by sophisticated members of the press.

To me the reasons for our presence in Vietnam are so crystal clear that I find it difficult to comprehend the confusion which now appears to exist on this subject.

We are in Vietnam because our own security and the security of the entire free world demands that a firm line be drawn against the further advance of Communist imperialism—in Asia, in Africa, in Latin America, and in Europe.

We are in Vietnam because it is our national interest to assist every nation, large and small, which is seeking to defend itself against Communist subversion, infiltration, and aggression. There is nothing new about this policy; it is a policy, in fact, to which every administration has adhered since the proclamation of the Truman doctrine.

We are in Vietnam because our assistance was invited by the legitimate government of that country.

We are in Vietnam because, as the distinguished majority leader, the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], pointed out in his 1963 report, Chinese Communist hostility to the United States threatens "the whole structure of our own security in the Pacific."

We are in Vietnam not merely to help the 14 million South Vietnamese defend themselves against communism, but because what is at stake is the independence and freedom of 240 million people in southeast Asia and the future of freedom throughout the western Pacific.

These are the reasons why we are in Vietnam. There is nothing new about them and nothing very complex. They have never been obscure. They have never been concealed. I cannot, for the life of me, see why people fail to understand them.

IS THERE A POSSIBILITY OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT?

The senior Senator from Idaho, and several other Senators who spoke last Wednesday, repeated the proposal that we should seek negotiations for the purpose of terminating the bloodshed in

Vietnam and of avoiding an enlargement of the war. We are told by some people that negotiations are the way of diplomacy and that if we reject negotiations now, we are in effect rejecting diplomacy.

The proposal that we negotiate now overlooks the fact that there does exist a negotiated agreement on Vietnam, approved by the participants of the Geneva Conference of 1964. The final declaration of this agreement read, and I think it is worth while reading it for the RECORD and for our own recollection:

Each member * * * undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity, and the territorial integrity of the above-mentioned states and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

Since there is no point to negotiating if it simply means reiterating the Geneva agreement, I cannot help wondering whether those who urge negotiations envisage rewriting the agreement so that it does not "guarantee the territorial integrity of the above-mentioned states."

The history of negotiated agreements with the Communists underscores the fact that their promises are worthless and that only those agreements have validity which are self-enforcing or which we have the power to enforce. A report issued by the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security—on which I have the honor to serve—establishes that the Soviet Union has since its inception violated more than 1,000 treaties and agreements. The Communists have repeatedly violated the terms of the Korean armistice, of the Geneva agreement on Vietnam, and of the Laotian armistice.

Incidentally, I had hoped the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] would be present. He had hoped to be here. He is tied up on another matter, but hopes to get here later.

The Senator from Idaho has held up the Laotian armistice as an example of a rational agreement with the Communists that has served our interests. He could not possibly have picked a worse illustration for his argument.

I can think of no more dramatic proof than the Laotian armistice that agreements with the Communists are worthless, and that every time we try to escape from today's unpleasantness by entering into a new covenant with an implacable aggressor, we are always confronted on the morrow by unpleasantness compounded 10 times over.

I traveled through southeast Asia just before the conclusion of the Laotian armistice.

I talked to many people at that time. It is true that the armistice was favored by our Ambassador in Laos, and it obviously must have had the support of important members of the State Department hierarchy. But the personnel of our Embassies in Saigon and in Bangkok did not conceal from me their grave apprehensions over the consequences of such an armistice for Vietnam and southeast Asia.

All of this I reported on confidentially upon my return.

At that time, the Saigon government still controlled the situation throughout

most of the countryside, although the 15,000 Vietcong guerrillas were giving it increasing difficulty. Our Embassy personnel in Saigon expressed the fear that the conclusion of the Laotian armistice would enable the Communists to infiltrate men and material on a much larger scale and would result at an early date in a marked intensification of the Vietcong insurgency. Needless to say, the apprehensions which they expressed to me have been completely borne out by subsequent developments.

The Laotian armistice has served Laos itself as poorly as it has served the cause of freedom in Vietnam. The Communists have continued to nibble away at what is left of free Laos, in one aggressive act after another, so that by now they firmly control more than half the country, while their infiltrators and guerrillas are gnawing relentlessly at government authority in the rest of the country.

In mid-1964, I asked the Library of Congress to prepare for me a study of Communist violations of the Laotian armistice agreement. The study which they submitted to me listed 14 specific violations up until that time.

That was last year. There have been many more since then.

Mr. President, I plan to insert into the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks a copy of the survey of Communist violations of the Laotian armistice prepared for me by the Library of Congress. I earnestly hope the Senator from Idaho will take the time to study this before he once again holds up the Laotian armistice as a model for Vietnam.

I should also like to quote from a statement made on March 30, 1963, by Gen. Kong Le, the neutralist military commander who, as is common knowledge, had favored the conclusion of the Laotian armistice. Kong Le's statement is significant because it illustrates how Communists will deal tomorrow with non-Communist elements that they are prepared to accept into coalition governments today.

Referring to certain Communist stooges, Gen. Kong Le said:

Despite their continual defeats, however, these people learned their lessons from their Communist bosses. . . . When the Prime Minister went abroad, they moved rapidly to destroy the neutralist forces. They used tricks to provoke the soldiers and people to overthrow Colonel Ketsana. When these did not succeed, on February 12 they used an assassin to murder Ketsana. They also savagely killed or arrested all neutralist party members, and their bloody hands caused the death of many people.

This was the statement of Gen. Kong Le, one of those who had pressed the hardest for the Laotian armistice, after he saw what the armistice had done to his country.

Finally, I do not believe that the Laotian armistice has served the interests of the other peoples of southeast Asia. I have in my possession a map of northern Laos showing areas where the Chinese Communists have been building roads that would give China direct access to the borders of Burma and Thailand. The construction of these roads borders ill for the future peace of south-

east Asia. That they are intended for future military use is taken for granted by everyone in the area.

So much for the example of the Laotian armistice.

All this does not mean to say that we must not under any circumstances enter into negotiations with the Communists. I do not suggest that at all. It simply means that when we do so, we must do so with our eyes open and with a clear understanding of the ingredients required to enforce compliance with the agreement about to be entered into. That is all I have ever urged.

Moreover, there is a time to negotiate and a time not to negotiate.

The demand that we negotiate now over Vietnam is akin to asking Churchill to negotiate with the Germans at the time of Dunkirk, or asking Truman to negotiate with the Communists when we stood with our backs to the sea in the Pusan perimeter in Korea. In either case, the free world could have negotiated nothing but total capitulation.

The situation in Vietnam is probably not as desperate and certainly no more desperate, than Britain's plight at the time of Dunkirk or our own plight at the time of Pusan. If we are of good heart, if we refuse to listen to the counsels of despair, if we again resolve that "we will never give in"—as Churchill put it—there is every reason to be confident that a time will arrive when we can negotiate with honor and for a more acceptable objective than a diplomatic surrender.

There are those who say that the whole of southeast Asia will, whether we like it or not, go Communist. These people are at least consistent in urging negotiations now. But anyone who believes that we can negotiate now and not lose Vietnam to communism is deluding himself in the worst possible way.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEFEAT IN VIETNAM

It is human to oppose the cost of staying on in Vietnam when American boys are dying in a faraway land about which we understand very little. I am conscious of this. I am sensitive to it. I share the troubled minds of all Senators. But I am convinced that the great majority of those who advocate that we abandon Vietnam to communism, either by pulling out or by "negotiating" a settlement, have not taken the time to weigh the consequences of defeat.

In my opinion, the consequences of an American defeat in Vietnam would be so catastrophic that we simply cannot permit ourselves to think of it. This is truly an "unthinkable thought," to use an expression coined by the Senator from Arkansas. He was not applying it to this problem, I point out, but I find the words particularly apt in reference to Vietnam.

GENOCIDE

For the Vietnamese people, the first consequence would be a bloodletting on a genocidal scale.

In the Soviet Union and in Red China, tens of millions of "class enemies" were eliminated by the victorious Communists. While it is true that there are some slightly more moderate Communist regimes in certain countries, Vietnamese

communism is characterized by utter disregard for human life of Stalinism and Maoism. What will happen to the more than 1 million refugees from North Vietnam? What will happen to the millions of peasants who resisted or bore arms against the Vietcong. I shudder to think of it. The massacre of innocents in Vietnam will be repeated in every southeast Asian country that falls to communism in its wake, in a gigantic bloodletting that will dwarf the agony and suffering of the war in Vietnam.

Those who urge our withdrawal from Vietnam in the name of saving human lives have the duty to consider the record of Communist terror in every country that has fallen under the sway of this merciless ideology, with its total disregard for human life.

The total number of victims of communism will probably never be known. Students who have followed the Chinese Communist press closely claim that it can be demonstrated that Chinese communism has cost the lives of at least 25 million and more, probably 50 million people, while students of Soviet communism put the overall figure for the Soviet Union at approximately the same level. They point out that, entirely apart from the purges and mass killings at periodic intervals and the forced starvation of 5 million Ukrainian farmers, the reported death rate in the Soviet forced labor camps ran approximately 25 percent per annum in bad years, and 15 to 20 percent in good years. If one accepts the average population of the slave labor camps as 10 million over the 20 odd years of Stalin's undisputed rule, this would mean that approximately 2 million slave laborers died annually in Stalin's camps, or 40 million for the 20-year period.

According to the Polish Government in exile, in London, the Soviets deported 1½ million Poles to Siberia after they had occupied eastern Poland in the wake of the Hitler-Stalin pact. Approximately 150,000 were returned through Teheran after the Nazi invasion of Russia. Another 300,000 drifted back after the war. More than 1 million never came back. Such was the mortality in the Soviet slave labor camps.

All of this seems incredible to the Western mind.

I remember, when I was in Nuremberg, that when I first read the terrible statistics about the mass killings by the Nazis, I could not comprehend them. If I suggested to Senators that a train wreck had occurred in which 100 persons had lost their lives, or a shipwreck in which 150 had lost their lives, or some common disaster with hundreds or even thousands of lives lost, we would react, we would feel it. But if I suggested that 1 million murders had taken place, our minds would not be able to grasp the enormity of such a crime.

Perhaps that is just as well. There must be built into our intellectual mechanism some kind of governor. Unfortunately, while it does probably save us from insanity, the fact that our minds cannot comprehend the murder of 1 million people or 40 million people serves as a protective asset to the perpetrator of

such an evil deed. It does not make the crime any less horrible. It simply makes our task that much more difficult.

Even after Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin confirmed all the essential charges that had been made against the Soviet regime, men of good will in the Western World refused to believe that the Communist regime could be so evil. They refused to believe, because it is difficult for them to conceive of horror and brutality on such a mass scale.

To those who refuse to believe, I would like to read the eloquent words penned by Dr. Julius Margolin, a prominent Jewish leader in prewar Lithuania, one of the scores of thousands of Lithuanians deported to Soviet slave labor camps after the Soviet occupation of his country. When he was released after 7 years in the camps, Dr. Margolin wrote:

Until the fall of 1939, I had assumed a position of benevolent neutrality toward the U.S.S.R. * * * The last 7 years have made me a convinced and ardent foe of the Soviet system. I hate this system with all the strength of my heart and all the power of my mind. Everything I have seen there has filled me with horror and disgust which will last until the end of my days. I feel that the struggle against this system of slavery, terrorism, and cruelty which prevails there constitutes the primary obligation of every man in this world. Tolerance or support of such an international shame is not permissible for people who are on this side of the Soviet border and who live under normal conditions. * * *

Millions of men are perishing in the camps of the Soviet Union. * * * Since they came into being, the Soviet camps have swallowed more people, have executed more victims, than all the other camps—Hitler's included—together; and this lethal engine continues to operate full blast.

And those who in reply only shrug their shoulders and try to dismiss the issue with vague and meaningless generalities, I consider moral abettors and accomplices of banditry.

Let those who talk of getting out of Vietnam for the ostensible purpose of saving human lives weigh the words of Dr. Julius Margolin—a man who, like themselves, refused to believe that communism could be so inhuman until he saw its punitive machinery at work with his own eyes.

And if the administration should ever succumb to their pressure and negotiate the surrender of Vietnam, and if the Vietnamese Communists then embark on the orgy of bloodletting which has always accompanied the establishment of Communist power, let those who are pressuring for negotiations not be heard to say, "But we didn't intend it this way." Because there is today no excuse for ignorance about communism.

(B) THE FURTHER CHOICE: COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OR MAJOR ESCALATION

Our withdrawal from Vietnam would immediately confront us with an agonizing choice.

If we decide to try to defend what is left of southeast Asia against the advance of communism, it will require far more money, far more men, and far more American blood than we are today investing in the defense of Vietnam. What is more, it would involve a far greater risk of the major escalation which we seek to avoid.

If, on the other hand, we decide to abandon the whole of southeast Asia to communism, as some of the proponents of withdrawal have frankly proposed, it would result in the early disintegration of all our alliances, and in the total eclipse of America as a great nation. Because no nation can remain great when its assurances are considered worthless even by its friends.

(C) MORE VIETNAMS

Whether we decide to abandon southeast Asia or to try to draw another line outside Vietnam, the loss of Vietnam will result in a dozen more Vietnams in different parts of the world. If we cannot cope with this type of warfare in Vietnam, the Chinese Communists will be encouraged in the belief that we cannot cope with it anywhere else.

In the Congo, the Chinese Communists have launched their first attempt at applying the Vietnamese strategy to Africa.

In the Philippines, the Huk guerrillas, after being decisively defeated in the early 1950's, have now staged a dramatic comeback. According to the New York Times, the Huks are now active again in considerable strength, control large areas of central Luzon, and are assassinating scores of village heads and local administrators on the Vietcong pattern.

In Thailand, Red China has already announced the formation of a patriotic front to overthrow the Government and eradicate American influence. This almost certainly presages the early launching of a Thai Communist insurrection, also patterned after the Vietcong.

An article in the Washington Post on January 16, pointed out that the Venezuelan Communists now have 5,000 men under arms in the cities and in the countryside, and that the Venezuelan Communist Party is openly committed to "the strategy of a long war, as developed in China, Cuba, Algeria, and Vietnam."

And there are at least half a dozen other Latin American countries where the Communists are fielding guerrilla forces, which may be small today, but which would be encouraged by a Communist victory in Vietnam to believe that the West has no defense against the long war.

It is interesting to note in this connection that, according to Cuban reports, a Vietcong delegation which came to Havana in 1964 signed a "mutual aid pact" with the Venezuelan guerrilla forces. In addition, Marguerite Higgins, the distinguished correspondent for the Washington Star and other papers, points out that Vietcong experts have teamed up with experts from Communist China and the Soviet Union in training Latin Americans for guerrilla operations in the several schools maintained by Fidel Castro.

(D) WHAT NEW DEFENSE LINE?

It has been suggested that if we abandon southeast Asia, our seapower would make it possible for us to fall back on Japan and the Philippines and the other Pacific islands, and constitute a more realistic defense line there. This is nonsense. American seapower and American nuclear power have thus far proved impotent to cope with Communist politi-

cal warfare. Cuba is the best proof of this.

If we abandon southeast Asia, the Philippines may prove impossible to hold against a greatly stepped-up Huk insurgency.

Japan, even if it remains non-Communist, would probably, by force of circumstances, be compelled to come to terms with Red China, adding the enormous strength of its economy to Communist strategic resources.

Okinawa, where our political position is already difficult, would become politically impossible to hold.

If we fail to draw the line in Vietnam, in short, we may find ourselves compelled to draw a defense line as far back as Seattle and Alaska, with Hawaii as a solitary outpost in mid-Pacific.

(E) THE ECLIPSE OF AMERICAN PRESTIGE

To all those who agree that we must carefully weigh the consequences of withdrawal before we commit ourselves to withdrawal, I would refer the recent words of the well-known Filipino political commentator, Vincente Villamin. The abandonment of Vietnam, wrote Mr. Villamin, "would be an indelible blemish on America's honor. It would reduce America in the estimation of mankind to a dismal third-rate power, despite her wealth, her culture and her nuclear arsenal. It would make every American ashamed of his Government and would make every individual American distrustful everywhere on earth."

This is strong language. But from conversations with a number of Asians, I know that it is an attitude shared by many of our best friends in Asia.

VIETNAM AND MUNICH

The situation in Vietnam today bears many resemblances to the situation just before Munich.

Chamberlain wanted peace. Churchill wanted peace.

Churchill said that if the free world failed to draw the line against Hitler at an early stage, it would be compelled to draw the line under much more difficult circumstances at a later date.

Chamberlain held that a confrontation with Hitler might result in war, and that the interests of peace demanded some concessions to Hitler. Czechoslovakia, he said, was a faraway land about which we knew very little.

Chamberlain held that a durable agreement could be negotiated with Hitler that would guarantee "peace in our time."

How I remember those words.

Churchill held that the appeasement of a compulsive aggressor simply whetted his appetite for further expansion and made war more likely.

Chamberlain's policy won out, because nobody wanted war. When he came back from Munich, he was hailed not only by the Tories, but by the Liberals, and the Labor Party people, including leftwingers like James Maxton and Fenner Brockway.

Churchill remained a voice crying in the wilderness.

But who was right—Churchill or Chamberlain?

Who was the true man of peace?

In Vietnam today, we are again dealing with a faraway land, about which we know very little.

In Vietnam today, we are again confronted by an incorrigible aggressor, fanatically committed to the destruction of the free world, whose agreements are as worthless as Hitler's. Indeed, even while the Communist propaganda apparatus is pulling out all the stops to pressure us into a diplomatic surrender in Vietnam, the Chinese Communists are openly encouraging a new Huk insurgency in the Philippines and have taken the first step in opening a Vietcong type insurgency in Thailand through the creation of their quisling Thai patriotic front.

In signing the Munich agreement, it was not Chamberlain's intention to surrender the whole of Czechoslovakia to Hitler. The agreement was limited to the transfer of the German-speaking Sudetenland to German sovereignty. And no one was more indignant than Chamberlain when Hitler, having deprived Czechoslovakia of her mountain defenses, proceeded to take over the entire country.

While there are some proponents of a diplomatic solution who are willing to face up to the fact that negotiations at this juncture mean surrender, there are others who apparently quite honestly believe that we can arrive at a settlement that will both end the war and preserve the freedom of the South Vietnamese people. If such negotiations should ever come to pass, I am certain that the story of Czechoslovakia would be repeated. Having deprived South Vietnam of the political and military capability to resist, the North Vietnamese Communists would not tarry long before they completely communized the country.

And, before very long, those who urge a diplomatic solution for the sake of preventing war, may find themselves compelled to fight the very war that they were seeking to avoid, on a bigger and bloodier scale, and from a much more difficult line of defense.

I take it for granted that no one in this Chamber and no loyal American citizen believes that we should stand by indifferently while communism takes over the rest of the world.

I take it for granted that every intelligent person realizes that America could not long survive as a free nation in a world that was completely Communist.

I take it for granted that everyone agrees that somewhere, somehow, we must draw the line against further Communist expansion.

The question that separates us, therefore, is not whether such a line should be drawn, but where such a line should be drawn.

I believe that we have been right in drawing the line in Vietnam and that President Johnson is right in trying to hold the line in Vietnam, despite the setbacks we have suffered over the past year. Because, if this line falls, let us have no illusions about the difficulty of drawing a realistic line of defense anywhere in the western Pacific.

NEITHER SURRENDER NOR ESCALATION

We have been told in many statements and articles that the only alternative to withdrawal from Vietnam, with or without negotiations, is a dramatic escalation of the war against the North. And we have been warned that such an escalation might bring in both Red China and the Soviet Union and might bring about the thermonuclear holocaust that no one wants.

These are supposed to be the choices before us.

It is my belief, however, that the tide of war in Vietnam can be reversed and that this war can ultimately be won without an invasion of the North and without a significant intensification of our military effort. It is my belief that there are many measures we can take, primarily in the nonmilitary field, to strengthen our posture and the posture of South Vietnamese forces in the fight against the Vietcong insurgency.

Before outlining some of the measures which I believe can and must be taken, I wish to deal with a number of widely accepted fallacies and misconceptions about the situation in Vietnam, because one cannot intelligently approach the problem of what to do about Vietnam without first establishing the essential facts about the present situation in that country.

THE FALLACY THAT THE VIETNAMESE WAR IS A CIVIL WAR

The belief that the Vietnamese war is a civil war is one of the most widespread misconceptions about Vietnam. This is frequently associated with the charge that it is the United States, and not North Vietnam or Red China, which is intervening in South Vietnam.

The war in South Vietnam is not a civil war. It was instigated in the first place by the North Vietnamese Communists, with the material and moral support of both Peiping and Moscow. There is overwhelming proof that Hanoi has provided the leadership for the Vietcong insurrection, that it has supplied them massively, and that it has served as the real command headquarters for the Vietcong.

The present insurrection in South Vietnam goes back to the third Communist Party Congress in Hanoi in September of 1960. At this Congress it was decided "to liberate South Vietnam from the ruling yoke of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen in order to achieve national unity and complete independence." The Congress also called for the creation of a broad national front in South Vietnam directed against the United States-Diem clique. Several months later the formation of the front for the liberation of the south was announced.

I understand that there is an official report, according to which, the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam is in possession of reliable evidence indicating that probably as many as 34,000 Vietcong infiltrators have entered South Vietnam from the north between January 1959 and August 1964.

The report indicates that the majority of hard-core Vietcong officers and the bulk of specialized personnel such as

communications and heavy weapons specialists have been provided through infiltration. Infiltrators, moreover, apparently make up the major part of Vietcong regulars in the northern half of South Vietnam.

The infiltration from the north supplies the Vietcong with much of its leadership, specialist personnel, key supplies such as heavy ordnance and communications equipment, and, in some cases, elite troops.

This information is derived from the interrogation of many thousands of Vietcong captives and defectors and from captured documents.

It is this hard core that has come down from the north that has provided the leadership cadres in all major insurgent actions, including the series of sensational attacks on American installations.

The scale on which Hanoi has been supplying the Vietcong insurgency was dramatically illustrated this weekend when an attack by an American helicopter on a ship off the coast of South Vietnam resulted in the discovery of an enormous arms cache—almost enough, in the words of one American officer, to equip an entire division. The haul included a thousand Russian-made carbines, hundreds of Russian submachine guns, and light machine guns, and Chinese burp guns, and scores of tons of ammunition. There were also a variety of sophisticated land mines and ammunition for a new type of rocket launcher used against tanks. A Communist guerrilla who was captured in the action said that the ship which delivered the weapons had made six trips to bases along the South Vietnam coast, dropping off supplies.

Finally, we would do well to consider the fact that the general offensive launched by the Communist forces in Vietnam 2 weeks ago was preceded by an open call by Hanoi radio for assaults throughout the country on Vietnamese and American positions.

The public confusion on the nature of the Vietnamese war stems in large measure from the sabotage of the Communist member of the three-man International Control Commission set up to supervise the carrying out of the Geneva agreement. By 1961, reports of 1,200 offensive incidents of Communist agents, ranging from one-man assassinations to large-scale military actions, had been presented to the Commission. The Commission, however, took no action because the Polish Communist member consistently refused to investigate reports of North Vietnamese intervention in South Vietnam. In this way, this entire massive body of evidence of Hanoi's intervention in South Vietnam was muted and rendered ineffective.

In order to understand the war in Vietnam, we have to get away from traditional concepts in which armies with their own insignias cross clearly marked national demarcation lines after their governments have duly declared war.

Communist guerrilla warfare is waged without any declaration of war. In the case of Vietnam, it is waged from external sanctuaries which claim immunity to

attack because the state which harbors them has not formally declared war.

It blends military cadres who have infiltrated into the country with native dissidents and conscripts, in a manner which conceals the foreign instigation of the insurgency, and which enables the Communists to pretend that it is merely a civil war.

It is time that we nail the civil war lie for what it is. It is time that we recognized it as a form of aggression as intolerable as open aggression across marked frontiers.

Why did Ho Chi Minh decide to launch the current war for the liberation of South Vietnam? The answer to this question is really very simple.

After the Geneva agreement, it had been the expectation of the Communists that South Vietnam would collapse in administrative and political chaos before many months had passed, and that it would fall into their hands like an overripe plum. Indeed, when Ngo Dinh Diem took office as Premier after the surrender of North Vietnam to the Communists, 99 percent of the Western press viewed the situation in South Vietnam as hopeless and predicted an early takeover by the Communist guerrillas.

Cut off from the mineral and industrial riches of the north; swamped by an influx of 1 million refugees; without an adequate army or administration of its own; with three major sects, each with private armies, openly challenging its authority—confronted with this combination of burdens and handicaps, it seemed that nothing could save the new born South Vietnamese Government.

But then there took place something that has properly come to be called the Diem miracle; this term was used at different times by President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara prior to Diem's overthrow, which most people, I believe, now realize was a tragic mistake.

Diem first of all moved to destroy the power of the infamous Binh Xyuen, a sect of river pirates who, under the French, were given a simultaneous monopoly on the metropolitan police force of Saigon and on the thousands of opium dens and houses of prostitution and gambling that flourished there.

So powerful was the Binh Xyuen and so weak were the Diem forces at the time that even the American Ambassador urged Diem not to attack them.

Diem, however, did attack them and drove them out of Saigon.

Having defeated the military sects and integrated them into the Armed Forces of the republic, Diem within a few years was able to resettle the 1 million refugees and to create a stable unified state where none had previously existed.

I could not help feeling indignant over articles and publications dealing with North Vietnam which have underscored what the Communists have done for their people. Among other things, they have stressed the fact that the Communists have greatly expanded their school system. What these articles did not mention was that from 1955 to 1963 President Diem has doubled the number of students in elementary schools, while

at the secondary school level the increase has been fivefold.

The remarkable progress in the field of education was no exception. The entire South Vietnamese society scored remarkable advances in every field of economic and social endeavor, so that in 1963 South Vietnam for the first time had a sizable rice surplus for export. There were significant increases in all sectors of industry and agriculture, and a 20-percent rise in per capita income.

Meanwhile, in North Vietnam, things were going from bad to worse. As in every other Communist country the collectivization of the peasants resulted in a dramatic reduction of food output and in chronic food shortages throughout the country. The resentment of the peasants was compounded by the brutal and indiscriminate punishment of hundreds of thousands of peasant farmers who were hailed before so-called people's courts and charged with being bourgeois elements or exploiting landlords. During the course of 1955 peasant revolts broke out in several areas. There was even a revolt in Ho Chi Minh's own village. And there was some evidence that the troops sent to suppress these revolts sometimes sympathized with the peasants. Shortages increased year by year. The people became increasingly apathetic.

The contrast between the growing prosperity of the South and the growing misery in the North confronted the Vietnamese Communists with a challenge they could not tolerate. That is why they decided that they had to put an end to freedom in South Vietnam. While they have scored some sensational victories in their war of subversion against the South Vietnamese Government, I think it important to point out that this war has gravely complicated the already serious internal difficulties of the North, so that in 1963, for example, the per capita output of rice in Communist North Vietnam was 20 percent lower than in 1960.

And I also consider it important to understand the significance of the fact that the Vietcong insurgency was directed not against a government that had failed to improve the lot of its people but against a government which, over a short period of time, had scored some of the most dramatic economic and social advances recorded anywhere in Asia.

ESCALATION: FACT AND FALLACY

There has been a good deal of talk about the United States escalating the war in South Vietnam. Several Senators who spoke last week warned that if we escalate the war by means of air strikes against North Vietnam, the escalation may get out of hand and wind up as a war with Red China or perhaps even a world war.

But it is not we who have escalated the war; it is the Communists. Peiping and Hanoi have been busy escalating the war in South Vietnam for several years now. They have sent in tens of thousands of soldiers of the North Vietnamese Army; they have trained additional tens of thousands of dissident South Vietnamese; they have supplied them with massive

quantities of equipment; and they have stepped up the tempo of their attacks against the Vietnamese people.

Now we are told that if we take any action against the territory of North Vietnam, which has mounted and directed the entire attack on South Vietnam, it will entail the risk of world war.

If the Communists are always to be permitted the privilege of escalating their attempts to take over new countries, while we shrink from retaliation for fear of further escalation, we might as well throw in the sponge now and tell the Communists the world is theirs for the taking.

I find it difficult to conceive of Red China sending in her armies in response to air strikes against carefully selected military targets. After all, if they did so, they would be risking retaliation against their highly vulnerable coastal cities, where most of Red China's industry is concentrated. They would be risking setting back their economy 10 or 20 years.

Moreover, both the Chinese Communists and the Hanoi Communists are aware that the massive introduction of Chinese troops would create serious popular resentment because of the traditional Vietnamese suspicion of Chinese imperialism.

That there will be no invasion of the North by Vietnamese and American forces can, I believe, be taken as axiomatic. Nor do I believe there will be any large-scale involvement of American troops on the Korean model. We will have to continue to provide the Vietnamese with logistical support and air support, as we are doing now. But on the ground, the fighting can most effectively be done by the Vietnamese armed forces, supported, I believe, by military contingents from the other free Asian countries.

THE FALLACY THAT THE ASIAN PEOPLES DO NOT KNOW THE MEANING OF FREEDOM

It has been stated by the senior Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] and by other critics of our foreign policy in Vietnam that it is pointless to talk about fighting for freedom in Asia because the Asian people historically do not know the meaning of freedom. It has even been implied that, because of their ignorance of freedom and their indifference to it, communism exercises a genuine attraction for the peoples of Asia.

I am sure that most Asians would consider this analysis condescending and offensive. I myself would be disposed to agree with them. It is an analysis which, in my opinion, is false on almost every score.

We have grown accustomed to equating freedom with the full range of freedoms that we in the United States today enjoy. But, in the world in which we live, the word "freedom" has at least three separate and perhaps equally important connotations.

First, there is national freedom, or independence from foreign control.

Second, there is freedom of speech and press and the other freedoms inherent in parliamentary democracy, such as we enjoy.

And, third, there is the type of natural freedom that is enjoyed by primitive peasants and tribesmen in many backward countries, even under political autocracies.

It is true that most Asian governments are autocratic; and it is probably true that the Vietnamese people do not understand or appreciate freedom in the sense of parliamentary democracy. But they certainly understand the meaning of "freedom" when the word is used to mean independence from foreign rule. They are, in fact, a people with a long and proud history and a strong sense of national identity. Every Vietnamese schoolboy knows that his people fought and triumphed over the hordes of Genghis Khan in defense of their freedom; and he also knows that his country was free for five centuries before the French occupation. Finally, he knows and takes pride in the fact that his people drove out the French colonialists despite their army of 400,000 men. Do not tell me that these people know nothing about freedom.

To the westernized Saigonese intellectuals, freedom of speech and freedom of the press are certainly very real issues; and even though they may have not mastered the processes, they would unquestionably like to see some kind of parliamentary democracy in their country. It is completely understandable that they should have chafed over the political controls that existed under the Diem government, and that have existed, in one degree or another, under succeeding governments.

But in the countryside, where the great mass of the people reside, the political controls that exist in the city are meaningless. The peasant is free to own his own land, to dispose of his produce, to worship according to his beliefs, to guide the upbringing of his children, and to elect his local village officials. To him, these freedoms that touch on his everyday life are the freedoms that really count, not the abstract and remote freedoms of constitutional and federal government.

And, if on top of granting him these natural freedoms, the government assists him by building schools and dispensaries and by providing seed and fertilizer, then, from the standpoint of the southeast Asian peasant, his life is full and he is prepared to fight to defend it against the Communists.

It is, in short, completely untrue that the Vietnamese people and the other peoples of Asia do not know the meaning of freedom. And it is equally untrue that communism is acceptable to the Asian peasant because of his indifference to freedom.

Communism has never been freely accepted by any people, anywhere, no matter how primitive.

It has never been accepted for the simple reason that even primitive peoples do not enjoy being pushed around and brutalized and terrorized, and told what to do and what not to do, and having their every activity ordered and supervised by political commissars.

This is why communism must govern by means of ruthless dictatorship wherever it takes power.

This is why the primitive mountain peoples of both Laos and Vietnam have, in an overwhelming majority, sided against the Communists.

This is why there are almost 8 million refugees from Communist rule in Asia today—people who have seen the reality of the so-called People's Democracy, and who have given up everything they possessed and frequently risked their lives to escape from it.

That is why there is barbed wire and iron curtains surrounding the Communist countries. The inhabitants of the Communist countries would all leave if they could.

There is one final comment I would like to make while dealing with this subject. Too often I have heard it said that the Vietnamese people are not fighting because there is nothing to choose between communism and the kind of government they now have.

To equate an authoritarian regime like that in South Vietnam, or Taiwan, or Thailand with the totalitarian rule of communism is tantamount to losing all sense of proportion. Not only have these regimes never been guilty of the massive bloodletting and total direction of personal life which has characterized Communist rule in every country, but, carefully examined, it will turn out that these regimes are a mixture of natural democracy at the bottom with political controls of varying rigidity at the top.

Even at their worst, the political autocracies that exist in certain free Asian countries are a thousand times better than communism from the standpoint of how they treat their own people. And at their best, some of these autocracies have combined control of the press and political parties with remarkably progressive social programs.

But perhaps more important from our standpoint is that these free autocracies, for lack of a better term, do not threaten the peace of their neighbors or of the world or threaten our own security, whereas world communism has now become a threat of terrifying dimensions.

THE FALLACY THAT THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE HAVE NO WILL TO RESIST COMMUNISM

We have been told that the Vietnamese people are indifferent to communism; that they resist it only halfheartedly. Some commentators have even sought to create the impression that America is in a position of coercing the South Vietnamese to fight against communism.

This estimate of the attitude of the South Vietnamese people is totally false.

True, South Vietnam is suffering from political instability.

True, the war against the Vietcong is going badly.

But these things by themselves do not constitute proof that the Vietnamese people are indifferent to communism or that they do not have the will to resist.

The people of South Vietnam are, in fact, one of the most anti-Communist peoples in the world. Among them are more than 1 million refugees who sacrificed everything they possessed to flee from North Vietnam to South Vietnam after the country was divided by the Geneva agreement of 1954; and it is esti-

mated that there are another 300,000 internal refugees who have fled from Communist-controlled areas in the south. Among the present population of 14 million, in addition, there are several million peasants and workers and students who have at one time or another borne arms against the Communists, some of them in the Vietnamese Army, the majority in village self-defense units.

The overwhelming majority of the people of South Vietnam know what communism means because they have experienced it on their own backs. There are indeed very few South Vietnamese who do not have friends or relatives who have been the victims of Communist brutality and terror.

Let me tell the story of one such act of Communist terror, because statistics by themselves tend to be meaningless.

In the village of Phu Hoa, there was a teenage girl by the name of Giau, the pride of her parents and a born leader of others. As a member of the Republican Youth Organization, she organized the village youth and gave talks. On the evening of January 15, 1962, she was abducted from her village by Vietcong soldiers. The next morning her mutilated and decapitated body—I have a photograph of it—was discovered in the roadway outside the village with a note on her breast captioned "Death Sentence for Giau," and signed by the "People's Front of Liberation."

For a long period of time, assassinations such as this were going on at the rate of some 500 a month, or 6,000 a year. The victims were most frequently active supporters of government, local administrators, village heads, and schoolteachers. The families of village militiamen were another favorite target. The Vietcong would entice the militia away from the village—and when they returned they would find their wives and children massacred.

While the facts of these mass assassinations are not generally known in our country, they are known in Vietnam. And this is one of the reasons why the Vietnamese people hate the Communists, and why they continue to resist them despite the chronic political instability in Saigon and despite the seeming hopelessness of their situation.

For some strange reason, the torture of one Vietcong prisoner aroused far more indignation in our country than the assassination of scores of thousands of innocent civilians by the Vietcong Communists, including the bombing of a schoolbus in which a score of children died.

But, if the Vietnamese people are anti-Communist, I have been asked: Why has the Vietnamese Army put up so poor a show?

The Vietnamese Army has been handicapped by political instability by the frequent shifts of officers, by poor staff work, by its inadequate use of scouts and security patrols, and by the many disadvantages under which counter-guerrilla forces must always operate. But, it is simply not true that the Vietnamese Army has shown no willingness to fight.

They have fought bravely in thousands of engagements. They have taken

heavy casualties and inflicted much heavier casualties on the enemy.

The belief that the Vietnamese people do not have the will to resist the Communists and that the Vietnamese forces have fought poorly against them, is in large measure due to the unfortunate emphasis which the press always places on disasters and defects.

It probably also springs in part from the traditional attitude of the American newspaperman that it is his duty to mercilessly expose every weakness in his city government, in his State government, in his National Government.

I do not complain about that. I suppose that is the way it has to be.

But whatever the reasons may be, the emphasis in the press has been so misleading that even knowledgeable members of the administration have been confused by it. For example, a member of the administration who very recently visited Vietnam informed me that, contrary to his impressions from reading the press he was amazed to learn that in eight engagements of battalion size and larger which took place during the month of January 1965, the Vietnamese Army got the better of the engagement in every single case.

I have here the comparative figures for Vietnamese and Vietcong casualties for the 3-year period 1962-64, which I have received from an official source. I wish to read them, Mr. President, because they throw an altogether new light on the situation in Vietnam. I do not know why these figures were not released long ago. I hear people complaining that they do not know what is going on in Vietnam. The release of these figures would have helped them to understand.

In 1962 the Vietnamese Army lost 4,400 killed in action against 21,000 Vietcong killed, and 1,300 prisoners against 5,500 captives taken from the Vietcong.

Those are pretty good statistics. They ought to be read and studied by those who have been telling us that the South Vietnamese have no will to fight.

Listen to these further figures:

In 1963 the figures were 5,700 Vietnamese soldiers killed in action against 21,000 Vietcong, and 3,300 missing or captured against 4,000 Vietcong captured.

And even last year, when the fortunes of war turned against the Vietnamese government, the Vietnamese Army killed 17,000 Vietcong against a loss of 7,000 men, and took 4,200 Communists captive against 5,800 captives lost to them.

To those who say that the Vietnamese Army has not shown the will to resist, I point out that, over the 3-year period for which I have presented figures, this army suffered a total death toll of 17,000 men, which is almost as high as the total American toll in South Korea. The enemy's casualties have been much heavier. But the Communists have continued to attack regardless of losses. And because it has not been possible to reconstitute a stable government since the overthrow of Diem, and, because no one knows where guerrillas may strike next, and because unlimited terror is a dreadfully effective instrument, the Vietcong, over the past 15 months, have been able

to make most of the Vietnamese countryside insecure.

The fact that the Vietcong seem to be winning and that they have been so effective in resisting government counterattacks, has led some people to believe that the Vietcong soldier is convinced of the justice of his cause and that this is why he fights more grimly.

The Communists are masters of the art of imposing iron discipline by means of unlimited terror.

Senators will recall that during the Korean war we all marveled at the discipline of the Chinese Communist soldiers who kept on marching without breaking step while they were being bombed and strafed by American planes, or who attacked our positions, wave upon wave, apparently oblivious to casualties.

I remember people saying, "See the dedication of these Chinese Communists. See how they bear themselves against bullets and bombs. See how fanatically they believe in their cause." I did not think that was the reason, but I did not have an effective answer until after the war was over.

Senators will recall the terrible riots in the Koje prisoner-of-war camp, when the prisoners seemed so grimly united against us that for weeks on end American soldiers could not venture into the POW compound. Again, the common assumption was that the prisoners were all fanatical Communists.

But then the end of the war came—and it turned out that 20,000 out of 25,000 of the Communist prisoners in our hands asked for refugee status rather than return to North Korea or China. And these were supposed to be the dedicated Communists who believe so fanatically in communism.

Of the 5,000 who returned home, there is reason to believe that the majority did so with heavy hearts, because of strong family ties and not because of any love for communism.

I remind the Senators—because these things tend to be forgotten—of the evidence which emerged that the Koje prisoners of war had been terrorized by a tiny minority of Communist militants who ran the camp with an iron hand, torturing political opponents, staging kangaroo courts, and executing and burying those who were sentenced.

I also remind them of the scenes that took place when the prisoners were brought before the Communist interrogators under the procedures set up by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. The prisoners had to be dragged before the interrogators forcibly, their arms pinned behind their backs by Indian soldiers. When the Communist interrogators spoke to them, urging that they return to their homeland, the prisoners spat out their hatred with a vehemence that Western observers found frightening. So embarrassing were the interrogations for the Communists that after a number of sessions they decided to call off the whole show.

In the light of this conclusion, how much significance can one attach to the seemingly fanatical courage displayed by the Chinese and North Korean soldiers in attacking our positions, or to the grim

unity of the Koje prisoners of war in resisting their American captors?

Before we marvel at the apparently high morale of the Vietcong forces in South Vietnam, I suggest that we recall the experience of the Korean war, because the evidence is overwhelming that the Vietcong Communists are using terror on the same scale and in the same manner that it was employed on the Korean battlefield and in the prisoner-of-war camps.

That the morale of the Vietcong forces is not 10 feet tall is demonstrated by the substantial number of Vietcong prisoners taken over the past 3 years. It is demonstrated even more dramatically by the fact that from February 1963 through the end of 1964 there were approximately 17,000 Vietcong defections. The number of defections would be far larger, I am certain, if a stable government could establish itself in Saigon.

It is interesting to note that, while most of the defectors have been young peasants who were conscripted by the Vietcong, their ranks also include North Vietnamese officers who were told that they were going south to fight the Americans and who broke when they discovered that they were fighting their own people.

Impatient constituents have sometimes asked me why the Communists have been able to plan elaborate attacks on our airfields and other installations without advance intelligence reaching us from members of the local population who must have observed the Communists.

The instrument of terror is also applicable to the control of the civilian population. Whenever the Communists take over a village or a town, they systematically massacre all known anti-Communist leaders and those who are suspected of informing. They frequently mutilate their bodies as an example to the people. If we could give the Vietnamese villagers a feeling of greater security, I am sure that more intelligence would be forthcoming. As matters now stand, the average Vietnamese peasant fears that the Communists are going to win the war, and he knows the terrible punishment that awaits those who inform on the Communists. This is why our intelligence has admittedly been inadequate—one of the reasons, certainly. But this is a situation that could change dramatically if we succeeded in convincing the Vietnamese people of our determination to help them retain their freedom, and if we succeeded in inflicting a number of significant defeats on the enemy.

THE BUDDHIST FALLACY

I now wish to discuss the Buddhist situation, about which we have heard so much over the several years.

The myth of Buddhist persecution and the parallel myth that the Buddhists are opposed to the Government, have because of the so-called militant Buddhist movement, become important political factors in Vietnam. It is, therefore, important that we should seek to understand the nature of this movement, the motivation of its leaders, and the real degree of influence it exerts over the Vietnamese people.

It is, indeed, idle to debate the subject of Vietnam and our policy there, and not understand the so-called Buddhist problem. There has been much loose talk about it, but there has thus far been little hard, factual information.

The campaign which resulted in the overthrow of President Diem was marked by the charge that he had subjected the Buddhist religion to inhuman persecution; and, in protest against this alleged persecution, a number of Buddhist monks went through the horrifying ritual of self-immolation.

Week after week, month after month, the American people and the people of the world were inundated with stories supporting the charge that Diem was persecuting the Buddhist religion. There were a number of experienced correspondents of national reputation who challenged the authenticity of these stories. But their voices were drowned by the torrent of charges and allegations that appeared in some of our major newspapers, and that were lent further credence because of repetition of our official information agencies.

At the invitation of President Diem, the U.N. General Assembly decided to send a factfinding mission to South Vietnam to look into the situation. I find this rarely referred to in any discussion of the Buddhist question, but it is a fact that the United Nations did send a mission over there.

While the mission was still in the country, President Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, were overthrown and assassinated.

The mission decided that the overthrow of Diem made it unnecessary to come up with a formal finding. I believe that this was most regrettable. But the summary of the testimony which it had taken in Vietnam pointed strongly to the conclusion that the persecution of the Buddhists was either nonexistent or vastly exaggerated and that the agitation was essentially political. This, in essence, was what I was told in a personal conversation with Ambassador Fernando Volio Jimenez, of Costa Rica, who had introduced the motion calling for the setting up of the U.N. mission and who served as a member of it.

I went to New York and saw Ambassador Volio. I said, "Mr. Ambassador, I understand you were a member of the United Nations commission which went to Vietnam. I should like to ask you what the facts are." Ambassador Volio gave me the facts as I have given them to you here.

Ambassador Pinto, of Dahomey, another member of the U.N. mission, expressed himself in similar terms in public.

The entire tragic story suggests that the free world was made the victim of a gigantic propaganda hoax, as a result of which the legitimate government of President Diem was destroyed and a chaotic situation created which has inevitably played into the hands of the Communists.

If Senators have not yet had time to read the report of the U.N. factfinding mission to Vietnam, I urge them to do so because it throws essential light on the

current activities of the militant Buddhists. I am arranging to have copies mailed to every Senator, and I hope that all Senators will read it, because they will learn a great deal about the present Buddhist situation from it.

The first fact which needs to be established in evaluating the militant Buddhist movement is that the Buddhists do not constitute 80 or 85 percent of the population, as was widely reported at the time of the Buddhist crisis. According to Dr. Mai Tho Truyen, one of the greatest authorities on Vietnam Buddhism, the Vietnamese Buddhists number approximately 4 million people, or about 30 percent of the population.

The second point that must be made is that the militant Buddhists constitute only a small fraction of the total Buddhist population. The millions of the Buddhist peasants, in their great majority, do not approve of the militant political actions and the government-toppling intrigues of the Buddhist militants in Saigon. Their activities, indeed, run completely counter to the pacific traditions of the Buddhist religion.

It is questionable whether the Buddhist militants have been able to mobilize as many as 50,000 active supporters in all the demonstrations they have staged in Saigon and Hue and other cities. But because political power resides in the cities, the several tens of thousands of Buddhist militants, by their clamor and their persistent demonstrations and their clever propaganda, have succeeded in creating the impression that they speak for the people of the cities and for the majority of the people of Vietnam.

What do the Buddhist militants want? Before the overthrow of President Diem, Thich Tri Quang told Marguerite Higgins frankly: "We cannot get an arrangement with the north until we get rid of Diem and Nhu."

The evidence is clear that Thich Tri Quang and some of his other militants are still bent on an agreement with the north. Indeed, only last Friday, Quang called for U.S. negotiations with Ho Chi Minh.

If there is reason to believe that Thich Tri Quang is a neutralist, there is even more reason for fearing that some of the other members of the Buddhist opposition movement are openly pro-Communist or that they have become tools of the rather substantial Communist infiltration which is known to exist in the Buddhist clergy in the various countries of Asia.

That such an infiltration should exist is not surprising because there are no barriers to it.

A man who wants to become a Buddhist monk does not have to prepare himself for his ministry by engaging in studies, nor does he have to be ordained, nor does he take any vow.

He simply shaves his head and dons the saffron robe and enters a monastery—and overnight he becomes one of the religious elite.

When he wishes to leave the monastery, he sheds his robe and leaves it; if he wishes to reenter, he dons his robe again and reenters. That is all there is to it.

I do not criticize this procedure on religious grounds.

Buddhism is one of the great religions of mankind and much can be said for an arrangement that enables every man of religious disposition to spend at least a portion of his life under the voluntary monastic discipline characteristic of Buddhism.

But, regrettably, it is a procedure that leaves the door wide open to Communist infiltration.

I remember that when we were digging into the files of the Nazis at Nuremberg, we found that Hitler had under consideration a program of infiltrating the churches by inducing young people to enter seminaries, so that he could have them at his disposal.

When I first began to hear of the Buddhist situation, it occurred to me that more than likely there was a similar infiltration of religion at work.

The militant Buddhists have used the influence and prestige which accrued to them from the overthrow of Diem for the prime purpose of making stable government impossible: in this sense, whatever the intent of their leaders, they have been serving the desires of the Communist Vietcong.

They have organized demonstrations, provoked riots, inflamed passions with highly publicized fasts and self-immolations, and subjected the government to a ceaseless propaganda barrage. They overthrew the Khanh government. Then they overthrew the Huong government which succeeded it. And they seem to be intent on making things impossible for any government that may come to power.

It is, of course, difficult to deal with a political conspiracy that camouflages itself in religious robes. In any case, this is a matter for the Vietnamese Government and not for our own Government. But it would make matters immeasurably easier for the Vietnamese authorities if the true facts about Buddhism in Vietnam were given to the American people and if they could be helped to understand how little the Buddhist militants really represent, how nefarious their political activities have really been, and how much they have done to undermine the fight against Communists.

No stable government can be created in Vietnam without the participation and support of responsible Buddhist leadership. But this responsible leadership cannot be found among the handful of monks of questionable antecedents who have been misdirecting the militant Buddhist movement in the cities of Vietnam.

It is time to speak bluntly on this issue.

THE FALLACY OF THE FRENCH ANALOGY

Over and over again in recent months I have heard it said that our position in Vietnam is impossible because the French, who knew Vietnam so much better than we do, were compelled to admit defeat after 8 years of war against the Vietminh. A recent half-page advertisement in the New York Times asked: "How can we win in Vietnam with less than 30,000 advisers, when the French

could not win with an army of nearly half a million?"

Our own position is entirely different from the French position in Indochina. The French were a colonial power, exploiting and imposing their will on the Indochinese people and stubbornly denying them their freedom. The French military effort in Indochina was doomed because it had against it not only the Communists but the overwhelming majority of the Indochinese people. It was a war fought by Frenchmen against Indochinese.

The United States, however, does not seek to impose its control on Vietnam or exploit Vietnam. We are not a colonial power. We seek only to help the people of South Vietnam defend their freedom against an insurgency that is inspired and directed and aided by the North Vietnamese Communists. This is understood by the Vietnamese people. And that is why hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese who fought with Ho Chi Minh against the French are today fighting for the Saigon government against the Vietcong.

That is why the war against the Vietcong can be won, while the war of French colonialism against the Indochinese independence movement was doomed from the outset.

There is no similarity in the two situations that has any meaning or validity.

WHAT CAN BE DONE?

I believe the war in Vietnam can be won without a significant increase in our military effort. There are many things that can be done to improve the performance of our side, and most of them lie essentially in the nonmilitary field.

Let me set forth some of the things that I believe can be done.

THE NEED FOR IMPROVED LIAISON

One of the most obvious and most serious weaknesses of the American position in Vietnam is the lack of adequate liaison with the leaders of the various sectors of the Vietnamese community.

Because of this lack of communication, we have frequently been caught unawares by developments; we have remained without serious ability to influence them; and we have not been able to effectively assist the Vietnamese in communicating with each other and in stabilizing the political situation in Saigon.

No one person is to blame for this. It is, rather, the system which rotates military officers and AID officials and other Americans in Vietnam on an annual or 2-year basis.

As one American officer pointed out in a recent interview, "It takes about 8 months before you can really get to know the country and the people. And, just about the time you are beginning to understand something, you are rotated home and that is the end of your utility."

I believe that something can be done to improve this situation.

I have met a number of Americans, former soldiers and former AID officials, who have spent 5 years or more in Vietnam, have built up personal friendships with leaders of every sector of the Vietnamese community, enjoy the confidence of the Vietnamese because of their understanding and dedication, and who

would jump at the opportunity to return to Vietnam for the purpose of helping it in this critical hour. I am told that there may be as many as 10 or 12 such people in this country.

I have proposed in a letter to the President that these Americans be constituted into a liaison group and that they be dispatched to Saigon immediately for the purpose of helping the Embassy to establish the broadest and most effective possible liaison with the army leaders, with the Buddhists, with the intellectual community, and with the Vietnamese political leaders.

I know that there is always a tendency on the part of World War II officers to resent World War I officers, and on the part of those who are involved in a situation today to resist the assistance of those who preceded them. There is also sometimes a tendency for those who were there yesterday to believe that they understand things better than those who are there today.

But this is a situation in which I am confident every American, no matter what his rank, will seek to rise above his personal prejudices. It is a situation that demands the utilization of every ounce of experience and dedication available to us.

It is my earnest personal conviction that the dispatch of such a liaison group to Saigon would result in an early improvement in our ability to communicate with the Vietnamese and in our ability to assist them in achieving the political stability which is essential to the successful prosecution of the war.

THE NEED FOR A STEPPED-UP POLITICAL WARFARE EFFORT

From many conversations with Vietnamese and with Americans who have served in various capacities in Vietnam, I am convinced that another one of our major weaknesses lies in the field of political warfare.

We have, by and large, been trying to meet the Communist insurgency by traditional military methods or by traditional methods slightly tailored to meet the special requirements of guerrilla warfare. In the field of political warfare, where the Communists have scored their most spectacular triumphs, our own effort has been limited, and halting, and amateurish, and, in fact, sadly ineffective.

The prime goal of political warfare, as it must be waged by freemen, is to win men's minds. The prime goal of political warfare, as it is waged by the Communists, is to erode and paralyze the will to resist by means of total error.

An effective political warfare program requires three major ingredients: First, a handful of basic slogans which capsule popular desires and which are capable of striking responsive chords in the hearts of the people; second, a propaganda apparatus capable of conveying this program both to those on the Government side and those on the side of the insurgents; third, specially trained cadres to direct the effort.

But the slogans we have are inadequate. Our propaganda program is dismally weak compared with that of the Communists. And according to my in-

formation, we still have not assisted the Vietnamese to set up an intensive training program in Communist cold war methods and how to counter them.

An article in the New York Times on August 3, 1964, pointed out that in every area "the basic cutting tool of the Vietcong is a squad of about 10 armed men and women whose primary function is propaganda." The article also said that "Most of the experts in psychological warfare and propaganda here believe the Vietcong's agitprop teams have done the Saigon government more damage than even the tough Vietcong regular battalions." Finally, the article made the point that according to estimates there were 320 Vietcong "agitprop" teams working in the country, against 20 "information teams" for the government side. This gave the Vietcong an edge of 16 to 1 in the field of propaganda personnel. And the edge was probably even greater in terms of finesse and effectiveness.

Even if we help the South Vietnamese Government intensify its propaganda effort, there would still remain the problem of basic goals and slogans.

I have pointed out that the Vietnamese people have a proud history and a strong sense of national unity. All Vietnamese, whether they live in the north or south, would like to see a unified and peaceful Vietnam. But as matters now stand, only the Communists are able to hold forth the prospect of the reunification of Vietnam. To date we have not given the South Vietnamese Government the green light to set up a "Committee for the Liberation of North Vietnam," as counterpart to the "Liberation Front" which the Communists have set up in the south. This places the South Vietnamese side at a grave disadvantage.

There are any number of patriotic North Vietnamese refugees who have been itching for the opportunity to set up a Liberation Committee for the North. The establishment of such a committee could, in my opinion, have an immediate and profound impact on the conduct of the war.

But above all, the situation in Vietnam underscores the need for an effective training program in political warfare, for our own foreign service and military personnel so that they can help to communicate this knowledge to nationals of other countries who, like the South Vietnamese, are engaged in a life-and-death struggle for survival against the most cunning and most ruthless practitioners of political warfare history has ever known.

In this connection, I wish to bring to the attention of my colleagues the fact that there has been pending before Congress for some 6 years a bill calling for the establishment of a Freedom Academy. This would be an institution where Americans and citizens of other free countries could receive concentrated training in Communist techniques and operations, and in tactics and methods designed to frustrate the Communists at every operational level, from elections for the control of trade unions and student organizations, to street riots, to attempted insurrections.

The Senate Judiciary Committee in reporting this measure to the floor in May of 1960, described the bill as "one of the most important measures ever introduced in the Congress." But, unfortunately, although the bill was passed by the Senate, the House took no action.

When the bill was reintroduced for the third time in early 1963, it has the sponsorship of the following Senators: MUNDT, DOUGLAS, CASE, DODD, SMATHERS, Goldwater, PROXMIRE, FONG, HICKENLOOPER, MILLER, Keating, LAUSCHE, and SCOTT.

The distinguished senior Senator from South Dakota last Friday reintroduced the measure for the fourth time, and it is now lying on the table, so that those who wish to add their names as cosponsors may do so. It is my earnest hope that the measure will have the sponsorship of an even larger bipartisan group of Senators than it did in 1963. It is my hope too that there will be no further delay, no foot dragging, in enacting this long-overdue measure. It is time, high time, that we recognize the imperative need to equip ourselves and our allies with the knowledge and the trained personnel required to meet the Communist onslaught.

CARRYING THE GUERRILLA WAR TO THE NORTH

First of all, I think there is a growing acceptance of the need for punishing the North with hit-and-run raids. It would be much more effective if these raids could be carried out in the name of a North Vietnamese Liberation Front than in the name of the South Vietnamese Government.

Second, I have reason for believing that increasing consideration is being given to the need for countering the Vietcong insurgency in the South with a guerrilla warfare effort in the North.

In May of 1961, when I returned from Laos and Vietnam, I made a statement, which I should like to repeat today:

The best way for us to stop Communist guerrilla action in Laos and in South Vietnam is to send guerrilla forces into North Vietnam; to equip and supply those patriots already in the field; to make every Communist official fear the just retribution of an outraged humanity; to make every Communist arsenal, government building, communications center and transportation facility a target for sabotage; to provide a rallying point for the great masses of oppressed people who hate communism because they have known it. Only when we give the Communists more trouble than they can handle at home, will they cease their aggression against the outposts of freedom.

I believe that every word I said in 1961 is doubly valid today. It is not too late to embark upon such a program. And if we do give the South Vietnamese Government the green light to embark upon it on an effective, hard-hitting scale, again I think it would add significantly to the psychological impact of the entire program if all guerrilla activities were carried out in the name of the "Committee for the Liberation of the North."

A FEW MILITARY SUGGESTIONS

I do not pretend to be a military expert. But I have discussed the situation in Vietnam with a number of military men of considerable experience in the area, and I have been encouraged to be-

lieve that the several suggestions which I have to make in this field are realistic.

I submit them for the consideration of my colleagues, because I think they make sense.

My first proposition is that we cannot regard the war in Vietnam in isolation from the rest of southeast Asia.

The Communist Party over which Ho Chi Minh presided for many years was the Communist Party of Indochina. Indeed, to this day, there is no such thing as a Communist Party in Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh's thinking and strategy are directed toward the reunification of all the former territories of French Indochina under his personal sway. This makes it imperative for us to develop a coordinated strategy for the entire area if we are to cope effectively with the Communist strategy.

Proposition No. 2 is that there are certain dramatic military actions open to us that do not involve the territory of North Vietnam.

The hub of the Ho Chi Minh trail is the town of Tchepone, inside the Laotian frontier, just south of the 17th parallel, the dividing line between North Vietnam and South Vietnam. Through Tchepone pour most of the reinforcements and equipment from North Vietnam. From Tchepone the men and equipment are infiltrated into South Vietnam along hundreds of different jungle trails.

I recall that when I met with President Diem in April of 1961, he urged that the Americans assist him and the Laotian Government in preemptive action to secure three key centers in the Laotian Panhandle—Tchepone, Saravane, and Attopeu—in order to prevent the large-scale infiltration which is today taking place. I still have a copy of the marked map which he gave me in outlining his project. Had Diem's advice been followed there would have been no Ho Chi Minh trail. But this was at the time of the Laotian armistice and we were not disposed to take any actions which might provoke the Laotian Communists. So nothing was done.

The seizure of Tchepone by Laotian and Vietnamese forces, with American air support would, I have been assured, be a feasible military operation and one that could be carried out with the means available to us on the spot. It would do more to put a crimp in the Ho Chi Minh trail than any amount of bombing we could attempt. And it would have as dramatic an impact on the situation in Laos as on the situation in Vietnam.

Finally, there is the matter of collective action by the SEATO nations.

As late as April of 1961, the SEATO nations in the immediate area of the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and Pakistan—all favored common action against the Communist menace in Laos. But the British and French were opposed to such action, and we ourselves sat on the fence; and the result was that nothing was done.

The charter of SEATO will have to be modified so that one nation cannot veto collective action by all the other nations. Britain, I am inclined to believe, would now be disposed to support collective ac-

tion by SEATO because of the situation in Malaysia. But, perhaps France should be invited to leave SEATO, on the grounds that she has no vital interests in the area, and her entire attitude toward Red China is one of appeasement. In view of the fact that something has to be done immediately, however, the sensible course is to encourage collective action by the free nations in the area, outside the framework of SEATO, until SEATO can be reorganized in a manner that makes it effective.

In this connection, I am most encouraged by the news that South Korea has decided to send a contingent of several thousand military engineers to South Vietnam, and the Philippines have decided to do likewise. It is infinitely better from every standpoint to have Asian troops supporting the Vietnamese forces against the Vietcong on the ground, than it is to have American troops actively involved.

THE NEED FOR UNDERSCORING OUR LONG-TERM COMMITMENT

The retaliatory strikes ordered by President Johnson against the North have had the effect of reiterating our commitment in a manner that the Communists understand; and this, in the long run, is probably more important than the damage wrought by these strikes.

But if the Communists are to be discouraged from continuing this costly war, we must seek every possible means of underscoring our determination to stand by the people of South Vietnam, to pay whatever cost may be necessary, and to take whatever risk may be necessary to prevent the Communists from subjugating the Vietnamese people and other peoples in the area.

It is important to reiterate our resolve at every opportunity. And it is even more important to translate this resolve into hard political and military actions.

The American Friends of Vietnam have suggested another dramatic measure. They have suggested a commitment to a massive southeast Asian development program based on the harnessing of the Mekong River—a kind of Tennessee Valley Authority for southeast Asia. Such a plan, they point out, would offer incredible promise to Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand as well as to South Vietnam, and it would offer equal promise to the people of North Vietnam, which only the continued belligerence and noncooperation of their Government could frustrate.

This, to me, sounds eminently sensible.

FOR A COMMITMENT TO VICTORY

If we decide to withdraw from Vietnam we can certainly find plenty of excuses to ease our path. We can blame it on the geography; or on the topography; or on local apathy; or on political instability; or on religious strife; or even on anti-Americanism. But that will fool no one but ourselves. These conditions make our success there difficult, but only our own timidity and vacillation can make it impossible.

It has become obvious that we cannot go on fighting this undeclared war under the rules laid down by our enemies. We

have reached the point where we shall have to make a great decision, a decision as to whether we are to take the hard steps necessary to turn the tide in Vietnam or whether we are to refrain from doing so and thus lose inevitably by default.

The ultimate outcome of the cold war depends upon an affirmative decision to do whatever is necessary to achieve victory in South Vietnam. The events of recent weeks demonstrate again that the administration is not lacking in resolve and that it is rapidly approaching such a decision.

Whether that means a larger commitment of forces, or continued retaliatory strikes against the North, or carrying guerrilla warfare to the enemy homeland, or completely sealing off South Vietnam from Communist aid—I say to the administration, "Give us the plan that will do the job, and we will support you."

Whether our victory be near or far, can we, dare we, turn away or begin to turn away from the task before us, however frustrating or burdensome it may be?

Here surely is a time for us to heed Santayana's maxim "Those who will not learn from the past are destined to repeat it."

And so I speak today not merely to urge that we stand fast in Vietnam, but also to urge that we meet head on the new isolationism in its incipient stages, before the long months and years of discontent, frustration, and weariness that lie ahead have swelled the chorus urging disengagement and withdrawal to a deafening roar.

Let us expound a foreign policy nurtured in our constantly growing strength, not one fed by fear and disillusionment; a policy which each year is prepared to expend more, not less, in the cause of preserving our country and the decencies of man.

Let us insist upon a defense budget based upon the dangers we face abroad, not upon the benefits we seek at home.

Let us embrace a doctrine that refuses to yield to force, ever; that honors its commitments because we know that our good faith is the cement binding the free world together; a doctrine that recognizes in its foreign aid program not only that the rich are morally obligated to help the poor, but also that prosperity cannot permanently endure surrounded by poverty, and justice cannot conquer until its conquest is universal.

Let us, above all, encourage and inspire a national spirit worthy of our history, worthy of our burgeoning, bursting strength, in our arms, in our agriculture, in industry, in science, in finance, a spirit of confidence, of optimism, of willingness to accept new risks and exploit new opportunities.

And let us remember that providence has showered upon our people greater blessings than on any other, and that, great though our works have been, much greater is expected of us.

In recent days, the free world has paid tribute to its greatest champion of our age, Winston Churchill.

It is a curious thing that though Churchill is acknowledged on all sides as the preeminent figure of our time

and as the highest embodiment of Western statesmanship, he was, throughout his life, and remains today, a prophet unheeded, a statesman whom men venerate but will not emulate.

It may well be that Winston Churchill's greatest legacy will prove to be, not the legacy of his immortal deeds, but that of his example and his precepts; and that freemen of the future will pay him the homage denied by his contemporaries, the tribute of imitation and acceptance of his message.

As we ponder the passing of this heroic figure and reflect upon his career and try to draw from it lessons which we might apply to the aggressive onslaught that we face today in a hundred ways on a hundred fronts, we might take to heart this advice which he gave in the dark days of 1941 to the boys of Harrow, his old school:

Never give in. Never, never, never, never. Never yield to force and the apparently overwhelming might of the enemy. Never yield in any way, great or small, large or petty, except to convictions of honor and good sense.

Let us resolve to nail this message to the masthead of our ship of state in this year of decision.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the following documents: First, a summary of Communist violations of the Laotian armistice prepared for me by the Library of Congress; second, a copy of a statement released yesterday by the American Friends of Vietnam, under the caption of "A New Policy for Vietnam"; third, a copy of a telegram to the President from the Veterans of Foreign Wars; fourth, various newspaper clippings bearing on the situation in Vietnam.

There being no objection, the sundry documents were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
Washington, D.C., May 28, 1964.

To: Hon. THOMAS J. DODD.

From: Foreign Affairs Division.

Subject: List of violations by the Communist Pathet Lao of the Geneva armistice of 1961-62.

July 27, 1962: Laotian cease-fire committee of the three factions (neutralists, rightists, and pro-Communist Pathet Lao) reaches an agreement on principles to implement a truce: Forces of each faction will remain in their previous positions; frontline forces and military supplies are not to be increased; and troops of the three factions will not attack each other.

August 22, 1962: Several companies of pro-Communist Pathet Lao troops attack outposts of rightist forces near Sam Neua in northeastern Laos.

November 27, 1962: U.S. C-123 cargo plane, flying rice and other supplies to neutralist forces, is shot down over the Plaine des Jarres. Two American airmen are killed and one wounded. Investigation shows that the plane was shot down by dissident neutralist troops tied up with Pathet Lao.

April 4, 1963: Premier Souvanna Phouma announces that Pathet Lao troops have attacked neutralist troops of Gen. Kong Le in the Plaine des Jarres. On April 8 the U.S. State Department accuses the Pathet Lao of a serious violation of the cease-fire.

April 15, 1963: Following brief cease-fire, fighting breaks out again on the Plaine des Jarres. The neutralist forces of Gen. Kong Le are attacked and suffer new setbacks. On April 16 U.S. Under Secretary of State George

Ball says that the United States does not rule out the possibility of sending troops into Laos if the situation should continue to deteriorate. Warnings are also issued by Secretary of State Dean Rusk on April 18 and President Kennedy on April 19.

May 3, 1963: Pathet Lao troops fire on two helicopters of the International Control Commission in the Plaine des Jarres, destroying one and wounding four occupants. On May 10, U.S. Ambassador Leonard Unger accuses the Pathet Lao of disrupting the peace and violating the Geneva accords, and he says that the United States will never leave Laos standing alone "to face its enemies from within and abroad."

May 21, 1963: Premier Souvanna Phouma issues communique stating that severe fighting has been going on for 2 days in the Plaine des Jarres between Pathet Lao troops and neutralist forces. On May 23, the ICC asks Britain and the Soviet Union to issue immediate appeal for a cease-fire on the Plaine des Jarres.

June 1, 1963: Premier Souvanna Phouma charges that Pathet Lao forces are continuing their attacks, resumed on May 30, against neutralist positions near the Plaine des Jarres.

September 7, 1963: U.S. C-47 unarmed cargo plane is shot down by Pathet Lao in central Laos. The government says they carry only rice and other relief supplies.

September 9, 1963: Fighting breaks out in Vientiane between the Pathet Lao and the rightist police force under Deputy Premier Phoumi Nosavan.

November 17, 1963: Cease-fire is broken as fighting resumes in the Plaine des Jarres. Talks between neutralist and Pathet Lao military leaders subsequently break down as the Pathet Lao rejects a proposal for the ICC to police the cease-fire.

January 29, 1964: Neutralist military headquarters reports that six Pathet Lao and four North Vietnamese battalions have launched an attack in southern Laos, have defeated neutralist and rightist forces at Na Kay, and are now heading toward the strategic post of Thakhek.

April 19, 1964: Military coup in Vientiane, organized by rightist army officers, ousts government of Premier Souvanna. Coup leaders give as reason for their action the premier's failure to establish peace in Laos.

May 15, 1964: The Laotian Government reports that Pathet Lao forces have seized Tha Thom, a key town about 90 miles northeast of Vientiane. It also reports that an attack on the defense perimeter of Paksane is imminent. On May 16, Pathet Lao forces renew attacks on neutralist position on the Plaine des Jarres. A State Department spokesman calls the new attacks a "flagrant and open violation" of the Geneva accords of 1961-62.

DAVID E. LOCKWOOD,
Analyst in Far Eastern Affairs.

A NEW POLICY FOR VIETNAM
(Statement by the American Friends of Vietnam)

THE DILEMMA

If we are to identify wisely our most effective forward course in Vietnam, it is important first to understand the exact nature of our dilemma there. We know the inherent generosity, both toward free Vietnam and its neighboring countries, which has led us to involve our substance and our blood. We know that but for our commitment, free Vietnam would long since have fallen into the political darkness and physical despair which oppresses Communist North Vietnam. We know that our presence there is in response to the wish of most segments of Vietnamese leadership, however they differ among themselves on other matters. We know that our presence there is earnestly desired by most neighboring countries of southeast Asia. We know that our purpose is to assist responsible

and responsive government and to enable Vietnam and its neighbors to maintain national independence against external encroachment. We know that we have neither wished to "establish" nor "dominate" a Vietnamese government nor to seek for ourselves political, military, or economic advantage.

Our dilemma flows in part from the fact that this knowledge is not shared by all of the Vietnamese people, is not accepted by the members of the Vietcong, is not believed in parts of the less developed world still suffering the scars of recent colonial experience. Nor, in fact, is this understanding uniformly shared by our own people.

The dilemma is sharpened further by a spreading doubt among leadership elements in independent southeast Asian countries that the United States has staying power. Thailand's foreign minister, Thanat Khoman, recently warned members of the Overseas Press Club: "The Thai Government knows much better but some people are not sure we can depend on outside help—especially when there is so much talk of quitting and going home. The Communists have never spoken that line of quitting. When they go some place they stay there."

In part, at least, this skepticism is fostered by the doubt among some Americans that any valid purpose led to our presence in Vietnam in the first place.

THE ALTERNATIVES

The lack of public understanding flows in part from inadequate examination of the alternatives confronting the United States now. In our opinion there are six choices:

1. Continue as now. Whether or not the Vietcong are, in fact, increasing their effectiveness there is a growing conviction in Saigon, in the United States, and in much of the rest of the world, that this is so. This alone makes continuation of our present policy undesirable. The overriding hazard of the present policy is the undeniable fact that it has not provided sufficient psychological and political potency to sustain a Vietnamese Government.

2. Withdraw. This would violate our pledge not to abandon the Vietnamese people. It would manifest throughout the world a U.S. inability to long sustain an effort designed to frustrate Communist intentions. The implications would be read as eloquently in Berlin or in Cuba, as they would be in Vietnam, Indonesia, or India. There can be no question that this alternative would require the Governments of the Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan, India, Japan, to reassess totally present policy and to reorient toward what would be the dominating new facts of Asian life.

("Neutralization" of Vietnam is not suggested here for a simple reason: genuine and reliable neutralization of Vietnam is not possible at the present time. What is most often talked of in this connection is merely a rhetorical euphemism designed to make withdrawal more palatable. On the other hand, the proposals discussed here are valuable to part precisely because they do hold the promise that they may generate sufficient free Vietnamese vitality to make true and assured neutralization possible at some future time.)

3. Military cordon sanitaire across Vietnam and Laos. An estimated military force of up to 100,000 would be involved in making such a cordon truly effective and enemy penetration genuinely hazardous. Its greatest contribution would be in providing hard evidence of new determination to maintain southeast Asian integrity. Although military effect of interdicting the Vietcong's transport and supply may be limited, it is nonetheless one useful alternative, especially when employed with other steps outlined here.

4. Extend military action to the north. Until last week, steps taken in this di-

rection were, in our judgment, not sufficiently explicit, either to rekindle Vietnamese faith in our intentions or to inspire confidence in other Asian countries that we are indeed willing to accept risk as the price of our commitment to freedom. The increased external, Communist intervention in South Vietnam has made it both reasonable and essential that there be a vigorous anti-Communist military response. The limited air strikes in North Vietnam by American and Vietnamese planes constituted such an appropriate response.

There are many other forms of stronger American action and involvement and they are not mutually exclusive. They include:

(a) Formation of an open, well-publicized North Vietnam liberation movement sponsoring major psychological operations programs, including paramilitary action, against the North Vietnamese regime.

(b) Establishment of an International Voluntary Corps dedicated to the maintenance of free nations in the Mekong basin. This corps should consist primarily of volunteers from Asian countries but may also contain a liberal admixture of Americans with military experience. Operating normally in small units with sufficient air support, this force—under the sponsorship of the proposed North Vietnam Liberation Movement—would harass the enemy wherever suitable targets exist, including targets within North Vietnam.

(c) Positioning of U.S. combat forces within South Vietnam to act as a general reserve—a sizable firefighting force. Such a military contingent (perhaps as many as two brigades) should not be used for routine combat or security duties, but as an immediate-reaction fighting force intended to engage Vietcong troops in fixed positions. Desirably, combat elements from other nations will be attached to this force.

(d) Continued bombing of selected military targets in North Vietnam. In contrast to the indiscriminate terrorist activity of the Vietcong in South Vietnam, the free world's concern for the Vietnamese people in both halves of the country make it undesirable for us to conduct warfare upon cities where the innocent will be hurt. However, those military targets in North Vietnam which are vital to their aggressive capability and which can be destroyed with our assistance are, in our view, legitimate targets for stage-by-stage destruction.

What is the risk involved in such action? In our judgment the possibility of Chinese involvement in South Vietnam would be only slightly increased. The possibility of Chinese help thrust upon North Vietnam would be greater. However, this probability may be precisely what is needed to make clear to even the most Communist leaders of North Vietnam how undesirable such help is to them in the long run. A heightened awareness of this danger might, in fact, force greater restraint upon the Government in Hanoi than our present policy can achieve.

Frankly, however, the direct military damage inflicted on the Communist regime in North Vietnam is the lesser of our reasons for suggesting that these steps be undertaken. In our opinion, it is urgent that the people of free Vietnam be assured that President Johnson means what he says—that we mean to stay and help, no matter what risks we must incur. It is equally urgent that these intentions be understood also in Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, the rest of Asia, and the world. Stanch, long-term American commitment—fully communicated and understood—would provide a lift to morale in free Vietnam, inject new vitality in the Vietnamese Government and require a new assessment of the United States among neighboring countries and among Asian allies elsewhere.

There is one final reason we support this painful course of action. Basic require-

ments for victory in Vietnam are not primarily military. They are psychological, social, and economic. Below we address ourselves to instruments which can meet the nonmilitary aspects of the undertaking. But neither the economic nor political measures we propose will get off the ground without evidence of the seriousness of our military intention. Nor will our military commitment produce the desired results without the companion economic and psychological supports.

America's experience in relation to the instability in postwar Europe is clearly relevant. The Marshall plan did not begin to come to life until the physical security promised by NATO was added. Nor would NATO by itself have been meaningful without the human vision and economic future presented by the Marshall plan.

5. Forging a more popular or responsive government. It is clear that the difficulties confronting any Vietnamese Government under Communist attack are enormous. We can but sympathize with those who carry the burdens of government in circumstances so frustrating and continuously demanding. It is possible that 20 years of civil war, colonial war, and Communist insurrectionary war, have so debilitated the structure of government as to preclude the immediate possibility, no matter how desirable, of absolutely stable government. There are political personalities with nationalist backgrounds who are deserving of our help and encouragement. We must do what we can to help them and bring them forward. At the same time, we must help to diminish the present conflict of personalities that has proved in past years to be so destructive. In any event, we believe it is futile to concentrate, as we have in the past, on personalities, rather than on purposes, ideas, and institutions.

6. Injection of new purpose. If charismatic leadership is unavailable, charismatic purpose can be found. One aspect of that purpose involves the modest extension of military effort discussed above. It involves the clear demonstration that the United States means to remain committed even at enlarged risk. And such charismatic purpose must, of necessity, accept as workable "the best available choices of Vietnamese Government personnel"—choices made by the Vietnamese not by us. But our object would be to harness our military commitment and the Vietnamese effort to an infinitely larger objective than has previously motivated our participation. It would make crystal clear that the objectives which unite us with the Vietnamese people, as with our other allies on southeast Asia, are constructive and inextricably linked to the welfare of all southeast Asian peoples.

We suggest that all of our military, political, and economic programs in Vietnam be subordinated to a massive southeast Asian development program. A Johnson plan for the full flowering of southeast Asian economic resources and independence will have as much potency and promise for success in that corner of the world as the Marshall plan did in Europe and the Tennessee Valley Authority in the United States.

The Mekong Basin is one of the world's richest and least developed areas. In an area of the world already food rich there is an opportunity to harness the tributaries of the Mekong Basin toward an economic flowering offering infinite promise to Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand as well as to South Vietnam, and offering to the people and the Government of North Vietnam economic opportunity which only their blindness or non-cooperation can frustrate. To Burma, Malaysia, and even India, this would present an opportunity in both economic and political terms which, especially at this moment, could not possibly be more desirable. To the Philippines such a program would provide the same magnetic opportunity for participation as led them generously to create and

man Operation Brotherhood a decade ago. It would also offer the first possibility of really involving the wealth and energy of the Japanese Government and people. A Johnson development plan for southeast Asia would manifest to the entire world that the welfare of the people of southeast Asia is our only purpose.

The Mekong Basin development program will provide for the first time a future-oriented thrust around which a Vietnamese resurgence program can be made vital and toward which the efforts of Americans, Japanese, Lao, Thai, Cambodians, and Filipinos can hopefully be attracted.

THE MISSING LINK

Within the last 3 years the Communist nations have revealed their inability to meet their own most pressing economic needs. The shortcut to the future has suddenly proved to be a dead end of economic failure, recrimination, and political embarrassment. But this has not frustrated the wars of national liberation nor prevented the Communists from mounting insurrectionary warfare whether in Congo or Vietnam. National governments and native peoples assaulted by such Communist purposes have, at best, sought to sustain their own energy through defensive effort. Virtually unused has been the enormous potential for hope which can be found only in the non-Communist, world, cooperatively employing the resources of the United States and nations friendly to it whether in Asia, the Pacific, or Western Europe.

We have offered to the Vietnamese people our assistance in their struggle for national independence. We have failed, however, to harness that struggle and our assistance to an all but miraculous future, a flowering of man, his capabilities, his resources, his aspirations. Ours indeed is the truly revolutionary opportunity. The Johnson plan offers to southeast Asia a genuine opportunity to harness nature, enlarge justice, extend life, eradicate the scourges of illness and illiteracy and enable long-suffering peoples to reap the fruits of their soil and the permanent benefits of national independence. Behind this large vision, men throughout the world may be led to voluntary association in Lincoln Brigades, Gandhi Brigades, Mag-saysay, and Marti Brigades—an international volunteer corps for peace and freedom.

The Johnson plan for the development of the Mekong Basin has, in our judgment, the following potential, essentially unavailable in the present circumstances:

1. It will inject dramatic, viable, and politically potent new purpose adequate to sustain popular support of Vietnamese Government leaders.
2. It will infuse new energy into the Vietnamese already risking their lives in daily defense against the Vietcong.
3. The plan offers concrete reasons for the cooperative involvement of neighboring southeast Asian countries as well as a generous commitment able to sustain emotionally an international corps of volunteers.
4. It contains an enormous incentive to North Vietnam to turn away from its present fratricidal course.
5. Finally, the Johnson plan constitutes a pioneering laboratory of hopeful consequence to other less developed areas where Communist insurrectionary warfare presently finds soil in which to sow the seeds of destruction.

VFW ENDORSES PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S NORTH VIETNAM ACTION

WASHINGTON, D.C., February 8, 1965.—The national commander in chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, Mr. John A. Jenkins, of Birmingham, Ala., today informed President Johnson of the "wholehearted and unreserved support of the VFW" for the President's decision to retaliate

against North Vietnamese military installations.

In his telegram to the President the VFW commander pointed out that such military action against North Vietnam was in full accord with the unanimously adopted resolution of the 1964 VFW national convention, supporting whatever action is necessary to win in South Vietnam. The text of Commander Jenkins' telegram to President Johnson follows:

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Veterans of Foreign Wars wholeheartedly and without reservation supports your decision in taking retaliatory armed action against the Communist aggressors in North Vietnam. Your wise and bold decision in this matter will go far toward assuring our allies throughout all Asia that the United States stands by its commitments and will not be intimidated by Communist threats and aggressive action. U.S. action against North Vietnam is entirely consistent with the unanimously passed resolution of our 1964 VFW national convention which called for all action necessary to win in South Vietnam. The VFW, consisting of 1,300,000 overseas combat veterans fully recognizes that communism has launched a deliberate attack against all southeast Asia and, consequently, the interest of U.S. security and the cause of freedom can be protected, in the final analysis, only by the judicious and willing use of military power.

JOHN A. JENKINS,
Commander in Chief, Veterans
of Foreign Wars of the United States.

1. THE CONTINUING RESISTANCE

[From the New York Times, July 31, 1964]

"PLEASANT VALLEY": A VIETNAMESE SUCCESS STORY—SAIGON'S FORCES WREST AREA FROM STRONG RED CONTROL—"SHOW CONFIDENCE IN PEOPLE," MAJOR SAYS OF HIS METHOD
(By Jack Raymond)

PHUOC CHAI, SOUTH VIETNAM, July 26.—In Vietnamese, Phuoc Chai means "pretty valley," and that is just what this collection of hamlets is. It represents a success story in South Vietnam's desperate struggle to defeat the Communist insurgency.

Phuoc Chai is about 45 miles west of Tamky, in the northern part of South Vietnam. For more than 2 years, until 6 months ago, this valley, with its population of about 6,000, was virtually controlled by the Vietcong.

The insurgents grew rice here to feed the guerrillas. They "taxed" farmers. They maintained rest stations and assembly points for fighters who blew up bridges and terrorized villages.

Two organized Vietcong battalions with a regimental headquarters operated without Government interference. Then a 34-year-old major, Hoang Tho, appeared with his outfit, the 6th Regiment of the 2d Division, Army of the Republic of Vietnam.

TRAINED IN GEORGIA

Major Tho has been an officer since 1951, when he fought for the French against the Communist Vietminh. He received training at the U.S. Army's military-government school at Fort Gordon, Ga., and at the Fort Denning, Ga., infantry training center.

Articulate, English-speaking and self-confident, Major Tho has evidently won the complete confidence of his troops and of American advisers here. He lives in Danang with his wife and five children.

He spoke matter-of-factly about having organized 10 defended hamlets after achieving military victories over the Vietcong.

Last February, the major recalled, he sent patrols into the valley. They located Viet-

cong units, ambushed some and drew others into stand-up battles of company and battalion size.

REDS FOUGHT HARD

The Vietcong fought hard for the valley; it was important as a source of food as well as a military center for the countrywide guerrilla campaign. Yet in a month the 6th Regiment drove the Vietcong into the jungle.

"It was only phase 1," Major Tho said. "Now came phase 2, the administrative and political phase."

Major Tho stood with a pointer before an operations map as he continued his story.

Before evacuating the valley, the Vietcong ordered the peasants to take 15 days' supplies into the jungle. They assured the peasants that the Government forces would not stay and that the Communists would soon resume control.

But the Government forces stayed. Major Tho and his men seized 40 tons of rice originally planted by the Vietcong. They distributed 20 tons and destroyed the rest because they could not handle it and did not want the Vietcong to try to recapture it.

THE PEASANTS EMERGE

Two weeks went by, and the peasants came out of the jungle to reclaim their homes and farms. "We let the people come back and keep their rice," Major Tho continued. "We said to them, 'You see, the Vietcong took your things, but we do not.'"

The major went on: "Many of the villagers came to us and denounced their neighbors as Vietcong. Some gave me a list of 40 men to be executed. But I realized that many were not hard-core Vietcong, only forced to do the bidding and pay allegiance to the Communists."

Major Tho weeded out those he thought were incorrigible Vietcong members and sent them to higher headquarters. Others, including some who had held positions under the Vietcong, he gave new assignments.

"I recommended no executions," Major Tho added. "I wanted to win the confidence of the people. I called the chief villager and asked him how he had organized the villages, and with a few changes I let the organization run the same old way for the time being."

"I wanted to show that we would protect the people against the Vietcong, and I provided special guards for those who took tasks as village administrators and hamlet chiefs. Every night I discussed village problems with the chiefs."

WEAPONS ARE REDISTRIBUTED

Then Major Tho collected weapons. He paid for all that were turned in. Most were rifles and carbines of varied origin. Some were American, captured from Government forces, and others were Russian and Chinese brought in from North Vietnam.

After collecting all the weapons, the major added, he redistributed them in the hamlets.

"I wanted to show confidence in the people," the major recalled. "I said, 'Here, take the weapons, and use them against the Vietcong if they bother you.'"

Major Tho retained one hamlet chief who had worked for the Vietcong, but he sent him to higher headquarters for questioning. The man died while traveling, and Major Tho ordered the body brought back for burial. He arranged a big funeral.

GESTURE WITH A MORAL

"I make propaganda, too," Major Tho explained with a smile. "I wanted to show that even those who had served with the Vietcong could be forgiven and could take a proper place in our community."

Now 10 Government hamlets flourish in a valley that was once a Vietcong stronghold. As Major Tho accompanied a visitor on a jeep ride to meet the people, they greeted him

with apparent pleasure and showed off a new school. Pupils on roughhewn benches in a big shack were writing the alphabet in notebooks.

There have been no incidents in the valley for more than 4 months, and the Vietcong have apparently been unable to reestablish links with villagers who were once more than ready to help them.

Yet all around the valley, the Vietcong are known to patrol in strength.

"They set up ambushes," the major said, "but they do not come within 2 or 3 miles of the valley. We have established good morale here."

[From the Baltimore Sun, Sept. 26, 1964]

VIETNAM HAMLET REPULSES REDS—PENTAGON RELEASES ACCOUNT OF RECENT CLASH

(By Mark S. Watson)

WASHINGTON, September 25.—Messages from the U.S. command in South Vietnam today permitted the Pentagon to supply in almost unprecedented detail an account of a well-conducted defense and counterattack recently, with the South Vietnam Government forces gaining a substantial success over Vietcong guerrillas.

It was at and near Luong Phu, a little hamlet of some 75 men, women, and children in the swampy delta of the Mekong River, southwest of Saigon. This is the region where the Communist Vietcong has long been generally in control, even before 1954 when the beaten and discouraged French withdrew from southeast Asia.

LOYAL TO GOVERNMENT

Luong Phu, largely because it remained loyal to the government has long been subjected to Communist harassment, the dispatch from Saigon mentioning 50 incidents thus far in 1964, including 15 genuine attacks, of which the latest was the most violent.

In the official account of this occasion there were several aspects so important as to attract attention.

1. The 40 men composing the hamlet's own defense, only lightly armed, held off the attack, with temporary loss of only an ammunition bunker.

2. A group of them had the spirit to counterattack and regain the bunker without loss of its contents, but with four of the loyal force killed.

RELIEF FORCES CALLED

3. A relief force, summoned by radio, came within artillery range and provided quick assistance to the defense.

4. The relief force commander, moving in by a U.S. landing craft (one of five in the Mekong Delta's rivers) was warned by one of his agents that a Vietcong force was in ambush near the riverbank, awaiting him, after the familiar guerrilla practice.

He opened fire on the hidden guerrillas and broke up the ambush with large casualties, his own craft taking only one serious shot from the guerrillas' 57-millimeter rifle. The relief of Luong Phu was completed, with 40 enemy dead around it and a larger number in the ambush party carried away by river boats.

It was this combination of stout resistance at the attack point, prompt radio report to the district command, quick advance of relief forces, and alertness to the danger of ambush, with which the Saigon authorities are obviously most pleased.

PATTERN OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

This is the pattern of their counterinsurgency training, but nobody pretends that it is easy to accomplish that operation with all its four phases perfectly executed. With any of the four missing, the whole operation has small chance of success.

The landing craft and patrol boats and motorized junks on the several rivers and canals are—save for the helicopters—the

prime means of rapid movement of reinforcing troops and weapons. They make possible a fairly rapid use of guns and heavy mortars.

The other artillery application is by mounts of single guns in an entrenched position (dotted over the countryside) permitting movement of the gun throughout 360° and prompt laying of fire on any target within range.

This method presupposes the existence of excellent maps and prime ability to use them effectively for fire or an unseen target. A most encouraging aspect of the war in South Vietnam is that the maps do exist and that there is interesting skill in their efficient use.

CONTINUING MYSTERY

There is one continuing mystery in Vietnam, namely the reason for the Vietcong guerrillas' strange failure to take wide advantage of the South Vietnam Government's semiparalysis as a result of the most recent coup. It would have seemed the ideal time for massive assaults.

A growing theory is that the guerrilla movement has been hurt more than is generally realized, and compelled to slow down for a time in order to regather strength for another strong assault at widely scattered points.

Such an assault is still thought likely, the surprise being that it was not timed to take advantage of governmental confusion.

[From the Evening Star, Nov. 9, 1964]

VIETNAM VILLAGERS FIGHT ON

(By Marguerite Higgins)

MEKONG DELTA, SOUTH VIETNAM.—From the distance the boom of artillery sounded a steady reminder that the frontlines of the war were at hand.

A few rice paddies away there was the authoritative crackle of small arms fire which was, as to be expected, harassing the helicopter that was whirring down on the dirt road next to the quaint and charming little village of thatched roofs that now gave haven to the broken bodies of two American sergeants killed by an electrically detonated landmine.

It was a road of bitter memories, this muddy, tortured dirt lane surrounded by emerald green rice paddies and a deceptively lyrical and limpid stream in which the big-eyed children played, not even looking up when the angry machinegun bursts got close and mere adults looked for cover.

In the summer of 1963 there had been a nasty fire fight on the road, in which several American reporters lost face but not much else when they made a run for it. In November 1963 this reporter revisited the road and its villages on the day that it claimed the lives of two United Nations agricultural workers. And now the death of the two sergeants.

FAMILIES FIGHT REDS

Yet, at the end of the road is a small village—Van Thien—whose 150 families have been overrun six times by the Vietcong and who still fight back. And one reason they fight back is because every day American advisers and Vietnamese soldiers, American aid teams and Vietnamese engineers defy the danger and travel back and forth with their guns and supplies and medicines to help Van Thien try to stay free.

And this is the real miracle of South Vietnam—this fact that somehow the war is still fought anywhere at all with devotion and sacrifice and hope despite the selfish joustings of the politicians in Saigon, the power plays of the military, the riots of the draft-dodging students and the political poisons spread by a handful of power-hungry Buddhist leaders whose intrigues are totally disapproved of the genuinely religious Buddhists here in the countryside.

Indeed, here in this section of the delta, I found the progress of the war far less de-

pressing than I had expected. Chaos, lack of direction, arbitrary arrests, and purges have taken their toll, of course. But in giddy, gaudy Saigon the spoiled intellectuals and politicians do not know the Vietcong firsthand and can indulge their political death wishes with a garish gay ignorance of what would happen to them if the Communists took over.

VIETCONG DEPREDAATIONS

But in Van Thien it is only a short moment in time since the Vietcong disemboweled the wife of the district chief and kidnapped 14 youngsters of the village. So long as there is the slightest hope of real and effective outside help against the Vietcong, the people will fight to keep them out of the Van Thiens of the delta.

Mytho is the headquarters for the 7th Vietnamese Division, which guards four key provinces in the delta. When I first visited Van Thien in the summer of 1963, it had just been liberated for the first time from a long period of Vietcong rule. And elsewhere in the delta, the fight against the Communists, while tough and hard, was beginning to show results. That summer perhaps 64 percent of the population in these key four provinces were under central Vietnamese control.

Then came the coup d'etat of November 1963, the murder of Diem and Nhu, the disintegration of the entire fabric of Vietnamese governmental structure, all of which was taken as a signal by the Vietcong to really go on the warpath. As a consequence, when this reporter revisited the 7th Division provinces in late November 1963, it had been impossible to even go near many areas that had been clean and clear of Vietcong the previous summer. By early 1964, the Vietnamese controlled less than 25 percent of these four provinces.

NEED TO START OVER

"And so," said the American colonel in Mytho, "we had to start over. By April, we got a new and less ambitious pacification program. Somehow despite the tumult in the cities the supplies kept coming. Everytime a new coup d'etat was rumored everything ground to a halt, of course.

"Slowly and painfully we have gone back into village after village. It has been heartwarming to see places where we began with deserted marketplaces and burned schoolhouses soon make a comeback and become bustling again. I think we can win this war against the Vietcong. I am an optimist.

"You have to see for yourself how deeply the Vietnamese people fear and hate the Vietcong if they think they can oppose them and not have their throats cut. My team is working its heart out. But all this is dependent, of course, on some sort of stable strong governmental direction."

And it is precisely because so many fine people in the countryside are working their hearts out—and giving their lives—that a visit to the front lines renews a sense of fury at the intrigues in the city—intrigues that may mean that all this devotion and dedication here at the front will add up to nothing.

The war will not be won in Saigon. But Saigon can prevent it from being won.

[From the Washington Evening Star, Dec. 9, 1964]

COURAGE AT VIETNAM OUTPOST

(By Marguerite Higgins)

PLEI ME, VIETNAM.—The morning had begun with a mine disaster. Literally. It was a "Jumping Betty" mine—one of those that jumps out of the dirt and explodes in the air. And so it had cruelly mangled the bodies of 16 of the work detail that Capt. Ronnie Mendoza, of Los Angeles, had sent to repair about three and a half miles of the red dirt jungle road the Vietcong had

severed by digging great, gaping ditches across it.

Many of the wounded were only 11 to 14 years of age, children or relatives of the Vietnamese and Montagnard (non-Mongol mountain people) soldiers who, along with Captain Mendoza's 12-man team, use this isolated outpost near the Lao border for patrols and ambushes and other counter-guerrilla operations against the Vietcong.

COPTER ARRIVES

Soon the helicopter arrived at Plei Me to lift out the wounded. The two pilots—Capt. John Mustard, of Monteseand, Wash., and Capt. Charlie E. Bryant, of Ocilla, Ga.—spoke feelingly of the courage with which the big-eyed Vietnamese and Montagnard children tried to suppress their cries of pain.

This is high, spectacular country where the jungle covered mountains rise, steeply, 7,000 feet high and where air currents in the intervening valleys can be tricky. The helicopter bumped and dipped as it fought the turbulent currents.

From the air, Plei Me is an eyesore with its barbed wire outer fences, its trenches, its mortar emplacements and sandbags, its brick and tin barracks building. It seems an improbable and unexpected scar in the green jungle.

In this part of Vietnam the jungle trails are prowled not just by the Communist Vietcong but by mighty tigers that European hunters once traveled far to shoot.

And despite the morning tragedy, Mendoza had not been able to keep his mind off those jungle trails because 100 men of his special forces, including 2 American sergeants, were out there on a week long patrol, 3 days of which had passed. Their mission was to try and spot possible infiltration routes and the supply dumps that the Communists always prepare in advance at points a day's march apart.

Since his men had last checked in by radio, a lot of sniper fire had been heard in the next valley and Mendoza, a cool and controlled sort, nonetheless was eagerly awaiting the next radio report which would come at 4 p.m.

The itinerary of the patrol had been worked out by Mendoza in consultation with his Vietnamese counterpart, Capt. Nguyen Van Thoi who was known all over the valley as one of the few Vietnamese who could command the loyalty of the Montagnards.

I asked him if the morning mine casualties might have any effect on the morale of the soldiers.

"There has never been a desertion from this camp and there will not be," the Vietnamese captain said with pride.

"Were his men happy with the new regime in Saigon?" I asked.

"Madam," said the Vietnamese captain, "I am an officer and not even I know the name of the leader in Saigon. My men do not fight for Saigon. They fight for their village. They fight because the Vietcong takes their rice and steals their children and kills their kinfolk. They fight because the Americans give them rice and the American doctor treats their wife and children. And that is how it is."

Finally, it was 4 o'clock and the air was electric with good news. "Nobody hurt," said Mendoza after his curt quick radio exchange with the patrol.

When night came and it was time for mere reporters to leave, Mendoza saw us off and yelling against the noise of the chopper blades said something that sounded like, "We can take care of things up here if they can just keep those rioters quiet in Saigon."

It was the same high morale everywhere at the front. And it made you so mad at the so-called student and Buddhist rioters who cause chaos back in the soft-living city.

2. NORTH VIETNAMESE INTERVENTION

[From the Washington Star, Feb. 20, 1965]

EIGHTY TONS OF VIETCONG ARMS UNCOVERED, BIG SHIP SUNK

(By Peter Arnett)

TUY HOA, VIETNAM.—By far the biggest haul of Communist weapons for the Vietcong was uncovered yesterday, near a remote cove where a large mystery vessel was sighted and sunk earlier in the week. Officials estimated 80 tons of armaments—much of it Russian and Chinese—had fallen into government hands.

The weapons, ammunition, and medical supplies, including whole blood, apparently had been shipped along the coast from Communist North Vietnam to equip Red guerrillas fighting in the South, United States and South Vietnamese officials said.

"We thought the supply routes were through Laos and Cambodia, but look at this lot," said Col. Theodore Matakis, of Seattle, Wash., a senior adviser. "They could easily be arming a new division to launch against us up here."

CAMOUFLAGED SHIP SUNK

The materiel was found in the hull of the sunken vessel and in caches on the beaches of a cove on Vung Ro Bay here, 240 miles northeast of Saigon and about 50 miles south of Nha Trang, site of a major U.S. military installation.

A routine helicopter patrol uncovered the cache Tuesday. Flying over the bay, the helicopter crew sighted what looked like a drifting island. Then, heavy fire came up from the island. It turned out to be a well-camouflaged ship, about 400-feet long. South Vietnamese fighter-bombers were called in and sank the vessel.

Lt. Gen. Nguyen Khanh personally ordered troops into the area. After heavy fighting, they took over the cove and beach area Friday, when some of the armaments were found.

A captured Communist guerrilla said the ship had made six trips to bays along Vietnam's central coast, dropping off supplies.

Then yesterday the South Vietnamese uncovered more caches. One area, said an official, was "literally covered with weapons, six deep."

The haul included 1,000 Russian-made carbines, several hundred Russian sub-machineguns and light machineguns, and Chinese burp guns. All had been wrapped in waterproof cloth.

Scores of tons of ammunition were found for these weapons, some of it made as recently as last year in Chinese factories, according to ordnance experts at the scene.

There was also a selection of sophisticated mines and grenades, and ammunition for a new type of rocket launcher used against tanks.

The large supplies of captured medicines included many cases of penicillin, anti-malarial drugs, and whole blood produced in Japan late last year.

ONE BIG SUPPLY FACTORY

Four caches had been found up to late yesterday. Troops probing through the hills under the guns of Communist snipers expected to find more.

"These hills are just one big supply factory," said Matakis.

The extent of the Communist supply depots shocked U.S. advisers.

"This is just massive," one said.

The Vietcong put up a determined fight to keep government troops from the caches. But they had to pull back. Several government soldiers have been killed in isolated mortar and sniping attacks.

Government forces intend to stay in the region as long as it is necessary to clear it of supplies.

The commander of the 23d Division, Gen. Luu Lan, said, "What we have found here is of tremendous importance. The Communist aggressors have been able to confuse people, so that the truth has been hard to discover.

"But here we have discovered one link of the massive chain of weapons introduction into South Vietnam. This is one of the reasons why we and our American allies have had to take the actions we have taken," the General said.

This was a reference to retaliatory air strikes in North Vietnam.

Members of the International Control Commission, the organization created to police the Geneva accords on Indochina, were shown the arms haul by Khanh.

The commission is made up of Indian, Canadian and Polish delegates. Included in the Communist medical supplies were drugs from Poland.

COMMUNIST BUILDUP

U.S. sources said the apparent buildup of Communist arms along the coast may coincide with reports that increased numbers of guerrillas have been infiltrating from North Vietnam in the past 3 days.

The Vietcong have made determined attempts in recent months to take over the central Vietnamese region. They have met with considerable success so far.

Some Americans expressed belief the Communists will use ships more frequently to supply the Vietcong.

U.S. jet planes have been attacking the Communist supply routes through Communist-held territory in Laos.

[From the Baltimore Sun, Feb. 11, 1965]

CONCEPT OF "INTERNAL REVOLT" IN SOUTH VIETNAM PUNCTURED

(By Mark S. Watson)

WASHINGTON, February 10.—From the torrent of events in southeast Asia since the weekend one politically useful fact emerges. That is the well-publicized radio order from Communist Vietcong headquarters in the north to all Vietcong agents south of the border to redouble their activities immediately.

The promptness with which the order was obeyed at widely separated points shows how well organized are the Vietcong's controls. But more important in its long-range political effects may be this plain proof of a fact that hitherto the Communist leaders have denied; namely, that the whole internal revolt in South Vietnam is, and always has been, skillfully engineered from Red headquarters far to the north.

WORLD OPINION DISCUSSED

The victim of assassination is not greatly concerned with who kills him. But world public opinion, which communism has tried for years to delude with this "internal revolt" fiction, now is in better position to know that even while the Communist powers were agreeing to the Geneva neutralization pact the Communist machine in North Vietnam was already beginning its subversion and assassination program in the south.

In this program of deception a large influence was the International Control Commission, set up to assure that the pledges of neutrality were kept. By 1961, reports of 1,200 offensive "incidents" by Communist agents, ranging from one-man assassinations to fairly large scale military actions, had been laid before the commission. None was acted on.

The reason given by an American White Paper was that the Polish Communist member of the commission refused to investigate any charge that might embarrass the Communist Vietcong, and the Indian member refused to start an inquiry that would em-

barrass his Polish colleague. Opposed by two, the one remaining member, the Canadian, was powerless.

LEADERS KNOWN

For some reason, possibly the difficulty in remembering the oriental names, the Vietcong leaders have, with two exceptions, remained largely unknown to the American public.

There is no mystery about the others, for captured or defecting Vietcong agents and officers have divulged almost all details of the Red machine for which they worked. Full information about that complex and surprisingly efficient mechanism and its operators at all levels now can be reported without endangering security.

Of the two familiar names one is that of Ho Chi Minh, head of the North Vietnam political government and of its Lao Dong (Workers) Party, and tirelessly active in its all-important Central Research (Intelligence and Operations) Agency and other working elements. The other fairly familiar name is that of Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, Defense Minister, one of the world's great guerrilla leaders.

The Lao Dong Party follows the pattern of Russia's Communist Party, and its Secretary General, Ho Chi Minh, that of Russia's usual one-man-in-two-jobs, premier of the nation and secretary general of the party. The military is subordinate to Ho, the political chief, and all the way down the line and into the kindred Lao Dong of South Vietnam at all levels the political leaders uniformly command the military. That is one way of assuring unity.

FRONT CREATED IN 1960

To provide a cloak of respectability and conceal in some measure the responsibility of the Hanoi organizers with murder and insurrection against Saigon, Ho Chi Minh in 1960 created the "Front for Liberation of South Vietnam."

It is still guided wholly by Ho Chi Minh's Central Committee, immediately directing work in the "South Central" zone (just south of the 17th parallel border) and in the "Nambo" region (south and southwest, including Saigon and the Mekong Delta).

For the Central Committee, supervision is exercised in Hanoi by a "Committee for Supervision of the South," made up of Le Duc Tho, of the Politburo, Phon Hung, Vice Premier of North Vietnam, and Brig. Gen. Nguyen Van Vinh, chairman of the board for reunification. Each of the two zones has its own secretary general, a deputy and a dozen members; each its agencies for training, propaganda and action.

To this political leadership the military, as remarked, is subordinate. Its principals are Ga Vinh, who is indeed a member of that Committee of the South but pointedly a "junior member"; Brig. Gen. Nguyen Don, in charge of military work in the South-Central zone but directly responsible to Tran Luong, of the Lao Dong in Hanoi, and Brig. Gen. Van Muoi, similarly responsible to Muoi Cua, a politician.

The Central Research Agency, a prime "action" unit for subversion, forgery, arming, radio command, intelligence and military command, is actively directed by Ho Chi Minh and Giap. Its prime center for disorder in South Vietnam was at Vinh Linh, the target of Sunday's fierce bombing attack. Other centers handle Cambodian and overseas intelligence, with Gen. Hoang Dao, Col. Le Can and Col. Van Trong as principal agents.

This is regarded as the agency chiefly responsible for conveying Ho Chi Minh's directives straight to the guerrilla pockets in South Vietnam, and seeing that the supply of men and weapons continues pouring over the many branches of the so-called Ho Chi Minh trail into South Vietnam.

[From the Washington Post, Jan. 27, 1965]

AGGRESSION ADMITTED

(By Joseph Alsop)

At last, the administration's policymakers are somewhat reluctantly admitting the importance of the North Vietnamese troop movements into South Vietnam and Laos. Being clandestine, these Communist troop movements were long and obstinately pooch-pooched. Now, however, they are an officially acknowledged fact. While the fact is admitted, its meaning is still being played down. Even the resulting solid proof of North Vietnamese aggression has not been greatly stressed. As for the military implications, they have been hardly mentioned; yet they are potentially very great indeed.

In Laos, to begin with, the whole balance of the war has been upset. It is a tiny war. The non-Communist Laotians, although they have fought very well against Laotian Communist sympathizers, have always fared ill in their rare engagements with North Vietnamese units. Hence the appearance in Laos of several additional North Vietnamese battalions changes the whole local outlook.

Because Laos is both a subsidiary war theater and a corridor to South Vietnam, it is not quite certain how the additional battalions are to be used. Some think they are intended for use in Laos, since they have moved into the heart of Laos to the west of the corridor-region of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. If this is correct, the brilliant Communist commander, Gen. Vi Nguyen Giap, must be planning a semifinal test of strength in Laos.

Because of the generally misty character of every Laotian situation, a prompt American riposte to such a test of strength will be extra difficult. And a major Communist thrust in Laos will have the gravest repercussions in South Vietnam, unless the American riposte is both prompt and massive.

It is equally possible, however, that these new battalions spotted in Laos are eventually destined to be moved into South Vietnam. For a good many months, organized battalions of the North Vietnamese Army have been filtering into the South Vietnamese fighting—moving by truck down the Ho Chi Minh Trail to the Chepone region, crossing the border in small bands, and then reforming and marching to their assigned areas of operations.

There have long been plenty of signs to prove that the North Vietnamese had reached the stage of sending organized battalions into the fighting, instead of mere cadres to lead their guerrillas. As noted, for instance, in this reporter's recent dispatches from Saigon, young North Vietnamese army conscripts are now quite often found among prisoners of war.

The invasion of South Vietnam by two, three, or even four new Communist battalions per month may not sound like much by the standards of modern war. But this war in Vietnam is not very modern. An entire province may be defended by no more than five government battalions.

If the Communists already have seven battalions, as they do in Quang Nai Province, for instance, the addition of two more battalions may cause the Dien Bien Phu-like disaster that is General Giap's obvious aim in this phase. That is the real meaning of the persistent Communist troop movement into South Vietnam.

For this very reason, Gen. Maxwell Taylor has repeatedly recommended stronger, more direct action against the North Vietnamese. He wanted something much more effective than the brief retaliatory raid after the incident in the Gulf of Tonkin. He wanted retaliation after the attack on the U.S. airfield at Bien Hoa. He again asked for retaliation after a U.S. officers barracks in Saigon was destroyed by a Communist-planted bomb.

The recommendations of General Taylor were disapproved by President Johnson in all three instances. As a less dangerous sort of retaliation, the President instead authorized bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, first by the Laotian air force, and then by the U.S. fighter-bombers that recently destroyed a key bridge at Ban Ban.

The degree of power this deployed against the infiltrators may be gaged from the fact that one-half the Laotian air force has just been put out of action by a single accidental bomb explosion in an airplane hangar. In any case, mere air attacks on the Ho Chi Minh Trail are wildly unlikely to produce any solid result, even if made with 10 times the power.

The truth is, the war in southeast Asia is steadily going from bad to worse. The enemy is getting bolder, and he is steadily reinforcing his frontline troops. The reinforcement is not being countered. Hence there is no hope of any counteroffensive, unless President Johnson has important surprises up his sleeve.

Perhaps the President has such surprises in preparation, for he is a man of surprises. But as of now, we are drifting toward final defeat.

[From the Washington Post, Jan. 23, 1965]

RED ASIAN BUILDUP CONFIRMED

(By Murrey Marder)

U.S. officials confirmed yesterday that there has been increased infiltration of Communist North Vietnamese troops into Laos and South Vietnam. But they called it a cause for continuing concern, not sudden alarm.

The Communist buildup of forces in both places during 1964 and continuing into recent weeks is significant in relative terms, but not a dramatic or grave turn, officials said.

In both on-the-record and background comments, administration officials sought to demonstrate an attitude of skeptical calmness about recently published reports that the conflicts on the Indochina peninsula may be approaching a stage of more massive, open warfare.

Few hard facts or figures were disclosed in the process. Officials said more details should be available early next week after consultations with the U.S. mission in Saigon, capital of South Vietnam.

It became increasingly evident yesterday that both in South Vietnam and in Washington there are conflicting interpretations about the facts and the significance of the increased Communist infiltration.

Those officials most eager to strike more directly at Communist bases in North Vietnam appear to interpret the infiltration reports as evidence to justify that. This group believes the Communists are increasingly preparing to shift from guerrilla tactics to direct offensives.

But the less-alarmist school of thought rates such a shift in Communist strategy as unlikely.

Significantly, it is the latter, less-alarmist group that holds the controlling viewpoint inside the Johnson administration.

The administration has endeavored to convince congressional critics of U.S. policy in southeast Asia that this calmer attitude is justified, and that American policy, heavily committed physically and psychologically in Laos and South Vietnam, should continue in its present framework.

To buttress that position, administration officials said that while there has been increased Communist infiltration, North Vietnam has by no means committed all its power to either the Laotian or South Vietnamese conflicts.

Perhaps more importantly, these officials assert, the Chinese Communists, who give the North Vietnamese moral and physical

support, continue to demonstrate considerable caution about any direct involvement with the United States.

State Department Press Officer Robert J. McCloskey said yesterday that there have been indications in recent weeks of North Vietnamese military movements into southern and central Laos.

McCloskey said he could not state either the size or objective of the infiltration. He said, in answer to questions, that the troop movements might or might not be a seasonal increase coinciding with the ending of the rainy season, a shifting of forces, or a movement designed primarily to send reinforcements to South Vietnam.

Many officials here believe that the troops are being funneled through the so-called Ho Chi Minh network of trails in Laos, for use in South Vietnam.

McCloskey described the situation as "a cause for concern but not for alarm." He said, "We're following the situation closely."

Other authoritative sources said it appears that the thousands of South Vietnamese who were being trained in North Vietnam for use in the south are about used up, and that the Communist northerners are now sending down native-born men from the Red territory.

But while there have been published reports that between 15,000 and 20,000 men have been filtered into South Vietnam from the north during 1964, official sources here yesterday would speak only of "several thousand" men. In addition, it was said, these numbers have been offset by an increasing callup of South Vietnamese forces to fight them.

In Laos, officials said that since last May, when U.S. T-28 "reconnaissance" and "escort" planes were sent in to help the royal Government withstand the Communist Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese, the neutralist central regimes position has improved considerably.

What has helped improve it is what officials will not admit publicly—the air pounding of Communist positions by American jet fighters during recent months.

[From the New York Times, June 26, 1964]
HANOI IMPROVES SUPPLY LINE TO SOUTH VIETNAM—MORE TROOPS CROSS LAOS BY HO CHI MINH TRAIL—ANALYSTS FEAR LARGE FORCE MAY OPEN NEW FRONT

(By Hedrick Smith)

WASHINGTON, June 25.—Recent U.S. reconnaissance missions have confirmed earlier reports that Communist forces have been improving their road network in southern Laos and have considerably stepped up the pace of their supply convoys there.

Officials here report that the Communists now have stretched their road network south from Tchepone, previously the terminal point for truck traffic on the supply network known as the Ho Chi Minh trail. Other links of the network are reported to have been improved.

The Ho Chi Minh trail, a complex of dirt roads tapering off into scores of jungle trails, has long been one of the principal supply routes from North Vietnam to Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam.

Officials declined to give precise figures on the number of trucks recently seen operating in the Tchepone region, but intelligence estimates indicate that roughly 3,000 North Vietnamese troops are on more or less permanent duty in southeastern Laos near the South Vietnamese border.

FEAR OF NEW MOVES RISES

This concentration and the increases in supply convoys during the recent dry season are reported to have raised fears among U.S. officials including Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, about North Vietnamese intentions.

Officials have been worried for fear the Communists might try to infiltrate large forces across the Laotian border into the central Vietnamese highlands while South Vietnamese Government forces were largely concentrating on fighting guerrillas south of Saigon.

Other officials suspect that the activity in southern Laos may be a prelude to future offensives against Saravane and Attopeu, two rightwing strongholds in southern Laos. Hostile forces nearly surround both towns now.

Since neither town is in the Mekong Valley, some analysts here are concerned lest the Pathet Lao assume they can be attacked without fear of American intervention. The United States has often warned that its mantle of protection extends over the Mekong Valley bordering Thailand.

The stepped-up operations in southern Laos, officials said, began last fall and have increased in tempo this spring since pro-Communist Pathet Lao units gained control of the Nakay Plateau in January.

These officials consider the southern operations to be unrelated to recent offensives by Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops around the Plaine des Jarres in north-central Laos.

That fighting, which pushed the United States toward the brink of a major conflict, has now almost halted.

Although the ground fighting was confined to the region north of Paksane, Laotian Air Force T-28 fighter-bombers, supplied by the United States, have carried out strikes this month against some Pathet Lao positions in southern Laos as well.

Officials here have also dropped hints that some plans held in readiness would call for the South Vietnamese Air Force to raid Communist supply routes in Laos and possibly in North Vietnam.

So far such raids are considered a fairly distant possibility. Premier Nguyen Khanh has told U.S. officials he is opposed to carrying the war beyond his borders until he has developed a more stable base at home.

The principal roads from North Vietnam into southern Laos are Route 8, from the city of Vinh through the Nape Pass, and Route 12 through the My Gia Pass, a bit farther south.

Since last fall, intelligence reports indicated that the Communists were building up Route 12-A to connect Route 12 at Nhommarath with the town of Muong Phine about 80 miles to the south on Route 9.

From there, truck loads of troops and shipments of ammunition, weapons, fuel, medical supplies, and other equipment were reported moving east toward Tchepone on Route 9 and also down Route 23 toward Saravane, 80 miles to the southwest, to Pathet Lao guerrillas operating in that area.

3. MORE VIETNAM

[From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star, Feb. 19, 1965]

DETENTE HOPE DECEIVES UNITED STATES, LATIN SAYS

(By Marguerite Higgins)

SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO.—It is commonplace in Central America to hear experienced diplomats express the hope that Washington is getting over its hypnotism with the idea of a Russian-American detente and its misinterpretation of the Sino-Soviet split.

What hypnotism? What misinterpretation?

Said an experienced Venezuelan diplomat: "No country in Latin America would be happier to welcome a rapprochement between Washington and Moscow—if it were genuine. But we fear it is not genuine so far as Latin America is concerned. Indeed we believe that hope of a detente has been used by Moscow to pull the wool over Washington's eyes while the Communists down

here profit from America's nonseeing attitude to intensify guerrilla activities, violence, and terrorism—or at least try to.

"As to the Sino-Soviet split, we think that far from restraining the Soviet Union, it has merely spurred Moscow on to greater assistance to so-called wars of liberation in Latin America—assistance designed to prove that Moscow is not soft on the West as Peiping says."

CITES ATTACKS

"Washington was apparently surprised," the diplomat went on, "to hear of the Kosygin visit to North Vietnam. We were not surprised at all. For in Cuba, Russians, Chinese, and North Vietnamese have been cooperating in the training and planning for guerrilla attacks in Latin America."

According to Cuban broadcasts and to the Cuban press, a delegation from the Vietnamese liberation front, more commonly known as the Vietcong, came in 1964 to Havana where it signed a mutual aid pact with the Venezuelan guerrilla forces.

The Venezuelan guerrillas, who halted their attacks briefly in 1963, are once more in the mountains, burning and killing and blowing up things.

The fact that the overwhelming majority of Venezuelan peasants hate the guerrillas does not deter their terrorist leaders any more than the fact that the Vietnamese peasants hate the Vietcong deters Hanoi.

Intelligence reports indicate that this weird consortium planning and plotting liberation wars from Cuba includes four countries—Communist China, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and North Vietnam.

Here in Puerto Rico it is very unpopular for strangers to speak of Communist doings or even intentions. This is understandable perhaps in light of the tourist trade and continuing attempts to lure American business investment.

MINORITIES EXPLOITED

And, of course, this is perfectly correct. There is no Communist threat to Puerto Rico in the sense that the Communist consortium in Cuba and local extremists have made any real inroads in this country. Indeed, no responsible official or writer has ever alleged that the Communists are about to take over in Puerto Rico.

But whether Castro and his cohorts are exploiting certain minority elements in Puerto Rico and seeking to prepare the ground for mischiefmaking in Puerto Rico is another matter.

In relatively prosperous Puerto Rico there is plenty of evidence that the ideological divisions of the Communist camp have not prevented their cooperation in seeking to propagandize persons who hopefully may one day serve their purposes.

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 6, 1965]

CHINA PICKS THAILAND AS NEXT TARGET—PLEDGES SUPPORT TO REBEL MOVEMENT

TOKYO, February 5.—Communist China announced today that a "patriotic front" had been formed in Thailand to overthrow the pro-Western government and eradicate American influence there.

It was the first time that Peiping had openly named Thailand as the next target of a Communist campaign in southeast Asia.

Thailand is the staunchest U.S. ally on the Asian mainland. Bangkok, the capital, is the headquarters of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)—the American-led defense alliance in the Orient.

(In Washington, U.S. officials expressed concern but said that Peiping's announcement of support for the front had been anticipated.

"It strikes me as the logical step in Peiping's policy of supporting subversion wherever possible in southeast Asia," one official said.)

[From Bangkok, Reuters reported that Thailand had tightened its anti-Communist security as refugees from the fighting in Laos continued to enter the country across the Mekong River. Police sources said 56 Communist suspects had been arrested in northeastern Thailand in the past few days. Latest figures place the number of Laotian refugees at 15,000.]

Communist China's designs on Thailand were made clear in a broadcast of the New China news agency heard here today, although the "patriotic front" was first announced January 1 in a clandestine Thai-language broadcast.

Today's broadcast urged "all patriotic people to unite as one and launch a resolute struggle to drive out U.S. imperialism and realize the independence, democracy, peace, neutrality, and prosperity of Thailand."

The broadcast outlined a program aimed at "overthrowing the Fascist dictatorial government"; withdrawing from SEATO and "driving all imperialist troops * * * out of Thailand"; economic reforms with emphasis on restricting foreign capital "whose aim is to seize profits from Thailand * * *" and "suppressing and meting out severe punishment to traitors and bureaucrats who oppress the people."

The "reforms" followed the same revolutionary textbook that the Communists have used in Vietnam and tried to use in Malaya and the Philippines.

[From the Washington Post, Jan. 16, 1965]

COMMUNISTS PLAN VENEZUELAN TERROR (By Norman Gall)

CARACAS.—The Venezuelan Communist movement, after 13 months of relative quiet since the December 1963 elections, is planning a "counteroffensive" aimed at conquest of power through another cycle of terrorism and heightened guerrilla warfare.

According to recently obtained internal Venezuelan Communist Party documents, the current "defensive situation" of the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) scheduled to last "at least 6 months" will give way to coordinated violence in urban and rural areas and in infiltrated military installations.

Venezuela's Communists received a severe setback when their call for boycott of the presidential election was ignored despite threats of violence. The small party never received widespread support, even before the government restricted it in an effort to end terrorist acts.

The "defensive situation" described in a memorandum of the party's politburo circulated in recent months among FALN guerrilla units consists of accelerated programs of training guerrillas abroad, a campaign for amnesty for jailed insurrectionists, offers of a truce to the government, quiet gestation of more guerrilla operations and deepening infiltration of the regular armed forces.

According to this memorandum, the "general counteroffensive plan" consists of:

"Simultaneous insurgency in military installations with occupation of strategic objectives with sufficient flexibility to establish a long struggle. In these military insurgencies previous arrangements should be made for distribution of arms to our cadres and to the civilian population under our control."

Action of urban guerrillas, "including those formed with personnel and equipment coming from abroad, against industrial installations permitting a notable economic paralysis."

"Specialized action to disrupt roads and installations for centers of consumption which could supply troops for combat against our units."

"Provocations at military bases and in cities to occupy troops which otherwise could act against our insurgents, and guerrilla

activity to occupy enemy forces (in the mountains)."

Some longtime students of Communist operations here question FALN's present capacity to execute such large-scale operations, though current military estimates place rural guerrilla strength at 2,000 men, including those already trained and pursuing normal occupations while waiting orders, and 3,000 urban combatants.

According to these observers, 1964 was a year of quiet recuperation of Communist strength in Venezuela, despite reversals suffered in the universities and failure to organize a united front of leftist groups inclined to support anti-Government insurgency.

The Communists' achievements of 1964 consisted mainly in extending the number of guerrilla bands in gestation or in open operation and their success in creating a climate favorable for amnesty for jailed insurrectionists.

President Raul Leoni is being steadily pressured by the two parties which have joined Accion Democratica (the Government party) to form a coalition government into giving favorable consideration to the amnesty appeals.

Another internal Communist document, a report on party organization in eastern Venezuela, laments the decline in party activity in many localities after the election.

But the same report notes considerable strength in the iron and steel producing region of Bolivar state.

In the past the Communists have concentrated their labor effort in penetrating unions in the mining and petroleum industries.

The dominant Communist strategy in Venezuela, over the objection of a dissident minority opposing continued violence, is based upon the concept of "long war" as developed in China, Cuba, Algeria and Vietnam.

A training program advocated in the party strategy memorandum advocated "a prolonged period of specialization for the group that returns to Venezuela by irregular means."

[From the New York Times, Dec. 20, 1964]

GUATEMALA REBELS STEP UP FIGHT AGAINST REGIME

(By Paul P. Kennedy)

GUATEMALA, December 18.—Revolutionary forces fighting as guerrilla units in the Caribbean area of Guatemala are taking advantage of the political indecisiveness here to step up their activities against the military government of Col. Enrique Peralta Azurdia.

The well-equipped, well-trained groups in the mountain and jungle areas in the Department of Izabal are estimated at 150 to 300. They are said to have more than 1,000 adherents in the urban areas, particularly here in the capital.

They regularly produce the newspaper *Revolucionario Socialista* and also distribute pamphlets throughout the Republic. Persons caught distributing the publication face a heavy fine and prison sentence.

The guerrilla forces get ransoms from the families of kidnap victims and more money by holding up travelers on the Puerto Barrios Highway. But it appears evident now that the movement is receiving funds from outside sources as well.

SHIPMENT OF FUNDS

There has been considerable speculation over the reported shipment last month of \$100,000 in quetzals from a bank here to a New York bank.

The Guatemala bank assumed the costs of commission, insurance and the shipping at the going rate of 1 percent for the total transaction. There was no indication here of the identification of the consignee in New York. The Guatemala Government, while it enforces dollar control, does not ask for

details of quetzals-for-dollars transactions. The quetzal is on a par with the dollar.

The theory prevalent here is that the underground movement is being supplied by adherents traveling from Mexico. This theory, vaguely defined, holds that in transactions such as the quetzal-dollar exchange the messengers for the guerrilla forces smuggle in the funds from Mexico. The question of finances arises from the certainty that the expenses of the underground movement are mounting and that there is no way to account for its funds except from outside sources.

Marco Antonio Yong Sosa, called "El Chino" because one of his parents was Chinese, admitted in an interview with the leftist Mexican magazine writer Victor Rico Galan that a number of the incursions of the guerrilla forces he leads have brought in about \$100,000. The principal contribution was \$75,000 paid as ransom for Jorge Samayoa, the kidnapped son of a Guatemalan movie chain operator.

REVENUE FROM RAIDS

Additional revenue has come from raids on provincial United Fruit Co. treasuries and small banks.

Mr. Yong Sosa, in the interview published in the leftist Mexican magazine *Siempre* on October 30, 1963, conceded that his forces had assassinated several public figures and a large number of army officers ranging up to colonel in rank. Most of the assassinations, he said, were for political reasons.

The guerrilla forces, even their supporters in the capital concede, are primarily of nuisance value. But they have an unsettling political effect not only in the mountains but also in the urban centers. In the cities, particularly in the capital, they plant small bombs and occasionally kidnap or shoot persons considered to be enemies of the movement. Earlier this week they exploded about a dozen bombs here. These explosions followed a police search that found caches of mortars, machineguns, small arms, and ammunition.

There is some question whether Mr. Yong Sosa, who was trained as a guerrilla fighter by the United States in the Canal Zone, was himself a Communist. He has told at least one Guatemalan politician that he is accepting assistance from Communist sources in Mexico and Cuba.

This politician is Francisco Villagran Kramer, a young lawyer who is head of the leftist Revolutionary Democratic Union Party. At one time Mr. Villagran Kramer and his party contemplated a union with the Yong Sosa organization, the lawyer said. Representatives of the two organizations, according to Mr. Villagran Kramer, held a series of conferences, but these were broken off when the Villagran Kramer party decided to go to the polls on its own last May. This decision, Mr. Villagran Kramer said was made over the heated objections of the Yong Sosa group, which maintained that a revolutionary overthrow of the Peralta government was Guatemala's only political solution.

4. THE ECONOMY, NORTH AND SOUTH

[From the New York Times, Mar. 16, 1964]

VIETNAM SPEEDS GAIN IN INDUSTRY

(By Philip Shabecoff)

Amid the carnage of civil war, industrial birth is continuing in Vietnam.

At Bienhoa, 20 miles outside of Saigon, a new papermill will officially begin production today. The opening will culminate 26 months of construction work, frequently interrupted by skirmishes between Vietnamese troops and the Vietminh.

At Anhoa, 530 miles north of Saigon, work on a giant Government industrial complex is moving steadily ahead, despite frequent incursions by guerrillas.

The first phase of the project, including a coal mine, a hydroelectric plant, a nitrogen fertilizer plant, and a calcium-carbide plant, is about 75 percent completed and should be finished by early next year.

INTERNATIONAL TEAMWORK

The Cong Ty Ky Nghe Gray Vietnam pulp and paper mill was completely built by the Parson & Whittemore-Lyddon organization, with a team of workers and technicians that included Vietnamese, Americans, Canadians, Taiwan Chinese, Frenchmen, Germans, Indians, and Swiss.

The plant was built under difficult conditions. An American executive who visited the site said that workers were frequently the target of snipers—particularly occidental workers.

The mill, which will produce newsprint and writing paper, is owned by the Vietnamese Government. Foreign exchange for the purchase of machinery was provided by the Agency for International Development, and Parsons & Whittemore has subscribed for 19 percent of the share capital.

The Anhoa site, less than 100 miles south of the 17th parallel, partitioning Vietnam, was selected for the industrial complex because of the coal deposits at nearby Nongson.

The industrial project in the populous province of Quangnam, was aided by a \$1.7 million grant from the Development Agency, \$400,000 of which was used to purchase a fleet of 14 pieces of construction equipment from Allis-Chalmers International.

The Nongson coal mine is already in operation and last year produced some 200,000 tons of anthracite.

A SECOND PHASE

The second phase of the giant project, which is also owned by the Vietnamese Government, is scheduled for completion by 1968. This phase will include a caustic-soda plant, a glass factory, a cement plant, a dry-ice plant and several other producing facilities.

A third phase, which will depend on whether more coal can be found in the Nongson bed, will include development of nearby magnetite, hematite, gold, copper, lead, and other metal deposits and a factory for ore concentration.

The French and West German Governments have also made grants to assist the Anhoa-Nongson complex.

The project area is accessible by a railroad, two highways, and the Thubon River. Because of heavy guerrilla activity, however, military helicopter is often the only safe way of reaching the development.

One American technician, who recently returned from working on the complex, said that the first thing he was issued when he arrived was an M-1 rifle.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 19, 1964]

VIETNAM

(By Robert R. Brunn)

WASHINGTON.—Communist North Vietnam's woes are giving sizable encouragement to the South Vietnamese regime and the United States.

Some kind of a respite is being offered hard-pressed American officials dealing with the guerrilla war. They argued that now is the time to place aggressive pressure on the Communist forces.

Self-admitted weaknesses of the Hanoi government of North Vietnam, some rather surprising assumptions by the Communists, and U.S. intelligence assessments add up in this way:

Hanoi grimly assumes that the anguish-provoking war will continue, without any question through 1964 and beyond. This is despite Washington's acknowledgement that the next 4 months are "crucial."

Hanoi is combating the widening unpopularity of the war in the south which is draining off resources from a seriously depressed economy. Apathy often characterizes the civilian attitude.

MOSCOW REJECTION

Last year's North Vietnamese harvest was at least 20 percent below 1962's middling harvest. Some starvation is visible but there is no general disaster in sight.

Moscow has flatly turned down a direct Hanoi plea for aid to support the war. The North Vietnamese reason that they can't afford to turn their backs politically on Peiping, and that Peiping's gasping economy can give them little help in terms of food or weapons.

Morale among the Communist Vietcong troops in the guerrilla war is a continuing problem for the North Vietnamese Government. Analysis has seen absolutely no evidence that the division between pro-Peiping and pro-Moscow camps seriously hampers the war effort, as such. The major Hanoi decision to side openly with Peiping was bound to leave a disappointed minority but there have been no demotions, no dissident voices raised.

Hanoi has a healthy, decisive respect for U.S. military power and sees the superior weapons, equipment, and manpower of the South Vietnamese are still a major obstacle to victory. The Communists fear an escalation of the war, bringing an open U.S. invasion of North Vietnam, and this has tended up to now to keep the Communist military effort within a limited framework.

While the Vietcong at times has its guerrillas at battalion strength, they are in no position to coordinate such units in massive movements against the South Vietnamese. One factor is the lack of well-anchored supply bases for such operations.

Neutralization of North Vietnam is considered to be utterly out of the question in the minds of the Hanoi regime.

Much of the above analysis comes out of a careful American study of the most important statement made by the Hanoi government in several years.

PROTRACTED TRIALS

It was spelled out in two articles in the January and February issues in Hanoi's principal journal, Hoc Tan, and a third article in the newspaper Nhan Dan.

This official line laid down by the articles in Hoc Tan is designed to seep down through the ranks of the faithful and be imported to South Vietnam and discussed by the fighting guerrillas, observers here believe.

When the articles speak of new, hard, long, protracted trials in the war and use the word "protracted" over and over again, the signal is that the Hanoi Communists are not thinking in terms of a rapid termination of the war or the imminent defeat of the South Vietnamese army.

On the contrary, the Communists expect a mounting military initiative in South Vietnam and complain that often they will have to meet modern weapons with rusty nails and crossbows.

ECONOMIC DRAIN

Analysts emphasize there is no widespread disaffection in North Vietnam. The farm situation is grim but not beyond hope.

But there is little doubt there is a solid body of opinion in the north that the never ending war is the primary cause for the weakness of their economy.

The war in South Vietnam is seen here as basically an indigenous one, gaining in its support from within Vietnam. It is a dirty war and one which has its grim aspects for the Communists who have had no spectacular victories. These magazine articles were designed to buck up the morale of the fighting men.

5. COMMENTS AND EDITORIAL OPINION

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 23, 1965]

NEGOTIATIONS

It would be a mistake to allow the world to believe that the people of the United States have fallen into an irreconcilable division on the question of whether we should or should not negotiate a settlement in South Vietnam. There are differences of opinion, but they do not relate to the idea of negotiation; they concern the kind of negotiation. Sentiment surely is overwhelmingly in favor of negotiations that would end the fighting, set up enforceable peace terms, preserve the rights of our friends in South Vietnam and leave intact the honor and prestige of the United States. Just as certainly, sentiment is against negotiations that would not do this. The choice is not "negotiations" or "no negotiations." The question is: "What kind of negotiations?"

In 1954, the French were driven into negotiations of a kind we must avoid. Mendez France was in desperation. He had promised to get France out of Indochina. To do it he had to abandon many of the people of North Vietnam to Communist vengeance. He had to get the Soviet Union to intervene with Ho Chi Minh and by allowing the EDC treaty to fall in the French chamber he encouraged that collaboration. But French power was being drained away in Indochina. The nation was literally bleeding to death. History can forgive a weak power at the end of its resources for upsetting its allies in Europe, for deserting its comrades in arms in Indochina and for closing its eyes to the consequences in Asia. France had no other choice.

The United States, however, is not a small European power at the end of its military, economic, and political resources. It is a great global power whose might is undiminished. It will be judged by different standards. It cannot permit savage reprisals to be worked upon anti-Communist South Vietnamese. It cannot allow them to die by battalions in order to save the lives and property of Americans. It cannot offer the Soviet Union or any other intervenor political concessions at the expense of European allies. It cannot be indifferent to the extension of Chinese Communist power in Asia.

Many feared at the time that the 1954 negotiations would not end the fighting. And indeed they permitted it to continue on terms advantageous to communism. They did not provide a settlement that enforced itself or one that permitted anyone else to enforce it.

Can negotiations in 1965 do any better? If the North Vietnamese and their Chinese sponsors understand the difference between a powerful United States and an exhausted France they might. But they must be made to understand that difference. If they are convinced that this country has the power and the will to pursue its legitimate ends as long as it may be necessary to do so, negotiations might be feasible and arrangements of an acceptable peace possible. Until the posture of the United States is understood by those with whom negotiations must be conducted, this country must look to the practical military means of better protecting its position in South Vietnam.

It is perfectly clear that we need greatly to increase the effectiveness of our conduct of the war inside the borders of South Vietnam. Several immediate steps are self-evident to military authority: (1) The routes by which North Vietnam is maintaining replacements and supplies for 35,000 infiltrators must be more nearly sealed off by the use of more troops on the border and by a tighter naval blockade; (2) the ratio of South Vietnam to Vietcong forces must be raised from 5-to-1 to at least the 8-to-1 level by which the Brit-

ish gained success against Communists in Malaya; (3) points from which troops are embarked and material shipped in North Vietnam must not enjoy immunity from reprisal attack; (4) the command structure of the South Vietnam forces must be stabilized; (5) the South Vietnam civilian government must be strengthened.

There is no time limit in which we must achieve these objectives. The scale of expenditures is not prohibitive. We can keep up operations on an even greater scale, year after year and decade after decade, if that is vital to our interests.

At the same time, it must be acknowledged that nothing is possible without a primary effort by the South Vietnam people themselves. The war against the Vietcong is their war. And it is a war which only South Vietnam forces can win. The struggle for the loyalty of the people is the struggle of Vietnamese leaders. It is conceivable that the South Vietnamese may fail completely on these fronts. If that happens, regretfully and sorrowfully, it will be necessary for us to be governed by what we can do and not by what we would like to do or what we ought to do.

At the same time that we proceed to the more effective prosecution of the war and the more efficient organization of the civilian Government in South Vietnam, we should continuously make known the very limited nature of our objectives. Unlike the French in 1954, we have no colonial ambitions. We wish to see an independent South Vietnam, safe from external aggression, free to choose in peace the kind of government its people wish (even if it is a Communist government in the end), open to normal trade and intercourse with North Vietnam and other Asian neighbors with whom it surely must be closely associated in the future. Such a South Vietnam would not menace any Asian neighbor or threaten any legitimate interest of North Vietnam.

More than mere oral assurances are needed to assure the future of such a country. There are, however, many sorts of satisfactory performance bonds that could be given by a North Vietnam Government desiring peace on these terms.

Surely there is not much mystery about the conditions to settle the war in South Vietnam. When there is a fair prospect for arriving at these conditions, there will be little difference among Americans as to the wisdom or desirability of negotiating.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star, Feb. 15, 1965]

WASHINGTON CLOSE-UP—VIETNAM: THE DOMINO THEORY

(By Crosby S. Noyes)

With the way things are going in Vietnam it is only natural that a certain amount of thought should be given these days to the domino theory.

It was President Eisenhower who first used the metaphor to explain and justify our presence in Vietnam. If our position there should topple, he thought, a whole series of non-Communist states in southeast Asia would almost automatically fall under Communist rule.

The domino theory is a good deal less popular in administration circles today than it once was. As the political situation in Vietnam deteriorates and the possibility of Communist victory grows, serious consideration is being given to the ways and means of limiting the extent of a possible defeat there.

Since administration leaders tend to question the validity of the domino theory, they also tend to deny rather emphatically any total withdrawal of American military power

from southeast Asia in the event of a withdrawal from Vietnam. The argument sometimes made by Vietnam bitter-enders, that it would mean a retreat back to Hawaii and an end to our presence in Asia, is rejected.

It can be argued on the contrary that there is no country in the world harder to defend against Communist subversion than South Vietnam. The almost impossible task of trying to create a country where none exists in the midst of a revolution that had been in progress for a decade before the Americans arrived would not confront us elsewhere.

Thailand, for example, would provide infinitely more favorable ground for resistance to the Chinese Communist thrust. There, at least, there is a sense of national identity and a tradition of government authority. And while the history of the country is not exactly one of heroic defense of freedom, the Thai, with encouragement, have shown themselves quite determined in opposing Communist pressures.

These pressures, perhaps, could be expected to increase if the position in Vietnam were lost. But the problems of waging a subversive war against a country as relatively well organized as Thailand are enormously different than in Vietnam. There is no reason to suppose that Mao Tse-tung's guerrillas would find the waters of Thailand's population very congenial.

Open military pressure through Laos would involve substantial risks for the Chinese. As a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, Thailand could call on—and presumably receive—aid from Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Britain, and the United States.

Under the terms of this treaty, in fact, the power of the United States is already committed in Thailand, to the extent that it might be needed to resist either Communist subversion or outright attack. And though there is little reason to believe that our commitment would reach anything like the proportions in Vietnam, there is no reason whatever to suppose that it would be withdrawn.

There are those in Washington today who deplore this state of affairs. The advocates of worldwide American "disengagement" are inclined to the theory that American power and prestige should never have been committed in Vietnam in the first place. And from here they argue that its commitment in any of the so-called soft areas of southeast Asia—which, presumably, means all of it—should be avoided at all cost.

There are also those who contend that any substantial transfer of American power to Thailand would simply serve to invite increased Communist pressures there. The converse of the domino theory is that the only way to contain the spread of militant communism in the area is by strict noninvolvement and the encouragement of neutralist states on the periphery of China.

The trouble with both theories is that they are belied by the evidence. The evidence is that strong Communist pressure already is being brought to bear on neutral states in southeast Asia. It may be that these pressures can be resisted by reasonably well integrated nations with a reasonable amount of political stability and military backing. It is not to minimize the seriousness of a defeat in Vietnam to say that it would not necessarily mean defeat everywhere.

It is time to face up to the fact that we are engaged in a continuing process of containing or at least limiting the thrust of Communist China which threatens all of southeast Asia. To pretend that this thrust does not exist, or that it does not represent a threat to vital American interests, or that it can be limited by diplomacy, could well turn defeat into disaster.

[From the National Observer, Dec. 28, 1964]

AT A CROSSROADS IN ASIA?—VIETNAM: FADING FRIENDSHIP AND NEW FOCUS ON DOMINO THEORY

The speaker was no leftist demagog, though his attack on U.S. policy was full of words like interference and colonialism. The speaker was, instead, an American ally in a war against communism, South Vietnam's Lt. Gen. Nguyen Khanh. And his words raised serious questions about the very basis of American policy in southeast Asia.

It is better, said General Khanh, "to live poor but proud as free citizens of an independent country rather than in ease and shame as slaves of the foreigners and Communists." South Vietnam, he added, should be prepared to go it alone against the Communist Vietcong and spurn further U.S. help.

Washington was stunned by last week's attack from the wily ex-Premier, once regarded as South Vietnam's best hope of achieving victory over Red guerrillas. And the question, once again, was being asked in the Nation's Capital, "What would happen if the United States pulled out?"

CURTALMENT OF AID?

To be sure, no high administration official went so far as to urge outright withdrawal. But Secretary of State Dean Rusk, expressing the Government's opposition to last week's Saigon house-cleaning by young army officers, hinted at a curtailment of proposed U.S. aid. "Obviously," he said, "if there are problems of unity, there are certain kinds of assistance that are simply not feasible." And Senate Majority Leader MIKE MANSFIELD revived his proposal to transfer the question of Vietnam's future from the battlefield to the conference table. "I don't think neutrality is a bad word," he said.

Indeed, the voices urging a sharp reappraisal of America's Asian policy received an additional boost on Christmas Eve. A terrorist bomb exploded in the garage of the main U.S. officers' billet in Saigon, killing 2 Americans and injuring 110 persons. The bomb apparently was smuggled into the heavily guarded building in a U.S. jeep, another indication of increasing Vietcong boldness despite the intense U.S. effort in South Vietnam.

Why doesn't the United States pull out of Vietnam? The answer can be summed up in three words: The domino theory.

Through the years, American officials have argued that if South Vietnam were to fall to the Communists, the other nations of southeast Asia would likewise topple—like a row of stacked dominoes.

WHAT THE REDS WOULD GOBBLE

Landlocked Laos, already two-thirds in Communist hands, would be swiftly gobbled up by the Reds. Thailand, which caved in to Japanese invaders after only 5 hours of fighting in December 1941, would sue for some accommodation with Red China in hope of preserving a semblance of its long-cherished independence from foreign rule. Burma, whose government already has cut most of its ties with the West, would become little more than a Chinese province. Cambodia, recently professing friendship with China, would succumb quickly to Communist domination.

The domino theory extends even further. Pessimistic proponents of the theory fear that if the United States is forced out of South Vietnam, either by a Communist conquest or by the Saigon government, all of Asia might be opened to Chinese Communist penetration, either through subversion or outright invasion. At least, they argue, strongly pro-Western nations such as Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Formosa could no longer trust the United States to fulfill any promises to protect them. India, Pakistan, and South Korea, too, might have second

thoughts about alining themselves too closely with the United States.

A clear-cut Communist victory in South Vietnam, the domino theorists maintain, would have worldwide repercussions. The Communists in Peiping would win the argument with the Communists in Moscow over how to spread their ideology. Communists would expand their Chinese-style subversive activities in Africa and South America, confident that the United States would refuse to become involved in another expensive guerrilla war.

LEAVE THE WEAPONS BEHIND?

The domino theory is based, of course, on the presumption that without U.S. aid South Vietnam would collapse before the Communists. But if the United States did withdraw, most probably American weapons and equipment now stored in that country would be left behind. The South Vietnamese armed forces would certainly not succumb to the Communist guerrillas overnight.

But psychologically, South Vietnam would be weakened. The South Vietnamese military situation, after all, has steadily deteriorated despite American aid of more than \$1,500,000 a day and the presence of 22,000 American advisers. Without American support, the best guess is that the South Vietnamese would quickly seek a political, rather than a military, solution to the Red threat.

The Communists probably would be willing to negotiate a cease-fire, figuring it would be less expensive to them to subvert the Government from within.

BATTLE WITH NO FRONTLINES

The United States, even if it pulled out of South Vietnam, still would remain the strongest military power in Asia. The 7th Fleet now protects Formosa from Communist Chinese invasion and could quickly hustle troops to any Asian country threatened by Communist military forces. But, the domino theorists say, the 7th Fleet has failed to prevent Red subversion in Laos and South Vietnam. Although the United States is the world's mightiest military power, they say, nuclear bombs, tanks, and aircraft carriers are of little use against a guerrilla force fighting a battle with no front lines.

At a press conference last week, Secretary of State Dean Rusk ducked a question about whether the United States still subscribed to the domino theory.

He did say, however, that if South Vietnam were lost to the Communists, "they would simply move the problem to the next country and the next and the next. And, as I say, this is not dominoes. This is the kind of Marxism that comes out of Peiping."

Mr. Rusk asserted that South Vietnam's "primary requirement" in the fight against the Communists is national unity. "Unity," he said, "would be worth many, many divisions." But there was no unity in South Vietnam last week.

The latest upheaval began in the same way as most of the previous coups and attempted coups—with the rumbling of trucks filled with soldiers in the streets of Saigon. The purge was carried out speedily. Soldiers, under command of a clique of 9 junior officers, arrested most of the members of the 15-man High National Council, the country's provisional legislature, and several dozen other political figures.

The officers acted, they said, because the council was dominated by "counter-revolutionary elements that were acting against the spirit of national unity." The arrested council members, the officers said, had been "conspiring" against the armed forces in hope of furthering "their own personal ambitions."

OFFICER FACTIONS FEUD

But more than the personal ambitions and rivalries of the officers seemed to be involved. The nine officers all hold key positions in the

military, although in seniority they rank below many officers without field responsibility. The two officer factions have been feuding for months. On December 18 the junior officers formed an organization called the Armed Forces Council, with no representation from the senior officers. The council then drew up an order calling for mandatory retirement of all officers with at least 25 years' service. This would retire about 40 officers, including Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh, former Premier who is popular with South Vietnam's Buddhists.

The High National Council refused to approve the order. So the junior officers abolished the legislative group. The purge leaders, Air Commodore Nguyen Cao Ky, commander of the air force, and Brig. Gen. Nguyen Chanh Thi, commander of the 1st Army Corps, defended the military's right to "act as mediator" of disputes within the Government.

The officers said their move was aimed at eliminating political interference in the conduct of the antiguerrilla war. But, although they disbanded the legislative arm of the Government, they pledged continued support to Premier Tran Van Huong and his Cabinet. The Premier has been under attack by militant Buddhist organizations almost since he took office October 30. The purge leaders indicated they believed their move would pave the way for reconciling the Buddhists and the Huong government.

MOTIVES CALLED SINCERE

The U.S. Embassy in Saigon quickly opposed the purge. Conceding that the officers' motives in attempting to stabilize the Government were sincere, Embassy officials said the purge would only further disrupt the Government. U.S. Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor held hurried consultations with the junior officers, General Khanh, and Premier Huong. The officers refused to back down.

General Khanh's position in the maneuvering was unclear, but there were plenty of rumors. One said he had been at odds with the junior officers in recent weeks because of his refusal to pledge his support to Mr. Huong, his successor as Premier. The junior officers were said to have threatened December 6 to jail General Khanh unless he publicly announced support of the Premier. It was rumored, too, that General Khanh was quietly conferring with Buddhist leaders, presumably in hope of capitalizing on any Buddhist-provoked overthrow of the Huong government.

In a radio address after a meeting with Ambassador Taylor, General Khanh accepted full responsibility for the purge. Then he swung into his attack against the United States. "We make sacrifices for the country's independence and the Vietnamese people's liberty, but not to carry out the policy of any foreign country," he said. He defined the role of the military as "acting as an intermediary to settle all disputes and differences if they create a situation favorable to the common enemies: communism and colonialism in any form."

CRITICAL OF AMBASSADOR TAYLOR

In private interviews with American reporters, General Khanh was sharply critical of Ambassador Taylor. If he "does not act more intelligently, the United States will lose southeast Asia and we will lose our freedom," said General Khanh. He charged the U.S. Envoy had acted "beyond imagination as far as an ambassador is concerned."

In Washington, the Johnson administration replied with a message of support for its man in Saigon. "Ambassador Taylor," said the State Department, "has been acting throughout with the full support of the U.S. Government."

Secretary Rusk, at his news conference the next day, took a more conciliatory tone toward the junior officers and General Khanh. The remarks by General Khanh,

he said, "might have been made in the heat of the moment." But Mr. Rusk suggested that U.S. aid might be curtailed if the difficulties in Saigon continued.

The latest flare-up came just as plans were shaping up for South Vietnamese air strikes against Communist Vietcong supply bases and infiltration staging areas in Laos near the South Vietnamese border. Gen. Phoumi Nosavan, Deputy Premier of Laos, visited Saigon last week, presumably to put the finishing touches on plans to strike at the Communist bases.

THE FLAMES OF WAR

These preparations were enough to alarm the Red Chinese, who threatened to plunge Indochina into war if the United States bombs supply lines through Laos. "The flames of war will spread to the whole of Indochina if U.S. imperialism succeeds in its criminal scheme," warned the Peiping People's Daily.

Whether the United States would go along with these plans in view of the present turbulence in Saigon was uncertain. For one thing, it was no longer clear who actually held power in the country. U.S. officials were unsure whether General Khanh had again assumed the role of strong man or whether he was only acting as the mouthpiece of the junior officers. Nor was Premier Huong's position clear. Despite strong gestures of support from Washington, the Premier remained in the background, tacitly, at least, giving his approval to the purge. The Buddhists, too, stayed quiet, awaiting the military's next move. The United States alone was standing fast publicly against the purge. And the United States suddenly seemed to have very few friends in South Vietnam.

RICHARD EGAN.

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Dec. 25, 1964]

MATTER OF FACT: HOW NOT TO DO IT

(By Joseph Alsop)

HONG KONG.—The political trouble in Saigon began at almost the moment when this reporter was starting home for Christmas. But even on the road home, with no opportunity to study detailed developments, it is easy to see that we are being given another demonstration of how not to do it.

The Vietnamese generals have no doubt contributed their share to this demonstration, but so have the Americans. To be sure, the fault on the American side does not lie with Gen. Maxwell Taylor. The fault lies with the instructions that General Taylor was given, and even more with the ludicrously unrealistic ideas and prejudices in which those instructions partly originated.

It has been the same old story from the period when large numbers of U.S. officials, military officers and one must add, newspapermen, were doing everything in their power to undercut the beleaguered Chinese Nationalist Government, down to the present melancholy moment. Almost always, the same two tendencies have recurrently marked—and too often fatally marred—American dealings with situations like that in Vietnam.

In such situations, first of all, a good many Americans mysteriously tend to be hypercritical of precisely those allied leaders whose aims and purposes most closely coincide with American interests. It is never enough, for Americans of this stripe, that our interests are being served.

Whether in China, or Korea, or today in Vietnam, they must always be designing ideal governments; their ideal governments generally exclude the local leaders whose aims coincide with American interests. This was emphatically the case in Vietnam in the years of Ngo Dinh Diem, and in a considerable measure, it is today.

The rights and wrongs of the young generals' renewed intervention in Vietnamese politics cannot be judged from this distance. But from any distance, it is perfectly clear that these are the men most deeply committed to resisting the Communist attack on South Vietnam. It is also clear that with the possible exception of Prime Minister Tran Van Huong, they are the most effective personalities on the scene.

The motives for their renewed intervention may well have been a great deal more justifiable than one might suppose from a brief perusal of the pompous pronouncements of the State Department spokesman. Just before they acted, for example, there were strong indications that Phan Khac Suu, the nice, bewildered old gentleman who is the official chief of state, was about to make a dangerously muddled compromise with the political Buddhists.

Moreover, you need only ask any American in Saigon, whether political or military, what protection we have against a neutralist government finally coming to power because of the general deterioration in South Vietnam. The answer always is, "The army leaders will not permit it." In these very possible circumstances, in short, we are actually circling on the army leaders' intervention.

Because of American tendency No. 1, however, the army leaders are now the targets of the State Department's righteous indignation. As for tendency No. 2, it is symbolized by Phan Khac Suu, the chief of state above mentioned. He has clean hands and sore feet. And he wonderfully illustrates the usual results of ideal government designing.

It was a fairly hair raising experience to go straight from an audience with this amiable old man, with his white foot bandages and obvious feebleness, to a long meeting with one of the ideal government designers.

"Now," this American kept saying, "we've got a government we can really work with—a government with real promise of stability." And he went on to talk with pious enthusiasm about the high national council's promising first attempts to prepare a national election in South Vietnam.

In reality, it would be flattering to call the high national council a basket of eels. As for the notion of holding a general election in Vietnam at this juncture or at any time in the near future, this alone would almost excuse the dissolution of the high national council by the young generals.

Working for sane civilian leadership by men like Prime Minister Huong is one thing. Trying to stage a kind of comedy or parody of normal, duly elected democratic government in Saigon at this stage of the war, is quite another thing. The purpose of the parody is clear, of course. It looks nice in the papers back home, and thus consoles the large element in the U.S. Government that always worries about appearances.

The time has come to say, however, "To the devil with appearances. What matters is averting a shattering defeat."

[From the Philadelphia Inquirer, June 17, 1964]

ON THE SPOT: VIETNAM ERRORS OFFER VITAL LESSON

(By Marguerite Higgins)

NEW YORK.—One way for the United States to better its present chances (perhaps 50-50) of winning the war in Vietnam is to face coldly and honestly the consequences of its past mistakes.

Putting aside matters of America's image, world opinion, and the like, the greatest, and possibly disastrous, blunder of the last year was the decision to signal the overthrow of the Diem regime in midbattle. Quite apart from the resulting chaos and disorganization that permitted the Vietcong to take over 7 million (out of 14 million) Vietnamese in 2 months, the demoralizing ef-

fect of the first and second coup d'etats on Vietnam's fledgling officer corps has changed the very nature of the war.

The demoralization is such that many Vietnamese officers have become de facto hors de combat even though they are nominally still at their posts. The morale of many key officers has been crippled because they do not know whom to trust. In the wake of the successive purgings of the "ins" by the "outs" during the two revolts, who can blame these officers if they are fearful of taking responsibility and executing orders. After all, their general or other superior officer may be "in" today "out" tomorrow. If they do their duty today they may be punished tomorrow.

And the United States is not without blame for this uncertain atmosphere. If the American Embassy in Saigon had spoken out half as forcefully against the reign of terror perpetrated recently (mainly against Catholics) in Vietnam as it did during the so-called Buddhist crisis, there might be a saner atmosphere. The phony trial of the Catholic Mayor Dang Sy, the war hero (seven decorations) who was condemned for having carried out orders of his Buddhist superiors in Hue last May, is but one example of this reign of terror. And if Catholics carry signs saying "Henry Cabot Lodge Go Home" it is because they think the United States has stayed strangely silent in the face of what almost everybody on the scene in Saigon considers a mockery of justice—only one among many.

In any case, the morale of many Vietnamese officers in crucial areas is shot.

Further, this country is going to have to stop trying to fight this war with its left hand. It is not serious warfare, to give but one example, to send over military advisers for 1 year only. The advisers are the first to say it. Said Maj. Olen O'Connor, of Arizona: "It takes about 6 to 8 months to get to know your Vietnamese opposite number and work smoothly with him. And just as things are really beginning to mesh, it is time to go home."

Further, the Communists, who convinced themselves early in 1964 that the United States was about to bow out of Asia, must be put on notice that this country will do whatever is necessary to prevent a Communist victory. This means, if necessary, the commitment of American troops, sabotage and other dirty tricks in North Vietnam, etc. The Communists know that the United States has the power to win in southeast Asia. And if Peking and Hanoi are convinced that the United States is prepared—at last—to use it, the invocation of this power may not be necessary.

6. THE BUDDHIST MILITANTS

[From the Washington Star, Jan. 23, 1965]
ISN'T IT TIME TO FACE TRUTH?

(By Marguerite Higgins)

The spectacle in Saigon of brown-robed monks egging on delinquents, both juvenile and adult, to smash the windows of our libraries leads to one insistent question:

Isn't it time the United States told the American people the truth concerning the way in which a handful of Buddhist politicians in Vietnam have used a religious cover to camouflage a campaign of chaos that for the last 18 months has served only Communist ends?

Is it embarrassing to admit that the United States made a mistake in giving asylum at its Saigon embassy no less than twice (3 months in 1963, 1 day in 1964) to the intellectual powerhouse of the rock-throwing clique, the Buddhist Monk Thich Tri Quang?

Is it difficult to acknowledge that perhaps we should have checked a little further into Quang's past, his two arrests by the French for serving with the Communists, his statements that Marxism and Buddhism were alike, his furtive meetings with leaders of the Vietcong National Liberation front?

Will faces turn red if we admit further that for many months Quang bamboozled many well-meaning Americans into believing his absurd claim that his particular clique of Buddhists represented "85 to 90 percent" of the Vietnamese people when in point of fact Buddhists in Vietnam may just possibly constitute 30 percent of the people (see "Buddhism in Vietnam" by Dr. Mai Tho Truyen, chairman of the Vietnamese Association of Buddhist Laymen) and further, Quang's faction is bitterly opposed by truly religious Buddhists such as those at Saigon's Xa Loi Pagoda, which is not on speaking terms with the Buddhist center run by the Communist-tinged extremists?

Embarrassing as all this may be, embarrassment has become, and resoundingly, the lesser of the evils. The moment of truth is at hand.

The truth is vital because otherwise American opinion is going to fall, just like that, into the trap so cleverly and deviously prepared by Quang—the trap of believing that the so-called and in fact nonexistent "Buddhist majority" of the Vietnamese people have turned against the United States.

The truth is, and it needs to be repeated loud and clear, that the man behind the persons cradling the rocks that smash our library is Quang as well as others who have been been intriguing with the Vietcong Communists for a very long time, as the American intelligence record—to its credit—shows even though the policymakers have chosen to disregard the evidence.

But if and when the majority of the American people begin to believe that utterly false, but so carefully prepared, piece of Communist-abetted propaganda to the effect that the illusory Buddhist majority wants us to go home, then the clamor for Americans to give up and get out of Vietnam could become irreversible.

All right, so the United States made a mistake back in the summer of 1963. We can now see, in retrospect, that the Vietnamese army, the Vietnamese security police, and Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem were completely right when they tried to tell us from the very beginning of the Buddhist crisis that in Vietnam the Communists do not, after all, play cricket, but play dirty. They play real dirty and indulge in precisely such tricks as infiltrating the Buddhist movement, and not only that, infiltrating also, to some degree, the Catholics, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, mountain tribesmen, the ancestor worshippers, and the many other non-Buddhist sects and religions of Vietnam.

More recently, Premier Tran Van Huong was perfectly correct in warning that ace-government toppler Quang talked like a Communist, acted like a Communist, and served Communist ends.

The United States' mistakes are painful, but not shameful. Contrary to the Communists, we have not been plotting for 25 years to seize Vietnam and have not meticulously studied every village, every province, every religion, every superstition, with the aim of subverting them to our ends. If it is any comfort, our inexperience is born of virtue—the virtue of a Johnny-come-lately desperately seeking to save a drowning man without time to find out much about him, let alone bone up on his family tree.

And the essential, and most salutary point of admitting past mistakes is that this is the only way to stop repeating them.

[From the Washington Evening Star, Jan. 8, 1965]

CONTROLLING THE BUDDHISTS

If the militant Buddhist leaders in Saigon are recognized as subversive conspirators instead of the spiritual characters they pretend to be, the problem of containing their power and rendering them relatively harmless should not be insoluble.

The methods of doing this are hardly up to Americans to decide. The best they can do is to encourage Premier Tran Van Huong to face up to the situation and take corrective action. The worst they can do is to keep insisting that Huong find some ground for compromise with men who are actively seeking to overthrow his government.

The problem of dealing with widespread and well-organized subversive conspiracies, after all, is not exactly new. Even the fact that this conspiracy may command wide public support does not make it all powerful. The French, for example, faced something of the same situation with the Communists in the late 1940's, complete with infiltration of the army, police and government, nationwide strikes and impressive street riots. It was not necessary to annihilate the Communists to contain the threat to the security of the state.

What gives the Buddhist conspiracy its uniquely dangerous twist is the pseudo-religious cover of its leadership. The majority of Buddhists in Vietnam are quite certainly neither proneutralist nor pro-Communist. Yet the militant leaders in Saigon naturally seek to identify themselves with, and presume to speak for, every Buddhist in the world.

Certainly they will raise the cry of religious persecution at the first hint of trouble. Given the experience of the unfortunate President Ngo Dinh Diem, it is a highly effective form of defense. And every effort must be made to avoid lending credence to the charge.

It seems improbable, therefore, that an attempt to crush the conspiracy by force will be called for. But short of this, there are plenty of things that the Saigon government could do.

It could, for instance, put considerably more backbone in suppressing the kind of senseless juvenile hooliganism that fills the daily news columns from Saigon.

It could screen out of the army and police force those elements which might be likely to side against the Government in any real showdown with the Buddhist leadership.

It could strengthen the hand of more conservative (and more religious) Buddhist leaders who, at present, are themselves the targets of strong-arm tactics by their militant coreligionists.

It could, in short, face up to the problem instead of shrinking from it. What is essential in Vietnam is that the power to overthrow governments—any government which they do not control—be taken away from this handful of monks. If this is not done, and soon, there will be no prospect whatever of any stable government in South Vietnam.

[From the Washington Evening Star, Jan. 8, 1965]

BUDDHISTS BRAG OF SUBVERSION (By Marguerite Higgins)

On the bulletin board of the newest pagoda in Saigon there recently has appeared a communique in which the Communist-oriented wing of militant Vietnamese Buddhism claims to have subverted at least four regiments of the Vietnamese National Army.

The sinister Thich Tri Quang, Vietnam's ace toppler of governments, boasts that 2,000 officers of the Vietnamese army would lay down their arms and refuse to fight the Communists if he ordered them to do so. How valid are these boasts?

It is a crucial question—and an appalling one. For if the Vietnamese regular army has been subverted to this extent today, what will happen tomorrow?

First, it should be pointed out that there appears to be a widespread misconception in this country about the southeast Asian Buddhist movement. According to the respected work "Buddhism in Vietnam," written by Dr. Mai Tho Truyen, the greatest Vietnamese authority on Buddhism, the

movement in Vietnam has expanded to at least 4 million persons (or about 30 percent of the population of 14 million). But again according to Dr. Truyen, the overwhelming majority of Vietnamese Buddhists do not agree—and indeed disapprove—of the Communist-tinged extremism and violence of the Thich Tri Quang wing.

Dr. Truyen, who is additionally head of South Vietnam's powerful Buddhist Laymen's Association, cooperates with and supports Vietnam's Buddhist-dominated Government led by Premier Tran Van Huong. Certainly the Huong government has no quarrel with the Buddhist but rather vice versa.

As Huong put it in a cabled answer to my question on the subject:

"You refer to a quarrel. But my government has never answered attacks and accusations directed against the Government and myself by certain Buddhist elements. If these attacks were halted, the quarrel would die automatically."

But if there is a genuine schism in the Vietnamese Buddhist movement between the moderates and the extremists, and if the extremists are in the minority, how have they managed to infiltrate the Vietnamese army?

It goes back to last summer when Gen. Nguyen Khanh was still fighting for his political life and was under the illusion that he could appease his most vocal tormentor—the same extremist monk, Thich Tri Quang—by giving in to his demands. One of these demands was to give Quang the right to assign Buddhist chaplains to every army company.

Three-man Buddhist chaplain teams (in reality political cells) were soon thereafter attached to the army and soon trouble started. A few irate Vietnamese commanders began to expel the chaplains when they caught them distributing tracts telling soldiers they need not obey their officers if they felt they were acting in the interests of colonialist Americans or persons unfaithful to the nationalist cause.

But for the most part, individual Vietnamese army officers have been unwilling to take upon themselves the expulsion of these cohorts of Thich Tri Quang, particularly so long as his capacity to wrest further appeasement from the Government and from the Americans seemed unchecked.

In any case, the capacity of a militant minority to make trouble out of all proportion to their true importance is part of the current political landscape in Vietnam. And even if Quang's boast of subverting the Vietnamese armed forces is exaggerated, it is surely criminal negligence not to take whatever steps necessary to destroy his capacity to spread political poisons among Vietnam's fighting men.

[From the Evening Star, Jan. 7, 1965]

THE BUDDHISTS IN VIETNAM

In some ways, the American Government is its own worst enemy in Vietnam. In its refusal to come to grips with the problem of Buddhist subversion and its fatuous insistence on the theme of a broadly based civilian government in Saigon it is in itself largely responsible for the near paralysis of the regime of Premier Tran Van Huong, a paralysis not likely to be broken by today's reported agreement to form a new coalition council.

The threat raised by the militant Buddhist leaders is now perfectly clear. After months of behind-the-scenes incitement of disorder, the two top "venerables," Thich Tri Quang and Thich Tam Chau, are in open revolt against the Huong regime. They are threatening to overthrow it, using the same methods of mass disorder that led to the downfall of President Ngo Dinh Diem in November of 1963.

It is also perfectly clear that the Buddhist leaders would use the same tactics against

any effective anti-Communist government in Vietnam. So it is high time to stop acting as if the significance of these men is to any substantial extent religious. Whether or not they are actually agents of the Communists makes no real difference. The fact is that their activities are destructive to the freedom of the country and that attempts to arrive at some sort of compromise with them will very probably prove fatal.

Estimates vary on the effectiveness and size of the Buddhist apparatus in Vietnam. The more effective, however, the more essential it is that it be dismantled or neutralized without delay. The Huong government should be getting the strongest American encouragement to this end.

It is not getting any such thing. The Huong government, in dealing with the Buddhist threat, is inhibited, as all governments since the overthrow of Diem have been inhibited, by the feeling that the Americans are more interested in preaching democracy in Vietnam than they are in effective government there. We seem to be defending our fuzzy liberal ideal against the army—the only real source of strength for any government in Vietnam.

The sad fact of the matter is that American policy is still very much under the influence of the men who were responsible for the overthrow of Diem and who are still determined to justify their action. It apparently makes little difference that the highest officials of the administration are convinced—and were convinced at the time—that this move was a tragic mistake. The same thinking that produced the mistake is still shaping our policies in Vietnam today. It is time the nonsense stopped.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 21, 1964]

BUDDHISM WIDENS WORLD ROLE

With Christmas less than a week away, Buddhism continues to be active on the world's newsfronts.

The South Vietnamese Government has been on full alert, braced against the possibility of large-scale Buddhist demonstrations. Tension between some of the country's Buddhist factions and the Saigon government has been increasing daily.

In the midst of the Vietnamese friction, the religion that claims as many as half a billion adherents is being buffeted by new winds from Communist China and soothed by statements from the Vatican.

COOPERATION ASKED

Among the past week's developments involving Buddhism around the world:

Pope Paul VI appealed for Buddhists and Roman Catholics to cooperate, "especially in certain zones where the two communities live together and are confronted with the same problems." The zone that best fits this situation is Vietnam.

The Chinese Communist Government stripped the Dalai Lama of Tibet of his remaining post as chairman of the preparatory committee for the "Tibet Autonomous Region" of China. It called him a "traitor who is an incorrigible running dog of imperialism and foreign reactionaries."

The move dropped all Chinese pretense that the Buddhist god-king of Tibet, now in exile in India, retained any further secular or spiritual authority in his conquered land.

The Theravada Buddhist sect, an important minority in Vietnam, sent a petition to the Government asking for arms to fight the Communist Vietcong. It is unlikely it will be granted.

REACTION WATCHED

Vietnam has been badly fragmented by fighting religious sects before. And Theravada, weak as it may be in Vietnam, represents 95 percent of the population of adjoining Cambodia, a country with strong anti-Saigon leanings.

Political observers in Saigon were watching closely reactions of Vietnam's ranking Buddhist layman, Mai Tho Truyen, who returned home Friday from a World Buddhist conference in India.

Mr. Truyen is a vice president of the world body but, more importantly for Vietnamese Buddhism, he is a member of the High National Council, the Saigon Government's interim legislature.

Mr. Truyen has not joined the recent Buddhist protests and is regarded by some as the best hope for getting antigovernment Buddhist priests together with the government of Premier Tran Van Huong.

The Vietnamese Commissioner General for Buddhist Youth Affairs, Thich Thien Minh, said Vietnamese Buddhists had striven hard to live up to "Lord Buddha's teachings of compassion and altruism." He said the best way for Buddhists to combat communism was to come together in one united, centralized body to advance the Buddhist ideology and eliminate social injustice.

DISSENT INDICATED

In another quote, the State Department in Washington termed a letter written to President Johnson by another Saigon Buddhist leader, Thich Tam Chau, "a propaganda device and not an appropriate means of communicating with the President of the United States." The priest had written charging Premier Huong's government with oppressing Buddhism.

Meanwhile there has been evidence that not all Buddhists follow the protesting priests. It is known that many of the monks in the vanguard of last year's struggle against the Ngo Dinh Diem rule have opposed the current anti-Huong campaign. At least one of them, Thich Duc Nghiep, has been denounced by the North Vietnamese Government.

Thich Duc Nghiep has opposed the anti-Huong demonstrations and urged priests to take to the countryside to preach against the Vietcong.

Perhaps his followers are gaining ground. A week ago violent demonstrations and self-immolation by priests was predicted. But they failed to materialize. The same predictions have been made again.

NEW AGITATION

The Government has obviously mustered some support for its position and has successfully clamped down on troublemakers.

But some sources report agitation now is strong in the large cities of Hue and Da Nang farther north where Saigon control is less effective.

Meanwhile, the Saigon Government has admitted that the Buddhists are not the only factionalists dividing South Vietnam.

It announced the formation of an Armed Forces Council to iron out differences between the old guard officers and the "young Turks."

And Chief of State Phan Khuc Suu has proposed that seven new members be added to the High National Council. He suggested names representing the south, central, and north sections of the country in order to try to overcome regional factionalism.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 2, 1964]

SAIGON SCHISM: BUDDHIST STRUGGLE SAPS FIGHT AGAINST COMMUNISTS

(By Takashi Oka)

SAIGON.—The struggle between Premier Tran Van Huong and the Buddhist leadership continues, and South Vietnam is the loser.

Neither side talks to the other except in propagandistic appeals to the population. Each day of political instability at the center makes more difficult the task of pacification against Communist insurgents in the countryside.

Washington, engaged in intensive review of its Indochina policy, must decide whether

or not continuation of military and economic aid on the present scale of more than \$500 million a year can bring victory against the Communists without taking the war into North Vietnam.

It must also decide how this aid can most effectively be used as leverage to promote political stability within South Vietnam.

It is the second of these two tasks that preoccupies the American Embassy here these days. Washington formally supports the Tran Van Huong government, which came into being according to provisions of the October 20 constitution and which cannot legally be overthrown unless the 15-man High National Council votes it out.

Yet there is full recognition that Buddhism in South Vietnam constitutes a powerful political force, that leaders of the Buddhist hierarchy have been dissatisfied with the Huong government from its inception, and that whatever legal rights and wrongs of the situation, an all-out confrontation between Buddhists and the Government can benefit no one but the Communists.

REGIME ATTACKED

Americans have, therefore, sought to keep an open bridge between the Government and Buddhist leadership. But the task becomes more difficult with each passing day.

Saturday Thich Tam Chau, one of the Buddhist hierarchy's two most prominent leaders, held a press conference bitterly attacking the Huong government.

The following day he permitted a student-sponsored funeral procession for a youth killed in government-student clashes last week to start out from Buddhist headquarters, the Vien Hoa Dao or Institute for Execution of Dharma.

Buddhist sources say Vien Hoa Dao will call for popular noncooperation with the Government.

A nightly program of loudspeaker broadcasts from within Vien Hoa Dao is to be launched this week. Those who gather in streets to listen will do so at their own risk, presumably.

BUDDHISTS ACCUSED

The Government accuses the Buddhists of mixing religion and politics by using the religious prestige of the hierarchy to promote secular causes such as the overthrow of the Government. Thich Tam Chau responds that "all things in the world are related."

To an observer the Buddhist hierarchy seems to be testing its strength with the people. Last August's events have already proved that on some issues they can win overriding popular support.

Whether this support will stay with them on lesser issues is problematical. But the Huong-Buddhist confrontation has had a snowballing effect. What seemed bridgeable and nonessential at the start has built up into a major test of strength from which neither now can afford to withdraw.

CAMPAIGN HINTED

[Meanwhile, the Associated Press reported the Buddhists may again turn to suicide by fire in an intensive campaign to overthrow Premier Huong's government, quoting an unnamed Buddhist leader.

[Leading monks deny there are plans for more such suicides. But Buddhist strategists generally keep their plans secret to the last moment.

[A Reuters dispatch said Government forces are pressing their gains against Communist Vietcong guerrillas while the Buddhist leaders work out a strategy for ousting the civilian government.]

[From the Washington Evening Star, Nov. 12, 1964]

PAINFUL VERDICT IN VIETNAM

(By Marguerite Higgins)

Key U.S. officials in Vietnam have come to a painful but significant conclusion. It is

that a tiny faction of Vietnamese—too clever to reveal their motives and too powerful for comfort—are bent on using the cloak of religion as a cover for undeclared warfare designed to prevent the emergence of a stable government in Vietnam. In other words, whenever any regime in Saigon shows any sign of being able to govern the drive to topple it will begin.

There are some dissenters from this view in the Embassy in Saigon. But this conclusion is nonetheless held widely and strongly enough to explain why the Embassy gave the strongest sort of backing to the decision of Vietnam's new premier, Tran Van Huong, last weekend to call out the army to repress the Buddhist-instigated demonstrations against his fledgling government.

WILY MONK

Thus Tran Van Huong's new regime, for whom practically nobody has great hopes, is momentarily one up on the wildest, slickest demagog in Vietnam, the Buddhist monk, Thich Tri Quang, who, Americans believe, was behind last weekend's initial attempt to topple the latest Saigon regime, just as he had previously masterminded the toppling of Ngo Dinh Diem and Gen. Nguyen Khanh.

But in this matter of government toppling, the smart money is on Thich Tri Quang, especially if his boasts of having swung some personalities of the Catholic, Cao Dai, and Hoa Hao faiths into his camp, are at all true.

It has taken some time for U.S. officials to permit themselves to face the fearsome and indeed awesome truth about Thich Tri Quang. Of late, Ambassador Maxwell Taylor in Saigon and State Department officials in Washington have taken to describing Thich Tri Quang as "the Makarios of south-east Asia."

There used to be brisk arguments among Americans in Saigon and Washington as to whether Thich Tri Quang, who once served with the Communist Viet Minh and whose two brothers serve Ho Chi Minh, is "still a Communist."

It is only recently that Americans have begun to realize that this begs the real issue which is whether Thich Tri Quang serves Communist ends. And the answer here is that if the Vietcong themselves had been writing the scenario as to how any given Buddhist monk could play into their hands, they could not have improved on the real life doings of Thich Tri Quang, including his current attempt to topple the new civilian government.

For if Thich Tri Quang and his followers can, by demonstrations, riot, and propaganda successfully keep on perpetuating the near chaos that has prevailed from the top down in Vietnam, it is just a matter of time until the Vietcong take over the country from within.

The civilian regime of Tran Van Huong required great courage to proclaim the separation of politics from religion, because if this much needed step were carried out it would checkmate some of the antigovernment troubles masterminded by Thich Tri Quang.

It would, as a few examples: End the vigilante squads of Buddhists who have taken law into their own hands in the provinces and arrested Catholics on the pretext that they are Diemists (it is a pretext because almost all educated Vietnamese worked for the Government between 1954 and 1963 and hence were Diemists).

End the system where triumvirates of Buddhists are attached to Vietnamese battalions with the divisive and dangerous habit of conducting antigovernment propaganda from this sensitive vantage point.

End the custom that came into practice during the Khanh regime where even a proven Vietcong agent would often be released if, as became standard operational procedure, the prisoner would state that he was "Buddhist" and claim—with Buddhist

backing—that his imprisonment therefore amounted to religious persecution.

PUBLIC RECOGNITION

If it sounds a bit insane that practices such as these have been permitted to take place in a nation supposedly at war with the Communist Vietcong, it can only be replied that the new Premier is the first to have recognized publicly these insanities and may soon lose his political head as a result.

But now that the United States privately recognizes that Thich Tri Quang is working at totally cross purposes in Vietnam, is there not some way to checkmate his design for chaos? Or has it already gone too far?

The fate of the new civilian regime should provide some clues as to the answer.

[From the New York Times, Oct. 18, 1964]

POLITICS HAMPERS VIETNAM'S WAR

(By Peter Grose)

SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, October 17.—Maxwell D. Taylor, the U.S. Ambassador, was given a poignant insight into the whys of Vietnamese politics the other day. Talking socially with a middle-aged politician, the Ambassador broached the subject of present political pressures from diverse groups on the Saigon Government and the possibly harmful effects of this agitation in the war against the Communist Vietcong insurgents.

"You Americans view all this in the terms of your own country," said the politician, not as a reproach but in an effort to let Americans understand what is going on in Vietnam.

"You must realize that this period—these few weeks—is the first moment in my lifetime that we Vietnamese are able to participate in the normal political interplay your democratic countries have enjoyed for decades."

SEEMING CONTRADICTION

"First we were under French domination, then came the war and rule by the Japanese. After the war we had to choose between the French again or joining the Communists. Those of us in the south got our independence with a non-Communist government but Diem kept all political parties down just as the French had.

"When Diem was overthrown it was the army that ran everything. They let us politicians talk in the open but nothing we said ever seemed to have any effect on the decisions of the military government.

"Now at last we are able to act as real citizens, not just as tools of one or another group which holds all the power, whether spokesmen of the people like it or not. There's nothing disloyal about politics."

The conversation, trivial in itself, nevertheless made an impression on Ambassador Taylor, who now freely admits that his frequent visits to Vietnam as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, did not prepare him for the political complexities and struggles he faces in the role of Ambassador.

Gradually U.S. officials are discovering a seeming contradiction underlying American and Vietnamese attitudes toward the war effort against the Vietcong. From this contradiction comes American impatience with Vietnamese intramural quibbling over forms of government. From it comes also Vietnamese suspicions about American motives here, suspicions that are only increasing.

COLD WAR TRENCH

To Americans, Vietnam seems to be a trench in the cold war, a chosen battlefield for the non-Communist world to confront Communist expansionism.

The Vietnamese do not see their plight in these terms at all. The upheavals of the last 2 months have made abundantly clear. To the articulate Vietnamese, the struggle is to build a viable nation and government, a government of justice truly representative of what the leading forces of society want. For too long they have lived under a government

and policies imposed upon them by outside influence. Communism would be another of these outside influences, but perhaps so now is the American notion of winning a war at whatever cost by whatever government.

THE COMING STORY

Resolution of this contradiction will be the story of South Vietnam in the months to come.

Considering the lack of political opportunity, the fumbblings of the Vietnamese in their quest for representative and just government should come as no surprise.

Nor is the accumulation of transitory political institutions—piled up in a haphazard and seemingly self-nullifying manner—alien to Vietnamese experience as any examination of the postwar years under the French will show.

At the top of the political pile now is an ad hoc body of 17 men called the High National Council. Appointed September 26 by Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh, the chief of state, after consultations with leading religious and social groups of the nation, the council is designed to resemble a representative assembly, not for the purpose of governing the country but only for deciding how the country should be governed.

The constitution it produces is supposed to be provisional, the personnel installed in high office only temporary, until some kind of national elections can be held.

The 17 men are a strange mixture. Only a few have any personal political futures or ambitions.

So remote from immediate cross-currents of politics does the council seem that many Vietnamese have dubbed it the "High National Museum." To American policymakers and Vietnamese officials, however, the council is the only available link between the tormented past and the promised land. Seldom has so much international stress been placed on such a weak link.

The extent of the council's responsibilities is unclear, the demands put upon it are enormous and diverse. So-called civilian government is the goal, but Premier Nguyen Khanh has insisted that the armed forces must have "a place of honor" in the Government to compensate the military establishment for its sacrifices in defending the nation on the battlefield.

The religious and political groups pressing for civilian government have not made clear whether they will be satisfied with civilian ministers alone or whether they will press further for military officers to be replaced as chiefs of some—or even all—of the country's 45 provinces.

Once the principles of government structure are determined, who are to be the personalities to fill leading posts? Some political groups insist that only immediate elections can bring forth leaders truly claiming the confidence of the people. Others recognize the difficulty of holding elections in the midst of a guerrilla war and propose instead the naming of "acceptable" persons as yet another interim measure.

Whether this course would solve anything is open to question since the ideal of a popularly supported government would remain remote.

Yet this is the ideal ever before Vietnamese political figures these days as they luxuriate in the democratic interplay they missed for so long.

WAR IS NOT THE ISSUE

If it all sounds remote from the war in the countryside, it is. The campaign against a purposeful Communist enemy is not much of an issue in the political jousting of Saigon. No agitation group admits to being neutralist; even the most intransigent of politicians can be at the same time sincerely anti-Communist.

The political groups making the most headway among the people outside of Saigon—the Central Vietnamese Political Move-

ment led from Hue University is a prime example—are not openly advocating a ceasefire or a negotiated settlement with the Vietcong and suspicions to this effect once expressed are vehemently denied with seeming conviction.

If the war is not an issue and all groups wish to continue the anti-Communist struggle and that is the end of the story, American policymakers should be able to sit back and await with equanimity the outcome of Vietnam's first self-conscious adventure with democracy. But, of course, this is not the end of the story and the Americans realize perhaps more clearly than the Vietnamese that the Communists are moving effectively into the governmental vacuum, in the countryside at least.

American officials maintain they have no ready answer to Vietnamese political strivings, no ideal government structure to propose. This time they are willing to let the Vietnamese work out their own government just the way they want it. But what the Americans in contact with members of High National Council are encouraging is rapid adjustment and conciliation toward some common denominator—anything in fact that would restore the central direction to the war effort that has been lacking since Premier Khanh stepped down as President last August 25.

So the interplay goes on and no end is in sight. The stable and popular government that the Vietnamese seek and that the Americans hope will arrive from somewhere before it is too late seems as remote as ever.

[From the New York Times, Sept. 13, 1964]

BUDDHIST POWER GROWS—IN SOUTH VIETNAM THEY HAVE CREATED A STRUCTURE THAT DRAWS THE LOYALTY OF MANY PERSONS

(By Peter Grose)

SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, September 12.—A Buddhist revolution is taking place in South Vietnam. Its lines and goals are still far from clear even to many of the Buddhists themselves, but seasoned observers consider it the most significant and far-reaching trend in present-day southeast Asia. Its implications stretch far beyond the frontiers of this country. They extend not only to nations nearby but also, because of Buddhism's unclear relation to the ideology and power of communism, the Vietnamese experience could alter the entire power structure the United States has been fighting to maintain in the southwestern Pacific.

The Buddhists seem to be gambling that they can produce a new basis for stability.

So far what has actually happened is that the American-supported Premier of South Vietnam, Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh, has accepted in general and in detail an immediate Buddhist formula for reforming his Government along new civilian lines. This is the outcome, now apparent, of this country's political crisis last month.

PREMIER FIRST

That crisis was the second step in an evolution starting 16 months ago. The first step was reached last November, when 9 years of rule by President Ngo Dinh Diem collapsed in a bloody coup d'état. Both the Buddhists and the Vietnamese Army contributed to President Diem's downfall, but the Buddhists were neither organized nor motivated to fill by themselves the void left when President Diem was removed.

Since November 1 the army has governed South Vietnam. On January 13 there was a change in leadership—General Khanh took over where a junta had failed to get off the ground—but throughout his first 7 months in power the army remained Premier Khanh's principal base of support, his only real claim to hold power in a land torn by war and popular dissent.

Now the Military Revolutionary Council, the instrument of army rule, has been dis-

banded. A constitution that seemed to institutionalize military dictatorship was withdrawn. Premier Khanh is in the process of easing his former military cronies out of their Government positions. Many have already resigned.

"I am still a general," Premier Khanh said the other day, "but I am Premier first." The former field commander now wears civilian clothes. He has shaved off the little goatee he sported throughout the military phase of his rule. He never stated publicly why he had grown this beard in the weeks preceding his coup d'etat, but from the smiles and jokes of officers around him it is clear the goatee had a certain barrack-room symbolic value to the military clique that helped him into power. Now both the goatee and the clique are gone.

NEW FOUNDATION

The full story of why the army gave up so easily has yet to come out—maybe it was only a tactical retreat to prepare for new power plays, perhaps by a younger generation of colonels. Some elements would have the people believe there were secret inducements—that is to say, money—that persuaded certain individuals to abandon their claims to power. More likely the generals felt an onrush of frustration and helplessness from 10 unpleasant months in power, even a feeling that they might as well get out while the going was still good.

However it happened, the army says it has abandoned its foray into politics and now theoretically will return to the business of fighting a war. Political power is forming on a new foundation.

Spokesmen in the Buddhist hierarchy will firmly deny any political aspirations for themselves as persons or for Buddhism as such. They are speaking, they say, solely in the name of the Vietnamese people of whatever religion.

A GOOD CLAIM

In fact, Buddhist leaders have as good a claim as anyone else, and better than many, for presenting the views of "the people," for Buddhism is the family religion of the vast majority of Vietnamese. It has been so for centuries. Premier Khanh himself has long had a Buddhist shrine to his parents in his house.

Figures are difficult and misleading since there are a few criteria for claiming to be a Buddhist. Out of a population of 14 million an estimated total of 5 or 6 million people are practicing Buddhists responsive to the voice of the hierarchy. Many more who say they are Buddhists if asked pay little more than lip service to any religion. Others adhere to Buddhist-oriented sects that nevertheless shun the central Buddhist organization.

Furthermore, there are clear geographical distinctions of attitude among even the most faithful of Buddhists. Until recently the most politically active were bonzes, or monks, from North Vietnam who had fled to the south to escape Communist rule. They gravitated toward Saigon, establishing their own pagodas separate from the pagodas of their brothe's native to South Vietnam.

Northerners are outspoken in their opposition to communism and have supported the military government in active prosecution of the war against the Communist Vietcong. The best known spokesman for the northern refugees is Thich Tam Chau, who holds the position of rector, or chairman of the Buddhist Secular Institute, the organizational center of Buddhist political activity.

At the opposite extreme in zeal are the Buddhists of the far south, the populous and rich Mekong Delta. In this area the orthodox hierarchy is weak, laymen have greater influence and religion plays a lesser role in the comfortable life of the population. Here also thrive many independent sects of Vietnamese Buddhists as well as a militant anti-

Communist group of Buddhists of Cambodian origin who adhere to the "hinayana," or "lesser vehicle," branch of international Buddhism. Vietnamese Buddhism is predominantly "mahayana," or "greater vehicle," in which the Buddha is deified.

HARDEST TO DEFINE

It is the Buddhists of central Vietnam who have spurred the most significant recent advances into politics. Their intellectual center is at Hue. These are the Buddhists hardest to understand or define in political terms. They profess anticommunism and antineutrality, but they also seem far from happy with the present American policy for fighting the war.

Their undoubted leader is Thich Tri Quang, considered by many the mastermind of last year's Buddhist revolt against President Diem. By seeking refuge in the U.S. Embassy a year ago, he forced the U.S. Government to take sides with the Buddhists against the Diem government, which was trying to arrest Buddhist leaders.

Though Tri Quang lacks Tam Chau's prestigious position as head of the Secular Institute, he seems now to be the most influential single Buddhist in the country. There are some observers who look upon his political skills as setting the pattern for Buddhism throughout southeast Asia.

A long-term Buddhist revolution is taking place both within the movement and in the country at large. Its goal is undefined. Its purpose, according to the bonzes, is to "protect Buddhism." Neither the meaning of this phrase nor the means to realize it have been made clear to nonbelievers.

A basic strain within the movement is the whole question of whether Buddhism should deal in temporal politics. Any typical Buddhist declaration will be couched in terms of religion, shunning partisan involvement in worldly political matters. Bonzes such as Tri Quang will evade difficult political questions by insisting they are solely men of religion and not competent to speak on matters of politics.

DRIVE REMOVED DOUBT

Considering their role last year and this, it is difficult to refrain from charges of hypocrisy on this point. Any doubt about the potential political strength and interests of at least some Buddhist leaders was removed in their campaign against President Diem.

With the November coup their effectiveness seemed ended for the moment, since they had no viable organization capable of retaining political control after 10 centuries of relative noninvolvement. Quickly but quietly this was changed.

Starting on January 3, when the "Vietnam Unified Buddhist Church" came into being, the Buddhists under Tam Chau and Tri Quang have established a shadow government across the country, a shadow rapidly assuming substance. At the top there are two "institutes," one for religious affairs, which has nominal and honorific responsibilities equivalent to those of a chief of state, and the other for secular affairs, which, like a premier, wields actual power over the organization.

POLITICAL STRUCTURES

In the secular institute there are six "general offices," resembling ministries, for clergy affairs, Buddhist studies, cultural affairs, construction and finance, lay peoples' affairs, and youth. Each general office is headed by a commissioner.

Down in the provinces there are delegates and deputies, all bonzes, mostly in their thirties or early forties, all appointed, like the Government's province chiefs, by their own administration in Saigon.

This is the political structure the Buddhists were erecting during the 10 months of military rule over South Vietnam.

How effective would this structure be in support of a government favorable to Buddhists? The matter has not yet been put to a test—little has so far been demanded of the Buddhist population by their leaders. But many observers think the test will come in the next months as long as Premier Khanh leans more and more heavily on apparently the one non-Communist element of the nation that has not yet been brought into active participation in the Government.

[From the New York Tribune, Sept. 11, 1964]

VIET: BUDDHIST PRESS LASHES UNITED STATES

SAIGON.—South Vietnam's leading Buddhist publication yesterday blamed the United States for the political and religious turmoil that has swept the country since mid-August.

The publication, Hai Trieu Am, charged indirectly that Americans are manipulating the Saigon government to extend U.S. influence in South Vietnam—an accusation previously voiced privately by some Vietnamese officials.

The paper also backed rebellious students' charges that Americans triggered the recent bloody clashes between Buddhists and Roman Catholics in the northern city of Da Nang.

PROTEST

More student trouble developed yesterday as Saigon's politically active student union denounced the ruling military government for not creating a promised "high national council" quickly enough. The council is to take steps within 2 months toward setting up a civilian government by late next year.

Hai Trieu Am, in voicing the Buddhist charges, said that "if one wishes to learn the deep reasons for the anger of the people of Da Nang, one must find them in the August 16 constitution, which certainly was not drafted by Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh."

INFLUENCE

The inference was that the Military Revolutionary Council, which approved the constitution, as well as strongman General Khanh were influenced by the United States.

The constitution, under which General Khanh was elevated from Premier to President and given sweeping powers, was rescinded in response to violent rioting and Buddhist demonstrations. General Khanh reverted to Premier and became the dominant member of the ruling military triumvirate. On Wednesday he also took over the Defense Minister's post.

The Buddhist publication criticized American press reports of Buddhists' razing of the Catholic sector of Da Nang, charging they failed to indicate the real causes of the rioting.

Asserting that "since the distant past until the arrival of Americans here, Buddhists have never destroyed or burned any houses," Hai Trieu Am said that "the immediate reason (for anger in Da Nang) was the shots fired in the air by Americans."

U.S. soldiers had fired shots in the air to disperse Buddhist demonstrators who tried to break into the U.S. Army compound in Da Nang.

The student union, meeting ostensibly to debate criteria for prospective civilian statesmen's conduct, denounced former U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge for allegedly being soft on the late President Ngo Dinh Diem. It charged that Mr. Lodge recently told a Paris audience that Mr. Diem, who was overthrown and slain in last November's coup, might have survived if he had been a better President.

The students termed this "a flagrant interference in the affairs of Vietnam."

EXILES

Raising a touchy political issue, the students also questioned the status of five generals exiled to the mountain resort of Dalat by Premier Khanh when he seized power last

January. General Khanh charged at the time the generals were plotting a neutralist solution for the country's war against the Vietcong Communist guerrillas. He said Wednesday the five officers were being returned to active duty.

The students asked whether this meant that the generals were falsely accused or whether General Khanh now is willing to admit high-ranking neutralists in his high command.

The Vietcong's clandestine Radio Liberation joined the anti-U.S. chorus yesterday with a broadcast plea to South Vietnamese religious leaders, intellectuals, and soldiers to help drive out the Americans.

Turning around U.S. charges that the Vietcong deliberately fomented interreligious strife, the Red National Liberation Front's top political official, Nguyen Huu Tho, said the "U.S. aggressors and their lackeys" plotted to separate Buddhists from Catholics "with the aim of invading our country and enslaving our people."

[From the Evening Star, Sept. 7, 1964]

VIETNAM ANSWERS SOUGHT

(By Marguerite Higgins)

What do the Buddhist political leaders of Vietnam really want?

What is the objective of the drumfire of propaganda and demonstrations against the predominantly Buddhist government of Vietnam that began as early as last April—a time, unfortunately, when the American Embassy and the American people had their mind on other things?

In secret meetings in Saigon late last week with top Buddhist leaders, Ambassador Maxwell Taylor tried urgently to find the answers to these questions because, among other things, he is under pressure from Washington to explain increasingly worrisome signals as to Buddhist intentions.

During the meeting, General Taylor addressed most of his questions to the Reverend Thich Tam Chau, a refugee from North Vietnam, a genuine anti-Communist in principle albeit something of a timid soul in practice, and ostensibly the leader of the United Buddhist Movement of Vietnam.

But the answers that really counted belonged to the Reverend Thich Tri Quang, a one-time associate of the Communist Vietnam, the mastermind of the anti-Diem campaign of last summer and fall, and currently the spearhead of a deadly struggle for power inside the Buddhist movement against the Reverend Tam Chau. Tri Quang is additionally the leader of a sometime open and sometime secret drive to topple the Khanh regime.

There are some who say that the Buddhist Monk Tri Quang is, next to General Khanh, the most powerful Vietnamese figure in South Vietnam today and that tomorrow he may be the most powerful.

It is of significance therefore that General Taylor's telegrams on the Buddhist situation produced so many somber faces around the Department of State.

For the time being, at any rate, it appears according to Ambassador Taylor's assessment that the moderates among Vietnam's nearly 5 million Buddhists (out of a population of more than 14 million of which the majority are ancestor worshippers) are being skillfully and relentlessly outmaneuvered by the extremist wing led by the Reverend Tri Quang, whose flamboyant oratory and calls for direct action have far more appeal, for example, to Vietnam's citified, riot-prone young people than the pleas for caution issued by the Reverend Tam Chau.

As to the political game being played by the Reverend Tri Quang, a key administration official who had read General Taylor's telegrams summed things up this way:

"A defensible case can be made for the theory that Tri Quang will sooner or later

seek to undermine any stable anti-Communist government in Vietnam in the belief that anarchy will drive the United States to go home, permitting the emergence of a neutralist or possibly pro-Communist state with himself at the helm."

He continued: "If Tri Quang wants to deliver Vietnam to neutralism or communism under his own leadership, it would explain the mystery of why he raised the false issue of persecution which is ridiculous in light of all the concessions—indeed the favoritism—shown the Buddhists by Khanh's regime."

"But the cry of Buddhist persecution—as Tri Quang well knows—brings an almost Pavlovian reaction in the outside world where most people are too uninformed and too naive to believe that a Buddhist monk might make up such accusations out of whole cloth to gain his own ends."

The issue now seems less and less whether the Reverend Tri Quang aspires for a neutralist and pro-Communist Vietnam under his leadership.

It is focusing more and more on the fact that his actions are pointing in that direction. The question now is whether anything can be done effectively to stop him as he operates from within the privileged psychological sanctuary of being a Buddhist monk.

[From the Baltimore Sun, Nov. 5, 1963]

REDS SEEK NEW COUPS OF BUDDHIST-LED TYPE—REPORTED TRYING TO SPREAD VIETNAM RELIGIOUS REVOLT TO LAOS

(By Paul W. Ward)

New York, November 4.—Having seen Buddhism spearhead a drive that toppled Vietnam's Diem regime, Communists now are trying to organize like offensives elsewhere in southeast Asia.

So it was learned here today following announcement that a United Nations mission sent to South Vietnam October 22 to investigate charges that Buddhists were being persecuted there has completed its task and will reassemble next Monday in New York.

IMMEDIATE TARGET

Laos, which lies just west of Vietnam and also abuts Communist China, appears the immediate target of a campaign originating in Peiping. Its aim is to set Buddhist communities throughout Asia to filing complaints against elements of Laos' coalition Government akin to those they had been pressing against the Diem regime at Saigon until it fell last Friday.

The chief indication was provided in broadcasts from Hanoi, in North Vietnam, and Peiping reporting that the "Laotian Buddhist Association [has issued] a statement strongly protesting against the bombardment of a monastery by the Phoumi Nosavan troops and reactionaries among Kong Le's troops."

Gen. Phoumi Nosavan heads the anti-Communist wing of a troika-form government set up in Laos last year to carry out an agreement to neutralize that southeast Asian kingdom worked out at a Geneva conference which included the United States, the Soviet Union and Communist China among its participants.

Gen. Kong Le commands the troops of the coalition's neutralist factions and enjoyed avowed support by Peiping and Hanoi until the Communists concluded several months ago that he is sincerely neutralist and will not help them take over Laos.

COMPENSATION DEMAND

Since then, they not only have been denouncing him but trying to win over his subordinate officers to their side.

The Laotian Communist radio station, calling itself the voice of Laos, also broadcast the statement attributed to the "Laotian Buddhist Association," that alleged their foes had "destroyed a [Buddhist] monastery and acting Buddhists" at Ban Ton Nuong in

Kiang Province's back country by a bombardment during the night of October 16-17.

The statement demanded "that the Phoumi Nosavan clique compensate the losses and immediately stop all moves against the Buddhists." Otherwise, "it would bear full responsibility for the consequences," it said, adding:

"All Laotian monks and Buddhists are urged to strengthen their solidarity, heighten their vigilance, and resolutely oppose all schemes of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys."

The Communists have been denouncing the anti-Communist and neutralist factions of Laos' coalition government as puppets of the United States, just as they formerly denounced South Vietnam's Diem regime and are currently trying to discredit on like grounds the military junta that displaced it Friday.

To further what began as a Buddhist campaign against the Diem regime, Communist China also staged shortly before that regime's fall a 3-day conference of Buddhist clergy and laymen from 11 Asian countries.

Held in Peiping's Fayuan Monastery the conference was devoted in large part to orations against "the United States-Ngo Dinh Diem clique" at Saigon.

MONKS REPORTED BEHEADED

Its participants, now touring Communist China under the aegis of a Peiping atheist regime, included:

1. The Venerable Thich Thien Hao, listed as president of the Luc Hao Buddhist Association of South Vietnam, who made a long speech about atrocities, including beheadings and disembowelings of Buddhist monks, that he attributed to "the United States-Diem clique."

2. The Venerable Thepbouary Pramaha Khamtank, named as president of the Buddhist Association of Laos, who charged the United States is trying to turn that country into a "colony" and demanded that Washington cease giving military aid to the Laotian Government, asserting:

AUGUST DENUNCIATION

"We Asian people and Buddhists are the masters of our own affairs. We don't need any other masters lording it over and ruling us."

Mainland China's Communist rulers, who in August denounced as "political agents" of Chiang Kai-shek a group of Buddhist monks from Formosa then visiting India, also brought together in Fayuan Monastery Buddhist monks and laymen from Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Nepal, Pakistan, Thailand, and North Vietnam, which, like Cambodia and Thailand, also abuts Laos.

Having produced on October 20 a formal appeal to Buddhists everywhere to join in the anti-Diem campaign, the conferees gave themselves over to a series of fetes arranged in their honor by the Peiping regime that only a few years ago was charged before the United Nations Assembly here with having destroyed more than 1,000 Buddhist monasteries in Tibet.

NORTH VIETNAM CHARGES

There was no Tibetan participation in the Buddhist conference at Peiping.

North Vietnam's Communist regime has sent to the International (i.e., Polish, Indian, and Canadian) Control Commission for both parts of Vietnam a compilation of "Buddhist persecution and atrocity" charges against the Diem regime that said in part:

"Gen. Ton That Dinh, military governor of Saigon, personally directed troops to martyrize pupils of Vietnamese and French middle schools" on September 7.

TO HEAD NATIONAL POLICE

He currently is slated to be Interior Minister (i.e., chief of police forces) in the new regime at Saigon, having turned revolutionist after being refused the same post in the

Diem regime, according to reports relayed from Saigon via Washington.

Today Moscow's radio stations continued to denounce the military junta in Saigon just as they previously had denounced the Diem regime as an American puppet and the United Nations mission to Vietnam as a Washington invention designed to protect and preserve the Diem regime.

Meanwhile, it was noted here that in Burma, homeland of U Thant, United Nations Secretary General, the military regime in control at Rangoon is under attack from the venerable U Kaythara, who, at 83, is the ranking Buddhist priest at Mandalay.

Addressing mass rallies assembled in defiance of the regime and overtly inviting arrest, he has also been predicting that Gen. Ne Win, the regime's head, will meet the same end as Gen. Aung Sau, Burma's national hero, who was assassinated in 1947.

In a statement relayed from Saigon and issued here today, a spokesman for the fact-finding mission that headed back to New York yesterday contended its departure from Vietnam was not occasioned by the coup d'etat there, but was "as scheduled," although in statements prior to the coup the mission had claimed inability to estimate when it would complete its on-the-spot investigation.

Today's statement also said the mission "had not been able to interview Thich Tri Quang [a Buddhist monk] who was in asylum at the U.S. Embassy" in Saigon. It added that "the former government of the republic had informed the mission that, according to the laws of asylum, a person in asylum was not allowed to make any contacts whatsoever while in asylum."

BURMESE COMPLAINT

Meanwhile, there were these additional developments at United Nations headquarters:

1. James Barrington, Burma's chief delegate here and its representative in the currently recessed disarmament conference at Geneva, complained in one of the Assembly's standing committees about a tendency toward "bilateralism" by Washington and Moscow and consequent bypassing of the lesser powers, including neutralists, in disarmament matters.

2. Mrs. Agda Rossel, Sweden's chief delegate took steps in another committee to initiate debate on a resolution—sponsored also by Austria, Ceylon, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela—that is aimed at getting all governments to follow the example Liechtenstein set in 1798 by abolishing capital punishment.

During the delivery of Mr. DODD's speech,

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DODD. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. I believe that my record on the scoreboard of the Americans for Constitutional Action is even lower than the record of the Senator from Connecticut.

I share with the Senator from Connecticut the feeling that it only demonstrates that we are trying in new ways to have the government use its powers for the people without at the same time jeopardizing individual freedom. We can only hope and pray that among the makers of these arbitrary scoreboards there could be a greater reflection of the consensus of our own people in our own States. Then I think the scoreboard would be very different for the Senator from Connecticut and myself.

Mr. DODD. I appreciate the Senator's making that observation. The Senator

is one of the great minds in this body. He stands out particularly in the area of which he has spoken. I am happy to be in his company on that scoreboard.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the colloquy in which I have just engaged with the Senator from New York be placed at the end of my remarks so that I may have my speech in continuity.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, am I to understand that the Senator from Connecticut does not wish to yield?

Mr. DODD. I am happy to yield. I merely wish that whatever yielding I do may appear at the end of my remarks, unless there is some reason for it to appear elsewhere.

Mr. ELLENDER. I have been listening to what the Senator has said with much interest, because I have visited southeast Asia on many occasions. I have often described to the Senate—and I believe my reports will so indicate—the situation that was prevalent in southeast Asia. I am almost certain that my good friend will agree that were he to go to South Vietnam now, he would find things quite different from what they were when he visited that country 4 years ago.

Mr. DODD. I am sure that is true.

Mr. ELLENDER. There is no doubt about that. On several occasions I made the statement on the floor of the Senate that unless we could persuade our allies to assist us in carrying this load—and I am sure the Senator agrees that that ought to be done—and unless a stable government could be established in South Vietnam, we would be in serious trouble.

Mr. DODD. Yes. I wholly agree with those two points. I refer to a speech I made 4 years ago, in which I made the same point. I said I thought it was absolutely essential that our friends and allies in that part of the world join us in the struggle to preserve the freedom of the South Vietnamese. I pointed out—and I shall touch on the issue later today—that there is a basic structural fault in the SEATO organization which gives a veto power to any one member; and, as the Senator knows, that power has been exercised by France and Britain.

We must have a stable government in South Vietnam. The Senator is a well-informed Member of this body on these problems. I have great respect for his opinions.

Mr. ELLENDER. The question I should like to ask the Senator is as follows: Should we continue to intensify our efforts in that area if we cannot get our allies to assist us or if a stable government is not established in South Vietnam? That is the question.

Mr. DODD. The Senator's question is part of a larger question. There are many things we must do. Those are two things that we must do. I believe that we must get our friends and allies in that part of the world to assist us. We are getting them. Already Korea has announced that it is sending men to that area.

Mr. ELLENDER. Two thousand men.

Mr. DODD. Two thousand men. The Philippines are sending in several thousand men. All this is encouraging. They are starting, at least. I would like to see other nations do as much or more, and I expect that they will. I believe we are underway, and that this is no time to quit, because now we have the signs and beginnings to indicate that our allies are starting to do what the Senator from Louisiana and I believe they should have done long ago.

Mr. ELLENDER. I am not suggesting that we quit now.

Mr. DODD. I know the Senator is not.

Mr. ELLENDER. We have gone so far into it that we may well find ourselves in over our heads.

What I fear—and I have said so on the floor of the Senate and have included it in my reports—is that the situation that now exists in South Vietnam may become similar to the one that now exists in South Korea. The Senator will remember that the South Korean war was supposed to be a United Nations affair, in which all the membership of that great organization was to join us in fighting in South Korea. But what happened? We took hold of the situation there; and as I recall the figures, 96 percent of the cost of that war was paid by the United States, and about 95 percent of the foreign men who died in that conflict were Americans.

Mr. DODD. I accept the Senator's statistics.

Mr. ELLENDER. That is as I remember them.

Mr. DODD. They seem to me to be approximately correct.

Mr. ELLENDER. Today we are stuck, as it were, in South Korea. We are trying to maintain 18 local divisions there. It is very costly to do that. In addition, we are maintaining 2 of our own divisions there. As the Senator from Connecticut knows, we cannot pay the expenses of our soldiers there with collar buttons. It is necessary to have the money and the wherewithal to do it.

What I have feared all along is that unless we can persuade our allies to assist us in South Vietnam, and unless a stable government can be established there, a condition may develop which will be worse than the situation that confronts us in South Korea. That is what has worried me.

Mr. DODD. I know the Senator from Louisiana is worried; and so am I. It is a proper problem to worry about. There is no question that a stable government must be established in South Vietnam.

The trouble began, in my opinion, with the assassination of Diem. Diem was the best thing we had going for the free world in that area, and the tragedy of his death still haunts us.

I hope that at some time the proper committee will conduct a formal inquiry as to his overthrow and assassination and what part, if any, officials of the U.S. Government played in this tragedy. We have never been told anything, except through some newspaper articles. So far as I know, no formal inquiry was ever made, although there have been many ugly rumors. But officially, we

do not know why Diem was overthrown, or how his death occurred.

That was the beginning of our trouble in South Vietnam. I make this statement only for historical reference, so that I may put my response in better perspective. We have since the death of Diem been plagued with the fall of one government after another in South Vietnam. There must be a stable government, and we can and must try to help the South Vietnamese achieve it.

Mr. ELLENDER. Suppose we cannot accomplish that?

Mr. DODD. I do not think that will happen. I think it can be done.

Mr. ELLENDER. The Senator has been speaking about Diem.

Mr. DODD. It is an "if" question. I do not know that anyone can ever answer it. The Senator says "suppose." I could add a hundred other suppositions that would make his question of no moment. Suppose we were attacked by the Soviets tomorrow morning with nuclear weapons; I do not think we would then be able to do much in Vietnam. But I do not believe that will happen. I do not think we get anywhere by such suppositions.

We must strive to assist the South Vietnamese in obtaining a stable government. I think that with our help, they can establish such a government; then we shall do better.

Mr. ELLENDER. I should like to speak about Diem, if the Senator will permit me to do so.

Mr. DODD. Certainly.

Mr. ELLENDER. I was in South Vietnam within a matter of months after Diem took office and on several occasions thereafter. I remember on my second visit there discussing with him the existence in his country of two pockets or areas, one in the delta and one to the northwest of Saigon, that were infested with Communists. He knew that. As I recall, we made efforts to encourage him to take action to satisfy those people, but we could never get him to do so. Those two pockets continued to grow in size. They may have been dominated by Buddhists, because it is alleged that 90 to 92 percent of the people are Buddhists.

Mr. DODD. No; the Senator is in error. This is a common mistake. Not more than 30 percent of the population are Buddhists.

Mr. ELLENDER. Thirty percent are Buddhists?

Mr. DODD. Thirty percent. I can document my belief.

Mr. ELLENDER. I wish the Senator would.

Mr. DODD. This is a common error. Such statements are made frequently. There is nothing to substantiate the figure of 90 percent.

Mr. ELLENDER. What is the division?

Mr. DODD. I should like to place that information in the RECORD in an orderly way. I shall discuss it.

Mr. ELLENDER. I want the Senator from Connecticut to know that I have taken part in debates in the Chamber in respect to South Vietnam on many occasions, but I am not one to try to dic-

tate to the President what he ought to do.

Mr. DODD. Neither am I.

Mr. ELLENDER. We have gone so far now that I do not know what the whole picture is. I still contend that unless we can persuade our allies to assist us in that area, and unless we can enable the South Vietnamese to build up to the point where they will have a strong, stable government, there is no telling how long we shall be in that country, and there is no telling how many American lives will be lost. I doubt that there is any way to win there under present conditions.

As the Senator may recall, the late President Kennedy said—and I will remember when he said it, because I discussed it with him in person, following my last visit to South Vietnam—that if victory were to be attained in South Vietnam, the South Vietnamese would have to achieve it. In my opinion, that cannot be done unless there is a stable government there that is willing, with our assistance, to fight. Does not the Senator agree?

Mr. DODD. Yes. I am much in agreement with the Senator from Louisiana. I have great admiration for him. I know how hard he has worked on these subjects and how widely he has traveled. I am grateful to him for his comment. I shall touch on these subjects later.

Mr. President, I reiterate my earlier request that this colloquy be placed at the end of my speech.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ELLENDER. I am deeply interested in what the Senator is saying. If I do not remain in the Chamber all the time, I shall read his speech in the RECORD. I should like to have the benefit of his statistics concerning the religious aspects of the trouble in South Vietnam.

Mr. DODD. Yes. I am grateful to the Senator from Louisiana.

Mr. President, I am pleased to observe in the Chamber the distinguished junior Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING]. I am happy that he is here, because I hope to receive his views as I proceed to discuss this subject.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DODD. I am delighted to yield to my distinguished friend the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I had the privilege of reading overnight the very able address of the Senator from Connecticut. In fact I read it over no less than three times.

Mr. DODD. I am indeed complimented.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I commend the Senator for many features of his address. First, I commend the spirit which animates his speech, the refusal to indulge in personalities, the crediting of high motives to those who differ in their prescriptions.

Mr. DODD. If I may interrupt, that could well have been learned from the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I commend the general elevation of attitude and the powerful logic of the speech. This is the

most puzzling and dangerous problem which our country has faced since October 1962.

I agree with the Senator from Connecticut that many Americans do not sufficiently appreciate what the loss of South Vietnam would mean to the free world and to the anti-Communist forces. I am not an expert on the subject of this territory, but a study of the map indicates what is involved. The Senator is completely correct in his statement that the fall of South Vietnam, or a withdrawal from South Vietnam, unless conditions change, would mean the almost immediate fall of Cambodia and Laos into the Communist camp. Laos is already half there; Cambodia is perhaps half there.

Then, if Senators will look at a map of the area, they will see that Thailand would be half encircled. As the Senator from Connecticut has pointed out, the North Vietnamese announced a few days ago that they were setting up a committee for the national liberation for Thailand.

Mr. DODD. Yes.

Mr. DOUGLAS. With that kind of power base, with North Vietnam pushing, with China behind North Vietnam, and with the United States out of the area, would not Communist influence take over Thailand and then spread north into Burma and south into Malaysia?

Mr. DODD. Most assuredly.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Then to the 650 million Chinese would be added 250 million Malays. What then would be the position of India?

Mr. DODD. Then it would be hopeless.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I remember talking many years ago with an eminent Indian, who was not pro-Western and not pro-Communist, but rather was a neutralist. I addressed this question to my Indian acquaintance: "How long could India be kept neutral if southeast Asia were to go Communist?" The reply was almost immediate. "We could not keep India neutralist for more than a year."

I know that the "domino" theory is being attacked now as not being applicable; but if these were an absence of force to check the Chinese, it would seem to many of us to be almost inevitable that all of Malaysia and virtually all of India would go Communist. We would then face a combination of 350 million Indians, 250 million Malays, and 650 million Chinese—1,250 million people. That would not be merely a change of political government—

Mr. DODD. Oh, no.

Mr. DOUGLAS. —but would be the conquest by a country bent on world domination which treats the United States as its basic enemy. It would be a powerful force dedicated to the defeat of the United States of America.

If the Senator from Connecticut would permit me to do so, I should like to underscore some of his remarks on neutralization. I suppose that if there could be genuine neutralization, that would be highly desirable.

Mr. DODD. Of course; I should have made that point. No one would be hap-

pler than I if genuine neutralization, as the Senator puts it, could be achieved. I was talking about neutralization in the sense in which the Communists use it. We are too inclined to believe that the Communists mean genuine neutralization, when what they mean, in fact, is communization.

Mr. DOUGLAS. If it were genuine neutralization, it should certainly apply to North Vietnam as well as to South Vietnam.

Mr. DODD. That would be genuine neutralization.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Even if it were applied to South Vietnam, it would not be effective in view of Communist philosophy and power, unless there were some adequate supervisory body having real authority to police the agreement.

We have all noticed press reports, which are authentic, that North Vietnam has even expelled the small inspection teams which, under the Geneva Convention of 1954, were placed both in North Vietnam and South Vietnam, to see what was taking place and to report. They are being expelled and forced out. So there will be no eyes and no voices—no eyes to detect and no voices to report the military preparations and movements of North Vietnam.

Mr. DODD. That is correct.

Mr. DOUGLAS. If there were a strong, effective United Nations, with a mobile police force, that force could be placed in this area to help fill the power vacuum.

Mr. DODD. There is no doubt about that.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I was in Egypt and Israel in 1956, shortly after the Suez hostilities. I was greatly pleased about the excellent work of the United Nations police force. The Senator from Connecticut and I may have differed somewhat about the role of a United Nations police force in the Congo, but to my mind it represented a healthy principle.

Mr. DODD. I have no difficulty with the Senator from Illinois on that point. I am sure the Senator would agree that we can make mistakes. But the principle is correct: A United Nations police force should be used wherever this is feasible.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Yes. Unfortunately, as we all know, the Russians and, I am sorry to say, the French also, have virtually stymied the creation of such a force by refusing to contribute to its support.

Mr. DODD. Yes.

Mr. DOUGLAS. So it will be almost impossible in the near future to finance and to place a United Nations police force in the field.

Another political change is occurring inside the U.N.; namely, a shift of power from the Assembly to the Security Council, where the Russians can interpose a veto and thus stymie any resolution of the U.N.

As one who has always been a supporter of the U.N., and who still is, I observe many signs that the United Nations is being weakened in the same fashion that the League of Nations weakened in the middle and late 1930's. I hope that this will not happen.

Mr. DODD. So do I.

Mr. DOUGLAS. We should try to prevent that from happening, but we should not ignore reality.

To those who say that there is no analogy between the cumulative conquests of Hitler and Mussolini in the late 1930's and the cumulative developments of the Chinese in Asia in the 1960's, I should say that there is grave danger that they delude themselves. It would be a terrible thing if we woke up to find all of Asia Communist.

Mr. DODD. It would be a dreadful disaster. Earlier I described it as an "unthinkable thought," borrowing my words from the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. DOUGLAS. It would have tremendous propaganda influence in Africa, much greater than the Russians alone could have, because the Russians, after all, are members of the white race. But the members of the yellow race or the brown race can make a much greater appeal to the blacks than the white nations can.

The Senator from Connecticut has performed a real public service in stressing the dangers. It should be noted also that he cannot be accused of being a war hawk. He does not advocate the indiscriminate bombing of North Vietnam or a bombing attack on China.

Mr. DODD. No.

Mr. DOUGLAS. He suggests the possibility of guerrilla warfare in the north, which would have to be done by South Vietnam, rather than by the United States.

Mr. DODD. Only because of what North Vietnam is doing to South Vietnam. This seems to me a proper corrective measure only so long as North Vietnam persists in its activities.

What we all hope for, I need not say to the Senator, is a settlement of the differences between countries, so that they can drop their arms and get on with the business of improving the lives of their people.

Mr. DOUGLAS. The Senator proposes political warfare and economic aid to be of real benefit to the people of South Vietnam; the development of SEATO; and various other measures.

I feel certain that the country will appreciate what the Senator from Connecticut has done. I urge that his warnings and his suggestions should not be dismissed summarily.

I can remember how, in the 1930's, after two trips to Europe, I felt that the combination of Hitler and Mussolini was moving to take over the free world. I believe that it was the duty of all who loved freedom to resist that movement. There is a similar obligation upon us today to resist totalitarianism of the left, as well as totalitarianism of the right. One is as bad as the other.

Mr. DODD. The Senator is correct. I am glad that the Senator made that observation.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I thank the Senator. Perhaps certain features of his program, such as the proposal to capture a staging area just inside of Laos may not be the right thing to do. But, in general, the program suggested is modest, moderate, and in good temper. I hope his program

will be considered by the American people and that it may serve to offset some of the finely motivated but incomplete suggestions that have been made.

Mr. DODD. I am deeply grateful for the observations of the Senator.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DODD. I yield.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I congratulate the distinguished Senator from Connecticut on making what I think is a valuable contribution to the national debate on what we should do in southeast Asia.

I not only had an opportunity to read the statement before it was delivered, but I also had the pleasure of listening to the delivery. There are several points that the Senator made which I think were publicly made for the first time. The one that I should like to emphasize at this point concerns some of the strategic implications, gained by looking at a map, of what might happen if the Red Chinese decide to move south.

The implication is rather plain that the Senator does not think they will do that. I agree. Among the things that would deter them from doing that is the presence in Taiwan of a highly trained air force. The Nationalist Chinese very much want to go back to the mainland if they have an opportunity. If the Red Chinese forces were to be drawn to the south, that would give them the chance to move, which chance they might not have again.

The Senator presented figures on what the Vietcong has done in the way of murder and terror within the country. The Senator said that almost 500 a month, or 6,000 a year, within the village hamlets have been murdered by the Vietcong.

Mr. DODD. The Senator is correct.

Mr. DOMINICK. I wonder if the Senator can tell me where the figures originate.

Mr. DODD. I hope the Senator will be satisfied with my statement. I am sure they are from an official source of the administration.

Mr. DOMINICK. The reason I asked is that figures have been given to me which are of a very substantial nature, but not quite that large. When I have mentioned the figures from time to time, in the process of meeting with groups and talking about the terrorism that has been inflicted, people had not heard of this before. They had never understood what was going on. They had no concept of the problem.

Mr. DODD. I do not know whether the Senator was in the Chamber before, but when I obtained the figures, I said, "Why in the world have the figures not been made public?" I think the figures should have been made public. I do not see much sense in classifying this material and concealing it. The people do not know these facts.

Mr. DOMINICK. It is particularly important with respect to the argument made by those who would like to see us negotiate and neutralize. The South Vietnamese villages are not with us. But it is very difficult to have them cooperate with us if they are under the grip of

terrorism and many people in their areas are being murdered. Until we give them the security they need, it is hard for them to be able to do anything.

Mr. DODD. The Senator is correct.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, one of the things that has not been made plain in the overall debate, I feel, is the fact that there is a contest of willpower in this area. There is no doubt in my mind, from the study that I have made of the overall situation, that the Communists are using the so-called national liberalization plan as a test mechanism to determine how great the willpower of the free world is. If this plan should be successful in persuading us to negotiate or neutralize, it is inevitable that this technique will spread widely throughout the world, through Africa, South America, and Latin America.

It is already being used. But I believe it will be accelerated sharply. I think the Senator brought that point out very well. I congratulate him on making a very useful contribution.

Mr. DODD. I thank the Senator.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DODD. I yield.

Mr. MUNDT. I congratulate the distinguished Senator from Connecticut for having presented a most conclusive and comprehensive statement on this whole Vietnamese problem. It is the type of white paper which I hoped the State Department would have placed before the American people long ago.

I believe it would still be well for them to do so. In his analysis of the historic developments of the problems and the consequences involved in this important theater of the world, the Senator leaves little doubt as to his accuracy.

While men may disagree among themselves as to the various processes to be used to bring this matter to a successful culmination, the matters that the Senator has anticipated are the type that should emanate from the State Department, carrying the full weight of the administration and the Government. I am sure that would convince many fine American citizens, who are beginning to doubt their own judgments in these areas, as to what is involved.

I congratulate the Senator on a most comprehensive study. I am happy to note the emphasis and the importance which the Senator places on a step-up political warfare in this area.

The distinguished Senator from Connecticut has long tried to establish a training institution in this country so that we could prepare Americans to go overseas for the type of warfare we wish to pursue, with a stable, constituted government in Vietnam.

I hope that the State Department, which has shown such a stubborn reluctance to provide the type training required for this type of warfare, will consider carefully the emphasis that the Senator places on this particular recommendation for future activity.

The Senator talks about cadres of trained political leaders and emissaries from these countries who are equipped and capable so that they could deliver the type of guidance and inspiration

needed by our friends in South Vietnam. Unfortunately, this is always debated in a vacuum in our ability to wage a cold war.

I happen to be one of those who believe honestly that had the other body approved in 1960 what the Senate then did approve, legislation for the creation of a freedom academy—following a wonderful report written in large part by the Senator from Connecticut, as a member of the Committee on the Judiciary, emphasizing the need for this adjunct to our contest against the Communists overseas—we would have had 5 long years within which not only to train ourselves, but also to provide for young governmental officials and career people in the government in Saigon to come here and learn the full truth about the techniques and devices employed by the Communists. These officials and career people would have learned to understand the maneuvers and manipulations of the Communist conspiracy, and been trained to be better able to convince their fellow citizens on the free side of the Vietnamese struggle of the dividends which accrue to freedom, and the importance of Communists.

There would not have been the melancholic succession of quick changes in the officialdom of South Vietnam. We would have obtained what all hands agree is an indispensable requirement in bringing success to our efforts there—the creation of a stable government in South Vietnam which has not only the will to win, but also the respect of the local people, so that it in turn would support the Government and maintain its stability in office, so that the people there could get on with the work to be done.

Mr. DODD. The Senator gives me credit for the idea of the Freedom Academy. It was the idea of the Senator from South Dakota. I was merely a minor help in getting it through the Senate. The Senator from South Dakota deserves great credit for it.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DODD. I yield to the Senator from Texas.

Mr. TOWER. I join my distinguished colleagues from South Dakota and Colorado in commending the able and distinguished Senator from Connecticut for his comprehensive contribution to the dialog on southeast Asia. It must be made clear to the American people that we must take stringent action in southeast Asia if we are to deter and discourage further aggressive adventures by the Communists. Again I thank the Senator from Connecticut very much.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DODD. I yield to the Senator from New York.

Mr. JAVITS. The speech of the Senator from Connecticut is altogether too provocative and he has done his homework altogether too well for him to be complimented merely or a good job. It is a good job, however, and I should like to join my colleagues from Texas, South Dakota, and other States who have said so. Any time the Senator devotes himself to this kind of work, it helps the country.

The Senator from Connecticut has done a thorough job in presenting new ideas. This is the place for them, for we are not inhibited by the administration or its policies, especially when a Democrat puts forth a good idea.

One lack, as I have said before, is that retaliation has been pictured as a policy. It is not a policy. It is a reaction. We support it. We close ranks behind the President. We have common interests in it and in the losses. The losses break our hearts, but we try to do something about them. However, it is not a policy.

The Senator from Connecticut is trying to work out a policy. Whether it be a good or a bad policy, he is right in trying to work it out, because he proposes something positive, which takes us on a road where there is a big lack. That is what is causing doubts among the people as to whether this country is going to pull out of South Vietnam or go forward.

Granting all that I have said, I should like to ask the Senator some questions.

In the first place, the Senator does not deal with something that troubles many of us, and that is the question, "Is there still a majority in South Vietnam who do not want communism? Do a majority of the people want to fight against it?" We cannot fight a war without soldiers. That statement goes whether the fight is for an ideology or for freedom. That is one question we must always determine. We cannot put our head on other people's shoulders and assume they are "buddies." We may, for example, be bitterly opposed in Albania and other places, because the people there may want communism. They may like it. That is a very gnawing question with respect to South Vietnam: What is the attitude of the people of the country?

Only a declaration of the President of the United States can answer. I know that is so often said that it must sound like a cliché, but it is the President who has the vast reservoir of intelligence information. I think all of us, notwithstanding difference of party, would accept a declaration on the facts by the President of the United States. We are talking about the Presidency; it is not the man or party we are talking about. It is the office we are speaking of.

So, first, we ought to have a declaration and assurance, based on the whole combination of intelligence, diplomatic, and military advice, that a majority still favors fighting communism in that country.

I wish the Senator would comment on that point.

Mr. DODD. The Senator from New York was not in the Chamber when I commented on that point; but I pointed out that, from all the information I can get, the Vietnamese people are overwhelmingly in favor of resisting Communist aggressors.

I pointed out that the people of Vietnam have a long history of resistance against oppression. I know and I have pointed out that many people believe that the people of South Vietnam have no will to fight, and that communism has an attraction for them. But the record shows that at the several different periods in their history, when they have

been under attack, they have demonstrated their will to resist. It was the people of Vietnam who successfully resisted Genghis Khan. In our own time, they threw out the French. And they had been free for 500 years before the French occupation. They are proud of the fact that they threw the French out with their army of 500,000 men. So, I repeat that the Vietnamese people have historically displayed the will to resist and they are displaying the same will today. They behave very well, in fact. And the evidence is that they are overwhelmingly anti-Communist.

I pointed out that some people say the Vietnamese do not know anything about freedom, and that it is silly to talk about freedom for the Vietnamese. There are, however, three or four or five kinds of freedom.

The primitive peasant in the mountains knows what freedom is. Many of them have lived under communism, so they also know what slavery is.

The freedom enjoyed by the Vietnamese peasant I call a natural freedom. The peasant can plant his own seed, raise his crops and sell his produce. He has a family life, he can guide the upbringing of his children, he can elect local officials. If, in addition, the government builds a school, and dispensary, or supplies him with fertilizer, he thinks he is about as free as anybody in the world can be.

They do not have to have democratic, parliamentary freedom such as we have. I do not mean to detract from parliamentary democracy, but historically it is a refined form of democracy. However, it just is not true that the Vietnamese people do not know very much about freedom. They do know much about it. They have demonstrated that again and again.

There is another kind of freedom, and that is freedom from foreign domination. They know the meaning of this, too. As I said before, they defeated Genghis Khan, and they threw out the French. That they have the will to resist communism is borne out by the fact that 1 million have fled south. Roughly 5 million of them have, at one time or another, fought the Communists.

If we make allowance for wives and children, that would make a figure of 9 or 10 out of 14 million. The percentage may even be higher.

Again I repeat that the Vietnamese people do have the will to resist. All they want from us is aid to counterbalance the technicians and personnel, and weapons that the Communists have been pouring in to support the Vietcong guerrillas.

I cannot give the Senator from New York the declaration which he wisely says we ought to have on Vietnam. I cannot speak in that capacity. I can say that, from my information—and I cited it—I am convinced that the facts are as I have stated them.

Mr. JAVITS. The Senator referred to the fact that the answer to my question is mentioned in his speech. I was not present in the Chamber all the time he was making his speech, but I have read it. I would not have presumed to ask the Senator these questions had I not read it.

The purpose of my questions is more for emphasis.

The Senator from Connecticut has already answered a collateral question in the course of his last reply; namely, whether the South Vietnamese want our help.

I am pleased to hear the Senator say that a declaration by the President on this subject would be a good thing. It is necessary. I am not critical, but that does not stop us from urging what would be good for the country and the world.

Mr. DODD. I knew the Senator was present. I was aware of his presence while I was speaking.

I think it is good to do anything that would help our people understand where they are, and what we are trying to do in Vietnam.

Mr. JAVITS. One big point being made is on the question of negotiation. The Senator has said that the demand that we negotiate now over Vietnam is akin to having asked Churchill to negotiate with the Germans at the time of Dunkirk and President Truman to negotiate at the time of Pusan. I assume that also goes for President Kennedy with respect to Castro.

Let me ask the Senator this question, which concerns a Presidential declaration. I do not know what the answer of the Senator will be, therefore I may be making a mistake, because a trial lawyer should not ask a question to which he does not already know the answer, but I believe that—

Mr. DODD. That is not what is worrying me. I am worrying as to whether I know the answer.

Mr. JAVITS. It is important that we explore each other's minds to see whether we agree with each other's point of view.

As the President has stated, we are ready to negotiate. We are ready to negotiate if negotiations do not represent a sellout of the people of South Vietnam or a sellout of the cause of freedom.

I should like that formula better, because this is a big question in the world: "Is the United States in a mood for unconditional surrender?" The Senator and every newspaper editor in the world know precisely what I mean by that.

What are we saying here—that someday, somehow, as in the case of the Berlin airlift, or other emergencies which looked as though they would never be settled, some way will be found out of the situation? The same thing occurred in Korea. The day came when there was some kind of negotiation, good, bad, or indifferent. Therefore, would the Senator, consistent with his conscience and his views, subscribe to the proposal that we should assert that we are ready to negotiate, provided it is not a sellout negotiation and not a negotiation for face-saving purposes because we wish to find a good reason to pull out, but that we are ready to negotiate honestly and legitimately for a political settlement of the issue, now, tomorrow, or at any other time?

Mr. DODD. Perhaps I could answer the Senator's question better and more directly if he would tell me what it is that he would suggest we negotiate.

Mr. JAVITS. I suggest that we negotiate the political future of South Vietnam, or that we encourage South Vietnam to negotiate it, in or out of the United Nations, in or out of the Geneva conventions, so long as the conditions which are the framework of the negotiations do not show the United States to be pulling out of South Vietnam.

Mr. DODD. What I am worried about is the fact that we already have an agreement. We have already negotiated one. It has been violated. What do we negotiate? Do we sit around a table and say, "You have broken your agreement. Stop doing it. Get back and obey its terms." I suppose that could be described as negotiation in a crude sense. But it seems to me that this is all we have to negotiate.

I do not like to use the term "negotiation" when what we are really talking about is a breach of covenant. If I have a contract with the Senator from New York and I should break it, I believe that he would use stronger language than negotiation.

I do not wish to be evasive. If it would help to sit down and talk with the Communists, I would be in favor of it. But, I have serious doubt that it would help us in this crisis. Certainly, in a general sense, the President has stated that we are always willing to negotiate.

If there is anything, really, to negotiate, and if it would help, I am sure the President would do it.

I would put it a little differently. We do not know what there is to negotiate. We already have an agreement. We say, "We have an agreement which you have violated and which has caused some trouble. All you have to do is to retire from your aggressions, and cease attacking your neighbor." If the Communists are willing to talk about this, then I suppose we should do so.

Mr. JAVITS. I have suggested the framework for negotiations, and let me say that the Senator has just made what could be an excellent opening statement by the United States in such a negotiation. I believe that within that framework, the Senator and I could agree.

But let me make one further comment on this subject which is important. In debate and in fortifying our own conscience on this issue, we must not forget that we are supposed to have allies in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, in mutual defense agreements, even in the offer of the Japanese to mediate. Perhaps, if we could suggest something, I would most enthusiastically join the Senator in a plea for vigorous action by the administration to enlist the participation of our allies. If any such vigorous action is in fact being taken, it is so quiet, so submerged, so subdued, that even we who are extremely sensitive and have many places where we can get information, have heard nothing about it.

I believe it is in this area that we should push and press. Bringing in our allies does not have so many of the connotations of negotiations with the other side—that is, with the Communists; but we really should make massive demands and keep at it eternally to get help in this situation, so that Asians may get

into the struggle, which is a struggle for the whole of Asia.

Mr. DODD. I wholly agree with the Senator from New York. I have said so many times years ago.

Mr. JAVITS. The Senator is correct.

Mr. DODD. When I came back from the trip which I made, I referred to it on the floor of the Senate. I then thought it was urgent and necessary. It is even more urgent and necessary now. I completely agree.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Connecticut yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MUSKIE in the chair). Does the Senator from Connecticut yield to the Senator from Oklahoma?

Mr. DODD. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. HARRIS].

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, I wish to associate myself with the remarks of the Senator from Connecticut and to commend him for the excellent thinking through which he has done on this grave problem and for the presentation of his very important recommendations in this critical situation. I commend him particularly for the overall position that what we are doing is so much better than two or three of the other alternatives which are available to us, among which are pulling out altogether from South Vietnam or neutralization without adequate safeguards, which would result in the same end as withdrawal from South Vietnam and eventual withdrawal from southeast Asia.

I believe that a general debate on this and all other matters of foreign policy are of great benefit, and help the people of this country establish a general consensus, which we as public officials have the responsibility not only to discover but also to lead toward. Nevertheless, it seems to me that we must be careful that we do not by our statements indicate to the people of southeast Asia, or to those who are our adversaries there, that this country plans any kind of negotiation which would result in our abandonment of the people of South Vietnam and, by any such statements, perhaps, accomplish the same results which many fear—that is, that we would force the administration to ever-increasing military efforts to keep those people from thinking that we are going to pull out.

I believe that is the greatest danger in the dialog on this subject. I believe that every Senator and others who have spoken have had much to add, but I especially wish to commend the Senator from Connecticut and to associate myself with his strong recommendations, particularly in regard to the intensification of political warfare in that troubled sector, and the encouragement of greater collective action by other people of the Asiatic nations.

Mr. DODD. I am deeply grateful to the Senator from Oklahoma for his comments.

Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Connecticut yield?

Mr. DODD. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Oklahoma.

Mr. MONRONEY. I should like to join my distinguished junior colleague in complimenting the able and distinguished Senator from Connecticut on his stand and the position he has taken in regard to Vietnam.

I had the great good fortune to represent the Senate in a visit to southeast Asia between Thanksgiving and Christmas for 3 days—to make the most of some 3 days by interviewing men who had served in that theater. Later, I talked to many who have served throughout the entire Far East theater of operations. I am convinced, as the Senator from Connecticut is convinced, that an attempt to arrange a negotiated settlement at this time would be folly in the extreme.

The Communists could use these so-called negotiations merely as a stalking-horse to get their apparatus more firmly at work or to gain time, or to gain place, or gain a position, or gain land, or gain in the conflict. I spent some time in Korea—3 days there. The only reason the Korean armistice has worked is the fact that we have had military power back of the 38th parallel, in a commanding position in the mountains, and have got air cover behind that, and tanks behind the air cover to make that line stick.

Otherwise the armistice agreement would not have been worth the paper on which it had been written, if we had had to depend on the Communists. Then it was the Korean Communists; this time it is the Vietnamese Communists. They are all of the same breed of cats. They may differ in their ideologies, as between the Chinese Reds and the Russian Reds, but they are both Reds; they are both Communists. In 99 percent of the cases, agreements are made by them for the very purpose of breaking them and misleading and tricking their opponents, and without any hope of having them honor their written commitments in any manner, shape, or form.

I am surprised that so many Members of the Senate, with good and peaceful intentions, invariably are taken in by this absolutely phony argument, which bears the hallmark of deceit and intent at misrepresentation and the obvious purpose of deceiving. I am surprised that it should fool anyone. I regret very much that so many of my able and distinguished colleagues in the Senate, who are in a position to know better, seem to think that because peace is so wonderful and so much to be sought after we should allow the Communists to trick us into negotiations, which would be used to exploit us for their purpose. The way to get peace is to try to improve our position, to be able to proceed from a standpoint of strength, rather than from a standpoint of weakness. When we reach that point we shall not be laying ourselves open to helping them in their objective to propagandize themselves and the alleged position that they have in Vietnam.

I compliment the distinguished Senator on his firm position.

Mr. DODD. I thank the Senator.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DODD. I yield to the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I am extremely delighted to state that my views have in the past coincided with the views of the Senator from Connecticut and coincide with them today. It is my recollection that in the Korean negotiations, the proposal to negotiate was not made by the United States, but by the North Koreans. Does the Senator have a recollection on that point?

Mr. DODD. That is my recollection.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I am quite certain that that is correct. Now it is proposed that we negotiate, and those who make the proposal used the analogy of what happened in Korea. Actually there is no analogy.

I heard the discussion about terrorism I would like to hear the Senator's view on whether the terrorism is in the main practically and in completeness the acts of the guerrillas of North Vietnam against the peasants in the hamlets in South Vietnam.

Mr. DODD. I do not want to be understood as altogether absolving the South Vietnamese from any acts of terror. Unhappily, these things have occurred on both sides. However, I believe that the overwhelming number of acts of terror are chargeable directly to the Communists. There is no doubt about that. Terror is a part of their policy; whereas to some extent it may be true of South Vietnam, it is not the stated policy.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I agree completely with the Senator from Connecticut that it is their technique to intimidate and terrorize the peasants working in the fields and living serenely in their homes, descending upon them at night to decapitate their leaders and place their separated heads on poles, so that the peasants will begin to fear that if they take up the position of chieftan or leader they will likewise suffer the same fate.

Mr. DODD. That is why it is done.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I heard the discussion between the Senator from Connecticut and the Senator from Illinois about drawing a lesson from what happened following the violation of treaties going back to 1939. Unless we take a look at these incidents of appeasement we shall miss completely the lessons that must be drawn from past conduct in order to guide ourselves in the future.

Mr. DODD. That is very true. I do not offer these analogies because I think they are exact parallels. The Senator understands that, I am sure. There are always some differences. I know that. However, we learn from what happened in the past, certainly from what happened in the near past, and we study these happenings in order to learn from them. If others made mistakes, we should try to learn how to avoid repeating them. I drew these analogies for that purpose. There are other examples in history—these are not the only ones—but the ones that I drew on are the latest and perhaps the most pertinent.

Mr. LAUSCHE. There was the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations covenants, the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, and the Lucarno Treaty. All of them

contained provisions which were violated by the Japanese as early as 1922.

Mr. DODD. Yes.

Mr. LAUSCHE. By Hitler beginning about 1932, and by Mussolini at the same time. In instance after instance it was thought that if we would give in, it would be the end of it.

Mr. DODD. That is true. I referred to Nuremberg and what we discovered there. One of the things we learned was that at the time Hitler ordered his troops to occupy the Rhineland, he had given instructions that if they met any opposition at all they should immediately retreat. How easy it would have been for us to stop him cold then. There was considerable dissatisfaction with Hitler in his own military circles, and, as we know, there was an attempt made later to get rid of him.

We failed in that situation to take the appropriate steps. Our failure enabled Hitler to remain in power.

There were those who said, "Oh, no; war would result if we tried to stop Hitler now, and it would be terrible." We did not do what we should have done, and in that way a terrible war was brought on.

Mr. LAUSCHE. It has been suggested that we negotiate the future political status of South Vietnam. What does that mean? Does it mean that we should negotiate a new type of government for South Vietnam?

Mr. DODD. I do not know. I do not believe that the Senator from New York meant it that way. As I understood him, he made a good point. I am sure the Senator from Ohio shares my feeling on that point. As I understood the Senator from New York, we do not want to do anything that will give the impression that we are for unconditional surrender and, on the other hand, we do not want to give the impression that we will have nothing to do with the Communists. That is all that the Senator from New York meant, I am sure.

Mr. LAUSCHE. There is now in existence a pact by which we have abided and by which the South Vietnamese have abided, but which the North Vietnamese have violated.

Mr. DODD. The Senator is correct.

Mr. LAUSCHE. That is the Geneva Pact of 1954.

Mr. DODD. The Senator is correct.

Mr. LAUSCHE. In addition, to that, a new agreement was made in 1962, in Laos.

Mr. DODD. Yes.

Mr. LAUSCHE. There we followed the policy of negotiation.

Mr. DODD. Yes. I believe it was in 1961.

Mr. LAUSCHE. May I ask whether the Laotian agreement worked out as it was anticipated it would work out by the sponsors of it?

Mr. DODD. Not at all. It could not have worked out worse than it did. For the people of Laos and the people of southeast Asia and for us it has been a complete farce. It has been repeatedly violated, and it is being violated every day. It is another case of our inability to trust those people.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I commend the Senator from Connecticut for his presenta-

tion, because I believe what he has said and what others have said on this point will bring home to the minds of the American people that what is involved is not merely wanting to be in southeast Asia, but that our national security is involved. In my judgment, words to the contrary, are not at this time helpful to the achievement of the common objective that we seek to achieve.

Mr. DODD. I am grateful to the Senator for his compliment, which I do not deserve, but which I enjoy.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

APPOINTMENT BY THE VICE PRESIDENT

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TYDINGS in the chair). On behalf of the Vice President, pursuant to Public Law 87-758, the Chair announces the appointment of the Senator from Vermont [Mr. PROUTY] as a member of the National Fisheries Center and Aquarium Advisory Board for a 4-year term.

INCREASE OF FUND FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I move that the Senate resume to the consideration of Calendar No. 64, House bill 45.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TYDINGS in the chair). The bill will be stated by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 45) to amend the Inter-American Development Bank Act to authorize the United States to participate in an increase in the resources of the Fund for Special Operations of the Inter-American Development Bank.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Arkansas.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I wish to make a brief statement in support of S. 805, a bill to amend the Inter-American Development Bank Act to authorize the United States to participate in an increase in the resources of the Bank's Fund for Special Operations.

I say that the statement will be short. I do so not as an indication of the strength of my support for the measure—indeed, I thoroughly approve of this bill—but in order to spare Senators a complicated and wearisome recital of factual material. A plethora of facts and figures will be found in the printed material on Senator's desks. As with data on any financial institution, there is virtually no end to the figures, charts, and tables. Oversimplification of such material in this case may be a service rather than a danger.

I have said that I heartily approve of this bill, and I am sure that my reasons for this position will be shared by a great number of Senators, for this is the kind of foreign assistance activity in which the United States should be engaged. The purpose of the bill is easily and fully

identifiable. The financing is of a kind which is particularly suited to the needs of friendly countries. We can readily keep track of the process of lending through ample public information on projects and their results. Self-help and responsibility are engendered through the participation of the countries being assisted. Criteria for eligibility are kept high. And the United States does not become embroiled in political squabbling or become the target of resentment and unseemly pressures.

However, before elaborating on any of these points it is necessary to give at least a very simplified explanation of the purposes and effects of this proposed legislation. We should start, I think, with the important fact that Latin American countries by and large are in a position where they find it increasingly difficult to service loans for economic and social development on conventional or hard terms. In addition, many vitally necessary projects in the so-called infrastructure category must be undertaken as a precursor to overall economic development. Since these projects do not represent an immediate or short-term economic return, they generally cannot be financed through ordinary banking operations. It almost goes without saying that loans for social projects such as housing, technical training, and education require special kinds of financing.

The need for this kind of lending activity was recognized at the time of the Inter-American Development Bank's establishment 5 years ago, and a Fund for Special Operations was created as a completely separate window of the Bank to service this requirement. At the same time, the initial resources made available to this special Fund were quite modest in comparison with the amounts subscribed toward the ordinary conventional lending operations of the Bank. Moreover, it was not then recognized how closely intertwined were the fields of economic and social development, and the Fund for Special Operations was not designed as an underwriter of social projects. To fill the resulting gap, the United States in 1961 unilaterally contributed a large sum to be administered through yet a third window by the Inter-American Bank; this window has been known as the Social Progress Trust Fund. A total of \$525 million has been made available to the social fund by our country.

Now we confront a situation in which the resources contributed to these two funds will be completely exhausted within the next 2 to 3 months. A plan to deal with this problem was formally presented within the Bank and accepted by its governors approximately 10 months ago. The proposal has been pending before the 20-member governments of the Bank since last summer. In the resolution which the Bank's governors recommended for acceptance, it was decided that the Fund for Special Operations would be replenished by a sum of \$900 million over a period of 3 years, and that the United States would make no further contribution to the Social Progress Trust Fund, in effect virtually closing this third window of the

Bank. Along with this decision, however, came full agreement that the functions of the Social Progress Trust Fund would henceforth be merged into the Fund for Special Operations, and that social projects would be considered equally along with economic ones.

The share of the United States in this increased contribution to the Fund for Special Operations would total \$750 million, to be made available in three installments of \$250 million each in the years 1965, 1966, and 1967. The Latin American countries would contribute the other \$150 million equivalent in three annual installments. All these sums would be contributed in the form of national currencies, involving no transfer of gold, and a letter of credit could be substituted for cash until expenditures were actually required for the Bank's approved projects.

Although it is obvious that the United States is the only member country of the Bank able to provide the needed foreign exchange, some explanation nevertheless is required to clarify the reasons for what may seem a disproportionate contribution by this country. Basic to this explanation is the fact that the two funds which have been making loans on flexible terms are being merged, and that the Latin American countries did not in the past contribute to the Social Progress Trust Fund. Therefore, while it seems that the relative percentage of the Latin American contribution to the Fund for Special Operations has dropped, the point is that the other member countries of the Bank will be making a larger relative contribution than they did to the two funds in the past. Beyond this, it should be stressed that the sense of participation and consequent responsibility accruing to these countries through their contributions is certainly not in proportion to the relative size of their participation. It is this feeling of sharing in a joint venture which I am sure is responsible for much of the success of the Inter-American Bank—and it certainly has been a definite success.

Now a few words about the lending terms to be adopted by the expanded Fund for Special Operations. To a considerable extent these terms will strike middle ground between those which heretofore have been standard in the special fund and the Social Progress Trust Fund. It is anticipated that the expanded Fund for Special Operations will maintain a substantial degree of flexibility in its lending arrangements, but that the average terms will be as follows: Loans may be repaid in the currency of the borrower with provision for maintenance of value; maturities will range from 20 to 30 years; total interests and charges will be around 3 to 4 percent, broken down between the interest payable in soft currency and a dollar service charge of three-fourths of 1 percent.

Yet it should be stressed that these are average figures. While the softest terms would not go below the minimum figures, there is ample flexibility for the Bank to be enabled to arrange harder terms when a situation seems to justify this course. It should also be emphasized

that the stringent criteria for eligibility of social projects maintained by the Social Progress Trust Fund should be adopted by the expanded Fund for Special Operations.

The Committee on Foreign Relations approved S. 805 by a vote of 15 to 1, and there has been almost no public opposition to this bill. Nevertheless, I think it would be useful for me to anticipate some of the questions which may occur to my colleagues at this time. Many of these questions, I am sure, will revolve around the balance-of-payments issue. This interrogation certainly will be justified.

In response, let me say first that the entire contribution of the United States authorized by this bill will be subject to "tied loan" provisions, whereby most of the money will be spent for the purchase of goods and services produced in this country. According to the testimony of Secretary of the Treasury Dillon, between 80 and 90 percent of our contemplated contribution will actually be tied. Under this computation the maximum annual effect on our balance of payments could be no more than \$50 million in each of 3 years. However, judging from our experience with the Social Progress Trust Fund in the past, with a rate of tied lending ranging above 90 percent, it is highly unlikely that anything like the maximum upper figure of \$50 million will be reached.

A second point is that, because of the use of the letter-of-credit procedure, the balance-of-payments impact will be delayed and will result from the rate of actual expenditures, rather than being related to a particular year. Under these circumstances, it is quite possible that the actual balance-of-payments effects of this specific proposal will spread out over a longer period than the 3 years, and may reach only one-half or even one-third of the maximum annual rate of \$50 million.

There is a third point to be considered in this connection. While the initial effects of the Inter-American Bank's ordinary capital operations on our balance of payments were adverse, in 1963 there was actually a favorable balance of almost \$22 million for the United States as a result of these regular operations. Beyond this, a distinction must be made between cash payments which affect the balance of payments, and commitment or authorization figures which do not; thus, for example, only about \$230 million of the \$675 million the United States has contributed to the FSO and the SPTF—most of it tied to purchases here—has entered into the payments equation.

It will be seen, therefore, that no simple calculations will easily reveal the actual effects of this legislation on our balance of payments, but that there is every reason to believe that the adverse impact will be small and will be kept to a minimal figure—probably on the order of \$12 or \$13 million a year, if I am forced to make an educated guess. In any case, if we are tempted to make the payments issue the touchstone of our foreign policies, I submit we should confine the temptation to areas where conditions

seem adverse to our interests. The last place where we should apply such erroneous doctrine is in an area of particular interest to us—Latin America—and toward an institution which has successfully promoted that interest.

I also realize that there are some who have reservations about the merits of the multilateral approach to development lending, and that a major factor in their thinking is the question of the degree to which the United States theoretically loses control over its contributions. I do not intend at this time to embark on a long discussion of the point—even though I dispute its validity—because the question really does not arise in connection with the bill before us. The fact of the matter is that the United States, with about 42 percent of the voting strength of the Bank's members, in effect has a veto power over the activities of the Fund for Special Operations. For the bank charter requires a two-thirds vote of approval before any loan commitment may be made.

One final anticipation of an objection may be worth citing. There are some who believe that the possibility of expropriation is a critical issue at the present time, even though there has been no occasion for the Bank to be involved in such a problem. Here again, the voting strength of the United States within the Bank gives assurance that there would be no conflict between our bilateral policy and our participation in multilateral activities, in the event that the so-called Hickenlooper amendment might be applied within the context of our foreign aid program. Moreover, I am sure that the Bank members themselves, with their stake in the activities of the institution, would be strongly opposed to any member government's taking an action which could adversely affect all its partners.

Mr. President, I will not continue dealing with essentially negative factors connected with the proposed legislation because I believe that this is one of the most positive and fruitful items of legislation likely to come before us in this session of the Congress.

We have had moderately heartening news in recent months about the trend of events within the Alliance for Progress. I think we are at last developing some momentum in the direction of bringing stability and economic and social progress to most areas of our hemisphere. Especially at a time when we are debating the question of a possible American overextension in areas of Asia and Africa, it seems even more vital for us to make sure that conditions are favorable to our interests close at home. I think there is ample evidence that the Inter-American Development Bank is one of the main instruments for achieving this mutually held concept of hemispheric cooperation and progress. And I believe that we should make available the funds and talents to keep up our momentum in this area.

I urge my colleagues to register a heavy vote in favor of S. 805.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. ELLENDER. Is it the view of the Senator from Arkansas that in section

14(a) of the pending measure, the consolidation he speaks of will take place by virtue of the acceptance of a resolution that is now before the Governors?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. ELLENDER. Has the Senator a copy of that resolution? If so, will he make it a part of the record?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The text of the resolution is in the hearings. I do not have a separate copy. Perhaps I could clarify my statement by saying that the purpose of the resolution is to discontinue the separate social fund of the Bank but to merge the type of lending that was formerly done—

Mr. ELLENDER. In other words, instead of three windows, there would be two windows?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes. On page 20 of the hearings is "Annex A—Resolution—Increase of Resources of the Fund for Special Operations." Would the Senator like to have me read it, or would he prefer that I place it in the RECORD?

Mr. ELLENDER. The Senator may place it in the RECORD.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD "Annex A—Resolution—Increase of Resources of the Fund for Special Operations," as it appears on page 20 of the hearings on S. 805.

There being no objection, Annex A was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ANNEX A

RESOLUTION—INCREASE OF RESOURCES OF THE FUND FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS

(Adopted at Panama City, Panama, April 16, 1964)

Considering that an increase in the resources of the Fund for Special Operations is urgently needed for the reasons set forth in the annex of this resolution;

The Board of Governors recommends that the members take such action as may be necessary and appropriate to give effect to the following proposal:

PROPOSED RESOLUTION

The Board of Governors resolves that—

(a) Subject to the provisions of this resolution, the resources of the Fund for Special Operations shall be increased in the equivalent of US\$900 million through additional contributions by the members, as follows:

[In thousands of dollars or the equivalent]

Argentina.....	US\$33,402
Bolivia.....	2,682
Brazil.....	33,402
Chile.....	9,171
Colombia.....	9,165
Costa Rica.....	1,341
Dominican Republic.....	1,788
Ecuador.....	1,788
El Salvador.....	1,341
Guatemala.....	1,788
Haiti.....	1,341
Honduras.....	1,341
Mexico.....	21,474
Nicaragua.....	1,341
Panama.....	1,341
Paraguay.....	1,341
Peru.....	4,473
United States.....	750,000
Uruguay.....	3,582
Venezuela.....	17,898
Total.....	US\$900,000

(b) Each member shall make its additional contribution in its own currency, and the en-

tire amount of each contribution shall constitute national currency to which the provisions of article V, sections 1(c) and 4, of the agreement establishing the Bank, shall be applicable.

(c) The additional contributions shall be made in three equal installments payable, respectively, on or before December 31, 1964, December 31, 1965, and December 31, 1966, or such later dates as the Board of Executive Directors may determine.

(d) None of the additional contributions shall become payable unless at least 14 members whose increased contributions total not less than US\$860 million shall each have deposited with the Bank, on or before December 31, 1964, or such later date as the Board of Executive Directors may determine, an appropriate instrument setting forth their agreement to their making the contribution to the increase in the Fund for Special Operations in accordance with the terms of this resolution.

(e) In the future, the Bank shall include in the operations of the Fund financing for social development purposes, including those heretofore financed through the Social Progress Trust Fund. Similarly, the Board of Executive Directors in establishing financing policies for the Fund shall take into consideration the policies which have guided the operations of the Social Progress Trust Fund.

(Approved in the Fourth Plenary Meeting on April 16, 1964.)

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION ON THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL RESOURCES OF THE BANK

1. Background

1.1. At its Fourth Annual Meeting held in Caracas in April 1963, the Board of Governors of the Bank approved the following resolution (AG-6/63):

Considering the fact that the Board of Governors has adopted the resolution recommending that the member countries take the measures necessary for the approval of the resolutions presented in the report of the Board of Executive Directors, of March 18, 1963, entitled "Proposal for an Increase in the Resources of the Inter-American Development Bank";

Having in mind that said report points out that further consideration should be given at an appropriate time to additional increases in the resources of the Fund for Special Operations;

The Board of Governors Resolves:

1. To express its gratification for the report of the Board of Executive Directors to the Board of Governors and for the adoption of the aforesaid resolution.

2. To recommend that each member country take the legislative and administrative actions necessary to make the proposed increases effective as soon as possible.

3. To request that the Board of Executive Directors, bearing in mind the desirability of strengthening the Bank's operations in carrying out the basic objectives of the Alliance for Progress and in the light of the needs of the member countries for the financing of economic and social development, submit a report to the Board of Governors on the future relationships of the Fund for Special Operations to other activities of the Bank and on the sufficiency of the Fund's resources.

1.2. The need for considering the future relationship of the Fund for Special Operations to the other activities of the Bank and the sufficiency of the Fund's resources arises from the existence of three separate and distinct sources of funds under which the Bank, either in its own capacity or in the capacity of trustee, finances programs and projects dedicated to the economic and social development of its member countries. These sources of funds are the Ordinary Capital Resources of the Bank, the Fund for Special Operations and the Social Progress

Trust Fund. The Ordinary Capital Resources and the Fund for Special Operations constitute the Bank's own resources subscribed by its member countries while the Social Progress Trust Fund has been entrusted to the Bank by the United States for administration.

2. Ordinary capital resources

Initially, the Bank's authorized Ordinary Capital was \$850 million of which the equivalent of \$400 million constituted paid-in capital and the equivalent of \$450 million was callable when required to meet the Bank's obligations as provided in the agreement establishing the Bank. The Ordinary Capital is used to make loans repayable in the currency loaned on normal banking terms comparable to those of other international lending institutions of a similar nature. Because Cuba did not become a member of the Bank, total capital subscriptions amounted to \$813,160,000, of which the equivalent of \$381,580,000 was paid-in capital and the equivalent of \$431,580,000 constituted callable capital. On January 28, 1964, the Board of Governors approved an increase of \$1 billion in the callable capital stock to strengthen the Bank's guarantee resources for the purpose of enhancing its borrowing capacity. The actual subscriptions are to be effected over a 2-year period. The increase is expected to enable the Bank to raise sufficient funds in the world's capital markets to cover its needs for normal banking type loans until 1967. A more detailed description covering this aspect of the Bank's needs and operations is contained in the report of the Board of Executive Directors to the Board of Governors of April 1963 entitled "Proposal for an Increase in the Resources of the Inter-American Development Bank."

3. Fund for Special Operations

3.1. The agreement establishing the Bank was drafted during the first 3 months of 1959 and the record of the proceedings reveals that the Fund for Special Operations was incorporated in the agreement in recognition of the need to make loans on terms and conditions adapted to meet special circumstances arising in specific countries or with respect to specific projects. The inclusion of the Fund for Special Operations reflected the desire of the member countries to create a mechanism for financing not only projects in those countries whose foreign exchange debt capacity was in question but also certain so-called overhead projects without which the process of economic development is not possible. The deliberations of the drafting committee indicate that it was expected that the Fund would finance both "economic overhead" projects such as roads, ports, and power facilities, and so-called social overhead projects, such as public health, housing, and educational facilities. It was recognized that the latter type of investments, despite their enormous impact on development, had been previously relegated to a secondary priority in international financing of the needs of less developed countries. Indeed, the language establishing the Fund (art. IV, sec. 1) "for the making of loans on terms and conditions appropriate for dealing with special circumstances arising in specific countries or with respect to specific projects," was designed to give broad scope of eligibility for projects or programs to be financed with the resources of the Fund.

3.2. The Fund for Special Operations was established with initial resources in the amount of \$146,316,000, of which \$100 million was contributed by the United States and \$46,316,000 by the Latin American members of the Bank. Each member was required to pay its contribution one-half in gold or dollars and one-half in its national currency. As of March 31, 1964, the Board of Executive Directors had approved 38 loans

for a total equivalent to \$124.1 million, including 1 loan for \$640,000 for a private industrial enterprise; 10 loans for \$50.8 million to development institutions; 4 loans for \$19.5 million for water supply and sewerage; and 23 loans for \$53.1 million to government or government enterprises, including loans for highway projects, farm settlement and colonization, mining, technical assistance, irrigation, electric power, and industrial projects. The "Proposal for an Increase of the Resources of the Inter-American Development Bank" submitted by the Board of Executive Directors to the Board of Governors in April 1963, referred to in paragraph 2 above, gives a detailed exposition of the activities carried out under the Fund and concludes that the activities of the Fund require additional dollar resources at the rate, at the minimum, of \$50 million per year. On the basis of this report, as a 1-year measure, the Board of Governors, on January 28, 1964, approved a proposal to increase the resources of the Fund by \$73,158,000.

4. Social Progress Trust Fund

4.1. The Social Progress Trust Fund was created pursuant to an agreement entered into between the United States and the Bank on June 19, 1961. Its genesis lay in the initiative of Dr. Juscelino Kubitschek, then President of Brazil, as expressed in his proposal for Operation Pan America. In July 1960, the "Declaration of Newport" of then President Eisenhower stated it to be the policy of the United States to cooperate with the countries of Latin America in enlarged programs of economic and social development. In September of the same year, the U.S. Congress authorized \$500 million to carry out the principles of the Declaration of Newport. Armed with this authority, the U.S. delegation to the third meeting of the Committee of 21 at Bogotá, Colombia, in the same month, proposed a new program for hemispheric social development.

4.2. The resulting agreement, the "Act of Bogotá," was an intermediate step between the proposed Operation Pan America and the Alliance for Progress. The act outlined a broad program for social development, and proposed the Special Fund for Social Development, with the Inter-American Development Bank designated as the principal administering institution. It made recommendations for the economic development of the hemisphere and called for a special meeting to draw up plans and coordinate them with the activities of other international organizations.

4.3. The Act of Bogotá was a great step forward in the strengthening of Inter-American unity, but it was not as far reaching as the principal objective of Operation Pan America—a broad cooperative program of economic and social development. On March 13, 1961, President John F. Kennedy proposed a new policy with these words:

"If we are to meet a problem so staggering in its dimensions, our approach must itself be equally bold, an approach consistent with the majestic concept of Operation Pan America. Therefore I have called on all the people of the hemisphere to join in a new Alliance for Progress—Alianza para el Progreso—a vast cooperative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work and land, health and schools—techo, trabajo y tierra, salud y escuela."

Five months later, representatives of the OAS assembled in Uruguay for the signing of the "Charter of Punta del Este," which established the Alliance for Progress as an endeavor of all the member countries.

4.4. In May 1961, the Congress of the United States appropriated \$500 million to implement the Act of Bogotá. Of this amount \$394 million were assigned to a Social Progress Trust Fund to be administered by the Bank under a trust fund agree-

ment. This agreement authorized the Bank to make loans in the fields of land settlement and improved land use, housing for low-income groups, community water supply and sanitation facilities, and supplementary financing of facilities for advanced education and training related to economic and social development and to provide technical assistance related to these fields and to the mobilization of domestic resources. The Bank accepted the administration of the Fund for these purposes, deeming it to be consistent with the provisions of the agreement establishing the Bank and to strengthen the efforts of the Bank to foster balanced economic growth and greater social progress.

4.5. In February 1964, the United States and the Bank signed a protocol whereby \$131 million was made available for the Social Progress Trust Fund, in addition to the original resources of \$394 million.

4.6. As of October 1, 1963, the approximate second anniversary of actual operations under the Social Progress Trust Fund, the Bank in its capacity as trustee had authorized 65 loans in the amount of \$357.9 million from the Fund or a rate of commitment approaching \$200 million per year, a figure which the Board considers would be a reasonable measure of minimum effective operation in the future. In the last part of 1963 and the first months of the current year the lack of resources definitely available for the future caused a reduction in the level of commitments. It may be expected that with the new resources now available the rate of authorization will rise and that the funds will be entirely exhausted before the end of the current calendar year. The loans committed as of March 31, 1964, fall in the following categories:

Social Progress Trust Fund

	Number	Amount (million dollars)
Loans for—		
Improved land use, land settlement, agriculture credits, etc.	21	68.6
Housing for low-income groups	21	168.7
Community water supply and sanitation	24	118.3
Facilities for advanced education	9	16.2
Total	75	371.8

5. Possibility of combining operations

5.1. The Act of Bogotá dealt separately with "Measures for Social Improvement" (ch. I) and "Measures for Economic Development" (ch. III). Given the fact that existing international lending institutions in general had not financed social development projects, that the Inter-American Development Bank, the primary mechanism for the administration of the Fund, was in the earliest stages of its existence, and that the concept of making funds available for this purpose represented a major change of policy on the part of the donor of the Fund as well as the beneficiaries, it can easily be understood why the Social Progress Trust Fund was created as an entity separate from the Bank's own resources. The provisions of the Trust Fund Agreement reflect the provisions of the Act of Bogotá, not only in terms of the fields to which the activities of the Fund apply but also with respect to the separate nature of its existence.

5.2. Subsequent to the creation of the Social Progress Trust Fund, the Charter of Punta del Este, establishing the Alliance for Progress, stated that "it is the purpose of the Alliance for Progress to enlist the full energies of the peoples and governments of the American republics in a great cooperative effort to accelerate the economic and social development of the participating countries of Latin America, so that they may achieve maximum levels of well-being, with equal

opportunities for all, in democratic societies adapted to their own needs and desires."

The charter declares the interrelationship of economic and social development and incorporates in title II the measures whereby development of both kinds might be achieved, including the role of the Bank in the financing thereof. It was recognized that economic development and social development are but two sides of the same coin. Ill-housed, poorly educated, and disease-ridden farmers and workers have neither the capacity nor the incentive to participate responsibly in organized political and economic life. Therefore, the Charter of Punta del Este emphasizes the need for fostering both social and economic improvements.

5.3. From the Bank's experience in the operations of the two funds it can be seen that the activities carried on under the Fund for Special Operations and the Social Progress Trust Fund have much in common. Loans from both funds are made on liberal long terms with low interest rates, usually are repayable in the currency of the borrower, and are for projects for which financing from the Bank's Ordinary Resources is not feasible. The primary difference, if any, relates to the designation of the Trust Fund for "social development," although it carries out operations, such as in agriculture and water supply, which have a direct economic impact, while the loans of the Fund for special operations have been directed chiefly to economic development, but with operations like water supply and sewerage which have important social effects. The interdependence of both concepts is well illustrated by the fact that parallel loans have been made from the resources of the Fund for Special Operations in the area of land use and land settlement and potable water and sewerage. Since the Trust Fund came into effect very early in the Bank's existence, it was never necessary to consider whether housing projects would be eligible for financing from the resources of the Fund for Special Operations although the Bank's Board of Executive Directors in discussions setting forth the operating policies of the Bank in early 1960 included projects for low-cost housing among those eligible for financing from the Fund for Special Operations. In short, sufficient flexibility exists in the Bank's charter to permit the financing with the resources of the Fund for Special Operations of the types of projects now assisted through the Social Progress Trust Fund.

5.4. As confirmed by the Charter of Punta del Este, it has been the absence of credit for agriculture, low-cost housing, potable water, adequate sewerage systems and educational facilities which is one of the elements creating, in the terms of the Bank's constituent agreement, "special circumstances" requiring financing from the Fund for Special Operations on terms and conditions appropriately flexible. A single fund for the financing of such special operations would obviously substantially simplify operations and make them more effective. Administratively, it could be expected to lessen the cost of operation, particularly in the area of reports and separate accounting systems. As a matter of policy, a single fund to which all members contribute and which is multi-lateral in character will accurately reflect the cooperative nature and spirit of the Bank and the Alliance for Progress.

5.5. In considering the need for an increase in the resources available to the Bank, the Board of Executive Directors has taken into consideration the minimum target figures of \$2 billion per year of external funds established in the Charter of Punta del Este, the country programs submitted to the Committee of Nine Experts, the magnitude of applications and inquiries pending before the Bank and the needs of the member countries as expressed at the meetings of the Inter-

American Economic and Social Council at Mexico City in 1962 and in São Paulo in 1963.

With the population growth and the development of a better institutional framework, not only are the needs for external credits consistently increasing, but also there is an increasing absorptive capacity for effective utilization of external financing. In view of the increased emphasis placed by the Bank on preparatory work designed to assist members to identify projects and to bring them to the point of financing, as well as the other technical assistance work of the Bank and other development institutions, it can be expected that the Bank will continue to receive a growing volume of meritorious applications in both the economic and social fields.

In addition to the general need for an increase in external financing on conventional terms, the need for credit on the kind of terms offered by the Fund for Special Operations and the Social Progress Trust Fund is also expected to expand. The experience not only of the Bank but also of other agencies such as the International Development Association and the Agency for International Development is that such needs have been growing, and the evident balance-of-payments pressures in Latin America point to the probability that in coming years they will continue to do so. At the same time, the increasing awareness of indispensable social requirements also calls for an expansion of lending on special terms, and the progress of institutional reforms in Latin America will logically produce both a greater number of well-conceived social projects and more efficient organizational structures for executing and operating programs in these fields.

5.6. In its report to the Board of Governors on the "Proposal for an Increase in the Resources of the Inter-American Development Bank," the Board of Executive Directors pointed out that it is essential to assure the orderly development and continuity of the Bank's lending operations over a reasonable period by providing an adequate degree of certainty that the needed resources will be available. These same factors, which were persuasive in approving an increase in ordinary capital sufficient for a 4- to 5-year period, are present in the need for increase in the other resources of the Bank. The increase in the Fund for Special Operations in January 1964 was a transitory measure designed to cover the requirements of 1 year. The Bank, as a financial institution desiring to cooperate with the member countries in carrying out well-conceived programs of development must have reasonable assurance of adequate resources over a minimum 3-year period. It would, therefore, follow that any increase in the Fund for Special Operations should provide sufficient funds until at least 1967.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, the Senator stated that the consolidation of the funds will enable the countries of South America to contribute more to the fund, and that their obligation will be reduced. Will the Senator explain how that will happen?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. They contributed nothing to the Social Progress Trust Fund. We contributed all \$525 million. Now the Latin American countries will contribute \$150 million out of a total of \$900 million. The United States will contribute \$750 million over 3 years.

Mr. ELLENDER. As I recall, the total authorization for the Development Bank is \$1,500 million. Is my understanding correct?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is probably talking about the regular capi-

tal. I am talking about the Inter-American Development Bank, whose total subscribed capital is \$1,284,985,000.

Mr. ELLENDER. Of the \$900 million, as I understand it, we are to furnish a total of \$750 million.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is discussing the bill before us, and not the original capital structure.

Mr. ELLENDER. I am not opposed to this measure. I am trying to get all the information possible into the Record so that interested Senators will know what we are trying to do.

I believe that the expenditures that we are now making in South and Central America are in accordance with a formula that was worked out quite a while ago. Under this formula, before the loans are made, certain forms must be executed by the countries which receive the money.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is correct.

Mr. ELLENDER. So long as that procedure is carried out and the money is spent for the purposes indicated, it is a good program. I am in thorough agreement with it. I would appreciate it if the Senator would elaborate a little on the consolidation and indicate what would be the total contribution that we would make to the authorized capital structure of the Bank. That is the figure that I would like to have in the record if it is possible to obtain it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The figure is contained in the transcript of the hearings. I cannot find it at the moment. We are discussing the Social Progress Trust Fund. That is aside and apart from the regular capital of the bank itself. We have approximately 42 percent of the voting strength in the Bank. That is approximately the percentage of the contribution we make to that original amount. The conventional Inter-American Development Bank makes the hard loans, on regular terms, 5, 5½ percent interest, and so forth.

We are not bothering the regular, conventional capital structure of the Bank. We are merging the Social Progress Trust Fund, to which we have contributed \$525 million, with the Fund for Special Operations.

When the two are considered together, we contributed 90.65 percent prior to this merger. The contribution of the Latin American members was 9.35 percent. They contributed only to the Fund for Special Operations, not to the Social Progress Trust Fund. Now when we combine the two under the formula contained in the bill, the United States will contribute 83½ percent. The other members will contribute 16½ percent. This action increases their percentage. After the two are combined, their relative participation is increased.

The percentage reflects the total figure for 3 years of \$900 million, of which we pay \$750 million and they pay \$150 million.

Mr. ELLENDER. Does the consolidation result in the expenditures being made for the same purpose?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is correct.

Mr. ELLENDER. Then there will be no change.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is correct. The whole purpose is to amalgamate the two.

The purpose of this fund and the regular loan funds are different; this involves lower interest rates and longer terms for repayment.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I noticed that it was contended that although our subscription would be made in dollars, from 75 to 80 percent of those dollars would come back to us. I assume this is to supposedly result from purchases made of materials to be used in the construction of houses, and other purposes covered by the resolution.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The testimony showed a higher percentage than that. These loans will be tied to the requirement of purchases in the United States, to the utmost extent possible. I believe the Secretary of the Treasury testified that he thought it would be 85 to 90 percent. Practically all material, except a minimum of local purchases, will be bought in this country.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, there is nothing in the bill itself that would compel the Government to do that. Is that correct?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is correct. That is the policy of the bank. The Senator knows that it takes the approval of two-thirds majority to make a loan. We have approximately 42 percent of the voting stock.

Mr. ELLENDER. I understand that. But I should feel a little better if we could have some kind of language in the bill that would carry out that view.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is hard to usurp the functions of our representative. He may not be as smart as we think he should be. But I think he will perform his duty. The Treasury Department is as interested as we are in correcting the situation. They have gone into it at great length. I do not think they are trying to work at cross purposes with us as far as balance of payments is concerned.

Mr. ELLENDER. I understand that very well. But I well remember that when we started to make loans years ago I offered several amendments to provide that a certain portion of the funds we were making available to our friends would be spent here. The Treasury Department and the State Department said that they did not see how that could be done. They said that it might involve foreign countries in some adverse way to the extent that they would not do business with us. They said that it would invade their sovereignty.

It is my belief that if we had put such language in the bills a long time ago, our balance-of-payments problem would not be in the condition it is now.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator has selected the least offensive part of our foreign policy. The part that contributes most to the balance-of-payments problem is the military. How are we to pay for the upkeep of our armies in Germany, Japan, Vietnam, or wherever they may happen to be? The part the Senator is dealing with is a very small part.

Mr. ELLENDER. The amendments that I offered at that time were directed

toward having the Department provide that whenever it made funds available abroad, such funds, or a portion of them, would be spent for purchases in this country. That concerned foreign aid. It had nothing to do with the military.

When we first commenced to make money available by way of grants, there were no strings attached. Four, five, or six years ago we loaned, as I recall it, \$150 million to India, for the purpose of dam-building. We woke up and found out that India used that \$150 million to buy equipment in Europe.

If the amendments that I had offered at that time and before that time had been written into the law, the chances are that most of the money that we donated, or even loaned, in the foreign aid program would have been spent in this country instead of abroad.

I realize it is a little late now, because our balance-of-payments problem has become so acute. It certainly would have been of assistance if the Treasury had been a little more careful. In any event, as I said, I would feel much better if we were able to place an amendment in the measure to make it unequivocal that of any money we loaned or granted as the result of this program, at least 75 to as much as 80 percent would be used and spent for goods, merchandise, and materials in our country.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. LAUSCHE. One of the difficulties about the argument that 80 percent of the U.S. dollars will be spent in the United States is the fact that the records show that imports from the United States in South American nations have been growing less and less. We can tie 80 percent of that money to purchases in the U.S. markets, but we do not tie those nations and prevent them from spending their other moneys in foreign countries.

While the argument is being made that 80 percent will be tied into purchases in the United States, the other moneys which we free through the aid are usable for spending wherever the recipient nation wants to spend them.

I do not agree with the Senator from Arkansas that 95 to 98 percent, according to the testimony, will be spent. The proof is that about 80 percent will be spent. Some words with the figure "95 percent" were used, but the final analysis is 80 percent. It was proposed in the House hearing that the matter be nailed down so that, with reference to our subscription, at least 80 percent will have to be spent in the United States.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am in no position to prove these figures independently, on my own authority. I did not make the investigation, and I have no means of doing it. I can only quote the Treasury's statement on this subject. I read from the statement of the Treasury Department:

In spite of substantial economic assistance expenditures, over the past few years to date, the United States has gradually been working down its payments to Latin America and now has been able to develop an overall surplus with the Latin American Republics at a time

when this area has developed a large surplus in its international transactions with other areas. This is a trend offering maximum assurance that aid extended by the United States, bilaterally or multilaterally, on a "tied" basis requiring a predominance of exports of U.S. goods and services will not be "leaked" to other countries but will actually be spent in the United States.

A table is appended giving the trade balances with this country and the rest of Europe. On the whole, it is 63 percent with Western Europe. With Latin America, there was a deficit of \$405 million. With Western Europe there was a surplus of \$402 million.

Mr. LAUSCHE. If they intend to spend 80 percent in this country, what would be wrong with having a condition in the bill that the money shall be made available only under a commitment with the Inter-American Development Bank that 80 percent will be spent here?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Bank is a multilateral operation. I assume if we did it, every other country—

Mr. LAUSCHE. We are putting up 83 percent of the money.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. We put up most of it. I am looking forward to the time when we shall not. I hope we do not always do it. We are trying to get those countries off the ground, and on their own. I think this kind of formal restriction would be very difficult for them to accept.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. In the first place, I take the statement of the Treasury Department with a considerable grain of salt, particularly since they have been explaining last year's tax bill to the public. I do not think there is any way of telling what part of the money we put into the Inter-American Development Bank will come back. I think if one has a sharp pencil, one can get 90 percent. If the pencil is dull, one will not get over 30 or 40 percent.

There are other factors to be considered. By strengthening the Inter-American Bank, we presumably make more secure American investments which have been made in Latin America, and we make the governments of those countries more secure. We have many billions of dollars invested in those areas. I do not know what the returns are, but I assume they are substantial.

Further, if our investments in Latin America and our contributions to the Inter-American Bank are not sound, I do not know any place in the world where we could safely invest the money. It seems to me that the Western Hemisphere is becoming closer and closer every day. I doubt if we are taking a chance in making this contribution that we would take in making it in many other parts of the world—in fact, most parts of the world, with the possible exception of Western Europe.

It is my belief that at the end of 3 years, when we have contributed \$350 million, they will be back for more contributions to the Bank, and there is no quick and easy way of getting the money if we need it.

I think it is worthwhile. If it is not worthwhile in this case, it is not likely to be worthwhile anywhere else in any other part of the world.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. I have had personal experience with the Inter-American Development Bank and with the situation that it affects in Latin America. I would consider myself derelict in my duties if I did not testify to it at this moment.

In the first place, I was in Chile in March 1964, during the parliamentary by-elections in the province of Curico, which resulted in a sharp reversal in the strength of the democratic coalition and a plurality for the Socialist-Communist candidate. As a consequence of the subsequent realignment of the democratic forces Eduardo Frei, the candidate for the Christian Democratic Party, came out on top as the leading presidential candidate. He won decisively as President of Chile on September 4, 1964.

The results of the Chilean presidential elections gives some measure of the meaning that we were there ready to assist in a constructive way, without interfering in their democratic processes. This was the real hope of the country. The question was whether the new Chilean Government could proceed with what we might regard as a rather radical socioeconomic revolution without feeling that it would be stabbed in the back and jeopardized as far as American aid was concerned. It was with the greatest assurance that I told Frei, as a Senator long concerned about Latin American affairs, that this would not be the case, and that our aid would not be politically tied; that the vast resources of the Inter-American Bank were not to be used other than in the role of doing an honest job in the development of the country.

It is fair to say that Frei's election could very well mark—and history will show—the apogee of the Communist threat to Latin America and the point at which it began to recede, provided that we do the things we really must do in this situation.

I very much respect the views of Senators who find imperfections in this or that, which I do not dismiss, but I make these comments as a witness of what actually occurred in terms of reliance upon the Bank. That is the point I wish to make.

Let me comment on one other instance. Senators know the work I did in respect to the creation of the great private investment company known as the Adela Investment Company in Latin America, which now has \$30 million in capital and has a vast potential because it includes the resources and know-how of the leading companies in the United States, Europe, and Japan with \$200 billion-plus in resources—which includes the Ford Motor Co., Caterpillar Tractor Co., IBM; you name them and they are subscribers of the company. This has limitless possibilities for Latin America. Again, it could not have been possible without having the Inter-American Development Bank as its substructure.

These are the facts and the evidence which are tied in directly with the Inter-American Development Bank.

One of the men who was most helpful in putting this idea together was loaned to me by Felipe Herrera of Chile, President of the Inter-American Development Bank. Without that great banking structure to tie to, with good insurance that it would look after the infra-structure which is at the bottom of any real private investment, the Adela effort would not have been possible.

It is for those reasons—and I am sorry to detain the Senate so long, but it is only in this way that when the Senator in charge of the bill is speaking one can get his point across—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I appreciate the views of the Senator.

Mr. JAVITS. I am a witness, because I have actually lived through it myself and have seen the evidence as to the validity of the concept. Without any "niggling" on my part about the objections of the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE], or the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], or other Senators as to what the terms and conditions may be, the fundamental point is that the Bank represents a great element of dignity and self-respect as well as the source of financing for building the fundamental substructure without which Latin America could not get the kind of private investment needed to build a healthy, viable private sector. The Bank, plus CIAP, really gives Latin America a "Marshall plan." I hope that in the "crunching"—as we say in curbstome language—we will support the fundamental effort to keep this concept viable, active, and working with liquid resources.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the able Senator from Arkansas yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the able chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT]. With the Senator's permission, I would make some observations, then ask a question of the distinguished Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS] who knows of my respect for his knowledge in this field.

Last year many Senators in complete agreement with the World Bank were nevertheless apprehensive about placing hundreds of millions of dollars of additional money into the "soft loan" window of that bank—the International Development Association. We were voted down, although it was close. We felt that loaning money for 50 years, no interest charge, no repayment of principal for 10 years, was actually a gift, not a loan.

In that case our apprehensions were increased by the fact the World Bank had developed on its own a surplus of over \$800 million. Many of us believed the World Bank should use some of that surplus. They certainly did not need any such amount.

I assure the Senator from New York that I agree with him as to the value of the Inter-American Development Bank. But, we get into all these "soft loan"

windows of these various international organizations where we put up nearly all the money and have relatively little to say about what is done with the money.

In IDA we found people were borrowing money for 50 years, with no interest rate, then lending that money for only 15 years, at interest rates as high as 12 percent.

To me that is no loan.

I ask the Senator from New York: Does this latest tapping of the Treasury to the tune of \$750 million, with all other countries involved putting up only a total of \$150 million—

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Missouri yield at that point?

Mr. SYMINGTON. May I finish my thought first?

Irrespective of the merits or demerits of the proposed legislation, is it not a bit incongruous for us to urge full cooperation from private industry to prevent it from increasing expenditures abroad and hope for cooperation and hope also that deposits and profits abroad be carried in American banks instead of foreign banks; in other words, urging policies to correct what could be the most serious domestic problem we face today. At the same time we are urging in this manner and to this extent the cooperation of private business, we are now asked to put up an additional \$750 million of the taxpayers' money, and on the basis of these extraordinary soft loan terms.

I do not see how we can urge such corrective measures as restrictions on foreign borrowing in U.S. capital markets, applying capital controls to long-term bank loans, and so forth, and at the same time be requesting this \$750 million from the taxpayers, with its automatic adverse impact on our growing balance-of-payments problem.

I ask my good friend from New York, to consider the logic of these two dissimilar positions.

Mr. JAVITS. I shall be happy to do so, if the Senator from Arkansas will yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am glad to yield.

Mr. JAVITS. First, I believe that we must place this problem in focus. If the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON] will bear with me for a moment, it is \$250 million a year rather than \$750 million in a year.

Mr. SYMINGTON. \$250 million a year for the United States for 3 years, totaling \$750 million; and \$50 million from all the other countries, totaling \$150 million. The total of the program is \$900 million.

Mr. JAVITS. The Senator is correct. The Senator also knows that the balance-of-payments impact of the U.S. contribution will be limited as the administration already notified the Bank of its intention to tie our contribution to the purchase of American goods and services. I am sure that the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] will deal with this point effectively. We are talking essentially about a 10 percent spread, or at the most 15 percent, between what will be spent here and what will be spent abroad.

I would be well in favor of being convinced on that point before I voted "yea," because that is what we are doing, essentially, with foreign aid everywhere. Certainly the rules should be no different for Latin America than they are anywhere else.

I justify this flexibility on the further ground set forth in the report. We cannot have preclusive buying where it is uneconomic. Therefore we are dealing, in contribution to the imbalance in international payments, with something between \$25 and \$37½ million per year. I would justify it. I do not regard this as inconsistent with what the President has done, on the ground that there are many things that contribute to what is the imbalance. There are many things made up for by the \$6 billion export surplus.

In short, we are not at anytime going to give ourselves a firm balance of payments. We are lucky to get our imbalance down to \$1 billion, and we can afford to carry it for 5 or 10 years, as the Secretary of the Treasury himself feels.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The fact my good and able friend the Secretary of the Treasury said we can continue to afford this heavy unfavorable balance over an extended period does not necessarily mean we agree with him.

Mr. JAVITS. I did not mean to quote the Secretary of the Treasury. I am saying that we can sustain a modest imbalance for a period of time. I could not agree more with the Senator with respect to the basic question of a \$3 or \$4 billion imbalance. He and I have both addressed ourselves to it.

In view of payments for our overseas Military Establishment, necessary economic aid, defense support, or whatever it is called, when we are dealing with a problem like that in Korea and in South Vietnam, and considering the condition in Latin America, and the fact that we will also permit some flotation of foreign securities in the U.S. market, even though it is only Canadian, I believe that the roughly \$25 million to \$37½ million outflow resulting from the U.S. contribution to the Bank is justified on security grounds. Why? Because of our sensitivity with respect to our situation in Latin America, and because I believe in Latin America we are further ahead in terms of likelihood of success than anywhere else with the exception of what was accomplished under the Marshall plan.

I am of the school of thought—I could be wrong—that even if we must endure some imbalance in our international payments, we would be most unwise to curtail many of the activities that we carry on.

I do not agree with the President with respect to restrictions on oversea investments.

After all, much of our exports are premised on the components which are fed into the places where these investments have taken place. The Senator is a very good student of these figures. So I say we get a net gain in the balance of payments in further income from foreign investments over and above the net outgo.

For these reasons we could justify the expenditure of this money.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, my friend from New York realizes we are not discussing the pluses or minuses of the administration's position with respect to private investments abroad. I join with him in saying the fact that we got back last year some \$3.8 billion in profits as against \$1½ billion of investment is significant.

Nevertheless and notwithstanding, for the last 15 years, with the exception of 1957, we have had heavy unfavorable balances of payments. This year, in the private sector, we had a favorable balance running to some \$6 billion, but the fact we bear and foster an increasing number of these governmental activities, results year after year in the projected improvement in our balance-of-payments position turning out to be incorrect.

I agreed with President Eisenhower when he said we could make reductions in our military position in Europe, where today live nearly a million Americans. All of this also affects adversely our balance of payments.

I am glad to note the President is giving consideration to other fields, such as the interest equalization tax, extending the idea to long-term loans, and so forth.

The point I was trying to get at is that it is a little incongruous to have the Government, where there is no profit motive, putting out such a heavy additional amount of money on these soft terms, at the same time we try to curtail oversea private financial activity.

I say to my good friend from New York that I cannot "buy" all the figures floating around about how much comes back to us, after we put this money out.

Recently I received some figures which almost showed that the more money we spend on the AID program, the more money we will receive back in this country.

It does seem at times that we are getting ourselves into a position where we justify this constant expenditure of American treasure on the grounds that, if we really get down into the details of the figures, ultimately it will all work to the net benefit of our fiscal and monetary position.

Mr. JAVITS. I should like to wind up this discussion with the indulgence of the Senator from Arkansas. Even if it were justified only on the security grounds, I would still be for it, because I think this very type of activity in Latin America can be justified on security grounds.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Security as a word can cover a great deal. Only recently I read an address delivered by my good friend, George Meany, who says that we are doing business with countries behind the Iron Curtain shows the selfishness of American businessmen who are more interested in profits than in security. I do not agree, and know my good friend from New York does not agree.

Mr. JAVITS. I certainly do not.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I should think the heads of labor would be interested in profits, or the lack of them, and also interested in jobs, or the lack of them. We

get into many tangents when we talk about all the facets of security.

There was a speech made this afternoon which worried me, because the logic of his proposal could only lead, ultimately, to the use of the hydrogen weapon in south Asia. There are more combat troops in the Army of North Vietnam than there are in the Army of the United States. I checked these figures only this afternoon. As a matter of fact, if we take the number of Vietcong in South Vietnam, then add to them the number of troops in North Vietnam, we find together they have more troops than we have, even if we add the marines to the Army.

I am anxious to cooperate with people who want a more secure United States. But I would hope everyone thinks this one through. We already have two of these divisions in Korea, and five more of them in Germany—and we have not yet considered the odds if we start talking about the Chinese Army.

Is it not interesting that all these programs, including those of the "overkill boys" as one group, another group who want to give, and continue to give, tremendous amounts to other countries in the hope they will not become Communists, and a third group which preaches hate for every man, woman, and child under Communist domination, demands we have nothing to do with them, all these groups end up recommending heavy expenditure by the American people for their particular program. Invariably their appeal is made on the grounds of security. It adds up to quite a bill for the taxpayer.

Mr. JAVITS. The Senator has spoken of a sense of proportion. I join him in that statement. My comments on the security value involved were proportionate to what was involved. That is why I analyzed it first as \$25 to \$37.5 million per year.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. In connection with the percentage of the money which would come back to our country and be spent here, it was my understanding that to a large extent the loans which would be made, would be made to finance housing projects, sanitation projects, sewers in various areas, according to a list which I hold in my hand, and educational programs. Practically all of those funds would be spent locally. They would not be spent in the United States of America. So I wonder if on the question of the money involved in these loans we are not overestimating the 70 percent or 80 percent.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Arkansas yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. There is merit in the Senator's observations. The Senator will remember that the IDA program was merchandized at one point on the grounds it would primarily help Central and South America. We investigated the loans, and found that 60 percent of all of them went to India, and 80 percent to either India or Pakistan. That may not be relevant to the discussion, but

as I said, I do not believe we get the money back into this country to the extent these extrapolations would attempt to prove. In any case, my primary position about the bill in question has to do with the fact it is detrimental to our growing balance-of-payments problem.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. That is the point I was attempting to make. I did not necessarily intend to speak against the measure. We must weigh all the effects and the benefits to be derived from it. But I do not think we can kid ourselves that the measure will not have an effect on the balance of payments, because to a large extent the money we spend will be spent primarily in the countries that would be the beneficiaries. I do not see how we can get away from that.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I merely wish to point out that last week we discussed on the floor of the Senate most vigorously the need to apply ourselves to the balance-of-payments problem. I heard the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] inquire of the Senator from Virginia [Mr. ROBERTSON] whether or not the Committee on Banking and Currency would apply itself to ways and means of solving the balance-of-payments problem. The Senator from Virginia vigorously stated that an existing committee would apply itself to the issue.

One week later we are considering a bill that admittedly would produce an imbalance, at the least, of \$37.5 million a year. It might be said that that amount is not large. But the accumulation of all these small amounts add to a larger amount. I have no opposition to providing aid into the fund if and when our monetary situation becomes such that we can do so safely. I do not think that that time has yet come.

I should like to ask the Senator from Oregon if he can answer a question. Perhaps Mr. Marcy will also listen. Is there included in the \$6 billion favorable balance of trade about which we have been speaking the export of food that we send out under the Public Law 480 program? I am having a check made on that subject now.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. If the Senator is speaking about total imports and exports, it is. That is the trading balance. Our deficit arises from other sources.

Mr. LAUSCHE. The value of all the food that we sell foreign countries for soft currency under Public Law 480 is included in what is supposed to be the favorable balance of \$6 billion.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I believe that is correct.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I would therefore submit that when we use the figure of \$6 billion as a favorable balance of—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I have not used it as a favorable balance. I used it only for the purpose of comparison. Nobody disputes the fact that we have an unfavorable balance of payments. We have a deficit. But the deficit does not arise from that source. Even if we should subtract the food delivered under the Public Law 480 program and everything else, we would still have a favorable trading

balance, and we would have a substantial deficit. That deficit arises from military aid abroad, tourism abroad, short-term capital investment abroad, and economic aid abroad. All of those contribute. The largest is military.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I fully agree with that statement, but I also respectfully submit that it is unfair to credit ourselves with exports, giving dollar-for-dollar value, when we are in truth giving away this—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is not unfair as long as we understand the situation. We are not trying to fool the Senator by saying that the money involves the export of automobiles. Everyone understands that. There is nothing unfair about it. All we are stating is that this is what the value of our exports was. We do not get paid except in local currency for what is exported under the Public Law 480 program. That is true. There is nothing unfair about it. That is an overall statement of our physical exports.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I recognize the position taken by the Senator from Arkansas, but I still submit that when the statement is made that we have sold \$6 billion worth of goods more to foreign countries than we have bought from them, it is incorrect, unless we also deduct from that \$6 billion the amount of dollars that we have credited to foreign countries for sales which were not sales but were gifts. I do not know what that amount is.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I believe that is correct. On that ground the aid under the Public Law 480 program I believe is a little more than \$1 billion. I believe it is \$1.2 billion. But some other factors are included.

I have not tried to fool anyone about the character of the exports. I would not minimize the importance of the deficit in our balance of payments. All I said before this particular exchange started is that a very small amount is involved in the bill and, in regard to some of the comments of the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON], there is nothing inconsistent about restricting the investment on capital funds in the developed countries in Western Europe and at the same time trying to assist the underdeveloped countries. That has been the policy that we have followed for a long time in encouraging assistance, either from a private sector or public, in the underdeveloped countries of Latin America, and discouraging it in Germany, France, and England.

Those countries do not need our money. All that has happened is that the opportunities for profit in a private company are a little greater there than they are here. Competition is not so great. Also, the interest rate there is a little higher, perhaps 1 or 2 percent. Therefore, a person can run off to Europe to get a little higher interest rate. This accounts for the substantial shifts in the balance of payments, to our disadvantage at the moment.

The Secretary of the Treasury stated, as appears on page 65 of the hearings:

Previous U.S. contributions to the FSO have been available for worldwide procure-

ment, while U.S. contributions to the SPTF were available only for U.S. procurement or procurement in other member countries of the IDB. Under this new proposal, the U.S. contribution to the expanded FSO will be available on the same basis as the SPTF procurement in the past, that is, only for the purchase of goods and services in the United States or from the country of the borrower; or in some cases, from the other member countries of the bank if such transaction would be advantageous to the borrower. On the basis of past experience with the SPTF this would mean that well over 80 percent of future U.S. contributions to an expanded FSO would be utilized to finance U.S. exports.

In the background is the important consideration that we have a favorable balance of trade with Latin America. Latin America has an unfavorable balance of trade with Western Europe, as I said a moment ago. So what they need with relation to us is some dollars to help balance their exchange, their balance of payments. The device they use is the letter of credit procedure, which in effect ties these loans to purchases in the United States. I have a memorandum on that point which reads:

The letter of credit procedure that will tie the dollars used for local costs to U.S. exports is operated through normal commercial banking channels. This means that shipping documents must be presented in order to justify drawings under the letter of credit. Therefore, no doubt will exist as to linkage of FSO dollars to U.S. exports.

The latest available official data on Latin American trade and payments indicate that Latin America, far from diverting dollar receipts to Europe, actually has a payments surplus with Europe and the rest of the world. By contrast, Latin America has a deficit with the United States. Thus, Latin America must not only use dollar receipts from the United States to cover its trade deficit with the United States, but must use part of its earnings from other areas for this purpose, as well.

Using evidence as to the U.S. share of the overall Latin American market to prove something about the Latin American payments situation as between the United States and other areas is simply relying on a non sequitur.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I wish to make a brief statement this evening. I have been advised that there will be no votes tonight. I shall speak later at greater length in opposition to the bill. However, I desire to have the RECORD show this statement tomorrow.

S. 805 is one of the measures whereby U.S. aid is being shifted into multilateral agencies. The \$250 million a year for 3 years called for in the bill replaces the old Social Progress Trust Fund, which was financed entirely by the United States.

Moreover, there is no corresponding reduction in bilateral aid funds requested for the Alliance for Progress. In fact, the administration is requesting \$70 million more for the Alliance this year than it received last year, for a total of \$580 million.

That plus this sum for the Inter-American Development Bank will bring Alliance funds up to \$830 million this year. I cannot find a single year when we have provided that kind of money for the Alliance. Of course, it will not all be called

Alliance for Progress money any more because a quarter of a billion will be under the IDB and hence, "non-AID."

The suggestion that foreign aid should be "multilateralized" falls to the ground when the capitalization of another lending operation is merely tacked onto an ongoing bilateral aid program instead of becoming a substitute for it.

The administration says that about half the Inter-American Bank funds are spent in the United States, compared with a claimed 90 percent of all bilateral aid. Secretary Dillon said that discussions are underway—note the use of his language—to tie at least 80 percent of these new funds to purchases in the United States. But it is not clear that they are final and binding.

This relates to commitments in regard to foreign expenditures, just as we have to make such commitments in respect to domestic expenditures through the authorization process. So far as specific expenditures are concerned, we are making sacrifices by the language of the bill. That is what the bureaucrats are up to. The bureaucrats desire to weaken the system of congressional checks on the expenditure of the taxpayers' money. This is another of the "sleeper" bills that will help along that cause.

The steadily declining U.S. share of Latin American trade suggests that even if our loan funds are spent here—and that is questionable—they are merely freeing dollars to buy imports from Europe. We have done very poorly in holding Latin American markets for U.S. exporters, and I think our aid program has in large part been responsible. It is time we had as much concern for our own bad balance-of-payments position as we have for the imbalance of Brazil and Chile.

There is no provision in the Bank's charter comparable to the Hickenlooper amendment relative to expropriation.

I shall offer an amendment that will place a check on this item. The amendment I shall draft will differ somewhat from the amendment of the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE], although I shall support his amendment. He seeks to amend the charter; I seek to direct the voting power of the United States to be used against any proposed loan that conflicts with the Hickenlooper amendment.

If the bureaucrats are not tied down, I say to the American people that they will be stolen blind this year in connection with the foreign aid program. The administration is talking about a \$3.4 billion aid program. It will be nearer a \$7 billion foreign aid program. But the administration is not talking about that. Their semantics cover it up. This is another example of the practice of concealment on the part of the administration, in connection with our foreign policy.

The senior Senator from Oregon repudiated the administration the other night on the floor of the Senate in regard to its Vietnam policy. I repudiate it tonight in regard to its foreign aid policy. I am perfectly satisfied that the American people will repudiate it. The President will go out of office the most

discredited President in our history if he does not start now to protect the American people in connection with their foreign policy.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I am glad to learn that the Senator from Oregon has prepared an amendment which will tie the Hickenlooper principle into this bill. As the Senator from Oregon knows, I have also had an amendment of this character prepared. I shall study the Senator's amendment.

Mr. MORSE. I want both amendments offered.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I shall offer mine.

Mr. MORSE. I want it offered. I shall support the amendment of the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I thank the Senator very much.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, repeating what I said, there is no provision in the Bank's charter comparable to the Hickenlooper amendment relative to expropriation. The United States has 42 percent of the vote on any loan, which amounts to a veto, since loans must be approved by two-thirds vote. But there is no guarantee that loans contrary to the Hickenlooper principle will be vetoed. My amendment would assure that they are. Otherwise the bill merely constitutes an evasion of the Hickenlooper amendment.

This bill would extend for at least 3 more years the soft-loan character of what was heretofore the Social Progress Trust Fund.

That Trust Fund emerged from the Act of Bogotá, which included a mention of a special fund to be set up for social development, including land reform and resettlement, housing, education, and public health.

The senior Senator from Iowa [Mr. HICKENLOOPER] and the senior Senator from Oregon were the two Senators present at the conference at Bogotá. We joined in setting up the Social Progress Trust Fund. But we had no intention that it should be in perpetuity. We had no intention that it should be set up for a long time. We intended that we should be able to taper it off.

The burden of my argument tomorrow will be to carry out the premise which I now lay down, that it should be tapered off. But that is not what would be accomplished by the sleeper that is provided in the bill.

The American taxpayers are going to be taken for a ride once more. We are going to pour money into Latin America with no hope of getting it back under the "soft loans." Let us stop kidding the American people. The time has come when the Latin American countries ought to be willing to assume at least 50 percent, in hard loans, of the money for the type of projects that would be covered by the bill.

I shall make that proposal tomorrow, and let Senators stand up and be counted.

Mr. President, the language of the act referred to "flexible terms and conditions, including repayment in local cur-

rency and the relending of repaid funds, in accordance with appropriate and selective criteria in the light of the resources available."

For a time it was necessary and desirable that a part of U.S. aid to Latin America take the form of grants and soft loans. Some grants and soft loans are still needed, but not in such largess amounts as contemplated in the bill. At least 50 percent of what is contemplated in the bill ought to follow the so-called tapering off process that I recommend. It ought to be transferred into hard loans, not into soft loans.

Why in the world should American taxpayers be building all the things contemplated by the report of Committee on Foreign Relations in connection with the projects to be covered by this loan? We have just completed a discussion of a vote on a poverty bill.

What we require in our own country to answer the humanitarian needs of the underprivileged by way of checks that we impose upon our own legislation is a far cry from the giveaway programs with no effective checks encompassed in the bill.

In my State chaos reigns tonight. This administration is still sitting on its haunches so far as concerns supplying the assistance needed by the flood-stricken people of my State. I wish the President of the United States would assign someone from the White House to come to my office, read my mail, and answer it.

The people of my State are justifiably antagonized over the failure on the part of the administration and Congress to supply the funds needed to meet the emergency problems that exist in northern California, most of the State of Oregon, southern Washington, and parts of Idaho.

This administration knew that the funds for the Small Business Administration and the various disaster needs of the country were practically gone at the time this flood occurred.

I wrote a letter to the President the other day, calling his attention to the serious situation in Oregon. I say, to his everlasting credit, that we did get some recommendations from him for appropriations. But, Mr. President, his agencies have let him down. The Bureau of the Budget completely failed in its responsibility to move and move quickly in connection with this American domestic issue.

If we had the same situation in Chile, Brazil, Peru, or any other Latin American country, the bureaucrats down in the Department of AID, in the Department of State would be falling all over themselves trying to get the millions of dollars spent. I have no doubt that the contingency fund of the President would be tapped—it has been tapped in the past—for aid abroad.

It is about time that Congress and the administration started thinking about its own taxpayers in its debate this afternoon.

Mr. President, our greatest security weapon is the economic welfare of our own people and the strength of our own economy. We do not help our people or

our economy with the kind of sleeper measures contained in this bill.

Mr. President, I shall work hard tomorrow on the series of amendments I shall offer to try to return this form of government to its historic concept of checks and balances.

We know and recognize, or some of us recognize, that there is a growing tendency in the Government to change us more and more into a British parliamentary in which more and more power is given to ministries.

Mr. President, I object to the tendency to take away from Congress and place in international bodies more and more control over the American taxpayers in a backdoor approach to a British administrative system in this form of government. I will have none of it.

I want none of the British parliamentary system. We cannot improve upon our system of checks and balances. The Government should stop delegating its powers to the executive branch and exercise its powers as contemplated by the Constitutional Fathers when they set up this system of checks and balances.

Mr. President, to continue this portion of the Alliance in the same amount for 8 years without phasing any of it into hard loans is both unnecessary and undesirable. I do not think the American people should be committed to doing that indefinitely. The Act of Bogotá contemplated a program of economic progress. It must be assumed that as the nations of Latin America make this progress they will undertake a more responsible share in furnishing the capital for it. I think the time is now here, after 5 years of the Alliance for Progress, when the nations to the south should be expected to undertake at least a portion of these social improvement projects on a truly reimbursable basis.

I do not believe the United States should furnish more than half the amount called for in S. 805 for soft loans.

We ought to stop deceiving the American people and recognize that the so-called soft loans for the most part are used as giveaways.

I am perfectly willing to give away money for proven humanitarian purposes. But a good many of the projects encompassed in this bill cannot be justified on a giveaway program from the American taxpayers.

As I said earlier, we are freeing some of the hard dollars of Latin American countries so they can go to France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan, where they enter into hard cash transactions, made possible because of our giveaway program. This must be stopped, and we must put some checks in it. It will not be stopped if we turn it over to the bureaucrats in the State Department and the foreign aid administration.

To furnish three-quarter billion more for soft loans will lead to future demands for more dollars for more soft loans when the 3 years are up. That is unfair to American taxpayers and it will be unfair to Latin America when American taxpayers finally call a halt.

Finally, I want to say that this bill is a good example of the dangers of dividing

up foreign aid legislation into several packages. We already have one major aid bill, which is called "barebones" and which totals \$3.380 billion. But it ignores S. 805, which for all practical purposes adds \$250 million to the foreign aid request, bringing it to \$3.630 billion.

It ignores a series of other foreign assistance programs which are foreign aid—I do not care what label is attached to them—and they bring the total recommended foreign aid by this administration to almost \$7 billion, instead of \$3.380 billion.

This administration ought to tell the American people all the facts at the same time that it starts talking about a segment of foreign aid. There is not a whisper by this administration as to what is involved in the foreign aid program over and above its so-called barebones program.

There are other spigots, in the form of other measures, which I shall discuss when the foreign aid bill is before the Senate. In addition, we are committing ourselves to another half a billion in the future.

It appears to me that a strategy of presenting Congress with several foreign aid bills each calling for several hundred million is designed to raise the total amount provided by extracting money from Congress in small doses rather than in one big dose.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point?

Mr. MORSE. Let me finish these two or three paragraphs, and then I shall yield.

Putting large portions of it under the control of international agencies is another means of increasing the total, because I have heard nothing and seen nothing from administration sources or from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which suggests to me any expectation of replacing bilateral aid with multilateral aid.

If this bill, S. 805, were accompanied by a quarter billion cut in the funds requested this year for the Alliance for Progress, I would have one less objection to it. But to the contrary, \$70 million more is being asked for the Alliance.

Passage of this bill will head us down the road of a rising, not a declining, foreign aid program, only one freed from past and future policy restraints imposed by Congress. Therefore, I shall vote against it.

Mr. President, I would be perfectly willing to have half the money figures in the bill transferred to the hard loan window of the Inter-American Bank. I have a right to speak about the Inter-American Bank because the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD will show that I was one of the chief spokesmen in the Senate, as chairman of the Latin American Subcommittee, for the establishment of the Inter-American Bank.

I am strongly for the Inter-American Bank, but I am not strongly for its soft loan window, because, in my judgment, if we leave it to the bureaucrats, they are going to channel more and more of their work through the soft loan window.

I want to see a strengthening of the Latin American economy, and the main-

tenance of the economic stability of the United States, and channeling such loans through the hard loan window.

It has been said that, in effect, this program is to be a Marshall plan for Latin America. I heard many Senators last year and this year talk about changes they would have voted for in the Marshall plan if they had to do it over again. One of the main changes they keep talking about is that they would insist on a loan program, and not on a giveaway program, because, if it is a sound program, it will pay out. But it is said that we are talking about roads and hospitals and schools. They are capital investments. As we help build them in those countries, we are helping to build up the economy of those countries.

The Senator from Oregon has always been willing to lend the money on a hard-loan basis, at reasonable interest rates, and on a long-term basis—longer than Latin American countries can obtain from any other nation in the world. We all know that when they get loans from France, West Germany, the Netherlands, or any other European country, they pay high interest rates and get shorter term loans. We are the Santa Claus of the world. It is about time we stopped being Santa Claus, and get the people to respect the soundness of our economic system, by making loans based on good investments, on projects that will pay out.

Does a hospital pay out? Of course it does. If a country needs a hospital, it ought to be willing to build the hospital. We may have to give them money for some of them; but if a country wants to have a hospital, it should be willing to take a loan on a 50-year basis and pay interest that will cover the cost of using the money. That is all I have asked for. I have never asked them to pay a profit interest rate.

The time has come to teach Latin America, as well as other countries, that there is a floor in our economy below which we cannot go if it is to support a sound superstructure.

The bill needs to be drastically amended. I shall attempt to amend it tomorrow to accomplish the purposes which I have outlined in this relatively short speech for the senior Senator from Oregon.

Now I yield to the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I think we ought to have clearly set forth in the RECORD what the total cost will be to the U.S. taxpayers of what we call the general foreign assistance program. The President's recommendation for what we call foreign aid is \$3,380 million. Under Public Law 480 the expenditure will be \$1,200 million worth of food given away.

Mr. MORSE. As the Senator knows, we found out how much foreign aid there was in connection with the Nasser issue the other day. We do not call it foreign aid, but it is.

Mr. LAUSCHE. The program we are discussing would have \$250 million a year in it. Then we have the Peace Corps and the soft loan department of the Export-Import Bank.

My understanding is that the total amount will be about \$6 billion—

Mr. MORSE. Then there are contributions to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I think I will have prepared the figures for the RECORD before we leave tonight, but, first—

Mr. MORSE. I have them in my office. I will use them tomorrow, but I suggest that the Senator from Ohio use them tonight. The amount is well over \$6 billion.

Mr. LAUSCHE. What is the Senator's opinion of what the amount is?

Mr. MORSE. Between \$6 and \$7 billion, and closer to \$7 billion than to \$6 billion.

Mr. LAUSCHE. That is the total amount that we could provide for foreign countries as foreign aid, although the Foreign Aid bill by itself will have in it only \$3,380 million if we accept the figures recommended by the President.

Mr. MORSE. In my judgment that can be legitimately listed as a foreign aid program in contrast to the semantically narrow item which the administration talks about when it talks about foreign aid or \$3.3 billion-plus.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Let me ask the Senator from Oregon [Mr. Morse] to what extent it is necessary now more than ever to guard against the sending of American dollars to foreign countries.

Mr. MORSE. The President is telling us that he does not even wish us to take trips abroad this year, because the situation is so critical. Our money can leave the country through all these spigots, but not our people.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Why is it—

Mr. MORSE. It is because of our balance-of-payments problem, because of the demands which will be made upon us by our alleged allies for gold.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Is it the opinion of the Senator that there may be some grants and help that we could give if our balance-of-payments position was good; but because it is admittedly bad, and dangerously bad, we cannot now do what we ordinarily might do.

Mr. MORSE. There are some humanitarian grants and soft loans which I believe from a moral standpoint we must make, balance-of-payments problem or no balance-of-payments problem; but we should never go beyond that point. Many of the projects which are called for under the program on the basis of so-called humanitarian appeal do not qualify, because if we analyze the situation in the country concerned, they can take a hard loan if we make it for a long enough period and keep the interest low enough.

In this debate, I am not going to give anyone justification for saying, "The Senator from Oregon does not pay attention any more to the moral obligations of American taxpayers to the people who are suffering from the great wants that many people in the world are suffering from."

Of course, I am going to support some soft loans and I am going to support some grants; but let me say respectfully that those in the administrative branch of the Government have been riding that horse

to death. They have exhausted him, because they are making the argument constantly that they should be given whatever they ask for under the soft loan sleeper bill for humanitarian reasons.

My point is to make a careful analysis of the economy of the country concerned and its ability to pay off in the future a hard loan, and we shall find that I am really understating my case when I state that we should take 50 percent of what is being asked for in this bill and transfer it to the hard loan window of the Inter-American Development Bank. If we did this, there would be great satisfaction in Latin America and in every country that would get the opportunity to make that hard loan, but so long as they will get it given to them in a soft loan, so long as we are not going to stop this gross, economic injustice to the American taxpayer, of course they will take the soft loan.

What I am pleading for, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Latin American Affairs, is to make it perfectly clear to our Latin American neighbors that this is the year they should start tapering off, that this is the year they should get ready to reduce their requests for soft loans and to increase their requests for hard loans. This is the place to start.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I thank the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. President, I would favor this grant and loan to the Inter-American Development Bank if our monetary situation warranted it. However, based upon the discussions which we had last week, I am convinced that we need blood from our own lifeline and not to use our inadequate supplies of vitality to build up other nations.

AMENDMENTS NOS. 40, 41, 42

Mr. President, I send to the desk three amendments.

The first amendment provides that we shall subscribe moneys finally provided in the bill to the Inter-American Development Bank on condition that the Board of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank agree not to float any new securities issues in the United States during the fiscal years of such authorization and appropriation. We do not wish American dollars to be sent to foreign countries to buy foreign bombs. We do not wish that to happen now, because of the dangerous position we occupy on the imbalance in payments.

Second, I send to the desk an amendment to the bill which provides that the Inter-American Development Bank, to which the United States is a major contributor, shall not make any grants or loans to any nation which has expropriated the property of American citizens. This amendment is predicated upon the Hickenlooper principle. It contemplates cutting off foreign aid to a country while the Inter-American Development Bank continues to disperse loans on an existing agreement or contracting new loans with such country. If and when a country in the Western Hemisphere expropriates property belonging to American citizens, and does not, within a reasonable time, compensate such

U.S. national in a reasonable amount covering the value of the property, these moneys provided by the bill will not be allowed to be paid out.

I send to the desk a third amendment, Mr. President, which reduces the authorization from \$250 million to \$225 million a year. The present annual subscription under this bill would be \$250 million. The administration has recommended that amount for each of 3 years.

My amendment would decrease the amount from \$250 million to \$225 mil-

lion for each year and it would be effective for 2 years instead of for 3 years.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendments will be received and printed, and will lie on the table.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD a statement of the present capital structure of the Inter-American Development Bank.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Inter-American Development Bank capitalization and contributions

	U.S. subscription	Subscription of other members	Total
Ordinary capital:			
Paid-in capital:			
In gold or U.S. dollars.....	\$150,000,000	\$115,790,000	\$265,790,000
In currencies of other subscribing members.....		115,790,000	115,790,000
Total paid-in capital.....	150,000,000	231,580,000	381,580,000
Callable capital:			
Initial subscription.....	200,000,000	231,580,000	431,580,000
Additional subscription.....	205,880,000	265,945,000	471,825,000
Total callable capital.....	405,880,000	497,525,000	903,405,000
Total subscribed capital.....	555,880,000	729,105,000	1,284,985,000
Fund for Special Operations:			
Initial contribution:			
In gold or U.S. dollars.....	100,000,000	23,158,000	123,158,000
In currencies of other members.....		23,158,000	23,158,000
Additional contributions:			
In gold or U.S. dollars.....	50,000,000	11,302,500	62,302,500
In currencies of other members.....		11,302,500	11,302,500
Total contributions to Fund for Special Operations.....	150,000,000	68,921,000	218,921,000
Total ordinary capital subscriptions and Fund for Special Operations contributions.....	705,880,000	798,026,000	1,503,906,000
Social Progress Trust Fund:			
Initial commitment.....	394,000,000		394,000,000
Additional commitment.....	131,000,000		131,000,000
Total Social Progress Trust Fund commitment.....	525,000,000		525,000,000
Total ordinary capital, Fund for Special Operations and Social Progress Trust Fund.....	1,230,880,000	798,026,000	2,028,906,000

Mr. LAUSCHE. I also ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD the table on page 121 of the hearings, showing the runaway inflation

which exists in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD.

Data on Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay

Country	External debt ¹ (millions)	Internal debt		Government-financed enterprise	Kind of government
		Dollars (millions)	Local currency (millions)		
Argentina.....	\$ 2,258	\$1,420	213,000 pesos	Railways, petroleum, electric power, natural gas, telephone and telegraph, commercial airlines, merchant and river fleets.	Democratic and constitutional.
Brazil.....	\$ 2,394	(*)	(*)	Transportation, power, communications, manufacturing (steel and automobiles), mining and petroleum.	Democratic reformist.
Chile.....	\$ 1,046	\$ 332	891 escudos	Railroads, electric power, mining and refining, petroleum exploration, national airlines, postal and telegraph, steel.	Do.
Uruguay.....	7149	\$ 142	2,591 pesos	Water sanitation, electric power, railroads, telephones, fishing, petroleum, cement, water and sanitation, radio and TV.	Democratic, moderately Socialist welfare state.

¹ Source: IBRD. Includes private debt guaranteed by the debtor's government. Excludes short-term debt, IMF transactions, swaps, arrears, and debts payable in local currency or nonconvertible currencies.

² As of December 1963.

³ As of June 1963. Including IMF, swaps, and short-term obligations. Brazil's external debt totals over \$3 billion.

⁴ Not available.

⁵ As of August 1964.

⁶ Source: Central Bank Report, April 1964.

⁷ As of December 1965.

⁸ Source: Central Bank Report, Nov. 30, 1964.

Mr. LAUSCHE. In Uruguay, the peso is losing value at the rate of about 40 to 50 percent a year. In Brazil, the loss of value is more than that.

I especially call attention to the fact that Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, the countries with the biggest inflation, are operating as follows:

Argentina is operating railways, petroleum production, electric power, natural gas, telephones and telegraphs, commercial airlines, merchant, and river fleets. In Argentina the government is called democratic-constitutional.

In Brazil, where inflation is more than 100 percent, and it is difficult to explain, the Government is operating the transportation system completely—power, communications, manufacturing, steel, and automobile production; also mining and petroleum. In that country the political complexion is supposed to be democratic-reformist.

Chile operates railroads, electric power, mining and refining, petroleum exploration and national airlines, postal and telegraph services and steel.

Here we have a good example of what happens in these countries.

I yield the floor.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, does the Senator from Ohio wish to offer one of his amendments, so that it will be the pending business tomorrow?

Mr. LAUSCHE. Yes. I offer the amendment which provides that the Board of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank must agree not to float any new security issues in the United States during the fiscal years in which the authorization contained in the bill pending before the Senate is in effect.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 2, line 10, strike out the quotation marks.

On page 2, after line 10, insert the following:

(c) The authorization and appropriation referred to in subsections (a) and (b) of this section are subject to the following condition: That the Board of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank agree not to float any new security issues in the United States during the fiscal years of such authorization and appropriation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE].

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, no action and no votes will be taken on the amendment tonight.

MEMORIAL ADDRESSES ON THE LIFE, CHARACTER, AND PUBLIC SERVICE OF THE LATE SENATOR CLAIR ENGLE, OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on behalf of myself, the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN], and the Senators from California [Mr. KUCHEL and Mr. MURPHY], I send to the desk a resolution and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the resolution?

There being no objection, the resolution (S. Res. 81) was considered and unanimously agreed to, as follows:

Resolved, That on Monday, March 1, at 2 o'clock p.m., the legislative business of the Senate be suspended to permit the delivery of memorial addresses on the life, character, and public services of Honorable Clair Engle, late a Senator from the State of California.

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 11 O'CLOCK A.M. TOMORROW

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I move that the Senate stand adjourned until 11 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 5 o'clock and 55 minutes p.m.) the Senate adjourned until tomorrow, Wednesday, February 24, 1965, at 11 o'clock a.m.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate February 23, 1965:

IN THE NAVY

Chief, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts

Rear Adm. Herschel J. Goldberg, Supply Corps, U.S. Navy, for appointment as Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts in the Department of the Navy for a term of 4 years.

IN THE AIR FORCE

The officers named herein for appointment as Reserve commissioned officers in the U.S. Air Force under the provisions of sections 8218, 8351, 8363, and 8392, title 10, of the United States Code:

To be major generals

Brig. Gen. Dale E. Shafer, Jr., AO433414, Ohio Air National Guard.

Brig. Gen. Donald J. Smith, AO695779, Illinois Air National Guard.

To be brigadier generals

Col. John A. Johnston, AO707699, Michigan Air National Guard.

Col. Robert H. Morrell, AO427688, South Carolina Air National Guard.

Col. Jack H. Owen, AO403870, Kentucky Air National Guard.

Col. Robert L. Pou, Jr., AO651005, Texas Air National Guard.

Col. William H. Webster, AO431580, Kentucky Air National Guard.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1965

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

The Chaplain, Rev. Bernard Braskamp, D.D., quoted these words of Scripture, Colossians 4: 2: *Continue in prayer, and watch in the same with thanksgiving.*

Let us pray.

Our gracious Benefactor, always and everywhere we need Thee, in our weakness to encourage and sustain us, in our strength to discipline and direct us.

Fortify us with prayer against those specters of fear which haunt us in our times of adversities.

Grant that with increasing tenacity of faith we may lay hold upon the glorious promise that they who wait upon the Lord shall mount up with wings as

eagles; they shall run and not be weary; they shall walk and not faint.

May we desire and choose Thy ways of righteousness and peace, for those who follow Thee shall not walk in darkness but shall have the light of life.

In Christ's name we pray. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Public Works may sit this afternoon during the session of the House.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

PEARSON-ANDERSON DISTORTIONS

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, in company with a great many others in public life, I have had good reason to challenge the veracity of statements published by Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson. Out of curiosity I have researched some of the findings of other people. The results are most interesting. In recent years, two Presidents, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman, called one of them a chronic liar or worse. Doubtless, this was done with sufficient supporting evidence. During this period no less than 64 Cabinet members, U.S. Senators, Congressmen, and other prominent persons have had occasion to publicly classify one or both of these individuals as liars in varying degree. A list of these leaders and their comments is being brought up to date and will be available. I am confident that each spoke with sound judgment, after mature consideration, and upon good authority. I find myself in good company.

By contrast, I find no record of any instances where responsible leaders in Government or in the business world have vouched for the truthfulness of the statements of Pearson and Anderson. Not a single instance. The kindest comment I have noted is that they are masters of innuendo and the half-truth. It appears there are two sides to every question—the true side and the Pearson-Anderson distortion.

Mr. Speaker, the record stands.

RANGER VIII SPACECRAFT

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.